Thomas v. PA Bd Probation

Opinions of the United
2006 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
9-29-2006
Thomas v. PA Bd Probation
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 04-4641
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2006
Recommended Citation
"Thomas v. PA Bd Probation" (2006). 2006 Decisions. Paper 407.
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2006/407
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova
University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2006 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova
University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 04-4641
ROBERT M. THOMAS,
Appellant
v.
PENNSYLVANIA BOARD OF PROBATION AND PAROLE;
PENNSYLVANIA ATTORNEY GENERAL OFFICE
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 04-cv-01171)
District Judge: Honorable Christopher C. Conner
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 28, 2006
Before: McKEE and AMBRO, Circuit Judges
RESTANI,* Chief Judge
(Opinion filed September 29, 2006 )
OPINION
*
Honorable Jane A. Restani, Chief Judge, United States Court of International Trade,
sitting by designation.
AMBRO, Circuit Judge
Robert M. Thomas seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 because
of the denial of his parole by the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (the
“Board”).1 At the time of the Board’s decision in 2004, it was operating under
Pennsylvania’s recently amended Parole Act (the “Act”). Act of Dec. 18, 1996, 1996 P.L.
1098, No. 164, § 1 (codified at 61 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 331.1). The amendments had the
effect of placing more weight on considerations of public safety than was previously the
case in the Board’s parole decisions. See Mickens-Thomas v. Vaughn, 321 F.3d 374,
385–86 (3d Cir. 2003). This, of course, had the potential to make it more difficult for
state prisoners to be granted parole. As a result, Pennsylvania’s retroactive application of
the new standard to prisoners sentenced before the Act had taken effect raised ex post
facto concerns. See U.S. C ONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
Prior to the denial of parole that is challenged here, Thomas similarly had been
denied parole in 2001. Raising the same ex post facto concerns as in this petition, he filed
for mandamus review of the former denial and pursued that claim through the
Pennsylvania court system to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. That Court reserved
decision in Thomas’s case until it issued an opinion in Finnegan v. Pa. Bd. of Probation
& Parole, 838 A.2d 684 (Pa. 2003). Finnegan resolved for the Pennsylvania
1
Our review of the District Court’s denial of Thomas’s petition is plenary. Richardson
v. Pa. Bd. of Probation & Parole, 423 F.3d 282, 287 n.3 (3d Cir. 2005).
2
courts—temporarily, as it turned out—the questions that had been swirling about the Act
and its effect on parole determinations. The Court ruled that the Ex Post Facto Clause
was not violated by the Act’s retroactive application. Id. at 690.2
It was in the face of Finnegan that Thomas filed in federal court the petition that is
the subject of this appeal. As did his Pennsylvania mandamus case, which challenged the
first denial of his parole, Thomas’s habeas petition here challenges the second denial of
his parole on ex post facto grounds. For federal courts to rule on petitions challenging
state custody, petitioners generally must have exhausted all state-law remedies. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(b), (c); Doctor v. Walters, 96 F.3d 675, 681 (3d Cir. 1996). Thomas readily
admits that he has not pursued a challenge to his second denial of parole in the
Pennsylvania courts, but asserts that the doctrine of futility excuses his failure to exhaust.
See Whitney v. Horn, 280 F.3d 240, 252 (3d Cir. 2002); Toulson v. Beyer, 987 F.2d 984,
987 (3d Cir. 1993).3 His reasoning is that because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
Finnegan had recently rejected an ex post facto challenge to the Act (indeed, it had
reserved decision on Thomas’s own earlier challenge pending its decision in Finnegan), it
would have been futile for him to raise the same claim to the same Court so soon.
2
Some background is helpful. After a splintered decision in Winklespecht v. Pa. Bd. of
Probation & Parole, 813 A.2d 688 (Pa. 2002), (which ostensibly held that the Act did not
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause), followed by this Court’s decision in Mickens-Thomas
(which ruled to the contrary), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s exact position on the
issue was unclear until its ruling in Finnegan.
3
The exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional in nature. See Rose v. Lundy, 455
U.S. 509, 518 (1982).
3
Our Court’s decision in Parker v. Kelchner, 429 F.3d 58 (3d Cir. 2005), issued
after Thomas filed this petition, forecloses his argument. In Parker, “we agree[d] with
our sister Circuits . . . that likely futility on the merits does not excuse a failure to exhaust
a claim in state court.” Id. at 63. “Allowing petitioners to bypass state court merely
because they believe that their constitutional claims would have failed there on the merits
would fly in the face of comity and would deprive state courts of [a] critical opportunity
to examine and refine their constitutional jurisprudence.” Id. at 64 (citing Engle v. Isaac,
456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982)). As Parker noted, see 429 F.3d at 64 n.5, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court eventually overruled Finnegan with its decision in Cimaszewski v. Bd. of
Probation & Parole. See 868 A.2d 416, 426–27 (Pa. 2005) (holding that “changes in the
laws governing parole may violate the ex post facto clause.” (double emphasis in
original)).4
Thomas has failed to exhaust his ex post facto claim in the Pennsylvania courts.
We therefore will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
4
Cimaszewski essentially harmonizes the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s jurisprudence
on this issue with ours. We limited our holding in Mickens-Thomas by ruling in
Richardson that Mickens-Thomas did not establish a per se rule that the Act violated the
Ex Post Facto Clause. Like Cimaszewski, Richardson endorsed a more individualized
approach. Compare Richardson, 423 F.3d at 289–91, with Cimaszewski, 868 A.2d at
426–27.
4