Coker v. State

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
CONDEE COKER, §
§ No. 273, 2022
Defendant-Below, §
Appellant, § Court Below—Superior Court
§ of the State of Delaware
v. §
§ ID No.: 2011011881(K)
STATE OF DELAWARE, §
§
Appellee. §
Submitted: May 17, 2023
Decided: July 19, 2023
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and TRAYNOR, Justices.
ORDER
This 19th day of July, 2023, after consideration of the parties’ briefs and the
record on appeal, it appears to the Court that:
(1) On November 25, 2020, the night before Thanksgiving, Condee Coker
was cooking food on the stove before she went to work the overnight shift (11 P.M.
to 7 A.M.) at the Delaware Hospital for the Chronically Ill in Smyrna. Coker and
her three sons lived in the first-floor unit of a two-story apartment located at 717
Talon Court in Smyrna. That evening, Coker left her sons—an eight-month-old, an
eighteen-month-old, and a three-year-old—at home unattended and clocked into
work at 11 P.M. The stove was still on when Coker left the apartment, and the food
she was cooking caught on fire while she was at work.
(2) Early on November 26, at 2:12 A.M., Coker’s upstairs neighbor called
911. Soon after, firefighters from the Smyrna Fire Department arrived at Coker’s
apartment and broke down the door. When the firefighter in charge, Robert Dwayne
Newnam, stepped into the apartment, he saw Coker’s three-year-old son standing
before him. Although there was no structural fire, the apartment was filled with
smoke. The firefighters evacuated the three-year-old and then discovered and
evacuated an infant inside a crib in the living room and another child in a bedroom
in the back of the apartment. They had to force open the door to the back bedroom,
because it was missing a handle. The children did not suffer any observable injuries.
The firefighters determined that the source of the smoke was a pot of burning food
on the stove. They removed the smoldering pot from the apartment and then used
powerful fans to clear the smoke.
(3) Coker received a call about the fire, clocked out of work early at 2:32
A.M., and rushed home. At the scene, Officer Evans Leighty of the Smyrna Police
spoke with Coker while his body camera was recording. He asked Coker why the
children were home alone, and Coker told him that she had gone out briefly to get
“wipes” for the children. She did not disclose that she had been at work. Coker
told the officer, however, that she had forgotten to take the pot off the stove. When
2
Officer Leighty informed Coker that he would be contacting the Division of Family
Services, she said, “I’m sorry.”1
(4) Four days later, on November 30, Coker was interviewed by Detective
William Davis at the Smyrna Police Department. Coker, who was Mirandized,
eventually admitted that she was working on the night of November 25, after
Detective Davis revealed that he had employment records showing that Coker
clocked into work at 11 P.M. Coker agreed that it was not right to leave her children
alone, but she told Detective Davis that she had hoped that the children’s father
would supervise while she was away, stating that “when he can, he will.” 2 The
children’s father, however, worked in Newark until midnight—an hour after Coker
was supposed to clock into work herself—and Newark is at least a 25–30-minute
drive from Coker’s home. During the interview, Detective Davis also asked Coker
why the stove was turned on. She explained, “That’s me. I forgot (inaudible) and
came up (inaudible) come back in the morning and do the cooking, so I forgot.”3
(5) In June 2021, Coker was indicted on three counts of reckless
endangering in the first degree—one count for each of her children. Her case went
to trial in April 2022. At trial, the State called Newnam, the firefighter in charge of
quelling the fire. He testified that a lack of oxygen in the apartment caused the
1
App. to Opening Br. at A113.
2
State’s Ex. 12 at 5–6.
3
Id. at 7.
3
burning food in the pot to smolder but that it was still “producing a lot of smoke.”4
According to Newnam, his “eyes were watering” during the rescue, and there was
enough smoke in the apartment to “cause somebody some difficulty to breathe.”5
The State’s next witness, Detective Davis, testified about his November 30
interview with Coker. After the State introduced Coker’s employment records,
Detective Davis testified that Coker agreed that she had clocked into work at 11
P.M. on November 25 and clocked out at 2:32 A.M on November 26. 6 Then,
Officer Leighty, who was present for Detective Davis’s testimony, testified that
Coker’s statement on the scene—that she had gone out briefly to buy “wipes”—
was inconsistent with her later statement to Detective Davis concerning her shift on
November 25–26.7
(6) After the State’s case-in-chief, Coker moved for judgment of acquittal,
arguing that no evidence had been offered showing that Coker knew that the stove
was on and that there was a hazardous condition in the apartment that could create
death or injury. Drawing all inferences in the light most favorable to the State, the
court denied the motion, ruling that “[a] rational trier of fact here could find Ms.
Coker’s conduct reckless, entirely distinct and apart from the factual issue of the
pot on the stove[,]” because Coker “knew she left three [young] children unattended
4
App. to Opening Br. at A50, A58.
5
Id. at A50.
6
A recording of the police interview was played for the jury at trial.
7
Video from Officer Leighty’s body camera was played for the jury at trial.
4
in an apartment” where “any number of calamities” could befall them.8 Clarifying
its ruling, the court stated, “[e]ven if the issue of Ms. Coker’s knowledge of the pot”
was case-dispositive, “credibility determinations regarding Ms. Coker’s statements
and knowledge regarding the pot and stove are reserved for the finder of fact.”9
(7) Coker did not put on a defense at trial. After resting her case, she
renewed her motion for judgment of acquittal, arguing that “[t]he State has failed to
prove that the Defendant was aware of any hazardous condition in that apartment
that would result in the children’s death or that would result in physical injury to
the children.”10 The Superior Court denied Coker’s renewed motion for the same
reasons as before. Coker’s counsel then advised the court that he would object
during the State’s closing argument to “any reference to any hazard in [Coker’s]
apartment that was not entered at trial as evidence . . .”11 The State asked the court
for a ruling to avoid such objections, and the court ruled that the State could argue
reasonable inferences about the hazards in the apartment, noting that leaving three
small children under the age of four unsupervised in an apartment was, “in and of
itself, a hazard.”12
8
App. to Opening Br. at A146.
9
Id. at A146–47.
10
Id. at A160.
11
Id. at A185.
12
Id. at A186–87.
5
(8) In its closing argument, the State argued that Coker’s statements to the
police that she forgot to turn off the stove were not credible. The State also argued
that Coker was aware of and disregarded the risk of cooking and the potential risks
associated with leaving three very young children alone in an apartment. It urged
the jury to use its “common sense when considering what could have happened to
those three children[,]” arguing, among other things, that Coker’s three-year-old
son was roaming around the apartment and could have done damage to himself or
his siblings.13 Thereafter, the jury found Coker guilty on three counts of reckless
endangering in the first degree. She was sentenced to probation.14
(9) On appeal, Coker argues that the Superior Court adopted an erroneous
“per se principle that leaving three children under the age of four unsupervised in
an apartment at night is reckless.”15 She claims that the act of leaving a child
unattended is not reckless without evidence “relevant to the question whether the
defendant consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk[.]”16 She also
contends that the State failed to establish that Coker consciously disregarded a
13
Id. at A211.
14
On July 13, 2022, Coker received concurrent sentences for each conviction and was placed in
the custody of the Department of Corrections for five years at supervision level V, suspended for
eighteen months at supervision level III. She was also ordered to participate and complete
parenting classes and take all medications as prescribed. She cannot have unsupervised contact
with her children. The sentence review date was scheduled for eight months later. Ex. D.
15
Reply Br. at 1.
16
Second Corrected Opening Br. at 19 (quoting Commonwealth v. Costa, 148 N.E. 3d 1211, 1216
(Mass. App. Ct. 2020)).
6
substantial risk of death created by the pot of burning food, because Coker told the
police that she forgot that the stove was on when she left the apartment.
(10) This Court reviews a trial judge’s denial of a defense motion for
judgment of acquittal de novo.17 “Specifically, we must determine ‘whether any
rational trier of fact, after considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the
State, could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.’”18 In making this determination, the Court does not “distinguish between
direct and circumstantial evidence[.]”19
(11) We note that Coker’s argument on appeal appears to be focused on part
of the trial court’s ruling—that the conclusion could be reached exclusive of
Coker’s knowledge about the stove—but the trial court clarified that credibility
determinations regarding Coker’s statements and knowledge about the pot and
stove were for the jury to decide. Because our review is de novo, we are not
confined to the trial judge’s reasoning or required to determine whether, “exclusive
of Ms. Coker’s knowledge of the pot,” Coker consciously disregarded a substantial
risk of death. Stated differently, we may consider the totality of the evidence,
including the smoldering pot and the length of time Coker intended to be away from
the children.
17
Bethard v. State, 28 A.3d 395, 397–98 (Del. 2011).
18
Id. (quoting Winer v. State, 950 A.2d 642, 646 (Del. 2008)).
19
Lum v. State, 101 A.3d 970, 971 (Del. 2014).
7
(12) Under 11 Del. C. § 604, “[a] person is guilty of reckless endangering in
the first degree when the person recklessly engages in conduct which creates a
substantial risk of death to another person.”20 According to the Delaware Criminal
Code’s definitions relating to state of mind, “[a] person acts recklessly . . . when the
person is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk”
and the risk is “of such a nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross
deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in
the situation.”21
(13) As noted above, the jury was free to find Coker’s statement—that she
forgot to turn off the stove—not credible. Viewing the facts in a light most
favorable to the State, a legitimate inference could be drawn that Coker turned on
the stove and left it on to pre-cook the Thanksgiving meal while she worked an
eight-hour shift, leaving her three small children—the oldest three years old and the
youngest an infant—unattended. This conduct, it seems self-evident to us,
“constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person
would observe in the situation.”22
(14) The only colorable defense—and its color is questionable—is that
Coker’s reckless conduct did not create a substantial risk of death to her unattended
20
Reckless endangering in the second degree is an identical crime, except the risk to the victim is
“physical injury” rather than “death.” 11 Del. C. § 603.
21
11 Del. C. § 231(e).
22
Id.
8
children. Although “‘[s]ubstantial risk of death’ is not defined in the Delaware
Criminal Code, . . . [the phrase] is accorded ‘its commonly accepted meaning.’”23
In the present context, we view “substantial” as meaning “real and not imaginary,
having actual, not fictitious, existence.”24 Moreover, in Hastings v. State, a case
involving the charge of reckless endangering in the first degree, we explained that
a “substantial risk of death” does not require an “imminent threat” of death.25
Applying these principles, a rational factfinder, viewing the facts in the light most
favorable to the State, could find beyond a reasonable doubt, that Coker’s conduct,
in turning on the stove and then leaving her very young children at home alone
while she went to work, created a substantial risk of death to her children, which
Coker consciously disregarded by failing to turn off the stove and leaving the
children unattended.
(15) Coker also claims on appeal that the court abused its discretion by
ruling that the State could refer to reasonable inferences in its closing argument
about the hazards in the apartment, including the “hazard” of leaving three young
children unsupervised in an apartment. She contends that the State should not have
been allowed to argue that potential dangers that generally pose a risk to unattended
23
Eaton v. State, 751 A.2d 878, 2000 WL 628330, at *2 (Del. Apr. 28, 2000) (TABLE) (quoting
11 Del. C. § 221(c)).
24
Substantial, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). See Substantial, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/substantial (last visited May 16, 2023) (“not
imaginary or illusory”).
25
289 A.3d 1264, 1271 (Del. 2023).
9
young children were “substantial and unjustifiable risks” that Coker was “aware of
and consciously disregarded.”26
(16) In Delaware, counsel is permitted “a certain flexibility in presenting
zealous jury argument.”27 The prosecutor “is allowed and expected to explain all
the legitimate inferences of the [defendant’s] guilt that flow from that evidence.” 28
“Therefore, unless we find a clear abuse of discretion or undue prejudice to the
defendants, we will not interfere with the Trial Court’s determination as to the
proper bounds of closing argument.”29
(17) Coker’s state of mind was a central issue in this case. The jury was
permitted to draw an inference about Coker’s state of mind from the facts and
circumstances.30 In drawing such an inference, the jury could consider whether a
reasonable person in Coker’s circumstances would have had the required intention,
recklessness, knowledge, or belief.31 The evidence clearly established that Coker
26
Second Corrected Opening Br. at 24.
27
Money v. State, 957 A.2d 2, 2008 WL 3892777, at *3 (Del. Aug. 22, 2008) (TABLE).
28
Hooks v. State, 416 A.2d 189, 204 (Del. 1980).
29
Burke. v. State, 484 A.2d 490, 498 (Del. 1984), abrogated by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S.
36 (2004) on different grounds.
30
See Deputy v. State, 500 A.2d 581, 597 (Del. 1985) (noting that “the problems involved in
proving the existence of a person’s state of mind necessitate some reliance on circumstantial
evidence”).
31
11 Del. C. § 307 (a) (“The defendant’s intention, recklessness, knowledge or belief at the time
of the offense for which the defendant is charged may be inferred by the jury from the
circumstances surrounding the act the defendant is alleged to have done. In making the inference
permitted by this section, the jury may consider whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s
circumstances at the time of the offense would have had or lacked the requisite intention,
recklessness, knowledge or belief.”).
10
consciously decided to leave her three very young children unattended for an
extended period. That this posed a very grave risk of harm to the children was borne
out by what the firefighters discovered when they responded to Coker’s apartment:
a three-year-old child wandering about in a smoke-filled apartment. Given these
facts, we reject Coker’s claim that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting
the State to refer in closing argument to the myriad harms that could have befallen
the children as a consequence of Coker’s recklessness.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior
Court be AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Gary F. Traynor
Justice
11