State of Maine v. Chad D. Lagasse

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2016 ME 158Docket: Aro-15-638
Argued: September 8, 2016
Decided: October 20, 2016
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
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STATE OF MAINE
v.
CHAD D. LAGASSE
ALEXANDER, J.
[¶1] Chad D. Lagasse appeals from the judgment and conviction entered
in the Superior Court (Aroostook County, Hunter, J.) following a jury verdict
finding him guilty of aggravated trafficking of scheduled drugs pursuant to
17-A M.R.S. § 1105-A(1)(B)(1) (2015).1 Lagasse contends that the Superior
Court erred by denying his motion to suppress. We find no error and affirm
the judgment.
Although not available at oral argument, Justice Gorman participated in the development of
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this opinion. See M.R. App. P. 12(a) (“A qualified justice may participate in a decision even though
not present at oral argument.”).
1 The court also issued a forfeiture order pursuant to 15 M.R.S. § 5826 (2015). Lagasse was
sentenced to fifteen years in prison with all but four years of the sentence suspended, four years of
probation, and a $5,000 fine.
2
I. CASE HISTORY
[¶2] When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
support a finding, we review the evidence—here the evidence at the
suppression hearing—and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from
that evidence, in the light most favorable to the trial court’s findings, to
determine whether the court rationally could have found the contested facts
at issue. See State v. Murphy, 2016 ME 5, ¶ 5, 130 A.3d 401; State v. Jones,
2012 ME 88, ¶ 7, 46 A.3d 1125.
[¶3] The Superior Court made the following findings, which are
supported by the record. On or about January 3, 2013, two masked men burst
into the victim’s home in Caribou and demanded money from her. At least one
of the men brandished a firearm. The victim gave them money, and the men
left the victim physically unharmed but shaken. The victim called the Caribou
Police Department to report the robbery. She reported that she recognized
one of the men as Eric Mowatt but could not identify the other robber. Police
located Mowatt within a few hours and interviewed him. At that time, he
denied any involvement in the robbery. Based on the victim’s report, police
arrested Mowatt and transported him to the Aroostook County Jail.
3
[¶4] Several days later, Mowatt contacted the police from the jail. He
admitted his involvement in the robbery and identified Lagasse as his
accomplice. He stated that the purpose of the robbery was to obtain money to
satisfy Lagasse’s drug debt. The police continued their investigation but were
unable to locate Lagasse.
[¶5] On January 19, 2013, Mowatt, who had been released on bail,
contacted the police to tell them that Lagasse was at a store in Fort Fairfield in
a silver Mazda Protégé with a special license plate called a “transport plate.”
Mowatt provided the license plate number. The lead investigator emailed the
officers of the Caribou Police Department to alert them to Lagasse’s presence
in the area. He provided a description of the car and instructed officers to
arrest Lagasse if they found him. The lead investigator also instructed officers
to find a reasonable basis to stop the car and to use caution when interacting
with Lagasse. No warrant for Lagasse’s arrest was sought.
[¶6] The following day, a Caribou police officer located a car matching
the description provided by Mowatt but could not determine anything about
its occupants. The officer was following the car closely enough to read the
transport plate when the car suddenly “veered sharply to the right” and
changed lanes without signaling. The officer executed a “high risk felony stop”
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by radioing for assistance, drawing his weapon, and verbally commanding the
driver to get out of the car and place his hands on the vehicle’s roof. When the
driver complied, the officer immediately recognized Lagasse and arrested him.
[¶7] Lagasse was indicted on charges of robbery (Class A),
17-A M.R.S. § 651(1)(E) (2015), theft by unauthorized taking or transfer
(Class C), 17-A M.R.S. § 353(1)(B)(4) (2015), illegal possession of a firearm
(Class C), 15 M.R.S. § 393(1)(A-1) (2015), and aggravated trafficking of
scheduled drugs (Class A), 17-A M.R.S. § 1105-A(1)(B)(1) (2015). The
indictment also included a claim for criminal forfeiture of property, 15 M.R.S.
§ 5826 (2015). The aggravated trafficking charge was based on pills that
Lagasse possessed or apparently dropped on the ground at the time of his
arrest.
[¶8] Lagasse moved to suppress evidence of drugs that the arresting
officer found on and near Lagasse when he was arrested, arguing that police
lacked probable cause for Lagasse’s warrantless arrest because Mowatt’s
identification was unreliable, the stop for failure to use a turn signal was
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pretextual, and the officer lacked reasonable articulable suspicion to stop the
vehicle.2
[¶9] The court held a testimonial hearing on the motion on May 20,
2014, at which the lead investigator and arresting officer testified. By written
order, the court denied the motion, finding that Mowatt’s identification was
sufficiently reliable because Mowatt had admitted personal involvement in
the robbery. The court further found that the car stop was lawful based on
Lagasse’s sudden change in direction without using a turn signal. The court
denied Lagasse’s motion for further findings of fact and conclusions of law.
See M.R. Crim. P. 41A(d).
[¶10] A jury trial was held on November 12-13, 2015. The jury found
Lagasse guilty of aggravated trafficking but not guilty of the three charges
related to the home invasion. Lagasse filed a timely notice of appeal.
15 M.R.S. § 2115 (2015); M.R. App. P. 2(b)(2)(A).
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
[¶11] “We review the trial court's factual findings on a motion to
suppress for clear error, and its ultimate determination regarding
2 Lagasse’s written motion to suppress asserted only that the stop of his vehicle was illegal
because it was based on pretext, rather than reasonable and articulable suspicion. At the hearing
on that motion, however, Lagasse also argued that the officer lacked probable cause to arrest him.
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suppression de novo.” State v. Bryant, 2014 ME 94, ¶ 8, 97 A.3d 595. Because
Lagasse does not challenge the trial court's factual findings, we review only
the legal determination. See id. We will uphold the trial court’s “denial of a
motion to suppress if any reasonable view of the evidence supports the trial
court's decision.” State v. Kierstead, 2015 ME 45, ¶ 14, 114 A.3d 984.
[¶12] On appeal, Lagasse contends that (A) the officer did not have
probable cause to arrest him for robbery, and (B) the officer did not have
reasonable articulable suspicion to stop his car. We address each contention
in turn.
A. Probable Cause to Arrest
[¶13] Law enforcement officers are authorized to make warrantless
arrests under certain circumstances, including when an officer has probable
cause to believe that a person has committed any Class A, Class B, or Class C
crime. 17-A M.R.S. § 15(1)(A)(2) (2015); cf. State v. Martin, 2015 ME 91, ¶ 8,
120 A.3d 113. “Probable cause exists where facts and circumstances within
the knowledge of the officers and of which they have reasonably trustworthy
information would warrant a prudent and cautious person to believe that the
arrestee did commit or is committing the felonious offense.”
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State v. Parkinson, 389 A.2d 1, 8 (Me. 1978); see also Maryland v. Pringle,
540 U.S. 366, 370-71 (2003).
[¶14] Probable cause includes the collective information known to the
police and is not limited to the personal knowledge of the arresting officer.
State v. Carr, 1997 ME 221, ¶ 7, 704 A.2d 353. The test is an objective
standard. State v. Enggass, 571 A.2d 823, 825 (Me. 1990). “The probable
cause standard . . . has a very low threshold.” State v. Webster, 2000 ME 115,
¶ 7, 754 A.2d 976.
[¶15] Here, the trial court found that the magnitude of Mowatt’s
admission of personal involvement in the armed robbery carried sufficient
reliability to overcome any flaws in Mowatt’s statements to the police and
supported the objective standard required for a probable cause
determination. Lagasse contends that the court erred in its probable cause
determination by relying on an unreliable and uncorroborated statement of
an informant.
[¶16] Lagasse’s characterization of Mowatt as an “informant” is
misplaced.3 Mowatt was an accomplice-witness to the crime and had
3 Lagasse supports his argument with a long list of cases involving police informants in drug
investigations. We have described police informants as persons who “are often criminally disposed
or implicated, and supply their ‘tips’ to the authorities on a recurring basis, in secret, and for
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provided accurate information identifying the vehicle in which Lagasse was
located.
[¶17] A conviction, which requires a burden of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, may be sustained upon the uncorroborated testimony of an
accomplice. See State v. Johnson, 434 A.2d 532, 534-535, 537 (Me. 1981)
(affirming conviction for murder principally based on testimony of accomplice
whose credibility was challenged); State v. Jewell, 285 A.2d 847, 851-852
(Me. 1972) (affirming conviction for breaking, entering, and larceny when the
uncorroborated accomplice testimony formed the basis for the jury’s verdict);
State v. Morey, 126 Me. 323, 327, 138 A. 474, 475 (1927); State v. Cunningham,
31 Me. 355 (1850).
[¶18] Because uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice may sustain
a conviction, which requires the highest burden of proof, such statements of
an accomplice may satisfy the lower standard of proof required to
demonstrate probable cause. Here, in the totality of circumstances of this
case, Mowatt’s statement to police identifying Lagasse as his accomplice
during the robbery was sufficient evidence, by itself, to provide the police with
probable cause for Lagasse’s arrest.
pecuniary or other personal gain.” State v. Parkinson, 389 A.2d 1, 9 (Me. 1978) (quoting People v.
Ramey, 545 P.2d 1333, 1336 (Cal. 1976)). That is not the case at hand.
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[¶19] Lagasse further contends that police were required to
corroborate Mowatt’s identification because of inconsistencies in Mowatt’s
statement. However, the uncorroborated statement of an accomplice may,
under certain circumstances, be credible despite inconsistencies. See State v.
Sawyer, 314 A.2d 830, 832 (Me. 1974). In Sawyer, we upheld a conviction for
breaking, entering, and larceny in the nighttime when the State's evidence as
to the defendant's participation in the crime came entirely from the testimony
of the accomplice, and the accomplice had renounced his accusation against
the defendant on one occasion prior to trial. Id. Under a different set of
circumstances, we found that a jury could have construed seemingly
inconsistent answers made by an accomplice during his testimony in a
manner that would be consistent with his prior description of events.
State v. James, 161 Me. 17, 22, 206 A.2d 410, 412 (1965). We noted “the
evidence in the case was not marked by that degree of inconsistency and lack
of credibility which would preclude a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Id.
[¶20] Here, Mowatt’s statement to police progressed from denying any
involvement in the robbery to, eventually, admitting his participation and
naming Lagasse as his accomplice. Throughout the course of a police
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interview or interrogation, it is not unusual for a suspect’s statement to
develop in stages. “Accomplices confessing their criminal activity with a
defendant oftentimes are influenced . . . by such motives as malice toward the
accused, fear, threats, promises or hopes of leniency or benefits from the
prosecution.” Jewell, 285 A.2d at 851. We cannot conclude that the
inconsistencies in Mowatt’s several statements were so significant that the
statements could not satisfy the low burden of proof required to demonstrate
probable cause.
B. Reasonable Articulable Suspicion for the Traffic Stop
[¶21] “The Constitution requires only the presence of a reasonable and
articulable suspicion to make an investigatory stop of a vehicle . . . .”
State v. Rideout, 2000 ME 194, ¶ 6, 761 A.2d 288. A “finding of probable cause
subsumes a finding of a reasonable and articulable suspicion.” Id.; see State v.
Menard, 2003 ME 69, ¶ 9, 822 A.2d 1143; State v. Babcock, 361 A.2d 911,
914 (Me. 1976). Because the officer had probable cause to arrest Lagasse,
based on information previously communicated, the officer necessarily had a
reasonable articulable suspicion to stop Lagasse’s car. The vehicle stop was
constitutionally permissible and the court properly denied Lagasse’s motion
to suppress.
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[¶22] Because we find that Lagasse’s stop and arrest were lawful, we
need not reach the other contentions advanced by Lagasse on this appeal.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
On the briefs and at oral argument:
Christopher J. Coleman, Esq., Law Office of Christine M.
Smith, Presque Isle, for appellant Chad Lagasse
Todd R. Collins, District Attorney, Prosecutorial District 8,
Caribou, for appellee State of Main
Aroostook Superior Court docket number CR-2013-38
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY