William E. Wells, III v. State of Florida

Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC2021-1001
____________
WILLIAM E. WELLS III,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
April 13, 2023
GROSSHANS, J.
William E. Wells III appeals his judgment of conviction of first-
degree murder and sentence of death. We have jurisdiction.
See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For the reasons given below,
we affirm in all respects.
BACKGROUND
On July 5, 2019, Wells, aided by Leo Boatman, murdered
fellow prison inmate, William Chapman. At the time, Wells was
serving seven consecutive life sentences—six for first-degree murder
and one for attempted premeditated murder. 1
At least a month before Chapman’s death, Wells and Boatman
began planning the murder. As Wells would later explain, he hoped
to receive the death penalty and be placed on death row where he
anticipated better living conditions.
With this goal in mind, Wells decided to target Chapman,
believing that Chapman intended to recruit him for sexual favors.
In preparation for the murder, Wells and Boatman collected two
ten-inch-long metal shanks, sharpened them over the course of
several days, and ultimately hid them near the dayroom. Wells also
crafted ligatures from his bed sheet and pillowcase to be used
during the attack.
On the day of the murder, Wells packed his belongings so that
authorities could easily collect them. Later, Wells, Boatman,
1. In 2003, Wells murdered his wife, her father, her brother,
and two other males in Mayport, Florida. After killing them, Wells
remained in his trailer for two weeks with the “rotting bodies.” He
pled guilty to these murders and received life sentences. Eight
years later, while serving those sentences (and another life sentence
for attempted murder), Wells brutally murdered a fellow inmate
using a shank and ligatures. A jury found him guilty of first-degree
murder but ultimately recommended a life sentence.
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Chapman, and several other inmates were ushered into the
dayroom, which was equipped with a surveillance camera. About
ten minutes before the attack, Boatman left the dayroom to walk to
the bathroom and, upon his return, Wells did the same. Once
Wells returned, Boatman approached Chapman, spoke to him, and
the two walked to an area of the room in the camera’s blind spot.
Wells removed a ligature—which had been concealed in his
clothing—and walked toward them.
Upon joining Boatman and Chapman, Wells wrapped the
ligature around Chapman’s neck and began choking him. As
Chapman struggled to break free, Boatman started punching him.
Anticipating that corrections officers would soon try to intervene,
Boatman moved in front of the only door to the dayroom, blocked it
with his foot, and brandished the two shanks. When corrections
officers pushed on the door, Boatman shouted that he would kill
them if they entered.
While Boatman was blocking the door, Wells dragged
Chapman over to him. Struggling to breathe, Chapman pled for his
life, begging: “Please don’t kill me.” Disregarding Chapman’s pleas,
Wells and Boatman continued the assault.
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Boatman began stabbing Chapman in the eyes with the
shanks. Eventually, the responding corrections officers pushed the
door open enough to deploy a chemical agent into the dayroom.
But the chemical agent had no effect on Wells or Boatman. At some
point when the door was slightly ajar, Chapman managed to get his
fingers in the gap between the door and the frame. But even with
Chapman’s efforts, the officers could not open the door.
As the brutal attack continued, Boatman handed Wells a
shank, which Wells used to forcefully stab Chapman in his back.
By this time, Chapman was offering no resistance and lying face
down on the floor. Sensing that Chapman was still breathing, Wells
urged Boatman to keep stabbing him. To buy them more time and
prevent corrections officers from entering the dayroom, Wells tied
the door handle to the nearest bench—which was bolted to the
floor. With the door secured in this way, Wells and Boatman
continued beating and stabbing Chapman without intervention.
Toward the end of the twelve-minute assault, Boatman plunged a
shank into Chapman’s neck and stomped on it, doing so with such
force that the shank went completely through Chapman’s neck and
bent under the pressure of being driven into the floor.
-4-
Eventually, Wells and Boatman ceased their attack and
allowed a tactical team and corrections officers to enter the room.
The officers apprehended Wells and Boatman and removed
Chapman, still breathing, from the dayroom. Despite receiving
medical care, Chapman died shortly after the attack due to the
extensive injuries inflicted by Wells and Boatman.
Meanwhile, shortly after law enforcement apprehended Wells,
he made several unsolicited statements. Referring to his “last
murder,” Wells criticized the jury for sparing his life by “not giving
[him] the death sentence.” Wells also joked about using Chapman’s
body “as a doorstop” to prevent the officers from intervening. While
still discussing the attack, Wells bragged about how deep he
inserted the shank into Chapman’s body. Wells also acknowledged
that he had, in fact, made plans to murder Chapman.
The day after the murder, law enforcement agents conducted a
recorded interview of Wells. After the agents advised Wells of his
Miranda 2 rights, he made multiple incriminating statements—giving
2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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the reasons he selected the victim and disclosing his plans and
preparations for carrying out the murder.
Ultimately, the State indicted Wells on charges of premeditated
first-degree murder and possession of a weapon by a state prisoner.
Based on the charge of first-degree murder, the State filed a notice
of intent to seek the death penalty.
The day after the indictment, Wells filed a motion requesting
to represent himself and another motion asking to waive a penalty-
phase jury. Before ruling on these motions, the trial court
appointed Dr. Harry Krop to perform a competency evaluation on
Wells. After conducting that evaluation, Dr. Krop found that Wells
was competent to stand trial.
At the arraignment, the court addressed Wells’s motion to
represent himself. The court underscored the benefits of using
appointed counsel over proceeding pro se and also noted pitfalls
associated with self-representation. Wells acknowledged the court’s
concerns but maintained that he wished to represent himself. The
court then conducted a thorough Faretta 3 inquiry, and upon
3. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
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completion, granted Wells’s motion for self-representation. At that
same hearing, the court appointed regional counsel to function as
Wells’s standby counsel and accepted his plea to the weapons
possession charge.
Wells, however, soon changed his mind and requested
representation. The court granted that request. Then, two months
later, Wells again decided to proceed pro se and requested that
regional counsel be discharged. Following another Faretta inquiry,
the court granted Wells’s request.
After the Faretta inquiry, Wells informed the court that he
wanted to plead guilty to the first-degree murder charge. After a
lengthy colloquy with Wells and the prosecutor’s presentation of a
factual basis, the court accepted the guilty plea, finding it to be
knowingly, freely, voluntarily, and intelligently given. Then, as he
had done before, Wells expressed his intent to waive a penalty-
phase jury and not present mitigating evidence during the bench
penalty phase. Notwithstanding Wells’s decision on mitigation, the
court ordered that the mitigating evidence from Wells’s prior capital
case be made available. According to the court, its intent was to
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review and take notice of that mitigating evidence during the
forthcoming penalty phase.
Several months later, while Wells was still representing
himself, standby counsel moved to continue. Standby counsel
asserted that they had not had an opportunity to undertake the
necessary preparations should they be reappointed. Standby
counsel did not claim that the motion was filed at Wells’s direction
or with his consent. The court denied the motion without prejudice.
Ultimately, the penalty phase began nine months after the
charges were filed. At the outset, Wells reiterated that he did not
want counsel appointed or a jury impaneled. And he again stated
that he would not present any mitigating evidence.
During the State’s case, it introduced several exhibits,
including: (1) surveillance videos of Chapman’s murder, (2) a video
of Wells’s initial comments, (3) a recording of Wells’s interview with
law enforcement agents, and (4) the medical examiner’s report
showing Chapman’s manner and cause of death. 4
4. Consistent with Wells’s stipulation, the court took judicial
notice of the judgments and sentences for Wells’s six prior murders.
-8-
The State also called four witnesses. One witness, a special
agent, testified about interviewing Wells after the murder. The
agent explained that, after receiving the Miranda warning, Wells
discussed his plans to commit the murder, emphasizing that
preparations were made days in advance. According to Wells, those
advanced preparations showed that the murder was clearly “cold,
calculated, and premeditated.” For its final witness, the State
called Dr. William Hamilton, the medical examiner who autopsied
Chapman.
Just prior to Dr. Hamilton taking the stand, Wells requested
the appointment of regional counsel. The court granted that
request. Given the sudden change of circumstances, counsel
immediately moved for a continuance. The court granted the
motion but allowed the State to proceed with Dr. Hamilton’s
examination before continuing the penalty phase. The court gave
regional counsel the option to cross-examine Dr. Hamilton that day,
but noted that counsel would be permitted to again cross-examine
the witness when the penalty phase resumed. The court also
notified regional counsel that the mitigation specialist who
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investigated and prepared mitigating evidence for Wells’s prior
death-penalty case was available.
Seven months later, regional counsel moved to continue,
requesting more time to prepare. The trial court denied the request.
Five days before the penalty phase was scheduled to resume,
defense counsel filed another motion to continue, which the court
also denied.
The penalty phase ultimately resumed over eight months after
the State completed its case. At the resumed penalty phase, the
defense presented mitigating evidence over the course of three days.
In total, the defense offered eight witnesses, including four experts.
Dr. Jeffrey Danziger, a forensic psychiatrist, was the first
expert witness. Based on his review of extensive records and an
interview with Wells, Dr. Danziger opined that Wells suffered from
serious psychiatric and mental health issues, significant brain
injury, schizoaffective disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD), cognitive deficits and limitations, and multiple adverse
childhood experiences.
Dr. Heather Holmes, a clinical and forensic psychologist,
evaluated Wells in connection with the prior death-penalty case,
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met with him twice in the instant case, and reviewed extensive
records. Dr. Holmes testified to the traumatic effects of Wells’s
childhood experiences, including an abusive alcoholic father who
gave Wells alcohol at age four, shot him in the foot as a
punishment, and forced him to have sex with a prostitute on his
thirteenth birthday. Dr. Holmes added that Wells also suffered
traumatic experiences as an adult. These adult traumatic
experiences included the death of a stepchild and a suicide attempt
following the shooting of his second wife.
Dr. Joseph Wu, a psychiatrist and expert in neuroimaging and
forensic psychiatry, also testified for the defense. He reviewed
records and Wells’s neuroimaging scans. Based on his experience
and training, Dr. Wu opined that Wells’s scans showed brain
abnormalities consistent with traumatic brain injury,
schizophrenia, or bipolar disorder, which can result in difficulty
regulating impulses. Dr. Wu also noted that Wells’s worsening
condition was consistent with chronic traumatic encephalopathy
(CTE). According to Dr. Wu, Wells suffered at least nine traumatic
brain injuries that could contribute to CTE. Dr. Wu ultimately
concluded that Wells suffered from traumatic brain injury, fetal
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alcohol spectrum disorder, childhood neglect and abuse, psychosis
or schizophrenia, mood disorder, and was at high risk for CTE.
Dr. Terry Kupers, a psychiatrist, was the final expert witness.
Dr. Kupers testified about the negative effects of solitary
confinement and close management levels, especially on the
mentally ill. He opined that it was impossible to provide adequate
mental health treatment in these conditions, and that this
accelerated the deterioration of Wells’s mental health. Dr. Kupers
further opined that, in his view, Wells was under the influence of
extreme mental or emotional disturbance when he murdered
Chapman, and that his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct or conform to the requirements of law was substantially
impaired at that time.
Four lay witnesses testified to different aspects of Wells’s life.
The first witness, Johnny Hodges, was an inmate. Hodges testified
that Wells was upset with the ineffectiveness of the prison
psychiatric staff. Another witness, Gwendolyn Lockwood, a prison
therapist and Wells’s case manager, described the difficulties in
providing adequate mental health treatment in prison. Lockwood
recounted observing Wells’s mental decline leading up to the
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murder, including hallucinations, anxiety, agitation, and
flashbacks. She reported her concerns to the medical director who,
to her knowledge, never visited Wells. The other two witnesses
described Wells as a likeable individual, who had been devastated
by personal loss.
Following the penalty phase, the State and Wells filed
sentencing memoranda. In arguing for the death penalty, the State
relied on four statutory aggravating factors, contending that they
outweighed any established mitigating circumstances. For his part,
Wells asked the court to find 96 mitigators, including some
specified in Florida’s death-penalty statute, see § 921.141(7), Fla.
Stat. (2021) (listing seven specific mitigators and one catchall
provision). As for two statutory factors, Wells claimed that he
committed the murder while under an extreme emotion or mental
disturbance and that, when he murdered Chapman, his “capacity
to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired.”
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After receiving the sentencing memoranda, the court held a
consolidated Spencer5 and sentencing hearing. No additional
evidence was presented other than Wells’s own statements made
under oath. Based on the evidence presented at the penalty phase,
the court found four aggravating factors proven beyond a
reasonable doubt: Wells committed the capital felony after
previously being convicted of a felony and under the sentence of
imprisonment (great weight); Wells was previously convicted of
another capital felony or a felony involving the use or threat of
violence (very great weight); the murder was especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel (HAC) (great weight); and Wells committed the
murder in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner (CCP) (great
weight).
Turning to mitigation, the trial court found that Wells failed to
prove any statutory ground. According to the court, while Wells
suffered from significant mental health and emotional issues, he did
not “reasonably establish that he was acting under the influence of
an extreme mental or emotional disturbance when he committed
5. Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993).
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the crime.” The court emphasized that Wells’s actions were
controlled and carried out deliberately to accomplish the goal of
improving his living conditions by being placed on death row. The
court further found that there was no credible evidence that Wells’s
ability to conform his conduct to the law was substantially impaired
or that he did not know that killing the victim was wrong; nor was
there any evidence that Wells was not thinking clearly before,
during, or immediately after the murder.
Though rejecting the statutory mitigators, the court found
several nonstatutory mitigating circumstances to be supported by
the evidence: Wells experienced extreme childhood abuse, neglect,
and other traumatic events in his early adulthood (slight weight);
Wells suffered from serious mental illness, neurocognitive issues,
and was in solitary confinement or close management for thirteen
years (some weight); Wells cooperated with authorities after the
incident (slight weight); Wells took responsibility for the offense
(slight weight); Wells respected FDOC staff and the court
throughout the proceedings (some weight); Wells struggled with
substance abuse and alcoholism throughout his life (slight weight);
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Wells’s mental health needs were neglected by FDOC (slight weight);
and Wells showed remorse for the murder (slight weight).
Ultimately, the court concluded that the aggravating
circumstances far outweighed the mitigating circumstances,
warranting a sentence of death. Wells now appeals.
ANALYSIS
Wells raises five issues for our review. At the outset, he
challenges the trial court’s refusal to grant him additional
preparation time for the penalty phase. He next argues that the
trial court abused its discretion in rejecting two statutory mitigating
circumstances. Additionally, he claims fundamental error in the
court’s failure to make certain findings in the sentencing order. He
concludes by raising two constitutional challenges to his death
sentence. And though not raised by Wells, we must also determine
whether his guilty plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
made.
Motion to Continue
After the State charged Wells with first-degree murder, he
chose to proceed pro se. He, however, changed his mind two
months later, and the trial court appointed regional counsel
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pursuant to his request. Almost three months later, Wells again
changed course and dismissed regional counsel, noting that he did
not wish to present any mitigating evidence. At that time, the trial
court designated regional counsel to function as standby counsel.
Wells then pled guilty and proceeded pro se until the second day of
the penalty phase—just before the State completed presentation of
aggravating evidence. Stating unspecified family reasons, Wells
asked for regional counsel to again fully represent him. The court
granted that request and gave the defense a continuance. Roughly
eight months later, as the scheduled date for resuming the penalty
phase neared, regional counsel asked for a continuance on multiple
occasions. The court denied those requests. According to Wells,
the refusal to grant a continuance was an abuse of discretion. We
disagree.
We review the denial of a motion to continue for an abuse of
discretion. Carr v. State, 156 So. 3d 1052, 1064 (Fla. 2015). Under
this “highly deferential” standard, In re Doe, 325 So. 3d 99, 100
(Fla. 5th DCA 2019), we will uphold a trial court’s ruling unless it
“is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable.” Trease v. State, 768 So. 2d
1050, 1053 n.2 (Fla. 2000) (quoting Huff v. State, 569 So. 2d 1247,
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1249 (Fla. 1990)). Put differently, we will not find an abuse of
discretion unless the trial court makes a ruling which no
reasonable judge would agree with. See Kelley v. State, 974 So. 2d
1047, 1051 (Fla. 2007). Here, Wells cannot show that the trial
court’s decision—to deny a continuance before the resumption of
the penalty phase—meets this standard.
Here, counsel had more than eight months after their
reappointment to focus on the mitigation component of the penalty
phase. 6 In developing mitigating evidence, counsel did not start
from scratch. Instead, counsel had the benefit of mitigating
evidence presented in 2017 in Wells’s prior death-penalty case—
mitigating evidence that resulted in a jury recommendation of life in
prison. Also, counsel had the assistance of a mitigation specialist
who was already familiar with Wells and his background—having,
in fact, conducted the investigation which led to much of the
mitigation at the prior penalty phase. With the benefit of these
leads, counsel presented a significant amount of mitigating evidence
6. Wells does not argue that the trial court committed error by
not reopening the State’s case so that defense counsel could have
the opportunity to cross-examine all of the State’s witnesses.
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at the penalty phase. Indeed, crediting substantial portions of that
evidence, the trial court found eight nonstatutory mitigating
circumstances. Accordingly, based on the amount of time the
defense had to prepare a mitigation case and the availability of
strong leads, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in declining to grant an undefined additional period of
time to prepare. 7
Mitigating Evidence
Wells next argues that the trial court erred in rejecting two
statutory mitigating circumstances. Concluding that the record
supports the court’s findings as to these mitigators, we reject
Wells’s argument.
Under our case law, a trial court has the authority to reject a
mitigator outright when the State presents evidence incompatible
with it. Colley v. State, 310 So. 3d 2, 16 (Fla. 2020). For example,
we have said, “A mitigator may . . . be rejected if the testimony
7. Consistent with a finding made by the trial court, we note
that Wells’s own decisions regarding counsel adversely affected the
time regional counsel had to prepare. See McKay v. State, 504 So.
2d 1280, 1282 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (recognizing defendant’s own
conduct in shortening preparation time as factor in determining
whether court abused its discretion in denying continuance).
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supporting it is not substantiated by the actions of the defendant,
or if the testimony supporting it conflicts with other
evidence.” Bright v. State, 299 So. 3d 985, 1005 (Fla. 2020)
(alteration in original) (quoting Oyola v. State, 99 So. 3d 431, 445
(Fla. 2012)). This principle applies even when the defense presents
expert evidence supporting a mitigator—and even if the State does
not counter that evidence with an expert of its own. Id. at 1005.
Here, competent, substantial evidence supports the court’s
rejection of the extreme-disturbance and substantial-impairment
mitigators. As to the extreme-disturbance mitigator, the
surveillance video shows Wells engaging in calm, deliberate conduct
during the vicious attack while methodically carrying out his plans
to kill Chapman. In particular, during the attack, Wells gave
specific and lucid instructions to his accomplice, casually retrieved
his eyeglasses after temporarily losing them, and secured the
dayroom door with no indication of panic. Put simply, this evidence
does not substantiate Wells’s claim that he was acting under
extreme duress during the attack.
As for the other statutory mitigator, Wells’s conduct during
and after the murder reveals that he was aware of the criminal
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nature of his conduct. See Newberry v. State, 288 So. 3d 1040,
1047 (Fla. 2019) (upholding rejection of substantial-impairment
mitigator when defendant’s purposeful actions during and after
crime revealed awareness of criminality of conduct). During the
attack, Wells ignored the instruction of corrections officers to stop
the attack, and he prevented them from entering the dayroom until
he felt confident that Chapman was dead. Then, after the murder,
Wells admitted that the attack was “cold, calculated and
premeditated,” explaining that he carried out the attack to achieve
his goal of being placed on death row. Thus, as demonstrated by
his conduct and statements, Wells knew that killing Chapman had
specific legal consequences in the criminal context and the record
contains competent, substantial evidence inconsistent with the
substantial-impairment mitigator.
However, even if the trial court had committed error in
rejecting the statutory mitigators, that error would be harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt under circumstances of this case. The
murder of Chapman was highly aggravated. Indeed, three of the
“qualitatively weightiest aggravators in Florida’s capital sentencing
scheme”—namely the CCP, HAC, and prior-violent-felony
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aggravating factors—applied here. See Allen v. State, 322 So. 3d
589, 602 (Fla. 2021). What is more, the trial court gave each
aggravating factor great or very great weight, while assigning the
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances only slight or some weight.
Thus, based on these facts, Wells would not be entitled to a reversal
even if the court had erred in rejecting the extreme-disturbance and
substantial-impairment mitigators. See Craft v. State, 312 So. 3d
45, 56 (Fla. 2020).
In sum, Wells is not entitled to relief on this issue either.
Failure to Make Findings
Wells also argues that the trial court committed fundamental
error in failing to expressly find beyond a reasonable doubt that
sufficient aggravating circumstances warranted the death penalty
and that such circumstances outweighed the mitigating
circumstances. This argument is meritless.
Wells’s argument depends on the premise that the sufficiency
and weighing determinations called for by section 921.141, Florida
Statutes (2021), are elements of the crime of capital murder and, as
a result, require proof beyond a reasonable doubt. We have rejected
that premise time and again, consistently holding instead that
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neither the sufficiency nor weighing determination is subject to the
reasonable-doubt standard. See, e.g., Rogers v. State, 285 So. 3d
872, 885-86 (Fla. 2019); State v. Poole, 297 So. 3d 487, 502-03 (Fla.
2020); Deviney v. State, 322 So. 3d 563, 572 (Fla. 2021); Bell v.
State, 336 So. 3d 211, 217-18 (Fla. 2022). Though Wells argues
that our case law is wrong, he has provided us with no substantial
reason to question our prior holdings. See McKenzie v. State, 333
So. 3d 1098, 1105-06 (Fla. 2022) (declining to revisit Poole);
Davidson v. State, 323 So. 3d 1241, 1248 (Fla. 2021) (finding that
arguments comparable to Wells’s did not present compelling reason
to recede from Poole).
As part of his failure-to-make-findings argument, Wells
criticizes the sentencing order for not containing express findings as
to the sufficiency of the four aggravating factors. Though the trial
court did not specifically say that these four factors were “sufficient
. . . to warrant the death penalty,” see § 921.141(4), the sentencing
order did, in fact, contain findings that all four aggravating factors
were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Cf. Poole, 297 So. 3d at
502 (noting that sufficiency for purposes of section 921.141 means
“one or more” aggravating factors; rejecting argument that
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sufficiency demands qualitative analysis). But even if sufficiency in
section 921.141(4) has a qualitative component, the court’s finding
that the four aggravating factors “far outweigh[ed]” the mitigating
circumstances—coupled with the particular aggravators found and
the weight individually assigned to them—necessarily implied that
the court found the aggravating circumstances to be sufficient in a
qualitative sense to warrant the death penalty in this case. Thus,
assuming there was error due to the absence of a separate
sufficiency finding, that error did not rise to the level of
fundamental error. See Smith v. State, 320 So. 3d 20, 28 (Fla.
2021) (“In capital cases, a fundamental error is one that is ‘so
significant that the sentence of death “could not have been obtained
without the assistance of the alleged error.” ’ ” (quoting Poole v.
State, 151 So. 3d 402, 415 (Fla. 2014))).
Since Wells’s arguments are inconsistent with our case law
and otherwise lack merit, they do not support relief.
Facial Overbreadth Challenge
As the first constitutional challenge to his death sentence,
Wells argues that Florida’s death-penalty statute is facially
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment. This constitutional
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infirmity, Wells contends, stems from the sheer number of
aggravating factors in the statute combined with our holding in
Lawrence v. State, 308 So. 3d 544, 552 (Fla. 2020) (finding
comparative proportionality incompatible with conformity clause in
article I, section 17 of Florida’s constitution). We disagree with
Wells’s argument.
We have repeatedly rejected the argument that the death-
penalty statute violates the Eighth Amendment because it fails to
sufficiently narrow the class of murderers eligible for the death
penalty. See Johnson v. State, 969 So. 2d 938, 961 (Fla. 2007);
Miller v. State, 926 So. 2d 1243, 1260 (Fla. 2006). We have done so
recently—even with the statute in its current form. See Joseph v.
State, 336 So. 3d 218, 227 n.5 (Fla. 2022); Cruz v. State, 320 So. 3d
695, 730 (Fla. 2021); Colley v. State, 310 So. 3d 2, 15-16 (Fla.
2020); Bush v. State, 295 So. 3d 179, 214 (Fla. 2020); cf. Ch. 2019-
167, § 129, Laws of Fla. (most recent legislation involving death-
penalty statute; merely reenacting subsection (9) of statute); Ch.
2010-120, § 1, Laws of Fla. (most recent change to aggravating
factors; adding a sixteenth factor).
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Lawrence’s abandonment of comparative proportionality
review does not alter our analysis. In receding from case law to the
contrary, Lawrence recognized that comparative proportionality
review was not an integral component of the Eighth Amendment.
308 So. 3d at 548-50, 552. Accordingly, our abandonment of this
type of review does not bolster Wells’s Eighth Amendment
challenge. And Wells provides no pre- or post-Lawrence case law
undermining that conclusion.
For the reasons above, Wells has failed to establish a
constitutional defect with Florida’s death-penalty statute.
Accordingly, he is not entitled to relief on this issue.
Extension of Atkins v. Virginia to the Mentally Ill
Wells also argues that he is exempt from the death penalty
because he has a serious mental illness. According to him, Atkins
v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that federal constitution
prohibits execution of individuals who are intellectually disabled),
should be extended to categorically bar imposition of the death
penalty on those who suffer from serious mental illness. Wells’s
argument lacks merit.
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We have consistently refused to extend Atkins. See Lawrence
v. State, 969 So. 2d 294, 300 n.9 (Fla. 2007); Schoenwetter v. State,
46 So. 3d 535, 562-63 (Fla. 2010); Muhammad v. State, 132 So. 3d
176, 207 (Fla. 2013); Dillbeck v. State, No. SC23-190, 2023 WL
2027567, at *4 (Fla. Feb. 16, 2023) (citing Gordon v. State, 350 So.
3d 25, 37 (Fla. 2022)). We are not alone in this respect. State and
federal courts alike have uniformly rejected arguments similar to
the one Wells now advances. See Lewis v. State, 620 S.E.2d 778,
786 (Ga. 2005); State v. Dunlap, 313 P.3d 1, 36 (Idaho 2013);
Matheney v. State, 833 N.E.2d 454, 458 (Ind. 2005); State v.
Kleypas, 382 P.3d 373, 447-48 (Kan. 2016); Dunlap v. Com., 435
S.W.3d 537, 616 (Ky. 2013); State v. Mammone, 13 N.E.3d 1051,
1089-90 (Ohio 2014); Mays v. State, 318 S.W.3d 368, 379 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2010); Mays v. Stephens, 757 F.3d 211, 219 (5th Cir.
2014); Franklin v. Bradshaw, 695 F.3d 439, 455 (6th Cir. 2012);
Carroll v. Sec’y, DOC, 574 F.3d 1354, 1370 (11th Cir. 2009); United
States v. Akbar, 74 M.J. 364, 406 (C.A.A.F. 2015).
Based on the foregoing authority, we reject Wells’s second
constitutional challenge.
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Voluntariness of Plea
In death-penalty cases, we have “a mandatory obligation to
independently review the sufficiency of the evidence underlying [a
first-degree murder] conviction, and the ‘customary review’
evaluates whether the conviction is supported by competent,
substantial evidence.” Davidson, 323 So. 3d at 1250 (alteration in
original) (quoting Santiago-Gonzalez v. State, 301 So. 3d 157, 180
(Fla. 2020)). But when, as here, a defendant’s guilty plea results in
the death-eligible conviction, we instead review the record to
determine whether the defendant made that plea knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily. Doty v. State, 170 So. 3d 731, 738
(Fla. 2015). In carrying out this review, we “scrutinize the plea to
ensure that the defendant [1] was made aware of the consequences
of his plea, [2] was apprised of the constitutional rights he was
waiving, and [3] pled guilty voluntarily.” Fletcher v. State, 343 So.
3d 55, 60 (Fla. 2022) (alterations in original) (quoting Ocha v. State,
826 So. 2d 956, 965 (Fla. 2002)).
In this case, the trial court conducted an extensive plea
colloquy. During that colloquy, the court apprised Wells of the
constitutional rights he would forfeit based on the guilty plea. The
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court also accurately informed Wells of the two potential sentencing
outcomes resulting from such a plea—life in prison or the death
penalty. The court also assured itself that Wells was in satisfactory
physical and mental health to make this decision. And for his part,
Wells confirmed that he was making the plea freely, knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily—with a full understanding of the
significance of the guilty plea and the rights he was giving up.
Finally, the evidence of Wells’s guilt was overwhelming, including
video evidence of the brutal murder, his unsolicited incriminating
statements on the day of the murder, and his post-Miranda
confession.
Thus, having independently reviewed the record, we conclude
that Wells’s guilty plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
given.
CONCLUSION
Based on our analysis above, we affirm Wells’s first-degree
murder conviction and sentence of death.
It is so ordered.
MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY and COURIEL, JJ., concur.
LABARGA, J., concurs in result with an opinion.
FRANCIS, J., did not participate.
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NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.
LABARGA, J., concurring in result.
Because I continue to adhere to my dissent in Lawrence v.
State, 308 So. 3d 544 (Fla. 2020), wherein this Court abandoned
this Court’s decades-long practice of comparative proportionality
review in direct appeal cases, I can only concur in the result.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Bradford County,
Mark W. Moseley, Judge
Case No. 042019CF000706CFAXMX
Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Barbara J. Busharis,
Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Appellant
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Janine D. Robinson, Assistant
Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Appellee
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