People v. Glover

NOTICE 2023 IL App (4th) 220681-UThis Order was filed under
FILED
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is May 10, 2023
NO. 4-22-0681
not precedent except in the Carla Bender
limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate
under Rule 23(e)(1).
IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Winnebago County
MARQUAN GLEN GLOVER, ) No. 21CF1777
Defendant-Appellant. )
) Honorable
) Joseph G. McGraw,
) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE ZENOFF delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Cavanagh and Lannerd concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed defendant’s five-year prison sentence for resisting a
peace officer causing injury because the trial court did not apply a double
enhancement and the sentence was not excessive. In accordance with recent
legislation, the appellate court reduced defendant’s term of mandatory supervised
release from one year to six months.
¶2 Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Winnebago County, defendant,
Marquan Glen Glover, was convicted of resisting a peace officer causing injury (720 ILCS 5/31-
1(a-7) (West 2020)). The trial court sentenced defendant to five years in prison, followed by a
one-year term of mandatory supervised release (MSR). Defendant appeals, arguing that (1) the
court imposed an improper double sentencing enhancement, (2) the five-year prison sentence is
excessive, and (3) the MSR term should be reduced to six months. For the reasons that follow, we
reduce defendant’s MSR term to six months but affirm the judgment in all other respects.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 At defendant’s trial, the State proceeded on two charges: aggravated battery (720
ILCS 5/12-3.05(d)(4) (West 2020)) and resisting a peace officer causing injury (720 ILCS 5/31-
1(a-7) (West 2020)). Officer Ashley Calhoun of the Rockford Police Department was the alleged
victim in both counts.
¶5 Calhoun was the only witness. She testified as follows. Around 11:45 a.m. on
September 13, 2021, she was typing reports in her squad car in a middle school parking lot. A car
driven by Latisha Stewart drove up quickly toward Calhoun. Stewart got out of her car, yelling
that defendant had a warrant and that she wanted him out of her car. Although Calhoun attempted
to deescalate the situation, Stewart remained angry, and defendant was reluctant to speak with
Calhoun. Eventually, while Stewart was standing outside her car, defendant moved from the
passenger’s seat of that car to the driver’s seat. Stewart then approached defendant and struggled
with him for control of the car. According to Calhoun, Stewart was “almost sitting on” defendant,
with one leg inside the car and the other outside. Defendant was “trying to change the gearshift,”
whereas Stewart was “trying to get the keys out of the car.” Calhoun heard the car’s engine revving,
though she did not know whose feet were on the pedals. As the car bounced backward and forward,
Calhoun told defendant and Stewart to stop.
¶6 Eventually, the car “revved back,” hitting Calhoun with the door and dragging
Stewart about 15 to 20 feet. Calhoun “pull[ed] on” her service weapon, thinking she was going to
shoot defendant because he was dragging Stewart on the road. Calhoun yelled at defendant, “stop,
you’re dragging her.” Defendant immediately stopped the car. However, defendant then put the
car in “drive,” at which point Stewart let go of the car. Defendant then made a “sharp left turn”
and sped away. In doing so, defendant struck Calhoun’s leg with the car’s rear driver’s side fender
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and ran over Calhoun’s foot with a tire. Defendant briefly got out of the car and yelled something
before reentering the car and leaving the parking lot.
¶7 Calhoun then walked over to check on Stewart. Stewart complained of a foot injury,
though the nature and extent of that injury were not detailed at trial. Calhoun testified that she felt
soreness and pain in her own foot on the day of the incident, and she experienced some limping.
Calhoun decided to see a doctor the next day when her foot was “very, very sore.” According to
Calhoun, her foot was bruised, a little swollen, and “very painful.” Neither X-rays nor any pictures
depicting Calhoun’s injuries were offered at trial. Calhoun was asked at trial why she did not take
pictures of her injuries, and she testified that she had gotten used to sustaining injuries as a police
officer.
¶8 The jury acquitted defendant of aggravated battery but found him guilty of resisting
a peace officer causing injury, a Class 4 felony. 720 ILCS 5/31-1(a-7) (West 2020). Due to his
criminal record, defendant was eligible for an extended-term prison sentence of up to six years.
See 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-45(a) (West 2020). The parties agreed the applicable MSR term was one
year.
¶9 Defendant’s presentence investigation report (PSI) showed the following.
Defendant was 24 years old, unmarried, and had no children. He identified Stewart as his
“significant other,” and he described their relationship as “ ‘perfect.’ ” Defendant was expelled
from high school and never obtained his general equivalency diploma. Defendant’s work history
was sporadic, and he left multiple jobs due to his arrests. Defendant had a history of substance
abuse with alcohol and marijuana.
¶ 10 According to the PSI, defendant, as a minor, was adjudicated delinquent for theft,
robbery, and mob action. He was unsuccessful on probation, and he ultimately spent time in the
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Illinois Department of Juvenile Justice. As an adult, defendant had convictions for multiple counts
of domestic battery, multiple counts of aggravated battery, and resisting a peace officer. Defendant
had served a two-year prison sentence for one of his domestic battery convictions. Defendant had
a history of not complying with the conditions of his probation.
¶ 11 According to the PSI, defendant’s younger brother was murdered while defendant
was incarcerated awaiting trial in the present case. Defendant also reported that his mother “needs
him” because she has heart problems. Defendant stated that since his arrest in the present case, he
learned to think before reacting. Defendant looked forward to getting married, starting a business,
obtaining a commercial driver’s license, and “talk[ing] to people who need help.”
¶ 12 At the sentencing hearing, neither the State nor defendant presented any evidence.
However, defendant submitted supportive letters from his family.
¶ 13 The prosecutor requested a prison sentence “at or around the 5 year mark.” The
prosecutor emphasized the seriousness of the offense, including that defendant “chose to maneuver
a vehicle to evade police” in a school parking lot. According to the prosecutor, defendant showed
“no concern as to who around was going to be injured,” as he dragged Stewart and ran over
Calhoun’s foot. The prosecutor argued that Calhoun “testified at great length and in persuasive
emotionality as to the impact this had on her as to the danger it presented.” The prosecutor asserted
that defendant’s conduct posed a “great risk” and “deserves strong deterrent value in sentencing.”
¶ 14 The prosecutor argued that three aggravating sentencing factors applied. See 730
ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(a)(1) (West 2020) (“the defendant’s conduct caused or threatened serious harm”);
730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(a)(3) (West 2020) (“the defendant has a history of prior delinquency or
criminal activity”); 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(a)(7) (West 2020) (“the sentence is necessary to deter
others from committing the same crime”). As to aggravating factor (a)(1), the prosecutor said: “It
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caused injury for an individual and it certainly threatened serious harm both at the location in
which this was conducted and the recklessness with which he drove away as testified to by Officer
Calhoun.”
¶ 15 Defense counsel requested a sentence of “time served, followed by probation.”
According to counsel, seven months of incarceration was “not an insignificant consequence.”
Counsel emphasized that Calhoun was not seriously injured. Counsel asserted, “So it could have
been worse. Thankfully, it was not.” Furthermore, counsel mentioned that defendant regretted
being incarcerated when his brother was murdered. In counsel’s view, it was not worth wasting
taxpayer money sending defendant to prison “when he’s already faced pretty significant
consequences of having his liberty deprived for almost a year [sic] and having unfortunately lost
his brother while he was locked up inside.” Counsel also noted that defendant’s mother had heart
problems, and defendant “would like to be out to care for her.”
¶ 16 Defense counsel argued that mitigating factor (a)(2) applied. See 730 ILCS 5/5-5-
3.1(a)(2) (West 2020) (“The defendant did not contemplate that his criminal conduct would cause
or threaten serious physical harm to another.”). On that point, counsel proposed that defendant
wanted to evade the police but did not intend to harm anyone. Defense counsel also argued that
“defendant’s criminal conduct was the result of circumstances unlikely to recur.” 730 ILCS 5/5-5-
3.1(a)(8) (West 2020). To that end, counsel characterized the facts of the case as “somewhat of a
freak incident,” as defendant panicked while “trying to get away” from the scene.
¶ 17 Defense counsel further argued that mitigating factor (a)(9) applied. See 730 ILCS
5/5-5-3.1(a)(9) (West 2020) (“The character and attitudes of the defendant indicate that he is
unlikely to commit another crime.”). With respect to this factor, counsel focused on defendant’s
statements in the PSI about desiring to get married and start a business. Finally, defense counsel
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contended that mitigating factor (a)(10) applied. See 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.1(a)(10) (West 2020) (“The
defendant is particularly likely to comply with the terms of a period of probation.”). Although
counsel acknowledged that defendant’s criminal history might not support this factor, counsel
argued that defendant was a young man who had “made numerous poor decisions” but was
“looking towards the future.” Defense counsel added that defendant had “strong family support,”
as indicated by the letters submitted on his behalf.
¶ 18 Defendant offered a brief statement in allocution. He apologized for his actions and
said he “didn’t mean to hurt” anybody. Defendant added: “I’m a changed man now. And I want to
do better, succeed in life, *** be there for my family, *** and make better decisions in life.”
¶ 19 The trial court began its sentencing ruling by stating, “To the extent I refer to the
facts of the case, it is not as an enhancement, but only as it relates to the nature and circumstances
of the offense.” The court added that it had considered all relevant aggravating and mitigating
factors, the trial evidence, the parties’ arguments, the PSI, defendant’s character letters,
defendant’s statement in allocution, and defendant’s rehabilitative potential. The court also
considered the four purposes of sentencing: retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation.
¶ 20 The trial court found that mitigating factor (a)(1) did not apply. See 730 ILCS 5/5-
5-3.1(a)(1) (West 2020) (“The defendant’s criminal conduct neither caused nor threatened serious
physical harm to another.”) The court prefaced its remarks by stating: “I’m not saying this as an
enhancement because he’s found guilty of causing injury.” The court then recounted the trial
evidence that defendant struggled with Stewart for control of the car while the engine revved and
the car jerked violently. The court said that “it was just a matter of time before the car lurched
forward or backwards in a way that either struck somebody or injured somebody.” The court noted
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that defendant’s struggle with Stewart was “ongoing” rather than “just a snap decision” by
defendant. The court further recalled that Calhoun pleaded with defendant to stop but all defendant
“could think about was getting out of there without being arrested.” According to the court,
defendant was “driving the car in a reckless and dangerous manner” when he struggled with
Stewart, even as Calhoun tried to get defendant’s attention and “get out of the way.” For these
reasons, the court found mitigating factor (a)(1) did not apply.
¶ 21 The trial court determined that mitigating factor (a)(2) did not apply. See 730 ILCS
5/5-5-3.1(a)(2) (West 2020) (“The defendant did not contemplate that his criminal conduct would
cause or threaten serious physical harm to another.”). The court described it as “a miracle” that
Calhoun was not injured more seriously, as defendant “gave no regard whatsoever” to Calhoun’s
and Stewart’s safety.
¶ 22 The trial court also determined that six other mitigating factors did not apply. See
730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.1(a)(3)-(7), (10) (West 2020). Specifically, the court noted that defendant did
not act under strong provocation, there were not substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify
defendant’s conduct, defendant’s conduct was not induced or facilitated by someone else, and
there was “no discussion of compensating the victim.” The court also recognized that defendant
had a “significant history of prior delinquency and criminal activity,” and defendant had “not led
a law abiding life for a substantial period of time.” Additionally, the court determined that
defendant’s adult and juvenile records did not indicate he was likely to comply with probation.
However, the court credited defendant for complying with the terms of a pretrial furlough the court
had granted when defendant attended his brother’s funeral.
¶ 23 The trial court then addressed the need for deterrence. The court explained:
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“I see every day in this courtroom, individuals that show no respect for law
enforcement. I don’t know what happened over the years, but it’s a huge problem
in our community of people running from the police, not obeying orders, fighting
the police, resisting arrest, driving in a crazy manner. It puts a whole community at
risk.”
The court stated it would remember Calhoun’s “compelling” testimony “for a long, long time.”
The court recalled that Calhoun feared for her life and contemplated having to use deadly force to
protect herself from defendant’s driving. The court also noted that this incident occurred in a school
parking lot. In the court’s view, defendant wanted to get away from the police and “didn’t care
who [he] had to hurt to do it.” The court “agree[d] with the prosecutor” that it was necessary “to
impose a sentence to deter others.” The court reiterated that it was “just a miracle” that defendant
did not injure Calhoun more severely.
¶ 24 The trial court recognized that defendant expressed having goals. The court hoped
defendant would pursue those goals in prison, including by not associating himself with “losers”
who “blame everybody else for their circumstances.” Ultimately, the court “agree[d] with the
prosecutor on this case.” The court sentenced defendant to 5 years in prison, with credit for 216
days served, to be followed by 1 year of MSR.
¶ 25 Defendant filed a motion to reconsider the sentence. Defendant argued the sentence
was excessive and that the trial court failed to consider mitigating factors and defendant’s
rehabilitative potential.
¶ 26 The trial court denied defendant’s motion. In explaining its ruling, the court
emphasized that defendant’s conduct was “extremely dangerous.” The court again described the
facts of the offense, including that defendant endangered both Calhoun and Stewart. The court
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clarified that it was “only sentencing [defendant] for what [he] did to Officer Calhoun.” The court
added that it “mentioned the other facts of the case not as an aggravation, but as it relates to the
nature and circumstances of the offense.” The court also reiterated that it considered the relevant
sentencing factors, including defendant’s rehabilitative potential.
¶ 27 Defendant timely appealed.
¶ 28 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 29 A. Double Enhancement
¶ 30 Defendant first argues that the trial court applied an improper double enhancement
by considering Calhoun’s injury in aggravation at sentencing, as injury is an element of the charged
offense. Defendant acknowledges he forfeited this issue by failing to raise it in the trial court. See
People v. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d 539, 544 (2010) (“It is well settled that, to preserve a claim of
sentencing error, both a contemporaneous objection and a written postsentencing motion raising
the issue are required.”). Defendant asks us to consider the issue pursuant to the second prong of
the plain-error doctrine. The State responds that the court did not apply an improper double
enhancement because the court appropriately commented on “the circumstances surrounding” the
offense and Calhoun’s injury.
¶ 31 To obtain relief pursuant to the plain-error doctrine, “a defendant must first show
that a clear or obvious error occurred.” Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d at 545. “In the sentencing context, a
defendant must then show either that (1) the evidence at the sentencing hearing was closely
balanced, or (2) the error was so egregious as to deny the defendant a fair sentencing hearing.”
Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d at 545. The defendant bears the burden of persuasion to demonstrate plain error.
Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d at 545. A defendant “cannot obtain relief on an unpreserved error under the
plain-error doctrine if he would not have been entitled to relief on the same error if preserved.”
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People v. Williams, 2022 IL 126918, ¶ 49. Thus, the typical threshold inquiry is to ascertain
whether any error occurred at all. Williams, 2022 IL 126918, ¶ 49.
¶ 32 Although a trial court has broad discretion to impose a sentence, a court may not
consider as an aggravating sentencing factor something implicit in the offense. People v.
Abdelhadi, 2012 IL App (2d) 111053, ¶ 9. In other words, an element of the charged offense cannot
also serve as “a basis for imposing a ‘harsher sentence than might otherwise have been imposed.’ ”
Abdelhadi, 2012 IL App (2d) 111053, ¶ 9 (quoting People v. Gonzalez, 151 Ill. 2d 79, 83-84
(1992)). For example, if a court were sentencing a defendant for involuntary manslaughter, it
would be improper for the court to enhance the sentence on the basis that the defendant’s conduct
resulted in a death, as death is inherent in the offense. See People v. Martin, 119 Ill. 2d 453, 461
(1988). “Such dual use of a single factor is often referred to as ‘double enhancement.’ ” Abdelhadi,
2012 IL App (2d) 111053, ¶ 9 (quoting Gonzalez, 151 Ill. 2d at 85).
¶ 33 Nevertheless, “[a] trial court is not required to refrain from any mention of
sentencing factors that constitute elements of the offense.” People v. Sauseda, 2016 IL App (1st)
140134, ¶ 15. To that end, “a trial judge’s commentary on the nature and circumstances of a
defendant’s crimes” does not necessarily constitute an improper double enhancement. Sauseda,
2016 IL App (1st) 140134, ¶ 15. Specifically, “even where serious bodily harm is arguably implicit
in the offense of which the defendant is convicted,” it is proper for the trial court to consider as
aggravating factors the degree of harm, the manner in which that harm occurred, and the nature
and circumstances of the offense. People v. Dowding, 388 Ill. App. 3d 936, 943 (2009). “In
determining whether the trial court based the sentence on proper aggravating and mitigating
factors, a court of review should consider the record as a whole, rather than focusing on a few
words or statements by the trial court.” Dowding, 388 Ill. App. 3d at 943.
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¶ 34 We determine the trial court did not apply a double enhancement. Unlike cases
defendant cites where trial courts were found to have imposed double enhancements, the court
here did not explicitly cite either harm or potential harm as aggravating factors. Rather, the court’s
discussion about harm and potential harm was in the context of explaining why certain mitigating
factors did not apply.
¶ 35 Additionally, the trial court obviously was aware of the prohibition against double
enhancements, as the court said its discussion of the facts of the case and its analysis of harm were
not enhancements. Defendant analogizes the case to People v. Sanders, 2016 IL App (3d) 130511,
where the appellate court vacated a sentence based on a double enhancement. In Sanders, the trial
court sentenced the defendant for offenses including first degree murder. In addressing the
aggravating factors, the trial court said, “ ‘[A]mong other things, the defendant’s conduct did cause
or threaten serious harm. It may be inherent in the actual fact that he committed a murder, but it
did occur.’ ” Sanders, 2016 IL App (3d) 130511, ¶ 6. Thus, the trial court in Sanders intentionally
applied a double enhancement despite recognizing that the aggravating factor was inherent in the
offense. Here, by contrast, the court indicated its awareness of the prohibition against double
enhancements and did not purport to apply a double enhancement.
¶ 36 Moreover, the trial court appropriately considered the circumstances of the offense
and the degree of harm that defendant’s actions threatened. The offense of which defendant was
convicted requires “an injury” to a police officer. 720 ILCS 5/31-1(a-7) (West 2020). There are
innumerable ways a person might resist an officer, and there is a broad spectrum of how severely
an officer might be injured. Here, a reasonable inference from the evidence was that defendant
intentionally reversed a car while Stewart was partially inside the car and while Calhoun was
standing close enough nearby to get hit. Defendant did not stop until Calhoun started to pull her
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service weapon and yelled at him. Defendant then put the car in “drive,” hitting Calhoun with the
car and running over her foot as he sped away. Operating a vehicle in this manner posed a uniquely
high risk of injury to both Stewart and Calhoun—more so than if defendant had fled the scene on
foot, for example. As the court recognized, it was a “miracle” nobody was injured more severely.
Rather than serving as an improper double enhancement, the court’s comments were part of a
proper analysis of the nature and circumstances of defendant’s conduct. Nothing in the court’s
comments suggests it enhanced defendant’s sentence based on the mere fact that Calhoun sustained
an injury.
¶ 37 In arguing to the contrary, defendant notes that (1) the State urged the trial court to
consider the mere fact of injury as an aggravating factor and (2) the court said it agreed with the
State. According to defendant, “[i]n adopting the State’s position, the trial court necessarily
implied that its sentence was based, at least in part, on the State’s argument that [defendant’s]
conduct caused injury.” We discern no error. The court twice mentioned agreeing with the State.
Specifically, the court “agree[d] with the prosecutor” that it was necessary “to impose a sentence
to deter others.” The court later said it “agree[d] with the prosecutor on this case” that a five-year
prison sentence was more appropriate than probation. In context, the court’s comments cannot
reasonably be interpreted as suggesting the court was applying a double enhancement.
¶ 38 Accordingly, we hold defendant has not met his burden to show that a clear or
obvious error occurred.
¶ 39 B. Excessive Sentence
¶ 40 Defendant next argues that his five-year prison sentence is excessive.
¶ 41 The Illinois Constitution provides that “[a]ll penalties shall be determined both
according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful
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citizenship.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. 1, § 11. “A reviewing court gives substantial deference to the
trial court’s sentencing decision because the trial judge, having observed the defendant and the
proceedings, is in a much better position to consider factors such as the defendant’s credibility,
demeanor, moral character, mentality, environment, habits, and age.” People v. Snyder, 2011 IL
111382, ¶ 36. A statutorily authorized sentence is presumptively proper, and we may not disturb
such sentence absent an abuse of discretion. People v. Musgrave, 2019 IL App (4th) 170106, ¶ 56.
“A trial court’s sentence is an abuse of discretion if it is greatly at odds with the spirit and purpose
of the law or is manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense.” Musgrave, 2019 IL App
(4th) 170106, ¶ 56. In reviewing a sentencing challenge, we may not substitute our judgment for
the trial court’s as to the weight to be attributed to applicable factors. Musgrave, 2019 IL App (4th)
170106, ¶ 56. “Absent explicit evidence to the contrary, we also presume the court considered all
mitigating factors.” People v. Page, 2022 IL App (4th) 210374, ¶ 52.
¶ 42 Defendant’s five-year prison sentence is statutorily authorized, and it is one year
less than the maximum extended-term sentence. Given defendant’s criminal record and the
seriousness of his conduct, the sentence is neither greatly at odds with the spirit and purpose of the
law nor manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense. Although the defense requested
“time served” plus probation, the trial court reasonably determined a prison sentence was
warranted. Defendant had a significant criminal record, along with a history of not complying with
the conditions of his probation. Defendant also had previously served a two-year prison sentence
for domestic battery.
¶ 43 Defendant argues the trial court exaggerated the gravity of harm to Calhoun.
According to defendant, a five-year prison sentence was unwarranted where Calhoun sustained
only “modest harm.” This argument is unpersuasive, as it ignores the extremely serious nature of
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defendant’s conduct. While attempting to flee from Calhoun, defendant dragged Stewart with his
car, hit Calhoun with the car twice, and ran over Calhoun’s foot. The court did not exaggerate
Calhoun’s injuries. Rather, the court appropriately recognized that defendant’s actions easily could
have resulted in more serious injuries. As mentioned above, the seriousness of the offense was not
just that defendant resisted Calhoun but the manner in which he did so.
¶ 44 Defendant argues the evidence showed he was not aware he was dragging Stewart
until Calhoun informed him of that fact. According to defendant, because he immediately stopped
the car when he learned he was dragging Stewart, he “did have concern for the safety of others.”
The record does not support defendant’s position. Calhoun testified that defendant dragged Stewart
15 to 20 feet while Stewart was almost sitting on him. Defendant then put the car in “drive,” made
a sharp left turn, hit Calhoun, ran over her foot, and left the scene. The evidence justified the trial
court’s conclusion that defendant showed no concern for the safety of others.
¶ 45 Defendant further maintains that the trial court discounted evidence of his
rehabilitative potential. Defendant notes that he expressed remorse for his actions, he had strong
family support, he was employed at the time of the offense, and he lost his brother while awaiting
trial. Defendant proposes that the court sentenced him without regard for his rehabilitative
potential.
¶ 46 The record likewise does not support this argument. Trial courts have discretion to
determine which of the four purposes of sentencing—retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation—predominate in a given case. Page, 2022 IL App (4th) 210374, ¶ 52. The trial court
stated that it considered defendant’s rehabilitative potential. “In fashioning a sentence, the trial
court need not give a defendant’s rehabilitative potential greater weight than the seriousness of the
offense.” People v. Anderson, 2021 IL App (2d) 191001, ¶ 24. Nothing in the court’s comments
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suggests that defendant lacks rehabilitative potential. Nevertheless, the court reasonably
determined that the totality of the circumstances justified a five-year prison sentence.
¶ 47 Defendant also argues that the trial court placed “undue weight on the value of
deterrence.” According to defendant, he did not intend to hurt Calhoun (the jury acquitted him of
aggravated battery), and deterrence is a marginally relevant consideration when a defendant’s
conduct is unintentional. See Martin, 119 Ill. 2d at 459 (“Since it is exceedingly difficult to deter
unintentional conduct, an enhanced penalty would have very little, if any, deterrent effect on
potential offenders.”). Defendant acknowledges “the offense of resisting a peace officer may be
deterrable in the way the trial court suggested.” However, defendant notes that the maximum
sentence for resisting a peace officer without a resulting injury is one year of incarceration. 720
ILCS 5/31-1(a) (West 2020) (establishing that resisting without a resulting injury is a Class A
misdemeanor); 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-55(a) (West 2020) (providing that Class A misdemeanors are
punishable by less than one year of imprisonment). From these premises, defendant concludes that
“[d]eterrence of that which was unintentional, the minor injury to Calhoun, cannot possibly justify
the imposition of additional prison time.”
¶ 48 In Martin, the defendant, who worked in a massage parlor, obeyed her manager’s
instruction to retrieve a shotgun when a fight broke out among the manager and inebriated
customers. Martin, 119 Ill. 2d at 455-56. Although the evidence was “not clear” as to whether the
defendant pulled the trigger of the shotgun, the gun somehow discharged, killing one of the
customers. Martin, 119 Ill. 2d at 456. It was in this context that our supreme court mentioned that
deterrence was only a marginally applicable sentencing factor for the defendant’s conviction of
involuntary manslaughter. Martin, 119 Ill. 2d at 459.
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¶ 49 Martin’s reasoning does not apply here. The defendant in Martin found herself in
a dangerous situation through no fault of her own, and she reacted by following her manager’s
instructions. Here, by contrast, defendant’s choices turned what should have been a routine police
encounter into a dangerous situation. Defendant could have stayed at the scene and allowed
Calhoun to do her job, including determining whether Stewart was correct that defendant had a
warrant. Instead, defendant chose to drive away from the scene in a manner that endangered both
Stewart and Calhoun in a school parking lot. The trial court reasonably considered that other
members of the public should be deterred from making similar choices. Deterrence may be a
relevant consideration where a defendant makes conscious choices that cause harm to another
person, even if the defendant did not intend such harm. See People v. Martin, 289 Ill. App. 3d 367,
376-77 (1997) (holding that deterrence was a relevant aggravating factor where the defendant was
convicted of reckless homicide).
¶ 50 In his reply brief, defendant asserts that “the trial court appeared to be sentencing
[defendant] for an offense of which he was not convicted”—aggravated battery. Defendant also
proposes that the court showed “personal disdain for defendants in [defendant’s] position.” These
arguments do not change our analysis. The court never said or suggested that defendant
intentionally injured Calhoun. The court’s comments at sentencing were focused on the
seriousness of defendant’s conduct, not the court’s personal disdain for people who resist police
officers.
¶ 51 Accordingly, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
sentencing defendant to five years in prison.
¶ 52 C. MSR
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¶ 53 Finally, defendant argues, and the State concedes, that his MSR term should be
reduced to six months. We accept the State’s concession. After defendant filed his notice of appeal,
Public Act 102-1104 (eff. Dec. 6, 2022) went into effect. The relevant statute now establishes a
six-month MSR term for the offense of which defendant was convicted. Pub. Act 102-1104 (eff.
Dec. 6, 2022) (amending 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(d)(3)). The statute further specifies that the
amendments “apply to all individuals released on mandatory supervised release on or after the
effective date of this amendatory Act of the 102nd General Assembly, including those individuals
whose sentences were imposed prior to the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 102nd
General Assembly.” Pub. Act 102-1104 (eff. Dec. 6, 2022) (amending 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(d)(3)).
In accordance with this statute, we reduce defendant’s MSR term to six months.
¶ 54 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 55 For the reasons stated, we reduce defendant’s MSR term to six months but affirm
the judgment in all other respects.
¶ 56 Affirmed as modified.
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