State of Maine v. Chad A. Logan

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2014 ME 92Docket: Cum-13-486
Submitted
On Briefs: May 29, 2014
Decided: July 15, 2014
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, SILVER, GORMAN, and JABAR, JJ.
STATE OF MAINE
v.
CHAD A. LOGAN
SILVER, J.
[¶1] Chad A. Logan appeals from a judgment of conviction of unlawful
sexual contact (Class B), 17-A M.R.S. § 255-A(1)(E-1) (2013), unlawful sexual
touching (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. § 260(1)(C) (2013), and two counts of assault
(Class D), 17-A M.R.S. § 207(1)(A) (2013), entered in the trial court (Cole, J.)
after a jury trial. Logan argues that (1) the court erred in prohibiting Logan from
eliciting testimony regarding sexual abuse that the victims’ mother experienced as
a child, (2) the court abused its discretion in denying Logan’s motion for a mistrial
after a portion of a police interview that the parties had agreed to redact was
inadvertently played for the jury, (3) the court committed obvious error in failing
to excuse or inquire further of a juror who worked for the same company as Logan,
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and (4) there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict. We disagree
and affirm the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, the record
supports the following facts. See State v. Diana, 2014 ME 45, ¶ 2, 89 A.3d 132.
On December 25, 2012, E.L. and C.L., then eleven and thirteen years old,
respectively, went to their father’s apartment in Brunswick to celebrate Christmas.
One of the guests present was Logan, who is E.L. and C.L.’s uncle. After the
family ate and opened presents, E.L. and C.L. played with their gifts in the living
room. C.L. was on the floor using a record player she had received for Christmas,
and E.L. and Logan were on the couch doing arts and crafts. At times, E.L. sat
next to Logan, but at other times Logan would touch E.L.’s ribs and pull her onto
his lap. Logan left later that evening, but returned the next day, and he and E.L.
continued to do arts and crafts in the living room, with E.L. at times sitting on
Logan’s lap as she had the previous day.
[¶3] On December 25 or 26, 2012, while E.L. was on his lap, Logan
touched E.L.’s back under her shirt, then moved his hands and touched her breasts
under her shirt. Logan also touched her genitals over her clothing. While he was
doing this, Logan said, “I love you so much,” and asked E.L. whether it felt good.
At some point on December 25 or 26, 2012, Logan kissed both E.L. and C.L. on
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their mouths, with his top lip between each girl’s lips. These kisses were unlike
kisses E.L. and C.L. received from other family members, and made them feel
uncomfortable. Other family members did not see anything unusual occur between
Logan and the girls, but there were times when Logan and the girls were alone in
the living room.
[¶4] E.L. and C.L. returned to their mother’s house on the evening of
December 26, 2012. Later that winter, E.L. would go to bed after school, cry at the
dinner table, and then go back to bed. Eventually, in March 2013, E.L. and C.L.
told their mother what had occurred at Christmas. The next day, E.L. was
interviewed by police officers with her mother present. E.L. later participated in a
forensic interview at Spurwink Clinic without her mother present.
[¶5] On June 7, 2013, Logan was indicted for unlawful sexual contact
(Class B), 17-A M.R.S. § 255-A(1)(E-1), unlawful sexual touching (Class D),
17-A M.R.S. § 260(1)(C), and two counts of assault (Class D), 17-A M.R.S.
§ 207(1)(A). A jury trial was held on September 10 and 12, 2013.
[¶6] At trial, Logan sought to elicit testimony from E.L. and C.L.’s mother
about her own childhood experience with sexual abuse by her father. The State
objected on relevance grounds. Logan argued that this evidence was necessary to
show that the mother was hypersensitive about sexual abuse and that she raised the
children in a manner that caused them to perceive innocuous contact as sexual.
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The court permitted Logan to question the mother generally about her
“hypervigilan[ce]” with respect to her children, but did not permit inquiry into the
mother’s childhood sexual abuse.
[¶7] The mother conceded that she was indeed more vigilant than most
people concerning the people she allowed her children to be around, and testified
that she did not allow E.L. and C.L. to have contact with her father. E.L. similarly
testified that she was not allowed to see her maternal grandfather because “he hurts
people, he has a problem.” Later, in an audio-recorded police interview played for
the jury, Logan said that E.L.’s mother had been “molested” as a child and had
previously accused Logan of inappropriately touching E.L. when E.L. was a
toddler.
[¶8] The parties agreed that certain portions of Logan’s interview with the
police would not be played for the jury, and that the prosecutor would turn the
sound off at certain times during the recording. This included a portion of the
interview in which one of the officers commented that E.L. and C.L. are “deemed
to be credible . . . [and] have no reason to lie.” When the prosecutor turned the
volume back up during this portion of the recording, the jury heard the words
“reason to lie” or “no reason to lie,” apparently due to an error in the timing agreed
upon by the parties.
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[¶9] After the recording was played, Logan moved for a mistrial. The court
denied the motion, concluding that the words “no reason to lie,” standing alone,
were not prejudicial, and that a curative instruction would be sufficient.1 The
parties agreed that the court would include in its final charge an instruction that the
jury was to disregard witnesses’ opinions as to the credibility of evidence. The
court ultimately gave the jury such an instruction.
[¶10] Logan was the last witness called by the defense. During his
testimony, Logan stated that he works at Bath Iron Works. After Logan testified
and both parties rested, the court stated on the record outside the jury’s presence
that it had learned from the court officer that the jury foreperson also works at Bath
Iron Works, did not recognize Logan, and said that “it wouldn’t have any effect
upon the process.” The court questioned Logan, who said that he did not recognize
the juror. The court found that this development did not “do[] anything to the
process.” Logan did not request that the juror be excused, or that any further
inquiry be made of the juror.
[¶11] The jury found Logan guilty on all counts. The court sentenced
Logan on the unlawful sexual contact count to the Department of Corrections for a
term of six years, all but thirty months suspended, with eight years of probation,
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Logan renewed his motion for a mistrial at the close of the State’s case, at the close of all the
evidence, and again after the jury rendered its verdict. The court denied the motion in each instance.
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and to lesser concurrent sentences on the remaining counts. Logan timely
appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Cross-Examination of the Victims’ Mother
[¶12] Criminal defendants have the “right to conduct reasonable or
otherwise appropriate cross-examination to expose facts from which jurors could
appropriately draw inferences relating to a witness’s reliability.” State v. Mills,
2006 ME 134, ¶ 9, 910 A.2d 1053 (quotation marks omitted). Defendants do not,
however, have “free [rein] to present testimony without the restraints imposed by
the rules of evidence.” Id. We review rulings on the relevance of evidence for
clear error. State v. Dolloff, 2012 ME 130, ¶ 24, 58 A.3d 1032.
[¶13] The court permitted Logan to elicit testimony that the victims’ mother
was more vigilant than most people in terms of the people she allowed her children
to be around, and that she did not allow her children to have contact with their
grandfather. The court also allowed Logan to elicit testimony suggesting that the
mother’s presence at police interviews had influenced the girls’ statements. The
court did not err in determining that the specific reason for the mother’s
“hypervigilan[ce]”—i.e., that she herself had been sexually abused—was not
relevant. See M.R. Evid. 401, 402; Dolloff, 2012 ME 130, ¶ 24, 58 A.3d 1032. In
any event, there was no prejudice to Logan because the mother’s history was later
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alluded to in Logan’s interview with the police, and Logan made no attempt to
further explore that issue after the interview was played for the jury. See
U.C.D.R.P.–Cumberland County 52(a) (“Any error, defect, irregularity or variance
which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.”); M.R. Crim. P.
52(a) (same).
B. Motion for a Mistrial
[¶14] “A motion for a mistrial should be denied except in the rare
circumstance that the trial is unable to continue with a fair result and only a new
trial will satisfy the interests of justice.” State v. Poblete, 2010 ME 37, ¶ 26,
993 A.2d 1104 (quoting State v. Bridges, 2004 ME 102, ¶ 11, 854 A.2d 855).
Because the trial court has a “superior vantage point,” we review the denial of a
motion for a mistrial for an abuse of discretion. Id. We will overrule the denial of
a mistrial “only in the event of exceptionally prejudicial circumstances or
prosecutorial bad faith.” Id. (quoting State v. Cochran, 2000 ME 78, ¶ 28,
749 A.2d 1274). “[T]he trial court’s determination of whether exposure to
potentially prejudicial extraneous evidence would incurably taint the jury verdict
or whether a curative instruction would adequately protect against consideration of
the matter stands unless clearly erroneous.” State v. Nelson, 2010 ME 40, ¶ 6,
994 A.2d 808 (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted).
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[¶15] There are no exceptionally prejudicial circumstances here because the
fragment of the police interview that the jury heard—“no reason to lie”—is not
highly prejudicial in and of itself. The jury did not hear the preceding portion of
the interview that made clear that the officer was referring to the victims’
credibility. The court instructed the jury to disregard any witnesses’ statements
about the credibility of the evidence, and made clear to the jury that it was the final
arbiter of credibility. There is no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct or bad
faith, and Logan does not claim any. The court did not err or abuse its discretion in
denying Logan’s motion for a mistrial. See Nelson, 2010 ME 40, ¶ 6, 994 A.2d
808; Poblete, 2010 ME 37, ¶ 26, 993 A.2d 1104.
C. Failure to Excuse the Jury Foreperson
[¶16] We review the court’s decision not to excuse the jury foreperson who
worked for the same company as Logan only for obvious error because Logan
failed to object. See State v. Lovejoy, 2014 ME 48, ¶ 19, 89 A.3d 1066 (defining
obvious error). Ordinarily, “[w]hen a juror’s impartiality is questioned, the court
should interview the juror to determine whether it is satisfied with the juror’s
ability to . . . participate in reaching a verdict based on the evidence and the law.”
State v. Rollins, 2008 ME 189, ¶ 12, 961 A.2d 546 (quotation marks omitted).
Here, although the court did not interview the juror, it was clear that the juror and
Logan did not recognize one another, and Logan did not request that the court
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excuse the juror or conduct any further inquiry. Under these circumstances, there
was no obvious error. See Lovejoy, 2014 ME 48, ¶ 19, 89 A.3d 1066; see also
Rollins, 2008 ME 189, ¶ 21, 961 A.2d 546 (“We cannot say that any juror who is
or was in the past socially acquainted with a witness cannot be impartial. Nor must
a juror who works for the same company as a trial witness be deemed impartial.”
(citation omitted)).
D. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[¶17] We will set aside a conviction for insufficiency of the evidence only if
no rational juror could have been convinced of the defendant’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. See State v. Robbins, 2010 ME 62, ¶ 14, 999 A.2d 936; State v.
True, 438 A.2d 460, 471 (Me. 1981). We view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the State. State v. Williams, 2012 ME 63, ¶ 49, 52 A.3d 911. “The
fact-finder is permitted to draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence” and
“to selectively accept or reject testimony presented based on the credibility of the
witness or the internal cogency of the content.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
“The weight to be given to the evidence and the determination of witness
credibility are the exclusive province of the jury.” State v. Filler, 2010 ME 90,
¶ 24, 3 A.3d 365 (quotation marks omitted). “A victim’s testimony, by itself, is
sufficient to support a guilty verdict for a sex crime . . . if the testimony addresses
each element of the crime and is not inherently incredible.” State v. Moores,
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2006 ME 139, ¶ 9, 910 A.2d 373. Although there were weaknesses in the victims’
testimony—particularly their inability to more precisely recall the sequence of
events on December 25 and 26, 2012—their testimony addressed all of the
elements of the offenses, see 17-A M.R.S. §§ 207(1)(A), 251, 255-A(1)(E-1),
260(1)(C) (2013), and was not inherently incredible. The jury apparently credited
the victims’ testimony, and, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, it
amply supports the jury’s verdict. See Williams, 2012 ME 63, ¶ 49, 52 A.3d 911.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
On the briefs:
Kevin G. Moynihan, Esq., Fairfield & Associates, Portland, for appellant
Chad A. Logan
Stephanie Anderson, District Attorney, and Julia Sheridan, Asst. Dist. Atty.,
Prosecutorial District No. Two, Portland, for appellee State of Maine
Cumberland County Unified Criminal docket number CR-2013-2204
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY