In re Chris C. Yum

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
Atlantic and Maryland Reporters. Users are requested to notify the Clerk of the
Court of any formal errors so that corrections may be made before the bound
volumes go to press.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
No. 16-BG-838
IN RE CHRIS C. YUM, PETITIONER.
A Disbarred Member of the Bar of the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals
(Bar Registration No. 424602)
On Report and Recommendation
of the Board of Professional Responsibility
(BDN 67-15)
(Argued May 23, 2017 Decided July 12, 2018)
Chris C. Yum, pro se.
William R. Ross, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, Hamilton P. Fox, III,
Disciplinary Counsel, Jelani Lowery and Jennifer P. Lyman, Senior Assistant
Disciplinary Counsels, were on the brief, for respondent.
Before GLICKMAN and BECKWITH, Associate Judges, and NEBEKER, Senior
Judge.
PER CURIAM: On May 12, 2011, petitioner Christopher C. Yum was
disbarred by consent following his 2006 conviction for making a false statement in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1001. In re Yum, 19 A.3d 367 (D.C. 2011) (per
curiam). On June 14, 2015, he filed a petition for reinstatement, which
2
Disciplinary Counsel opposed. The parties appeared before an Ad Hoc Hearing
Committee (“Hearing Committee”), which recommended reinstatement.
Disciplinary Counsel took exception to the recommendation, and brought the
matter before this court. Following oral argument, we referred the matter to the
Board on Professional Responsibility (“Board”) for its recommendation as to
whether petitioner should be reinstated, and as to evidentiary issues related to
Board Rule 9.8. On December 22, 2017, the Board issued a report recommending
denial of the petition. For the reasons that follow, we deny the petition.
“Although we place great weight on the recommendations of the Board and
Hearing Committee, this court has the ultimate authority to decide whether to grant
a petition for reinstatement.” In re Sabo, 49 A.3d 1219, 1224 (D.C. 2012)
(quotation and citation omitted). A petitioner seeking reinstatement must prove by
clear and convincing evidence “(a) [t]hat the attorney has the moral qualifications,
competency, and learning in law required for readmission[,] and (b) [t]hat the
resumption of the practice of law by the attorney will not be detrimental to the
integrity and standing of the Bar, or to the administration of justice, or subversive
to the public interest.” D.C. Bar R. XI, § 16 (d)(1); In re Mance, 171 A.3d 1133,
1136 (D.C. 2017). We consider the following “Roundtree factors” in determining
3
whether a petitioner has made these required showings: (1) the nature and
circumstances of the misconduct for which the attorney was disciplined; (2)
whether the attorney recognizes the seriousness of the misconduct; (3) the
attorney's conduct since discipline was imposed, including the steps taken to
remedy past wrongs and prevent future ones; (4) the attorney’s present character;
and (5) the attorney’s present qualifications and competence to practice law. In re
Roundtree, 503 A.2d 1215, 1217 (D.C. 1985).
The first Roundtree factor is “of primary importance in considering the
petition for reinstatement.” In re Bettis, 644 A.2d 1023, 1028 (D.C. 1994). Here,
petitioner acknowledges the seriousness of remaining willfully blind to a false
statement in an INS application submitted on behalf of a client. We apply
“heightened scrutiny” to the other Roundtree factors where, as here, petitioner’s
misconduct “is so closely bound up with [his] role and responsibilities as an
attorney.” See Sabo, 49 A.3d at 1224; In re Borders, 665 A.2d 1381, 1382 (D.C.
1995) (quotation omitted). Because the Hearing Committee heard petitioner
testify, we, like the Board, accept its conclusion that he is genuinely remorseful
and recognizes the seriousness of his misconduct. Nevertheless, when viewed with
heightened scrutiny, the fourth and fifth Roundtree factors counsel against
4
reinstatement and lead us to conclude that petitioner has failed to prove his fitness. 1
“Under the fourth Roundtree factor, a petitioner is required to prove that
those traits that led to disbarment no longer exist and, indeed, that he is a changed
individual having full appreciation of the wrongfulness of his conduct and a new
determination to adhere to the high standards of integrity and legal competence
which the Court requires.” Sabo, 49 A.3d at 1232 (quotation omitted). In support
of this factor, petitioner testified to his reflections about his misconduct and
presented two character witnesses. The Hearing Committee viewed petitioner’s
testimony as “demonstrat[ing] that he is a changed individual,” but accorded little
weight to the character witnesses, finding that neither witness knew the details of
his misconduct. The Board found the evidence on this factor to be lacking, citing
the witnesses’ unfamiliarity with the misconduct. In his brief, petitioner contends
that the witnesses’ testimony demonstrates their familiarity with his misconduct,
and therefore deserves significant weight.
A petitioner is “expected to put on live witnesses familiar with the
1
We find that petitioner’s post-discipline conduct weighs against
reinstatement, but focus our analysis on the fourth and fifth Roundtree factors,
which are stronger determinants of our judgment.
5
underlying misconduct who can provide credible evidence of petitioner’s present
good character.” Sabo, 49 A.3d at 1232 (quotation and alteration omitted). We
concur with the Hearing Committee and Board that petitioner’s witnesses were
unfamiliar with the details of his misconduct. 2 Although petitioner provided
assurances of his new character, he offered no examples of post-discipline conduct
from which his personal growth can be reasonably inferred. Applying heightened
scrutiny, we deem the lack of evidence regarding petitioner’s present character to
weigh against reinstatement. See, e.g., In re Tinsley, 668 A.2d 833, 838 (D.C.
1995) (per curiam) (appending Board report) (petitioner failed to prove his present
good character where his two character witnesses lacked substantial knowledge
regarding his misconduct).
As to the fifth Roundtree factor, the Hearing Committee found that
petitioner established his present qualifications and competence to practice law
because he attended a D.C. Bar course, adequately represented himself in these
reinstatement proceedings, and worked as a law clerk, translator, and document
2
Mr. Yi believed that petitioner’s misconduct related to attorney’s fees.
Ms. Osnos testified that petitioner’s misconduct arose from “miscommunications”
with a client and, later in the hearing, petitioner conceded that she did not know
“the details” of his conviction.
6
reviewer after his disbarment. The Board cited petitioner’s failure to explain
whether his work required legal analysis or call witnesses who could testify to his
competence in the work he described.
A petitioner’s post-disbarment legal work may demonstrate his competence
to practice. See, e.g., Bettis, 644 A.2d at 1030 (petitioner established his
competence where he “worked as a law clerk . . . and improved his legal research
and writing skills”). However, like the Board, we deem significant petitioner’s
failure to explain whether his post-disbarment work required legal analysis or
otherwise improved his legal knowledge or skills. See, e.g., Tinsley, 668 A.2d at
838 (appending Board report) (petitioner failed to demonstrate his competence
where he provided no details concerning his legal teaching experiences). Nor did
petitioner call witnesses who could testify to the quality or nature of his work. See,
e.g., In re Stanton, 589 A.2d 425, 427 (D.C. 1991) (per curiam) (petitioner failed to
prove his competence where no supervisory lawyer testified to his work).
Applying heightened scrutiny, we find that the remaining evidence is too meager to
establish his competence to practice, and therefore conclude that this Roundtree
factor weighs against reinstatement.
7
For these reasons,3 the petition for reinstatement is denied.
So ordered.
3
Given our disposition, we need not address whether the Hearing
Committee should have considered the additional unfavorable evidence, proffered
by Disciplinary Counsel, related to petitioner’s conviction.