People v. Mays

2023 IL App (4th) 210612 FILED
January 3, 2023
NO. 4-21-0612 Carla Bender
4th District Appellate
IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) McLean County
SYDNEY TYRONE MAYS, ) No. 18CF734
Defendant-Appellant. )
) Honorable
) John Casey Costigan,
) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE TURNER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Cavanagh and Zenoff concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 In February 2021, after a bench trial, the trial court found defendant guilty of nine
counts of first degree murder, one count of attempt (first degree murder), and one count of
aggravated battery. On October 15, 2021, the trial court sentenced defendant to three consecutive
terms of life imprisonment followed by an additional consecutive term of 50 years. Defendant
appeals, making the following arguments: (1) the trial court violated his right to due process by
(a) improperly relying on People’s exhibit No. 48 to impute a motive to defendant and
(b) misremembering Randy Nesby’s testimony; (2) defendant was denied a fair trial because the
State was allowed to introduce prior inconsistent statements made by Navarro Howard and
Cheonte Hinkle without the State satisfying the statutory requirements of section 115-10.1 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Criminal Procedure Code) (725 ILCS 5/115-10.1 (West
2020)) to admit the evidence; (3) defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel because his
trial attorney failed to object to Cheonte Hinkle’s unsworn testimony and other hearsay testimony;
(4) defendant is entitled to a new trial because the continuum of error denied him his due process
right to a fair trial; (5) the trial court erred by failing to appoint him new counsel after a preliminary
Krankel (People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181, 464 N.E.2d 1045 (1984)) inquiry; and (6) the trial
court erred in imposing three consecutive terms of natural life imprisonment. We affirm the trial
court’s judgment.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 On June 18, 2018, Nathaniel (Nate) Pena, Corey Jackson, and Juan Carlos Perez
were shot and killed, and N.P., a minor, was shot and paralyzed at an apartment complex in
Bloomington, Illinois. Pena and Jackson were found dead inside of apartment No. 9 at 311 Riley
Drive. N.P. was found in the same apartment. Perez was found shot in a stairwell and died from
his wounds.
¶4 On July 25, 2018, a grand jury indicted defendant on nine counts of first degree
murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1 (West 2018)), one count of attempt (first degree murder) (720 ILCS 5/8-4
(West 2018)), and one count of aggravated battery (discharge of a firearm) (720 ILCS
5/12-3.05(e)(1) (West 2018)). Defendant waived his right to a jury trial.
¶5 In January 2021, defendant’s bench trial commenced. Officer David Williamson
testified he was dispatched to the apartment building at 311 Riley Drive on June 18, 2018, at
approximately 2:43 p.m. Williamson found Perez in the stairwell and then came into contact with
Officer Eric Yamada on the way to the third floor of the building. Williamson and Yamada entered
apartment No. 9 and found Pena, Jackson, and N.P. No one else was in the apartment, but
Williamson heard reports someone might be hiding in the basement laundry room.
¶6 Gabrielle Sweeney testified Pena was her brother. Sweeney, Pena, and N.P. ran
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some errands the morning of the shooting. She dropped Pena and N.P. off at apartment No. 9
around noon. She heard Pena speaking with defendant on FaceTime while they were running
errands. Pena asked defendant what time he was coming to the apartment. Defendant said he was
waiting on a few guys and would then come over. Sweeney testified Pena had access to cash from
selling shoes and marijuana. She stated the back door to the apartment building was always
unlocked but Pena kept the door to apartment No. 9 locked.
¶7 Kearra Heard testified Jackson was her boyfriend in June 2018. On June 18, 2018,
she and Jackson went to Pena’s apartment and saw Pena and N.P. While there, Jackson and Pena
smoked a marijuana blunt, and she played with N.P. She did not see any other marijuana. While
at the apartment, Jackson made a Snapchat video with her and Jackson playing with a large stack
of $100 and $20 bills that belonged to Pena. Jackson shared the video on his Snapchat account,
but she did not know with whom he shared the video. The State introduced the video as evidence
(People’s exhibit No. 48). She did not know where the money had been before Jackson had it. She
eventually left the apartment to pick up her daughter and came back later when she heard
something had happened.
¶8 Brianna Watkins testified she lived in apartment No. 9 at 311 Riley Drive on June
18, 2018. Pena, who was her boyfriend of approximately two years, stayed with her four or five
times a week. Pena’s children, N.P. and K.P., also stayed there occasionally. On June 18, she left
for work around 6 a.m. and dropped her son off at daycare. Pena was at the apartment when she
left. She got off work at 2 p.m. and went straight home, arriving around 2:10 p.m. On the way to
her apartment, she did not see anyone in the hallway or stairwell. The door to her apartment was
locked, so she used her key to open the door. She had to push a black duffel bag on the floor out
of the way of the door. She saw Pena, N.P., Jackson, and defendant in the apartment. She did not
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lock the door. She had seen Jackson and defendant around Pena before and thought defendant was
an associate or friend of both Pena and Jackson. Pena was watching Jackson play a game, and
defendant was on his phone. Pena, Jackson, and N.P. were on a sectional sofa, and defendant was
in a stadium chair by the window. She went to her bedroom and lay down for a couple of minutes
and then went into the bathroom and changed her clothes. She then went back to her bedroom and
grabbed her keys and phone. Around 2:30 p.m., she left the apartment to pick up her son from
daycare and did not lock the apartment door. While at the apartment, she did not hear anyone come
in or leave. When she left, Pena, N.P., Jackson, and defendant were still in the apartment. She did
not remember seeing the black bag when she left and did not see anyone in the hallway, stairwell,
or parking lot. She also testified the earbuds found by police in her bedroom did not belong to her
or Pena. According to her testimony, the back door into the apartment building was unlocked about
half the time, and her apartment building was connected to another apartment building through the
laundry room in the basement.
¶9 Brianna indicated things were out of place in the apartment after the shooting. She
testified Pena did not keep money or drugs at her apartment. On redirect examination, the State
pointed out she told Detective Tim Power that Pena kept money and drugs in a nightstand in the
bedroom, which Brianna said she vaguely remembered.
¶ 10 Robert Schrand from Joe’s Towing responded to a white Chevy Trailblazer broken
down on the interstate on June 18, 2018. Three people were in the vehicle. He had contact with
the driver and one of the passengers. The other passenger, who was shorter and heavier than the
other two men, avoided him. The driver’s behavior seemed normal. He towed the vehicle to an
address around Morris and Seminary Avenues but did not remember the exact address. Jahquan
Howard owned the vehicle. Before he towed the Trailblazer away, a gray four-door hatchback
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picked up the three men. He did not notice anything odd about the Trailblazer, but it did smell like
marijuana. Schrand did not see any of the three men with a pistol, nor did it appear they were
concealing one in their clothes. He also did not see a gun, any blood, a black duffel bag, or the
men remove anything from the Trailblazer.
¶ 11 Travis Brady testified he lived in apartment No. 3 at 311 Riley Drive and heard
gunshots on June 18, 2018. He initially thought a tree had fallen before hearing screaming. He left
his apartment and saw a woman, who was screaming in Spanish, in the hallway. Brady walked to
where the lady was and saw a man’s body lying on the stairway platform. He then went back to
his apartment and called 911. The 911 dispatcher directed Brady to go back to where the body was
and see if he could see any injuries on the person and look for any weapons. Brady did not see any
weapons. The dispatcher then told Brady to go back to his apartment. Brady stayed in his apartment
until his father picked him up.
¶ 12 Maria Sanchez testified she was living at 311 Riley Drive, apartment No. 5, which
is on the second floor of the building, on June 18, 2018. She heard three big noises, which sounded
like they came from upstairs, after 2 p.m. Water started coming into her apartment from upstairs
by her window. Her husband, Juan Carlos Perez, started recording the water with his cell phone.
The cell phone recording was admitted into evidence and showed the water coming into the
apartment at 2:35:39 p.m. He then left the apartment approximately five minutes after she heard
the first three loud noises, leaving open the door to the apartment. Maria was in the kitchen and
heard three more noises louder than the first three. She left her apartment and found her husband,
who had been shot, on the steps leading to the third floor. Someone with gray tennis shoes was
standing behind her at some point, but she did not see the person. A police officer arrived and got
her out of the building. While she was outside, she and other people saw a black man with braids
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looking out the window of apartment No. 9 about 10 minutes after the second round of shots. After
the shooting, she saw a lighter skinned black man with braids walking around the building. She
told the police she was scared of the man. She did not think this was the same man she saw in the
window of apartment No. 9. Sanchez indicated she had frequently seen several black men and a
white man come and go from apartment No. 9.
¶ 13 James Hardesty, a maintenance technician for First Site Apartment Services,
testified he was working around building 311 on June 18, 2018, and saw a white SUV in the area
with two black men inside. The driver had cornrows or short dreadlocks.
¶ 14 Detective Jared Roth of the Bloomington Police Department testified he analyzed
surveillance footage from a residence at 305 Mecherle Drive and observed a white Chevrolet
Trailblazer on the video near the Riley Drive apartments. Roth also observed a person run across
the street from the south side of Riley Drive and enter the Trailblazer. The person running was
recorded by the video camera around 2:37 p.m. The video also showed first responders arriving
on the scene shortly after the Trailblazer left.
¶ 15 Officer Erik Yamada testified he responded to the shooting and did not see anyone
exiting the building as he approached or inside the building as he made his way to the third floor
before he encountered Officer Williamson. He smelled marijuana and gun powder when he entered
the building. The door to apartment No. 9 was open, and three victims were found inside. After
clearing the apartment, he stayed behind to secure the scene because they believed a suspect could
still be in the building. He did not see any responding officer or emergency medical technician that
was black with dreadlocks or braids.
¶ 16 Detective Martin Krylowicz, a crime scene detective with the Bloomington Police
Department, testified he was involved in processing the evidence in apartment No. 9. He indicated
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dresser drawers and other items were displaced and strewn on the floor in the master bedroom and
it looked like someone had lifted the mattress to look underneath. Some clothes and bags were also
strewn on the floor in front of the closet. On the bed, he identified an earbud headphone and a
magazine for a Smith & Wesson .40-caliber pistol with one live bullet inside. No fingerprints or
DNA were found on the gun magazine or bullet.
¶ 17 Detective Krylowicz testified six, .380-caliber bullet casings were found in the
common hallway and the entryway area of apartment No. 9. The detectives also found water
pooling on the floor in the apartment from a radiator leak. Krylowicz indicated the radiator had
been hit by a bullet. Krylowicz also testified a total of 12, .40-caliber bullet casings were found
inside the apartment. No fingerprints were found on the shell casings.
¶ 18 In addition, Detective Krylowicz testified three bullet projectiles were collected
during Perez’s autopsy, one projectile was found under Perez’s body, and two projectiles were
embedded in the stairway doorway. The parties stipulated these were .380-caliber bullets. The
parties stipulated the bullet projectiles found inside apartment No. 9 and during Jackson’s autopsy
were .40-caliber bullets. The parties also stipulated the .380-caliber bullets were fired from the
same gun and the .40-caliber bullets were fired from the same gun.
¶ 19 The police did not find any fingerprints on any of the bullet shell casings or the
bullets themselves. The casings were also not sent to the Illinois State Police (ISP) forensic lab for
DNA testing. He did not know if any of the bullets and shell casings found at the scene were shot
from the magazine found in the apartment. Gunshot residue testing was done on the door handles
of the Trailblazer and sent for analysis. No gunshot residue was detected. Detective Krylowicz did
not see a black duffel bag or a large stack of $100 and $20 bills at the apartment.
¶ 20 Detective Krylowicz took photographs of defendant on December 6, 2018. Those
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photographs were admitted into evidence.
¶ 21 Detective John Heinlen of the Bloomington Police Department testified he
interviewed N.P. on August 23, 2018, at the Children’s Hospital of Illinois in Peoria. The interview
was conducted at the hospital because N.P. was still there as a patient. N.P. said one man shot his
dad, Nate Pena. N.P. did not know what the man looked like or what his name was.
¶ 22 Navarro Howard testified Jahquan Howard is his brother. He knew defendant and
Jamahri Watkins, who was Navarro’s godbrother. Navarro stated he did not remember talking to
defendant in the days leading up to the shooting on June 18, 2018. The State then asked Navarro
about an interview he had at the Bloomington Police Department on June 22, 2018. Navarro said
he remembered the interview. However, Navarro said he did not remember telling a detective that
defendant had said he was coming to Bloomington from Chicago. Navarro testified he knew
Jackson but did not know anything about Pena. Navarro said he did not remember telling detectives
defendant was having “tude with the dude.” The “dude” Navarro was referring to was Pena.
Navarro also said he did not remember telling the detectives that defendant referred to Pena as a
“b*** a*** n***” who was flaunting his money and calling defendant a “b***.” Navarro also
testified he did not remember telling the detective that Navarro asked defendant what he was going
to do and defendant replied he was going to take Navarro’s advice and “hit him up.” In a
nonresponsive statement, Navarro said defendant had never talked to him “about s*** like that.”
He then said, “I don’t recall none of it. You tweaking. I don’t know none of that s***. I don’t know
the interview, none of that.”
¶ 23 Defense counsel then objected to the line of questioning, noting Navarro said he
did not remember any of the interview. Counsel argued it was improper for the State to start putting
in the interview through a witness who said he could not remember the interview. The State
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responded Navarro’s lack of memory allowed the State to impeach Navarro with his prior
statements, giving Navarro the opportunity to acknowledge or deny the prior statements or to
indicate he did not remember the prior statements. The trial court agreed. Navarro then indicated
he did not remember talking to the police and lied during the entire interview. He said he lied
because an assistant state’s attorney and a detective were threatening Navarro’s brother.
¶ 24 Navarro claimed he was not with defendant in the days before the shooting. He also
denied telling the detectives defendant responded “I got that b***” when Navarro asked defendant,
“[Y]ou must be rollin, huh? You dump a nine?” Navarro said he did not remember telling the
detectives this meant defendant had a pistol in his possession. In addition, Navarro also denied
telling the detectives he believed defendant had a .380-caliber pistol. Further, Navarro said he did
not remember saying he saw defendant with a gun at Navarro’s brother’s house and was lying if
he did say it.
¶ 25 According to Navarro’s testimony, he had never heard of Pena before the shooting.
He said he did not remember telling the detectives that there was a “little beef” between defendant
and Pena because Pena was “outshining” and disparaging defendant. Navarro also said he did not
remember telling the detectives that defendant told him he had settled the disagreement with Pena.
¶ 26 On cross-examination, Navarro said he believed he talked to the police two days
after the shooting and told the police he saw defendant with a .380-caliber gun prior to the shooting.
According to Navarro, he did not know if it was days, weeks, or months since he had seen
defendant before the day of the shooting. Navarro claimed he lied about seeing defendant with a
gun because he was trying to get his younger brother out of trouble with the police. Navarro
indicated the only true thing he told the police was his name. According to Navarro’s testimony,
the phrase “I’m going to hit him up” means to call or text the person. The phrase “squash”
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something means settle the issue. Navarro said neither phrase indicated violence. According to
Navarro, in June 2018, he was on and off his “pysch meds,” and he was also using cocaine, ecstasy,
and alcohol.
¶ 27 Caleb Hoenes testified he and Pena had been friends since grade school. Pena made
a lot of money selling marijuana, and Hoenes saw him with money at the apartment on 311 Riley
Drive. According to Hoenes, Pena flaunted his money on Facebook. Hoenes believed Pena had
posted a picture of himself on Facebook with a large amount of cash around the time he was killed.
Hoenes indicated he did not have any kind of relationship with defendant but would see him at
Pena’s apartment buying weed or smoking. When he saw defendant buy marijuana from Pena, it
was usually more than an amount for personal use. Pena sold smaller amounts of marijuana to
individuals for personal use but also sold larger amounts to other sellers. Hoenes did not know
where Pena kept the marijuana and money at the apartment. He also testified Brianna Watkins
knew Pena was selling marijuana out of the apartment.
¶ 28 Jahquan Howard testified he and Jamahri Watkins lived together in the summer of
2018 at 1413 North Morris Avenue in Bloomington. Defendant was his cousin. As to the events
on June 18, 2018, Jahquan testified he and Jamahri went to KMO Mattress Outlet to buy a desk.
While at the store, defendant sent him a message offering $200 for a ride if Jahquan could pick
him up in a hurry. Defendant told Jahquan he was at a Riley Drive address. Jahquan then drove to
the Riley Drive area but did not know where he was going.
¶ 29 Jahquan testified he remembered talking to a detective on June 19, 2018, but did
not remember what was said during the meeting. The State asked if Jahquan remembered telling
the police defendant originally told him to come to 311 Riley Drive but then told him to stop in
front of 307 Riley Drive. Jahquan said he did not remember, but that could have happened.
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According to Jahquan, when he first got to the apartment complex, he did not see defendant outside
so he sent defendant a message. He did not remember if defendant texted him back. The State then
asked Jahquan if he remembered telling the detectives defendant responded. Jahquan said he did
not remember but he could have said that to the detectives. According to Jahquan, he sent
defendant multiple messages because defendant was taking several minutes. Jahquan said he did
not remember telling the detectives he waited for 20 minutes but acknowledged he might have said
that. Jamahri Watkins was with Jahquan. Jahquan eventually sent a message to defendant saying
he was going to leave, but then defendant came out of a building. He did not remember if defendant
walked or ran to the vehicle, but he got in the back of the Trailblazer. Jahquan said he did not
remember hearing any gunshots or see anyone following defendant. The State asked Jahquan if he
remembered telling the police defendant was running to the Trailblazer. Jahquan again said he did
not remember word for word what he said. However, Jahquan testified defendant upon entering
the Trailblazer told Jahquan to drive because people were shooting.
¶ 30 After Jahquan and Jamahri picked up defendant, Jahquan testified they went to
Jahquan’s house because defendant wanted to change his shirt. They then started for Peoria, but
the Trailblazer broke down on the interstate. They made a call for a tow truck. While they were
waiting for the tow, an ISP trooper pulled over behind them. After the tow truck arrived, another
car pulled up driven by someone Jahquan did not know to drive them to Peoria. On the drive to
Peoria, defendant said Pena was shot. Defendant then started crying. Jahquan did not remember
any other conversation on the ride. Jahquan did not remember where they dropped defendant off
in Peoria. The driver then drove Jahquan and Jamahri back to Bloomington. Jahquan did not notice
any injuries on defendant.
¶ 31 On cross-examination, Jahquan said it was not unusual for defendant to ask for
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rides. Jahquan made defendant pay when he gave him a ride. Before picking up defendant, Jahquan
dropped the desk he had purchased off at his house. It did not surprise Jahquan that defendant
would want to change his shirt because it was a hot day. While waiting for the tow truck, Jahquan
sat in the state trooper’s car talking to the trooper. Defendant was sitting on the bumper of the
Trailblazer with Jamahri. Defendant did not seem concerned the police were there. Jahquan
testified he did not see defendant with a bag, weapon, or stack of cash. According to Jahquan, he
did not even get the $200 for picking defendant up at the apartment. Jahquan did not know how
defendant learned about Pena being killed, but it was about an hour after they left the area of the
apartment when he mentioned it and started crying. Nothing was said about Jackson being shot.
The police came to Jahquan’s house a day or two later.
¶ 32 Jamahri Watkins testified he and Jahquan stopped being roommates after June 18,
2018. Jamahri knew both Navarro Howard and defendant. On June 18, 2018, he and Jahquan went
to the furniture store to get a desk. Jahquan got a text from defendant asking for a ride. They took
the desk home and unloaded it before they went to pick up defendant at Riley Drive. Jamahri did
not know what building defendant was in. They sat in the Riley Drive area for about 25 to 30
minutes before defendant came running to the vehicle and said someone was shooting. The three
men then went back to Jahquan’s house. According to Jamahri, defendant did not appear to be
injured and changed his shirt because he was hot. They then left for Peoria, and Jahquan’s car
broke down on the interstate.
¶ 33 When the police arrived, defendant was quiet and sat with Jamahri on the bumper
of Jahquan’s SUV waiting for the tow truck. Jamahri said he told defendant he was sitting in oil
that was on the bumper, and defendant got up. However, the State asked Jamahri if he remembered
telling the police in an interview in August 2018 that he was telling defendant he was sitting in oil
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but defendant was not listening to him. Jamahri said he did not remember that. When the tow truck
arrived, defendant paid the driver in cash. Defendant had someone come pick them up and give
them a ride to Peoria. After they dropped off defendant in Peoria, the driver took Jamahri and
Jahquan back to Bloomington. Jamahri said he did not see defendant with a gun, bags of cash, or
bags of marijuana on June 18.
¶ 34 ISP Trooper Tim Sweeney testified he was involved in a motorist assist on June 18,
2018, around 3:36 p.m. after he saw a vehicle pulled over on the side of the interstate with three
males near the vehicle. Jahquan Howard told Sweeney the vehicle was his and produced
identification. Sweeney did not ask either of the other men for identification. Jahquan came back
to the squad car with Sweeney. Sweeney did not look in, search, or smell inside the vehicle.
Defendant was talking to another state trooper on the scene while Sweeney was talking to Jahquan.
Defendant did not walk away from Sweeney or the other trooper on the scene.
¶ 35 Dr. Scott Denton, a forensic pathologist, testified he performed autopsies on Perez,
Pena, and Jackson. He determined all three men died from multiple gunshot wounds. During
Perez’s autopsy, Denton recovered three medium-caliber copper-jacketed bullets. Denton
recovered a large-caliber bullet and a few bullet fragments during Jackson’s autopsy.
¶ 36 Ky Williams testified he got a text message from defendant on June 18, 2018,
asking for a ride. He picked defendant, Jahquan, and another guy up on the interstate and drove to
Peoria. Defendant sat in the front seat. The other two were in the back seat. Williams stated
defendant’s demeanor was relaxed and quiet. During part of the trip, defendant was speaking to
the passengers in the back. The State asked Williams if he recalled saying during his police
interview on June 25, 2018, that defendant was quiet the entire ride. Williams said he did
remember.
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¶ 37 The State then asked Williams if he did anything during the ride in response or in
reaction to defendant being quiet during the drive. Williams said he did not recall. The State then
asked Williams if he remembered saying during his police interview that he messaged defendant
during the ride saying defendant was “starting to tweak me up.” Defense counsel objected because
the State’s question was not proper impeachment. The trial court sustained defense counsel’s
objection. The State then questioned defendant about Peoria. Williams said he dropped defendant
off, defendant gave him $80 for gas money, and he then drove the other two men back to
Bloomington. Williams testified he did not recall trying to contact defendant the following week.
Williams said he did not remember telling the police he tried to contact defendant but defendant
had not answered. As to whether defendant’s phone was disconnected and whether it would be
normal for it to be disconnected, Williams testified he did not recall or know. Williams said he did
not remember telling a detective defendant’s phone was never off.
¶ 38 The State then came back to the earlier question about whether Williams sent a
message to defendant on the drive to Peoria. Williams said he did not remember. The State then
asked if Williams recalled telling a detective during his interview that he messaged defendant
during the drive indicating defendant was “starting to tweak [Williams] up.” Williams then said
he remembered.
¶ 39 On cross-examination, Williams said no one had a gun with them or a black duffel
bag. He indicated defendant usually carried about $400 in cash. According to Williams,
defendant’s behavior during the drive was not unusual for defendant.
¶ 40 Randy Nesby testified he had known Jahquan Howard for 12 or 13 years and was
his friend. The friendship had deteriorated, but Nesby bought marijuana from Jahquan. Nesby also
knew Navarro Howard and Jamahri Watkins through Jahquan. Nesby denied knowing Navarro’s
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Facebook profile name. However, he recalled telling a detective in June 2018 that Navarro’s
Facebook name was Toni Hybreed. Nesby said he had been to Jahquan’s home and always saw
guns there. Four days before the shooting, he saw defendant there. On June 18, between 4:45 and
5:15, Jahquan and Jamahri came by Nesby’s house. When Nesby mentioned the shooting, Jamahri
was pacing and acting weird.
¶ 41 Cheonte Hinkle refused to take the oath before testifying. The trial court indicated
it would take his refusal into consideration when judging his credibility. The court advised Hinkle
he could still be held in contempt of court or face perjury charges if he gave false testimony. Hinkle
indicated he understood. Hinkle stated he knew defendant, who was his cousin by marriage.
Around July 14, 2018, Hinkle retrieved defendant’s clothes and shoes from a garage at defendant’s
mother’s house. He did not recall speaking to anyone at the house or to defendant on FaceTime.
In addition, he also said he did not recall defendant looking any different on FaceTime. Hinkle
claimed he did not remember talking to the police or telling the police he spoke with defendant
over FaceTime and that defendant had cut his hair. On cross-examination, Hinkle said defendant
spent time in Milwaukee because his dad lived there.
¶ 42 Officer William Lynn of the Bloomington Police Department testified Brianna
Watkins’s cell phone disconnected from the wireless network of apartment No. 9 at 2:32:10 p.m.
¶ 43 Administrative Sergeant Tim Power of the Bloomington Police Department
testified he was the lead investigator on the June 18, 2018, shooting. The police identified
surveillance video to help determine what happened, including video from 305 Mecherle Drive,
which showed a subject running from the area of building 311 or 313 by Riley Drive and entering
a white SUV on the passenger side. Surveillance footage from an Ashley Furniture store showed
Brianna Watkins’s vehicle when she arrived at the apartment complex. Within the first day of the
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investigation, the police were able to identify the white SUV, which was registered to Jahquan
Howard. The police also determined the license plate for the white SUV had been run by the ISP
on June 18 at 3:36 p.m. Power talked to Sweeney about his contact with the vehicle and received
the recording of the encounter. Sweeney identified defendant in a photo lineup. From the ISP
video, Power was able to identify defendant, Jahquan Howard, and Jamahri Watkins.
¶ 44 Power testified Jahquan Howard and Jamahri Watkins were brought in for
questioning. Both confirmed the trip to Peoria, a description of the vehicle that picked them up on
the interstate, and that defendant was dropped off in Peoria. The police determined Ky Williams
picked up defendant and the other two men from the interstate.
¶ 45 Power testified a warrant was issued for a Snapchat account with the handle “Syd
May 7.” The e-mail attached to the “Syd May 7” Snapchat account was
SydneyMays7@yahoo.com. The phone number 1-312-566-3121 was linked to the Snapchat
account. This was the phone number that was communicating with Jahquan Howard with regard
to getting a ride from Riley Drive. Power identified a Snapchat video from June 17, 2018, of
defendant. Defendant was wearing the same type of earbuds found in apartment No. 9. He also
noted a Snapchat video from June 29, 2018, showed defendant counting money. During the month
following the shooting, Power tried to locate defendant using every resource available. Defendant
was eventually arrested in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Power went to Milwaukee and brought
defendant back to McLean County. Defendant’s hair was short at that time.
¶ 46 On cross-examination, Power said defendant’s father lived in Milwaukee. Power
said defendant had short dreadlocks before the shooting but defendant’s hair was cut short at the
time of his arrest. Power indicated Pena, Jackson, N.P., and defendant were in the apartment at the
time of the shooing based on the statement of Brianna Watkins. Power acknowledged Watkins told
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Power that she did not look over and see defendant when she left the apartment and was not certain
he was there. Power also acknowledged Watkins said the door to the apartment was unlocked when
she left. Further, Power stated neither defendant’s DNA nor fingerprints were found anywhere in
apartment No. 9 and the earbuds were not unique.
¶ 47 Power testified the police executed a search warrant on Jahquan Howard’s house
but did not find any guns, a black bag, a large amount of cash, or a large amount of marijuana.
Further, Power said gunshot residue testing was performed on the SUV but none was found. He
also acknowledged Brianna Watkins lied in her testimony saying there was not a large amount of
cash or drugs in apartment No. 9. Power indicated he knew Pena was a drug dealer and a prior
shooting had occurred at this same apartment complex.
¶ 48 In addition, Power acknowledged defendant’s text to Jahquan asking for a ride
“ASAP” was sent at 2:10 p.m., which was before Brianna Watkins was back at the apartment. At
2:13:43, defendant sent Jahquan a message saying to pick him up at 311 Riley Drive. At 2:14:25,
defendant sent Jahquan another message telling him to park in front of 307 Riley Drive. The last
text message defendant sent to Jahquan was at 2:28 p.m. At that time, Brianna would have still
been in the apartment. At 2:31, 2:34, and 2:37 p.m., Jahquan sent defendant messages, but
defendant did not respond. The surveillance footage showed a person running from the area of the
apartments and entering the passenger side of the white Chevy Trailblazer at approximately 2:37
p.m.
¶ 49 On redirect examination, Power said Brianna told him she could hear the apartment
door open and close from her bedroom and did not hear anyone come into or go out of the
apartment when she was there.
¶ 50 During Detective Power’s testimony, the State introduced, the trial court admitted,
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and the State published portions of Brianna Watkins’s, Jahquan Howard’s, and Cheonte Hinkle’s
respective police interviews. After Power’s testimony, the State introduced, the court admitted,
and the State published segments of police interviews with Navarro Howard, Ky Williams, and
Jamahri Watkins.
¶ 51 Defendant chose not to testify, and the defense called no witnesses.
¶ 52 On February 3, 2021, the trial court issued its ruling, providing an extensive
overview of the evidence in the case. When discussing Brianna Watkins’s testimony, the court
indicated it understood Watkins told the detectives she was not 100% sure defendant was still at
the apartment when she left to pick up her child from daycare. When discussing Randy Nesby’s
testimony, the court indicated Nesby said he was at Jahquan Howard’s home on June 18 after the
shooting with defendant, Jahquan Howard, and Jamahri Watkins. According to the court, Nesby
had learned from Facebook about the shooting, which he mentioned to defendant, Jahquan, and
Jamahri. The court indicated Nesby testified Jamahri was pacing and acting weird when Nesby
mentioned the shooting.
¶ 53 The trial court noted these murders likely happened because of drugs or money.
The court found Caleb Hoenes’s testimony to be credible. The court noted Hoenes testified Pena
sold marijuana, uploaded pictures of large amounts of money to Facebook, and kept money in the
back bedroom of the apartment. This was known by a lot of people. The court also found the part
of Navarro Howard’s testimony that defendant and Pena had “beef” between each other because
Pena was “outshining him” to be credible. Although no drugs, money, or guns were found, the
court stated credible evidence was presented that the individuals involved in this case had access
to these things. The court then noted Randy Nesby bought weed from Jahquan Howard at
Jahquan’s house and said guns were always present at Jahquan’s house. Nesby also testified
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defendant was sometimes present at Jahquan’s house. The court indicated Nesby saw guns at
Jahquan’s house four days before the shooting and Navarro told the police defendant had a
.380-caliber pistol before it became public knowledge Perez was shot with a .380-caliber bullet.
¶ 54 The trial court also recognized and considered the fact other people could have left
the apartment buildings after the shooting but before the police arrived. As for the man with gray
tennis shoes standing behind Maria Sanchez in the stairwell, the court indicated he was not a
credible suspect based on the time and location Sanchez saw the shoes. The court also
acknowledged Sanchez’s observations of a man with braids in the window of apartment No. 9
three to four minutes after the police arrived. However, as to her observation, the court noted
Sanchez had understandable confusion as to the time because of what she had been through.
¶ 55 As to the large amount of cash in the Snapchat video of Corey Jackson and Kearra
Heard taken in apartment No. 9 a few hours before the shooting, the trial court stated it understood
the money was not located after the shooting. The court further acknowledged the State did not
prove this was the same money in defendant’s Snapchat video posted 11 days after the shooting.
¶ 56 With regard to what happened in the apartment after Brianna Watkins left, the trial
court noted it found credible Brianna Watkins’s testimony the earbuds were not present on the bed
when she left and did not belong to her or Pena. The court found the first set of shots had been
fired by 2:35:39 p.m. because that is when the water coming through the ceiling into the apartment
was filmed. The court stated it was convinced that someone with that type of earbuds was in the
apartment and shot Pena, Jackson, and N.P. Although the type of earbuds was not unique,
defendant was wearing the same type of earbuds in a Snapchat video from the day before the
shooting.
¶ 57 The trial court also indicated it considered evidence of defendant’s flight presented
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by the State. This included defendant’s offer to pay $200 to Jahquan Howard if he would pick him
up as soon as possible at the apartment complex. The court also noted defendant ran to the white
Trailblazer and was aware of the shooting. They then went to Jahquan’s house and shortly
thereafter left for Peoria and broke down on the interstate. Defendant was very quiet and looking
at his phone on the ride. Jahquan said defendant started crying when he saw a Facebook post that
Pena and N.P. had been shot. The court stated:
“[Defendant] already knew that the shooting took place because when he first got
in the Trailblazer he said ‘they shooting.’ Further, Randy Nesby said he brought up
the shooting when he was over at [Jahquan’s] house before Mr. Howard,
[defendant,] and Mr. Watkins left for Peoria. He said that Jamahri was acting weird
and pacing around at that time.”
The court indicated it found defendant’s behavior on the ride to Peoria unusual.
¶ 58 The trial court also noted Cheonte Hinkle talked to defendant on FaceTime after
the shooting and noticed defendant had cut his hair. The court also noted Ky Williams tried to call
defendant’s phone the day after the shooting but defendant’s phone had been disconnected, which
was unusual because defendant always had his phone. The court stated defendant’s phone records
showed he was an active user.
¶ 59 Although recognizing defendant’s father lived in Milwaukee and defendant
sometimes spent time there, the trial court stated it was convinced defendant had gone to
Milwaukee to avoid the police and the State’s evidence of his flight showed a consciousness of
guilt. The court also found the timeline established by the phone records, texts, and social media
activity compelling. In the approximately 3½ minutes between when Brianna Watkins’s phone
disconnected from the apartment’s wireless network at 2:32:10 p.m. and the water started leaking
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from the radiator in apartment No. 9 into the apartment below at 2:35:39 p.m, the individuals in
apartment No. 9 were shot. The court clearly believed the State established defendant was still in
the apartment when Watkins left, even though she was not certain. According to the court, the
evidence did not support a theory someone came into the building from outside or entered the
apartment itself through the unlocked apartment door during the short period after Brianna left and
the water started leaking. The court noted the evidence showed no signs of struggle inside the
apartment. The evidence also supported the conclusion nothing had disturbed the status quo inside
the apartment before Pena, N.P., and Jackson were shot. The shooter then encountered Perez at the
door to apartment No. 9 and shot and killed him with a .380-caliber weapon. Navarro Howard said
defendant possessed a .380-caliber handgun. Then at 2:37 p.m., defendant is seen in surveillance
footage coming from the front of building 311 and entering Jahquan Howard’s white Trailblazer.
Further, the court noted the evidence showed all the .40-caliber bullets recovered at the scene were
fired by one weapon and the .380-caliber bullets were fired by one weapon. In addition, the court
noted N.P. told the police that one man shot his dad.
¶ 60 Based on the totality of the evidence presented, the trial court found the evidence
convinced it beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant shot and killed Nate Pena, Corey Jackson,
and Juan Carlos Perez and shot N.P. The court indicated it found defendant guilty on each and
every count of the indictment.
¶ 61 On February 25, 2021, defendant’s trial counsel filed a motion to reconsider or, in
the alternative, a motion for a new trial. On April 15, 2021, defense counsel was given leave to
withdraw from the case. Defendant proceeded pro se and was given leave to adopt and supplement
defense counsel’s posttrial motion. The trial court also gave defendant additional time to
supplement the posttrial motion. On September 21, 2021, defendant filed an ineffective assistance
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of counsel claim and supplemented his posttrial motion.
¶ 62 On October 4, 2021, the trial court conducted a preliminary Krankel inquiry into
defendant’s claims his trial counsel was ineffective. The trial court and defendant addressed a
variety of defendant’s claims, one of which was that his trial counsel was unaware Brianna Watkins
told the police she was not entirely sure defendant was still in the apartment when she left to pick
up her child and failed to impeach her with this statement. After the matter was discussed by the
trial court, defense counsel, and defendant, defense counsel indicated he believed he failed to
confront Watkins with her prior statement when she testified during the State’s case. However,
counsel indicated the court ordered the State to make Watkins available during defendant’s case.
When Detective Power testified for the State, he admitted on cross-examination that Brianna said
she was not entirely sure defendant was still at the apartment when she left. From a strategic
standpoint, counsel stated he believed this was a better way to get this information into the case
because Brianna was not able to explain her prior statement. Counsel also noted the trial court was
clearly aware of Brianna’s statement regarding her lack of complete certainty.
¶ 63 The trial court mentioned defendant’s claim his trial counsel should have objected
to Detective Power’s testimony that Brianna Watkins said she thought a drug deal was going to
happen after she left the apartment. However, defendant did not offer any additional explanation
on this claim.
¶ 64 After hearing from defendant and defendant’s trial counsel, the trial court did not
find any basis to appoint counsel to investigate defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel. The trial court then heard arguments on and denied defendant’s posttrial motion.
¶ 65 On October 15, 2021, the trial court sentenced defendant to three consecutive terms
of life in prison followed by an additional consecutive term of 50 years in prison.
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¶ 66 This appeal followed.
¶ 67 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 68 A. Due Process
¶ 69 Defendant first argues the trial court violated his due process rights by
(1) improperly relying on People’s exhibit No. 48 to impute a motive to defendant despite the
exhibit being irrelevant for that purpose and (2) misremembering Randy Nesby’s testimony. Citing
People v. Williams, 2013 IL App (1st) 111116, ¶ 81, 103-04, 2 N.E.3d 552, defendant argues a
defendant is denied due process where the record reveals affirmative mistakes in the trial court’s
decision-making process.
¶ 70 Defendant was not denied due process in this case. The trial court did not rely on
People’s exhibit No. 48, which was a video posted to Corey Jackson’s Snapchat account showing
Corey Jackson and Kearra Heard playing with a big stack of money at apartment No. 9 a few hours
before the shooting, to impute a motive on defendant. The court only noted the video showed a
large amount of money in apartment No. 9 before the shooting and the money was not found in
the apartment after the shooting. The court did mention defendant had a large sum of money in
similar denominations to the money seen in People’s exhibit No. 48 in a video defendant posted
to Snapchat 11 days after the shooting. However, the court clearly understood the State never
established the money in the two Snapchat videos was the same.
¶ 71 As to Randy Nesby’s testimony, the trial court did misstate it. Nesby testified
Jahquan Howard and Jamahri Watkins were at his house a few hours after the shooting. Nesby had
learned about the shooting on Facebook and brought it up in conversation. According to his
testimony, when he did so, Jamahri acted strangely. When the trial court was explaining its
decision in this case, the court incorrectly stated Nesby said he was at Jahquan Howard’s house
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with Jahquan, Jamahri, and defendant after the shooting occurred.
¶ 72 Defendant argues the trial court’s error undercut part of his defense that the State
failed to prove its case because defendant’s mannerisms and behavior immediately following the
Riley Drive shooting were not consistent with a person who had just shot multiple individuals. We
disagree. The trial court’s mistake did not prejudice defendant in any manner and certainly did not
amount to a violation of his due process rights. The court did not mistakenly indicate Nesby saw
defendant acting strangely after the shooting. Instead, the trial court correctly indicated Nesby saw
Jamahri acting strangely. We fail to see how this mistake affected the trial court’s judgment against
defendant in this case.
¶ 73 B. Prior Inconsistent Statements
¶ 74 Defendant next argues he was denied a fair trial because the trial court allowed the
State to introduce prior inconsistent statements made by Navarro Howard and Cheonte Hinkle
without the State satisfying the foundational requirements of section 115-10.1 of the Criminal
Procedure Code (725 ILCS 5/115-10.1 (West 2020)), which provides:
“Admissibility of Prior Inconsistent Statements. In all criminal cases, evidence of a
statement made by a witness is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if
(a) the statement is inconsistent with his testimony at the hearing or
trial, and
(b) the witness is subject to cross-examination concerning the
statement, and
(c) the statement—
(1) was made under oath at a trial, hearing, or other
proceeding, or
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(2) narrates, describes, or explains an event or condition of
which the witness had personal knowledge, and
(A) the statement is proved to have been written or
signed by the witness, or
(B) the witness acknowledged under oath the making
of the statement either in his testimony at the hearing or trial
in which the admission into evidence of the prior statement
is being sought, or at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or
(C) the statement is proved to have been accurately
recorded by a tape recorder, videotape recording, or any
other similar electronic means of sound recording.
Nothing in this Section shall render a prior inconsistent statement
inadmissible for purposes of impeachment because such statement was not
recorded or otherwise fails to meet the criteria set forth herein.”
The supreme court also included similar language in the Illinois Rules of Evidence. See Ill. R.
Evid. 801(d)(1) (eff. Oct. 15, 2015).
¶ 75 According to defendant, the State’s practice of reading portions of the transcripts
of Navarro Howard’s and Cheonte Hinkle’s respective interviews with the police ignored the
requirements of section 115-10.1 and Rule 801 and constituted reversible error.
¶ 76 1. Navarro Howard’s Prior Statements
¶ 77 Defendant takes issue with the State being allowed to introduce Navarro Howard’s
prior inconsistent statements regarding defendant’s relationship with Pena and defendant’s
possession of a gun before the Riley Drive shooting without satisfying the requirements of section
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115-10.1. Defendant argues this was reversible error.
¶ 78 Defendant concedes he failed to properly preserve his arguments with regard to
Navarro’s prior inconsistent statements. Defendant asks us to consider the issue under the first
prong of the plain-error doctrine. The plain-error doctrine allows a reviewing court to consider an
unpreserved error if the defendant establishes a clear or obvious error occurred and either (1) the
evidence was so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against
the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) the error was so serious it affected
the fairness of the defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process even if the
evidence was not closely balanced. People v. Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 48, 89 N.E.3d 675.
Generally, the first step in any plain-error analysis is determining whether a clear or obvious error
occurred. Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 49. It is the defendant’s burden to show a clear or obvious
error occurred and a prong of the plain-error doctrine applies. People v. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d 539,
545, 931 N.E.2d 1184, 1187 (2010).
¶ 79 We first consider defendant’s argument that Navarro’s prior inconsistent statements
related to any relationship between defendant and Pena were inadmissible because Navarro had
no personal knowledge of the relationship and Navarro’s testimony was not inconsistent with his
prior statement to the police. Citing People v. Cooper, 188 Ill. App. 3d 971, 973, 544 N.E.2d 1273,
1274 (1989), defendant argues section 115-10.1 requires the prior statements to be based on the
witness’s personal observations. According to defendant, Navarro’s prior statements about
defendant’s relationship with Pena were not based on Navarro’s personal observations. Instead,
defendant argues Navarro was simply recounting things defendant had told him.
¶ 80 However, while the State did not establish Navarro had personal knowledge of
defendant’s relationship with Pena through the prior statements it introduced, defendant does not
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explain why Navarro’s prior statements did not show he had personal knowledge of defendant’s
feelings toward Pena. Navarro had personal knowledge of conversations he had with defendant,
and his prior statements to the police narrated, described, and explained those conversations.
According to Navarro’s statement to the police, defendant expressed his feelings about Pena to
Navarro. At trial, defendant testified he did not remember talking to defendant during the period
leading up to the shooting. However, the Second District in People v. Guerrero, 2021 IL App (2d)
190364, ¶ 53, 194 N.E.3d 961, has held:
“Whether the witness had the requisite personal knowledge is not determined from
the witness’s trial testimony but rather from the face of the statement. [Citation.]
The rationale for making this determination from the witness’s statement is to
prevent the ‘turncoat’ witness from precluding the admission of the prior statement
by simply testifying that he or she did not see or does not remember what
happened.”
As a result, defendant has failed to establish Navarro did not have personal knowledge of
statements made by defendant to him about which Navarro told the police.
¶ 81 We next consider defendant’s argument the State did not meet the requirement
found in section 115-10.1(a) (725 ILCS 5/115-10.1(a) (West 2020)) that the defendant’s prior
statement be inconsistent with his testimony at trial. According to defendant, Navarro’s testimony
was not inconsistent with his prior statements to the police. We disagree.
¶ 82 Defendant argues the State did not ask Navarro anything about defendant’s feelings
toward Pena before introducing Navarro’s statement to the police. However, as previously
indicated, the State asked Navarro whether he had a conversation with defendant in the days
leading up to the shooting, and Navarro testified he did not remember talking to defendant during
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this period. At that point, it likely would have been fruitless for the State to ask Navarro additional
questions about things said by defendant about Pena during a conversation defendant testified he
did not remember having.
¶ 83 In addition, when the State questioned Navarro about statements he made to the
police regarding defendant’s feelings toward Pena, Navarro testified he did not remember the vast
majority of his interview with the police. In Guerrero, 2021 IL App (2d) 190364, ¶ 50, the Second
District stated:
“A statement’s consistency is measured against the witness’s trial
testimony. [Citation.] The witness’s prior statement need not directly contradict his
or her trial testimony to be considered inconsistent. [Citation.] For example, a
witness’s evasive answers, silences, and changes in position [citation]; inability to
recall [citation]; and omission of ‘a significant matter that would reasonably be
expected to be mentioned if true’ [citation] at trial have been deemed inconsistent
with the witness’s prior statements. The determination of whether a statement is
inconsistent is left to the trial court’s discretion.”
As a result, because Navarro testified he did not remember his interview with the police, his
testimony is considered to be inconsistent with the statements he made in his interview with the
police.
¶ 84 Defendant has failed to establish the introduction of Navarro’s prior statements to
the police constituted a clear or obvious error because Navarro’s prior statement was based on his
own personal knowledge of defendant’s feelings toward Pena and his trial testimony was
inconsistent with his prior statement to the police.
¶ 85 In addition, based on our prior analysis, we find no merit in defendant’s claim he
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received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel did not object to the State’s
introduction of these prior inconsistent statements. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel,
a defendant must show deficient performance by his attorney and prejudice from the deficient
performance. Here, defendant was not prejudiced by his attorney’s failure to object because any
objection likely would have been overruled. We need not address this issue further.
¶ 86 We next consider defendant’s argument that the State introduced improper
evidence of Navarro’s prior statement to police he had seen defendant with a gun and thought
defendant had a .380-caliber handgun prior to the Riley Drive shooting. Again, defendant argues
the State failed to establish an inconsistency between Navarro’s trial testimony and his prior
statement to the police related to defendant’s possession of a gun. According to defendant, “the
State never asked Navarro a simple question, like, ‘Did you see [defendant] with a gun a few days
before June 18, 2018?’ ”
¶ 87 Defendant concedes in his brief he did not properly preserve this issue for this
court’s review. Once again, defendant asks us to review the issue pursuant to the plain-error
doctrine or find his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for not objecting to the State’s
introduction of this evidence. Based on our previous analysis, defendant’s arguments fail. Navarro
testified he did not remember being with defendant in the period leading up to the shooting. If
Navarro claimed he did not remember being with defendant in the period leading up to the
shooting, he also would not have remembered seeing defendant with a handgun during this same
period, had the State asked that precise question.
¶ 88 While the State could have done a better job establishing the foundation for
admission of Navarro’s prior statements, this is a situation where “defendant’s lack of a timely and
specific objection deprive[d] the State of the opportunity to correct any deficiency in the
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foundational proof at the trial level.” People v. Woods, 214 Ill. 2d 455, 470, 828 N.E.2d 247, 257
(2005). Defendant has failed to establish the introduction of Navarro’s prior statement rose to the
level of a clear or obvious error or that defendant was prejudiced by his trial counsel’s failure to
object, because the objection likely would have been overruled.
¶ 89 2. Cheonte Hinkle’s Prior Statement
¶ 90 Defendant also argues the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the State to
introduce Cheonte Hinkle’s prior statement to the police that he knew defendant cut his hair after
the shooting. The State asked Hinkle if he noticed anything unusual about defendant’s appearance
after talking with defendant while Hinkle was at defendant’s mother’s house. Hinkle testified he
did not. Hinkle denied telling the police defendant had cut his hair.
¶ 91 Defendant objected to the State asking Hinkle about his prior statement to the
police, claiming the State was going to impeach defendant with hearsay evidence. According to
defense counsel, Hinkle had only heard a rumor defendant had cut his hair after the shooting. The
court overruled defendant’s objection. Defendant argues the court erred in allowing the State to
introduce Hinkle’s prior statement defendant had cut his hair after the shooting.
¶ 92 The State argues the trial court did not err by allowing the State to admit Hinkle’s
prior statement. Further, according to the State, even if the court erred by allowing the State to
introduce Hinkle’s prior statement, the error was harmless. An evidentiary error “is harmless where
there is no reasonable probability that the jury would have acquitted the defendant absent the
error.” (Emphasis in original and internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Stull, 2014 IL App
(4th) 120704, ¶ 104, 5 N.E.3d 328.
¶ 93 We need not address the substance of defendant’s argument. Even assuming,
arguendo, the trial court erred in allowing Hinkle’s prior statement into evidence, the error was
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harmless. The State introduced other evidence, which defendant does not challenge, that defendant
cut his hair after the shooting. No reasonable probability exists the trial court would have acquitted
defendant absent Hinkle’s statement to the police about defendant cutting his hair.
¶ 94 C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
¶ 95 Defendant next argues his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective. According
to defendant, his trial counsel failed to move to exclude Cheonte Hinkle as a witness by objecting
to his unsworn testimony, failed to reassert his objection to Ky Williams’s hearsay testimony, and
failed to object to hearsay testimony from Detective Power.
¶ 96 To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show his
attorney’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and resulting prejudice
to the defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). “[A] court must indulge a
strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances,
the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. To demonstrate prejudice, a defendant need only establish a
different outcome would be reasonably probable absent the ineffective assistance. Strickland, 466
U.S. at 694. Our supreme court has indicated reviewing courts may proceed directly to Strickland’s
prejudice prong and need not consider whether the attorney’s performance was deficient to dispose
of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. People v. Johnson, 2021 IL 126291, ¶ 53.
¶ 97 1. Cheonte Hinkle’s Testimony
¶ 98 Cheonte Hinkle refused to swear or affirm he would testify truthfully. The trial
court told the parties it would take this into consideration when judging Hinkle’s credibility. The
court admonished Hinkle he was still subject to perjury charges if he gave false testimony, which
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Hinkle stated he understood. Defendant’s trial counsel failed to object to Hinkle testifying without
swearing or affirming he would testify truthfully.
¶ 99 Defendant argues he was prejudiced because the State would not have been able to
introduce Hinkle’s prior statement regarding defendant cutting his hair had defendant’s trial
counsel objected to Hinkle being allowed to testify. This is a situation where we can proceed
directly to the prejudice prong of the Strickland analysis. As we previously stated, the State
introduced evidence defendant cut his hair in ways other than Hinkle’s statement—the testimony
of Detective Power and video and photographic evidence. Therefore, defendant cannot establish
he was prejudiced by his trial counsel’s failure to object to Hinkle testifying.
¶ 100 2. Ky Williams’s Text Message to Defendant
¶ 101 Defendant next argues his trial counsel was ineffective because he did not reassert
a hearsay objection related to the substance of a text message Williams sent to defendant while
driving defendant to Peoria after the shooting. When the State only asked Williams whether he
had done anything in response to defendant being quiet on the drive to Peoria before trying to
introduce the content of the text message Williams sent to defendant, defense counsel objected,
arguing the preliminary question was too broad to impeach Williams with regard to his answer he
did not recall what he did. The trial court agreed.
¶ 102 However, after asking Williams some other questions, the State came back to the
defendant’s silence during the car ride to Peoria and specifically asked Williams if he sent
defendant a message from his phone to defendant’s phone during the car ride. Williams testified
he did not recall. At that point, the State could ask Williams if he remembered telling the police
he sent defendant a message during the drive saying defendant was “starting to tweak [him] up.”
¶ 103 Citing Guerrero, 2021 IL App (2d) 190364, ¶¶ 44-53, defendant concedes the State
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could ask Williams about his statement to the police after Williams said he did not recall sending
a message to defendant during the drive. However, citing People v. Lofton, 2015 IL App (2d)
130135, ¶ 32, 42 N.E.3d 885, defendant then argues the content of the message was still
inadmissible because section 115-10.1 and Rule 801(d)(1)(A) of the Illinois Rules of Evidence
(Ill. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(A) (eff. Jan. 1, 2011)) do not provide an exception for double hearsay.
According to defendant, the content of the text message Williams sent to defendant is inadmissible
double hearsay.
¶ 104 Defendant’s reliance on Lofton is misplaced. In Lofton, 2015 IL App (2d) 130135,
¶ 23, the defendant raised several evidentiary issues, which were not properly preserved by his
trial counsel. Defendant’s brief only cites paragraph 32 of Lofton, where the Second District was
discussing the substantive use of a witness’s grand jury testimony as a prior inconsistent statement
under section 115-10.1 (725 ILCS 5/115-10.1(c) (West 2006)) and Rule 801(d)(1)(A)(1) of the
Illinois Rules of Evidence (Ill. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(A)(1) (eff. Jan. 1, 2011)). Lofton, 2015 IL App
(2d) 130135, ¶ 32.
¶ 105 The defendant in Lofton did not argue the use of the witness’s grand jury testimony
was improper in general. Lofton, 2015 IL App (2d) 130135, ¶ 31. However, the jury was given a
transcript of the grand jury testimony that included the witness stating another person told her that
the defendant said defendant had just shot someone and needed a ride. Lofton, 2015 IL App (2d)
130135, ¶ 31. The defendant argued this was double hearsay and not admissible under section 115-
10.1. While the witness’s grand jury testimony was generally admissible, the Second District held
the jury should not have learned of statements allegedly made by the defendant to a third party,
which were then repeated by the third party to the witness. Lofton, 2015 IL App (2d) 130135, ¶ 32.
¶ 106 In the instant case, defendant argues the State should not have been able to
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introduce the content of a message Williams sent from his phone to defendant’s phone. Unlike in
Lofton, this is not a situation where the State was trying to introduce statements allegedly made by
defendant to a third party who then informed Williams of the defendant’s alleged statements. The
State was only introducing a statement made by Williams to the police about the content of a text
message he sent to defendant. Based on the argument in defendant’s brief, defendant’s trial
counsel’s lack of an objection was not unreasonable. Further, even assuming arguendo defense
counsel should have objected to the introduction of this evidence, defendant cannot establish he
was prejudiced by the introduction of this text message by Williams.
¶ 107 3. Hearsay Statement From Brianna Watkins
¶ 108 Defendant next argues his trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the
State’s elicitation of allegedly improper hearsay testimony from Detective Power that Brianna
Watkins believed the people inside apartment No. 9 were waiting for her to leave the apartment so
they could conduct a drug deal. Defendant argues this was clearly hearsay and counsel should have
objected. According to defendant, this evidence changed the trier of fact’s perception of what was
going on at the apartment from a few friends hanging out into a dangerous drug setting. We
disagree.
¶ 109 The State concedes Watkins’s statement was inadmissible hearsay. As a result, we
will skip directly to the prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance analysis. Brianna Watkins
testified Pena was friends with both Corey Jackson and defendant. She did not testify she thought
they were waiting for her to leave so they could have an argument or physical fight. Further, the
State presented other evidence both defendant and Pena were drug dealers. Defendant cannot
establish a reasonable probability exists that the result in this case would have been different had
Watkins’s statement not been admitted.
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¶ 110 4. Aggregate Prejudice
¶ 111 Defendant next argues the above instances of his trial counsel’s allegedly deficient
performance prejudiced defendant when considered all together. We need not discuss this
argument further because our prior holdings show no possibility for aggregate prejudice as to the
ineffective assistance claims raised by defendant.
¶ 112 D. Continuum of Error
¶ 113 Defendant next argues a continuum of error occurred in this case, denying him a
fair trial. According to defendant’s brief, the errors in this case improperly established a motive
for defendant to commit the shooting in this case, placed a weapon in defendant’s hands in the
days leading up to the shooting, and introduced other circumstantial evidence of defendant’s guilt.
Noting the State’s case was entirely circumstantial with no physical evidence directly linking
defendant to the shooting, defendant argues the errors he alleged and we previously addressed
likely resulted in his conviction. As a result, defendant argues his conviction should be reversed
due to the cumulative effect of the alleged errors.
¶ 114 Our supreme court has indicated the cumulative effect of multiple errors may deny
a defendant a fair trial. People v. Speight, 153 Ill. 2d 365, 376, 606 N.E.2d 1174, 1178 (1992).
“An appellate court’s resolution of the argument that the cumulative effect
of various trial errors warrants reversal depends upon the court’s evaluation of the
individual errors. If the alleged errors do not amount to reversible error on any
individual issue, generally there is no cumulative error. [Citation.] However, where
errors are not individually considered sufficiently egregious for an appellate court
to grant the defendant a new trial, but the errors, nevertheless, create a pervasive
pattern of unfair prejudice to the defendant’s case, a new trial may be granted on
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the ground of cumulative error.” People v. Howell, 358 Ill. App. 3d 512, 526, 831
N.E.2d 681, 694 (2005).
While some mistakes were made in defendant’s trial, including the trial court misstating Nesby’s
testimony and the State being allowed to introduce Brianna Watkins’s statement she believed a
drug deal was going to occur when she left her apartment, these errors neither individually
prejudiced defendant nor created a pervasive pattern of unfair prejudice to defendant. As a result,
we find no merit to defendant’s argument he was denied his due process right to a fair trial.
¶ 115 E. Krankel Inquiry
¶ 116 Defendant next argues the trial court erred in denying his pro se posttrial claim his
trial counsel was ineffective without appointing new counsel to investigate and litigate his
ineffective assistance of counsel claims. When a defendant pro se raises a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, the trial court is required to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the factual
basis of the defendant’s claim or claims and may also consider the legal merits of the claims.
People v. Moore, 207 Ill. 2d 68, 77-78, 797 N.E.2d 631, 637 (2003). “If the trial court determines
that the claim lacks merit or pertains only to matters of trial strategy, then the court need not
appoint new counsel and may deny the pro se motion.” Moore, 207 Ill. 2d at 78. A claim lacks
merit when it is misleading, conclusory, legally immaterial, or does not bring to the trial court’s
attention a colorable claim his attorney provided ineffective assistance. People v. Tolefree, 2011
IL App (1st) 100689, ¶ 22, 960 N.E.2d 27. “However, if the allegations show possible neglect of
the case, new counsel should be appointed.” Moore, 207 Ill. 2d at 78.
¶ 117 An attorney’s strategic decisions normally are not subject to a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel. However, if the attorney’s strategy was objectively unreasonable, a
defendant may potentially overcome the strong presumption of sound trial strategy. People v.
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Maya, 2019 IL App (3d) 180275, ¶ 27, 127 N.E.3d 1099; People v. Lawson, 2019 IL App (4th)
180452, ¶ 42, 139 N.E.3d 663.
¶ 118 Defendant does not argue the trial court failed to conduct a proper preliminary
inquiry. Instead, he simply argues the court erred in not appointing new counsel to investigate his
claims. As a result, we will not disturb the court’s ruling denying his pro se claims unless the
court’s decision was manifestly erroneous. People v. Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 98, 162 N.E.3d
223. “Manifest error is error that is clearly evident, plain, and indisputable.” Jackson, 2020 IL
124112, ¶ 98.
¶ 119 According to defendant’s brief, defendant established his trial counsel possibly
neglected his case for two reasons. First, when Brianna Watkins testified defendant was in her
apartment when she left to go pick up her child, defense counsel was not aware Watkins told the
police she was not certain defendant was in the apartment when she left. Second, defense counsel
failed to object to Detective Power’s testimony about Brianna Watkins’s hearsay statement she
believed a drug deal was going to take place when she left the apartment.
¶ 120 Regarding the impeachment of Brianna Watkins with her statement to the police,
the trial court noted defense counsel cross-examined Detective Power about Brianna’s concession
to the police. The detective agreed Brianna did say she was not certain defendant was in the
apartment when she left. The court specifically noted this statement by Brianna when it was
explaining its findings in this case. According to the court, defense counsel’s decision to bring out
Brianna’s statement through Detective Power and not question Brianna about her statement was
sound trial strategy because it denied Brianna the chance to explain away the potential significance
of the statement.
¶ 121 Defendant argues his attorney’s decision not to impeach Brianna with her prior
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statement to the police could not have been strategic because his trial counsel was not aware of the
prior statement until after she testified. Defendant stated he and his trial counsel got into a heated
discussion about Brianna’s statement, defense counsel checked the statement, and counsel then
apologized to defendant and said he would fix the issue. According to defendant, the trial court’s
ruling was manifestly erroneous and constituted improper “ ‘post hoc rationalization’ for counsel’s
decisionmaking that contradict[ed] the available evidence of counsel’s actions.” Harrington v.
Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 109 (2011).
¶ 122 Regardless, the trial court’s ruling on this issue was not manifestly erroneous. Even
assuming, arguendo, defendant’s trial counsel was unaware of Brianna’s statement to investigators
that she was not sure defendant was in the apartment when she left, defendant cannot establish any
prejudice from the situation. Defendant’s trial counsel did bring this information out while
cross-examining Detective Power, and the trial court considered the statement when determining
defendant’s guilt.
¶ 123 Turning to defendant’s argument his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
object to Detective Power testifying Brianna told him she thought Pena, Jackson, and defendant
were waiting for her to leave so they could conduct a drug deal, defendant did not address this
issue at the preliminary Krankel hearing. However, the trial court still addressed the issue because
it was raised in defendant’s written motion, finding counsel’s decision not to object was a strategic
decision.
¶ 124 Defendant argues Brianna did not offer any testimony regarding that statement, so
allowing the statement to go unchallenged could not have been part of a reasonable trial strategy.
As stated, defendant asserts the trial court engaged in “ ‘post hoc rationalization’ for counsel’s
decisionmaking that contradict[ed] the available evidence of counsel’s actions.” Harrington, 562
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U.S. at 109.
¶ 125 Once again, however, defendant was not prejudiced by defense counsel’s failure to
object to this hearsay statement. The State had already presented evidence both Pena and defendant
were drug dealers. Significantly, Watkins did not say she thought defendant was waiting for her to
leave so they could argue or engage in violence. As a result, the trial court’s decision not to appoint
counsel to defendant was not manifestly erroneous.
¶ 126 F. Mittimus
¶ 127 Finally, defendant asserts the trial court erred in sentencing him to three consecutive
terms of natural life imprisonment. Defendant argues his sentence is not compliant with the plain
language of section 5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Corrections Code) (730
ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) (West 2018)), which states “the court shall sentence the defendant to a
term of natural life imprisonment if the defendant, at the time of the commission of the murder,
had attained the age of 18, and *** is found guilty of murdering more than one victim.” Defendant
asks this court to correct the mittimus to show the imposition of only one term of natural life
imprisonment.
¶ 128 Citing People v. Holley, 2019 IL App (1st) 161326, ¶ 36, 129 N.E.3d 683,
defendant acknowledges he forfeited this issue but asks us to apply the second prong of the plain
error doctrine. The State concedes the trial court erred by imposing multiple natural life sentences
and agrees defendant’s sentence should be corrected. We are not persuaded and do not accept the
State’s concession.
¶ 129 Defendant essentially argues he can be sentenced to only one term of natural life
even though he was found guilty of the first degree murder of three individuals. Defendant provides
no analysis for his argument other than saying the plain language of section 5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii)
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supports his conclusion. Further, defendant cites no authority to support his interpretation, and we
have found none. As a result, not only did defendant not properly preserve this issue in the trial
court, he also failed to comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020),
which requires an appellant to provide this court with argument and authority to support his
argument.
¶ 130 Instead of arguing defendant had not provided any authority or analysis in support
of his argument, the State conceded the issue without providing this court with authority or analysis
supporting its concession. While we do not want to discourage the State from conceding an issue
where appropriate, we are troubled by the State’s concession, considering defendant provided no
authority or analysis in support of his argument.
¶ 131 More importantly, based on our review of the plain language of section
5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii), the trial court did not err in imposing three natural life sentences. Section
5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) states:
“(a) Except as otherwise provided in the statute defining the offense or in
Article 4.5 of Chapter V, a sentence of imprisonment for a felony shall be a
determinate sentence set by the court under this Section, according to the following
limitations:
(1) for first degree murder,
***
(c) the court shall sentence the defendant to a term of natural
life imprisonment if the defendant, at the time of the commission of
the murder, had attained the age of 18, and:
***
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(ii) is found guilty of murdering more than one
victim[.]” (Emphasis added.) 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii)
(West 2018).
In this case, defendant was charged with and convicted of nine counts of first degree murder (three
counts for the death of Pena, three counts for the death of Jackson, and three counts for the death
of Perez). The counts with regard to each respective victim merged. As a result, the trial court
sentenced defendant on three counts of first degree murder—one felony count for each victim. As
a result, pursuant to the plain language of section 5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii), the trial court did not err in
sentencing defendant to a natural-life term for each of the three victims.
¶ 132 Defendant did not make an alternative argument his natural-life sentences should
not run consecutively assuming, arguendo, he could be sentenced to a natural-life sentence for the
murder of each of the victims. However, we note section 5-8-4(d)(1) of the Corrections Code (730
ILCS 5/5-8-4(d)(1) (West 2018)) mandates consecutive sentences if one of defendant’s
convictions was for first degree murder. Further, in People v. Petrenko, 237 Ill. 2d 490, 506-07,
931 N.E.2d 1198, 1208 (2010), our supreme court found section 5-8-4 of the Corrections Code
should be enforced “without regard to the practical impossibility of serving the sentences it yields.”
The supreme court stated “[t]he legislature has determined that the imposition of consecutive
natural-life sentences serves a legitimate public policy goal, and even if its effect is purely
symbolic, it is within the purview of the legislature to make that determination.” Petrenko, 237 Ill.
2d at 506. Thus, we will not disturb the sentences imposed by the trial court, and we deny
defendant’s request to amend the mittimus.
¶ 133 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 134 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
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¶ 135 Affirmed.
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People v. Mays, 2023 IL App (4th) 210612Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of McLean County, No. 18-CF-734; the Hon.
John Casey Costigan, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys James E. Chadd, Catherine K. Hart, and Austin Wright, of State Appellate
for Defender’s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.
Appellant:
Attorneys Don Knapp, State’s Attorney, of Bloomington (Patrick Delfino, David J.
for Robinson, and Douglas Malcolm, of State’s Attorneys Appellate
Appellee: Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.
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