Randall Langford v. State of Indiana

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before Apr 11 2014, 5:51 am
any court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
NICOLE A. ZELIN GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Greenfield, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
CHANDRA K. HEIN
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
RANDALL LANGFORD, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 30A01-1309-CR-431
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE HANCOCK SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Dan E. Marshall, Judge
Cause No. 30D02-1205-CM-639
April 11, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
NAJAM, Judge
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Randall Langford appeals his conviction for operating a motor vehicle while
intoxicated (“OWI”), as a Class A misdemeanor, following a bench trial. Langford
presents three issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as two issues:
1. Whether the police officer had probable cause to initiate a traffic
stop prior to Langford’s arrest.
2. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support his
conviction.
We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 7, 2012, at approximately 1:05 a.m., Officer Nathan Garner with the
McCordsville Police Department was on patrol when he observed a white Cadillac
travelling eastbound on State Road 67 at a high rate of speed. Officer Garner used his
radar to determine that the car was going seventy-three miles per hour in a fifty-five mile
per hour zone. Accordingly, Officer Garner followed the car, which had turned into a
residential driveway, and initiated a traffic stop.
As Officer Garner approached the car, he smelled a strong odor of alcohol. The
driver presented his license and registration and identified himself as Langford. No one
else was in the car. As Officer Garner talked to Langford, he noticed that Langford’s
eyes appeared glassy and bloodshot and his breath smelled of alcohol. Officer Garner
also perceived that Langford’s speech was very slow. Langford consented to undergoing
field sobriety tests, and he failed the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, the walk and turn
test, and the one leg stand test. Officer Garner then advised Langford of his rights under
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the implied consent law. Langford consented to a chemical test, which was conducted at
the Fortville Police Department. That test revealed that Langford’s blood alcohol content
(“BAC”) was .13.
The State charged Langford with OWI, as a Class A misdemeanor, and operating a
motor vehicle with a BAC of .08-.15, a Class C misdemeanor. Following a bench trial,
the trial court found Langford guilty of OWI, as a Class A misdemeanor, and entered
judgment and sentence accordingly. This appeal ensued.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
Issue One: Probable Cause
Langford first contends that Officer Garner did not have probable cause to conduct
a traffic stop and investigate whether he had been drinking alcohol. The Fourth
Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures has been extended to
the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Thayer v. State, 904 N.E.2d 706, 709
(Ind. Ct. App. 2009). The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and
seizures by the government, and its safeguards extend to brief investigatory stops of
persons or vehicles that fall short of traditional arrest. Id. However, a police officer may
briefly detain a person for investigatory purposes without a warrant or probable cause if,
based upon specific and articulable facts together with rational inferences from those
facts, the official intrusion is reasonably warranted and the officer has a reasonable
suspicion that criminal activity “may be afoot.” Moultry v. State, 808 N.E.2d 168, 170-
71 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968)).
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A police officer may stop a vehicle when he observes a minor traffic violation.
Ransom v. State, 741 N.E.2d 419, 421 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied. Stopping an
automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a “seizure” within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment, even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting
detention quite brief. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979). “Once the
purpose of the traffic stop is completed, a motorist cannot be further detained unless
something that occurred during the stop caused the officer to have a reasonable and
articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot.” United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d
258, 264 (6th Cir. 1999). “If the . . . detention exceeds its proper investigative scope, the
seized items must be excluded under the ‘fruits of the poisonous tree doctrine.’” Id.
Here, Officer Garner testified that he observed Langford driving eighteen miles
per hour over the posted speed limit. Thus, the traffic stop was lawful. And as soon as
Officer Garner began talking to Langford, he smelled a strong odor of alcohol and
observed that Langford had glassy and bloodshot eyes. Langford consented to undergo
field sobriety tests, and he failed three of those tests. Finally, Langford consented to a
chemical breath test. The traffic stop and subsequent investigation did not violate
Langford’s Fourth Amendment rights.
Issue Two: Sufficiency of the Evidence
When the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction is challenged, we
neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses, and we affirm if
there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the crime
from which a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a
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reasonable doubt. Wright v. State, 828 N.E.2d 904, 905-06 (Ind. 2005). It is the job of
the fact-finder to determine whether the evidence in a particular case sufficiently proves
each element of an offense, and we consider conflicting evidence most favorably to the
trial court’s ruling. Id. at 906.
To prove OWI, as a Class A misdemeanor, the State had to show that Langford
operated a vehicle while intoxicated in a manner that endangered himself or another
person. Langford contends that the State failed to prove either that he was intoxicated or
that he endangered himself or another person. We address each element in turn.
Intoxication
Langford first maintains that the evidence is insufficient to show that he was
intoxicated. Indiana Code Section 9-13-2-86 defines “intoxicated” in relevant part as
under the influence of alcohol so that there is an impaired condition of thought and action
and the loss of normal control of a person’s faculties. Impairment can be established by
evidence of: (1) the consumption of significant amounts of alcohol; (2) impaired
attention and reflexes; (3) watery or bloodshot eyes; (4) the odor of alcohol on the breath;
(5) unsteady balance; (6) failure of field sobriety tests; (7) slurred speech. Fields v. State,
888 N.E.2d 304, 307 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Here, the State presented ample evidence that
Langford was intoxicated, including his failure of three field sobriety tests and a chemical
breath test showing a BAC of .13. Langford’s contentions on appeal amount to a request
that we reweigh the evidence, which we will not do.
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Endangering Himself or Others
Langford also contends that the State presented insufficient evidence to prove that
he endangered himself or others. The element of endangerment can be established by
evidence showing that the defendant’s condition or operating manner could have
endangered any person, including the public, the police, or the defendant. Vanderlinden
v. State, 918 N.E.2d 642, 644 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. Endangerment does
not require that a person other than the defendant be in the same area or that a person be
in the path of the defendant’s vehicle to obtain a conviction. Id. at 644-45.
Here, the State presented evidence that Langford was driving eighteen miles per
hour over the posted speed limit. In Vanderlinden, the defendant drove sixteen miles per
hour over the posted speed limit, and we held that that evidence was sufficient to prove
the endangerment element. Id. at 646 n.1. Langford’s contention on appeal amounts to a
request that we reweigh the evidence, which, again, we will not do. 1 The State presented
sufficient evidence to support Langford’s conviction.
Affirmed.
VAIDIK, C.J., and BROWN, J., concur.
1
To the extent Langford suggests that the State impermissibly used the evidence that he was
speeding to also support the element of intoxication, the record does not support that suggestion.
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