United States v. Henson

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-4221
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DAVID LAMONT HENSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Asheville. Lacy H. Thornburg,
District Judge. (1:07-cr-00053-LHT-1)
Submitted: November 2, 2009 Decided: November 13, 2009
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Robert L. Cooper, COOPER, DAVIS & COOPER, Fayetteville, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Gretchen C. F. Shappert, United States
Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, Amy E. Ray, Assistant
United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
David Lamont Henson appeals his convictions and
concurrent sentences of fifty-seven months’ imprisonment
following his guilty plea to two counts of possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006). On
appeal, Henson argues that the checkpoint stop leading to the
seizure of evidence against him was unconstitutional. * Finding
no reversible error, we affirm.
On September 12, 2006, officers working in the central
patrol district in Asheville, North Carolina, decided to conduct
a license checkpoint at a five-way intersection in a primarily
commercial area that had generated significant complaints and
traffic violations. The checkpoint was approved by supervisors
and conducted pursuant to a Special Operations Plan (“SOP”) that
gave the officers authority to direct patrols in designated
challenge areas defined by traffic violations or community
complaints. Approximately seven marked police cruisers and
officers wearing reflective vests were present at the
checkpoint. All vehicles passing through the intersection were
stopped to verify license and vehicle registration information.
*
Henson’s plea agreement reserved his right to appeal the
denial of his motion to suppress.
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In accordance with the SOP of stopping each vehicle
that passed through the intersection, Traffic Safety Officer Don
Eberhardt stopped a van driven by Monica Davis. Upon inquiring
for a driver’s license from Davis, the officer noticed an open
container of beer in the center console. Davis did not produce
a driver’s license, for which she later received a citation.
When Officer Eberhardt questioned Davis, the front seat
passenger, Henson, repeatedly interfered with the conversation,
attempting to answer questions posed to Davis.
Officer Eberhardt instructed Davis to accompany him to
the rear of the van and ordered Henson to place and keep his
hands on the dash. As Officer Eberhardt was speaking with
Davis, he observed Henson furtively place an unknown item under
the front passenger seat. Concerned about the presence of
contraband or a weapon, Officer Eberhardt ordered Henson to exit
the van. A pat-down search of Henson revealed 167 tablets of
methadone and a .22 caliber pistol. A search of the van
revealed a modified shotgun under the front passenger seat. A
subsequent search of Henson’s house executed pursuant to a pre-
trial release warrant uncovered additional firearms.
Henson filed a motion to suppress all of the evidence
seized during the checkpoint stop and subsequent search of his
home, contending the checkpoint was unconstitutional. Pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (2006), the district court referred the
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suppression matter to a magistrate judge. Following a
suppression hearing, the magistrate judge recommended denying
the motion. After considering Henson’s objections to the
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, the district court
adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation and denied the
motion to suppress.
On appeal, Henson contends the vehicle checkpoint stop
was a violation of his Fourth Amendment right against an
unreasonable search and seizure. We review the factual findings
underlying the denial of a motion to suppress for clear error
and the legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Johnson,
400 F.3d 187, 193 (4th Cir. 2005). We construe the evidence in
the light most favorable to the Government, the prevailing party
below. United States v. Seidman, 156 F.3d 542, 547 (4th Cir.
1998).
Stopping a vehicle at a checkpoint constitutes a
seizure of a person within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450
(1990). “A search or seizure is ordinarily unreasonable in the
absence of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.” City of
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000). However, the
Supreme Court has recognized “limited circumstances in which the
usual rule does not apply.” Id. With respect to roadblocks,
the Supreme Court has upheld a suspicionless seizure at a
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checkpoint aimed at intercepting illegal immigrants, United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566-67 (1976), and a
sobriety checkpoint aimed at combating drunk driving, Sitz, 496
U.S. at 455. In addition, the Supreme Court has suggested in
dicta that a roadblock to question all oncoming traffic to
verify drivers’ licenses and vehicle registration with the
interest of serving highway safety would be permissible under
the Fourth Amendment. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663
(1979). However, checkpoints set up for general crime
prevention, including drug interdiction, do not pass
constitutional muster under the Fourth Amendment. Edmond, 531
U.S. at 41-42; see also United States v. Morales-Zamora, 974
F.2d 149, 151-53 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that stop at drivers’
license checkpoint was invalid because it was a pretext to check
for drugs).
This court has noted with approval a traffic safety
stop in which police checked drivers’ licenses and
registrations. See United States v. Brugal, 209 F.3d 353, 357
(4th Cir. 2000) (observing that “courts have concluded that a
brief stop at a checkpoint for the limited purpose of verifying
a driver’s license, vehicle registration, and proof of insurance
is a reasonable intrusion into the lives of motorists and their
passengers even in the absence of reasonable suspicion that a
motorist or passenger is engaged in illegal activity”). Other
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courts have upheld similar checkpoints. United States v.
Fraire, 575 F.3d 929, 932-35 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Galindo-Gonzales, 142 F.3d 1217, 1221 (10th Cir. 1998); United
States v. McFayden, 865 F.2d 1306, 1310-13 (D.C. Cir. 1989),
abrogated in part by United States v. Davis, 270 F.3d 977, 981
(D.C. Cir. 2001).
In determining the constitutionality of a checkpoint,
the court must inquire into both the primary purpose and the
reasonableness of the checkpoint. If the primary purpose of the
checkpoint was to advance “the general interest in crime
control,” Edmond, 531 U.S. at 48, it is per se invalid under the
Fourth Amendment. United States v. Faulkner, 450 F.3d 466, 469-
70 (9th Cir. 2006); Mills v. Dist. of Columbia, 571 F.3d 1304,
1312 (D.C. Cir. 2009). If the primary purpose was valid, the
court must then judge the checkpoint’s reasonableness on the
basis of individual circumstances. Illinois v. Lidster, 540
U.S. 419, 426 (2004). This requires balancing “‘the gravity of
the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which
the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of
the interference with individual liberty.’” Id. at 420, 427(quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979)). Factors to
weigh intrusiveness include whether the checkpoint: (1) is
clearly visible; (2) is part of some systematic procedure that
strictly limits the discretionary authority of police officers;
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and (3) detains drivers no longer than is reasonably necessary
to accomplish the purpose of checking a license and
registration, unless other facts come to light creating a
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. McFayden, 865 F.2d
at 1311-12 (citing Prouse, 440 U.S. at 662; Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. at 558-59; Brown, 443 U.S. at 51).
With this framework in mind, after reviewing the
parties’ briefs and the materials submitted in the joint
appendix, we find the district court did not err in accepting
the recommendation of the magistrate judge and in concluding
that the primary purpose of the checkpoint was not general crime
control, but rather to promote traffic safety by allowing police
to check drivers’ licenses and vehicle registration. The
court’s reasonableness determination with respect to the
checkpoint is also sufficiently supported by the record.
Therefore, the district court properly denied Henson’s motion to
suppress on the ground that the checkpoint stop did not violate
Henson’s Fourth Amendment rights.
Accordingly, we affirm Henson’s convictions and
sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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