United States v. David Williams, III

PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4680
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
DAVID JAMES WILLIAMS, III, a/k/a Two,
Defendant – Appellant.
No. 14-4689
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
KRISTIN DEANTANETTA WILLIAMS, a/k/a Tina,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the District
of South Carolina, at Florence. R. Bryan Harwell, District
Judge. (4:13-cr-00843-RBH-10; 4:13-cr-00843-RBH-9)
Argued: October 29, 2015 Decided: January 28, 2016
Before WILKINSON, SHEDD, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part; dismissed in part by published opinion. Judge
Wynn wrote the opinion, in which Judge Wilkinson and Judge Shedd
joined.
ARGUED: Melvin Wayne Cockrell, III, THE COCKRELL LAW FIRM, PC,
Chesterfield, South Carolina; Kathy Price Elmore, ORR, ELMORE &
ERVIN, LLC, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellants. Robert
Frank Daley, Jr., OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: William N.
Nettles, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
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WYNN, Circuit Judge:
David James Williams, III and Kristin Deantanetta Williams
(“Defendants”) were convicted and sentenced pursuant to
stipulated plea agreements under Rule 11(c)(1)(C) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Both Defendants appeal from their
convictions, but only Defendant Kristin Williams challenges her
sentence. Regarding the convictions, we find no error below,
and therefore affirm. But regarding the sentence imposed on
Defendant Kristin Williams, we find that we lack jurisdiction to
review her sentence because a sentence imposed pursuant to the
terms of a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement may only be reviewed
if it is unlawful or expressly based on the United States
Sentencing Guidelines (the “Guidelines”)—circumstances not
present here.
I.
Defendants separately pled guilty to one count of
conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine and cocaine base,
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. In their respective plea
agreements, Defendants stipulated to a sentence of 120 months of
imprisonment under Rule 11(c)(1)(C). The district court
sentenced each defendant in accordance with those agreements.
On appeal, Defendants’ appellate counsel, pursuant to
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), questions whether the
district court complied with Rule 11 with respect to each
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defendant. Additionally, appellate counsel for Defendant
Kristin Williams questions whether her sentence was reasonable.
II.
Before accepting a guilty plea, a trial court, through
colloquy with the defendant, must ensure that the defendant
understands the nature of the charges to which the plea is
offered, any mandatory minimum penalty, the maximum possible
penalty, and the various rights the defendant is relinquishing
by pleading guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b). The court also
must determine that the plea is voluntary and that there is a
factual basis for the plea. Id.
Generally, we review the acceptance of a guilty plea under
the harmless error standard. United States v. Martinez, 277
F.3d 517, 524 (4th Cir. 2002). But when, as here, a defendant
fails to move in the district court to withdraw his or her
guilty plea, any error in the Rule 11 hearing is reviewed only
for plain error. Id. at 525.
Having reviewed the record, and especially the Rule 11
colloquy the court conducted, we conclude that the district
court fully complied with Rule 11’s requirements before
accepting Defendants’ guilty pleas. Accordingly, we reject this
challenge.
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III.
Counsel for Defendant Kristin Williams also questions
whether her sentence was reasonable. However, not all sentences
are subject to appellate review. We may review a defendant’s
sentence only if (1) it “was imposed in violation of law,” (2)
it “was imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the
sentencing guidelines,” (3) it “is greater than the sentence
specified in the applicable guideline range,” or (4) it “was
imposed for an offense for which there is no sentencing
guideline and is plainly unreasonable.” 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).
However, a defendant who is sentenced pursuant to a stipulated
plea agreement “may not file a notice of appeal under paragraph
(3) or (4) of subsection (a) unless the sentence imposed is
greater than the sentence set forth in such agreement.” Id.
§ 3742(c). 1
In this case, the sentence imposed was not “greater than
the sentence set forth in [the plea] agreement,” since the
sentence—120 months—was exactly what Williams stipulated to.
Therefore, paragraphs (3) and (4) of subsection 3742(a) are
inapplicable here. Nor can paragraph (1) of subsection 3742(a)
provide the basis for the appeal, since the sentence was not
1The provision applies to “a plea agreement that includes a
specific sentence under rule 11(e)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure.” 18 U.S.C. § 3742(c). Rule 11(e)(1)(C) was
renumbered as Rule 11(c)(1)(C) in 1999. See United States v.
Dews, 551 F.3d 204, 205 n.1 (4th Cir. 2008).
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“imposed in violation of law:” indeed, the imposed sentence was
the mandatory minimum sentence for the relevant crime. See 21
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), 846. Consequently, the only
option for reviewing Williams’s sentence is if it “was imposed
as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing
guidelines.” 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(2).
In numerous unpublished opinions, this Court has suggested
that any sentence imposed pursuant to a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea
agreement is “not imposed as a result of an incorrect
application of the Sentencing Guidelines because it [is] based
on the parties’ agreement—not on the district court’s
calculation of the Guidelines.” United States v. Boswell, 607
F. App’x 244, 246 (4th Cir. 2015); see also, e.g., United States
v. Hodges, 590 F. App’x 258, 259 (4th Cir. 2015); United States
v. McWhite, 581 F. App’x 190, 192 (4th Cir. 2014); United States
v. Edwards, 578 F. App’x 321, 322 (4th Cir. 2014); United States
v. Jennings, 540 F. App’x 155, 156 (4th Cir. 2013); United
States v. Rice, 537 F. App’x 270, 271–72 (4th Cir. 2013).
Some of our sister circuits have similarly indicated that a
Rule 11(c)(1)(C) sentence is based not on the Guidelines but on
the plea agreement itself, and therefore generally not
reviewable. See, e.g., United States v. Cieslowski, 410 F.3d
353, 364 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Littlefield, 105 F.3d
527, 528 (9th Cir. 1997). Others, by contrast, have stated that
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a defendant may still appeal a sentence imposed pursuant to a
stipulated plea when resulting from an incorrect application of
the Guidelines. See, e.g., United States v. Carrozza, 4 F.3d
70, 86 n.12 (1st Cir. 1993); United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d
551, 555 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Smith, 918 F.2d 664,
668–69 (6th Cir. 1990).
We believe that this issue should be considered in light of
Freeman v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2685 (2011), in which the
Supreme Court held that in some circumstances a stipulated plea
can be “based on” the Guidelines. Specifically, Freeman
considered whether a district court had authority to grant a
defendant’s motion for a reduced sentence under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2) where the original sentence was imposed pursuant to
a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement. Subsection 3582(c)(2)
permits a district court to reduce a defendant’s sentence where
that defendant “has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment
based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered
by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).
The issue in Freeman was whether a sentence imposed
pursuant to a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement is “based on” a
Guidelines range, and therefore reviewable. The Supreme Court
held that a sentence imposed pursuant to a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea
agreement is generally based on the agreement and not the
Guidelines, but that an exception exists where the “agreement
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expressly uses a Guidelines sentencing range applicable to the
charged offense to establish the term of imprisonment.”
Freeman, 131 S. Ct. at 2695 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the
judgment). 2 Because the plea agreement in Freeman explicitly
calculated the applicable Guidelines range and stated that the
defendant “agree[d] to have his sentence determined pursuant to
the Sentencing Guidelines,” the defendant’s sentence was “based
on” the Guidelines and therefore reviewable. Id. at 2699–700.
Applying Freeman’s rule in United States v. Brown, 653 F.3d
337 (4th Cir. 2011), we concluded that the district court lacked
jurisdiction to reduce the sentence at issue there, where the
Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement did “not expressly use a
Guidelines sentencing range to establish [the] term of
imprisonment.” Id. at 340. Unlike the plea agreement at issue
in Freeman, the agreement considered in Brown never engaged in a
Guidelines calculation, nor did it state that the stipulated
sentencing range was based on such a calculation. Id.
We see no reason why the rule articulated in Freeman and
applied in Brown is not also applicable to the jurisdiction-
defining provisions of Section 3742. That Section specifically
provides that we may review a sentence where it “was imposed as
2
We have recognized that Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence
provides the narrowest grounds for the Court’s holding and is
therefore the controlling opinion. United States v. Brown, 653
F.3d 337, 340 & n.1 (4th Cir. 2011).
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a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing
guidelines.” 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(2). Surely, where a
stipulated plea is “based on” the Guidelines and reviewable in
the context of subsection 3582(c)(2), it also involves an
“application of” the Guidelines and is reviewable under
subsection 3742(a)(2). Therefore, we clarify that a sentence
imposed pursuant to a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement may be
reviewed, but only where that “agreement expressly uses a
Guidelines sentencing range applicable to the charged offense to
establish the term of imprisonment.” Freeman, 131 S. Ct. at
2695.
A rule allowing for at least the possibility that a Rule
11(c)(1)(C) sentence will be reviewable, even if that sentence
falls within the mandated statutory range, is also in harmony
with Section 3742 overall. As noted above, subsection 3742(c)
specifically prohibits appeals of Rule 11(c)(1)(C) sentences
only under paragraphs (3) and (4) of subsection 3742(a). By
clear implication, then, the provision would seem to allow such
appeals under paragraph (2) of that subsection, i.e., appeals
“imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the
sentencing guidelines.” 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(2); see POM
Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2238 (2014)
(applying the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius
to conclude that Congress’s express preclusion of some legal
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provisions indicates an intention to preserve others). The rule
we articulate today fittingly allows for at least some
stipulated plea sentences to be appealed under subsection
3742(a)(2).
None of this helps Defendant Kristin Williams here,
however, because her plea agreement did not expressly rely on
the Guidelines to calculate the agreed-upon sentence. The plea
agreement for Defendant Kristin Williams simply states that
“both parties agree that the appropriate disposition of this
case . . . is a sentence of 120 months [of] actual
incarceration, followed by the appropriate statutory term of
supervised release.” Plea Agreement at 6–7, United States v.
Williams, No. 4:13-cr-00843-RBH-9 (D.S.C. filed Apr. 28, 2014),
ECF No. 335. 3 Nowhere in the agreement is there a Guidelines-
based calculation of an imprisonment term. Consequently, the
sentence was not “imposed as a result of an incorrect
application of the sentencing guidelines,” 18 U.S.C.
3
There is a note in Defendant Kristin Williams’s agreement
providing that this stipulation is “subject to any downward
departure as set forth in paragraph 8.” Id. at 7. That
paragraph allows for the government to move the court for a
downward departure or reduction in sentence on the basis of the
defendant’s substantial assistance in accordance with section
5K1.1 of the Guidelines. Id. at 5. However, that paragraph
also states that “[a]ny such motion by the Government is not
binding upon the Court, and should the Court deny the motion,
the Defendant will have no right to withdraw his plea.” Id. In
other words, the departure motion was not a condition of the
stipulated Rule 11(c)(1)(C) agreement, and the agreement was
therefore not based on a Guidelines calculation.
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§ 3742(a)(2), and no provision under Section 3742 permits us to
review the sentence’s reasonableness.
IV.
We have examined the entire record in accordance with the
requirements of Anders, 386 U.S. 738, and have found no
meritorious issues for appeal. Accordingly, we affirm
Defendants’ convictions. Further, we dismiss Defendant Kristin
Williams’s appeal of her sentence.
AFFIRMED IN PART;
DISMISSED IN PART
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