Robert Childs v. State of Missouri

In the Missouri Court of Appeals
Eastern District
DIVISION III
ROBERT CHILDS, ) No. ED100441
)
Appellant, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
) of the City of St. Louis
vs. )
) Honorable Margaret M. Neill
STATE OF MISSOURI, )
)
Respondent. ) FILED: August 19, 2014
Introduction
Appellant Robert Childs (“Childs”) appeals from the judgment of the motion court
denying his Rule 29.151 motion for post-conviction relief without an evidentiary hearing. Childs
was convicted by a jury of first-degree tampering with a motor vehicle. This Court affirmed
Childs’s conviction on direct appeal in State v. Childs, 362 S.W.3d 491 (Mo. App. E.D. 2012).
Childs subsequently filed a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 29.15, alleging his
trial counsel was ineffective for: (1) failing to introduce photographs of the scene where Childs
was identified by Officer Vogelzang, and (2) failing to object to police reports offered by the
State at sentencing that accused Childs of prior unadjudicated criminal conduct. The motion
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All rule references are to Mo. R. Crim. P. 2013.
court denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing. Childs now appeals. Finding no clear
error, we affirm the judgment of the motion court.
Factual and Procedural History
Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence adduced at trial is as
follows: On the morning of January 3, 2010, Jasmine Fisher (“Fisher”) was in her green 1997
Toyota Camry in front of her home in the City of St. Louis. Fisher was preparing to leave for
work when she realized she left her security badge in her house. Fisher went back inside her
house for about 30 seconds, leaving the keys in the ignition. When she returned outside, her car
was missing. Fisher then called the police and reported the car stolen.
Between 7:00 and 8:00 p.m. that night, St. Louis Metropolitan Police officers Stephen
Walsh and Matthew Karnowski, plainclothes officers with the Anti-Crime Task Force, were
working in the 5000 block of Davison Avenue. The officers saw a car matching the description
on the department’s “hot sheet” of stolen cars. A check with the dispatcher confirmed the car
was still considered stolen. The car appeared unoccupied, so the officers watched the car from
their unmarked vehicle, waiting to see if someone got in. Although the officers never saw
anyone get in the car, the car suddenly drove off. The officers then followed the car and made a
radio call to put out a description of the car and get help in apprehending it.
The officers initially lost sight of the car, but again saw it near Thrush and Lillian. Other
Anti-Crime Task Force detectives were at that location and attempted to deploy spike strips to
stop the car. The car came into contact with the strips, but the strips failed to stop the car.
Shortly thereafter, the car stopped, a passenger got out, and the driver continued on. At this
point, the officers again lost sight of the car.
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Meanwhile, Officer Alexander Vogelzang, a uniformed patrol officer in the area, was
stopped on an unrelated matter on Ferris Avenue, a one way street, when he saw Fisher’s vehicle
turn the wrong way onto Ferris. The car quickly drove directly toward Officer Vogelzang. At
that time, Officer Vogelzang identified Childs, whom he knew from numerous encounters in the
area, as the driver and sole occupant of the car. Vogelzang witnessed Childs jump the car onto
the curb and drive through front yards of several houses along Ferris Avenue to maneuver
around Officer Vogelzang’s patrol car. Officer Vogelzang then made a radio call giving a
description of the vehicle. After that call, Officer Walsh called Officer Vogelzang’s cell phone
to ask if he saw the driver, and Vogelzang told him the driver was Childs.
Officers Walsh and Karnowski later found the car in the 4300 block of Darby. The car
was parked and unoccupied, with the keys inside. After the car was photographed and checked
(unsuccessfully) for fingerprints, the officers called Fisher to come and pick up her car. When
Fisher retrieved her car, she noticed some clothing in the back seat that did not belong to her,
including a pair of pants. In the back pocket of the pants, Fisher found an ID card with Childs’s
name and address on it. The next day, Childs was arrested at the address on the ID card found in
Fisher’s car.
A jury convicted Childs of one count of first-degree tampering with a motor vehicle. The
trial court sentenced Childs as a prior and persistent offender to ten years in the Missouri
Department of Corrections. This Court affirmed Childs’s conviction and sentence in State v.
Childs, 362 S.W.3d 491 (Mo. App. E.D. 2012). On June 7, 2012, Childs filed a pro se motion to
Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Judgment and Sentence. Appointed counsel filed an amended
motion and request for an evidentiary hearing, raising two claims of ineffective assistance of
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counsel. On August 8, 2013, the motion court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law
denying Childs’s motion without an evidentiary hearing. This appeal follows.
Points on Appeal
Childs presents two points on appeal, both of which assert that the motion court clearly
erred in denying his motion for post-conviction relief without an evidentiary hearing because he
alleged facts not refuted by the record showing he was denied effective assistance of counsel. In
his first point on appeal, Childs argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to impeach
Officer Vogelzang with photographic evidence proving that his eyewitness account and
identification were not credible. In his second point on appeal, Childs argues his trial counsel
was ineffective in failing to object to inadmissible police reports offered by the State at
sentencing.
Standard of Review
We review the denial of a Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief only to determine
whether the motion court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law are clearly erroneous. Rule
29.15(k); Anderson v. State, 196 S.W.3d 28, 33 (Mo. banc 2006). The motion court’s findings
and conclusions are presumptively correct and will be overturned only when this Court is left
with a “definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made” after reviewing the entire
record. Vaca v. State, 314 S.W.3d 331, 334 (Mo. banc 2010).
To be entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a claim brought for post-conviction relief, a
movant must (1) allege facts, not conclusions, that, if true, would warrant relief; (2) the facts
alleged must raise matters not refuted by the record and files in the case; and (3) the matters
complained of must have resulted in prejudice to the movant. Barnett v. State, 103 S.W.3d 765,
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769 (Mo. banc 2003). An evidentiary hearing is not required if the files and records of the case
conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief. Id.
Discussion
To state a claim of post-conviction relief premised on ineffective assistance of counsel, a
movant must allege facts, not conclusions, showing (1) his counsel failed to exercise the
customary skill and diligence of a reasonably competent attorney under similar circumstances
and (2) his counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced him. Morrow v. State, 21 S.W.3d 819,
823 (Mo. banc 2000) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). Failure to
prove either prong is fatal to the claim. Barnes v. State, 334 S.W.3d 717, 721 (Mo. App. E.D.
2011). To establish deficient performance, a movant must overcome the strong presumption that
counsel acted professionally and that all decisions were based on sound trial strategy. Id. To
establish prejudice, a movant “must show that, but for counsel’s poor performance, there is a
reasonable probability that the outcome of the court proceeding would have been different.” Id.
(internal citations omitted).
I. Failure to Impeach Officer Vogelzang
In his first point on appeal, Childs alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
impeach Officer Vogelzang, the only witness who identified Childs as the driver of the car.
Childs avers that trial counsel did not introduce photographs that would have demonstrated it
was impossible for Childs to drive over the front yards of houses on Ferris Avenue as Officer
Vogelzang had testified.
At trial, Officer Vogelzang testified that he was conducting a traffic stop on Ferris
Avenue, a one-way street, when he saw a dark-colored car turn onto Ferris going the wrong
direction at a high rate of speed. Officer Vogelzang saw the driver, whom he recognized as
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Childs from five to ten previous encounters, including one encounter that occurred just the week
prior. Vogelzang testified that, as Childs approached him, the car jumped a curb, drove up onto
the south sidewalk and into the front yards of the houses on the south side of the street to drive
around the officer, and continued west on Ferris. Officer Vogelzang further testified that Childs
was the sole occupant of the car.
Childs maintains that the yards on the south side of Ferris are very steep and are
punctuated by stairways with railings that would have been damaged had the car been driven
through the yards as Officer Vogelzang testified. Childs further claims that driveways that cut
into the steep yards on Ferris would have disabled the car had the car been driven into the yards
as Officer Vogelzang testified. Childs avers that had trial counsel shown the jury photographs
depicting the steep yards on Ferris, the jury would have realized that Officer Vogelzang was
lying about what he saw that night and therefore would have found Childs not guilty. We are not
persuaded.
“Failure to impeach a witness does not generally warrant relief for ineffective assistance
of counsel where the facts, even if true, do not establish a defense.” Wren v. State, 313 S.W.3d
211, 219 (Mo. App. E.D. 2010). Trial counsel’s decision to impeach is presumed to be a matter
of trial strategy. Id. To overcome this presumption, a movant must demonstrate that the
decision was not a matter of reasonable trial strategy and that the impeachment would have
provided him with a defense or would have changed the outcome of the trial. Id.
Even assuming that photographs of Ferris Avenue would have contradicted Officer
Vogelzang’s testimony describing the exact route Childs drove to steer around his patrol car,
impeaching Officer Vogelzang on this issue would not have provided Childs with a viable
defense. The critical part of Officer Vogelzang’s testimony was his identification of Childs as
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the driver of Fisher’s vehicle. The photographs that Childs argues should have been introduced
would not have contradicted Officer Vogelzang’s identification of Childs as the driver and sole
occupant of the car. We are not persuaded by Childs’s suggestion that if such photographs had
been shown to the jury, Officer Vogelzang’s credibility would have been so fully impeached that
the jury would have rejected Officer Vogelzang’s testimony identifying Childs, which testimony
was corroborated by the identification card found in the stolen car having Fisher’s name and
address and Officer Walsh’s testimony that Officer Vogelzang identified the driver as Childs
prior to finding the identification card in the car.
The motion court concluded that Childs’s claim regarding the photographs “is purely a
collateral matter that touches marginally on Officer Vogelzang’s credibility but would not have
provided a defense.” We agree. Trial counsel’s failure to introduce such photographs and
evidence at trial does not rise to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel. We hold that the
motion court’s conclusion is not clearly erroneous. Point One is denied.
II. Failure to Object at Sentencing
In his second point on appeal, Childs asserts that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to
object to the admission of police reports at sentencing which accused Childs of offenses for
which he had never been convicted. The police reports contained allegations of peace
disturbance, unlawful use of a weapon, first-degree assault, and armed criminal action. Childs
argues that under State v. Fassero, evidence of prior unadjudicated criminal history is
inadmissible at a sentencing hearing unless the State proves the criminal conduct by a
preponderance of the evidence. State v. Fassero, 256 S.W.3d 109 (Mo. banc 2008). By relying
solely on the allegations in the police report, rather than direct evidence of the alleged crimes,
Childs contends the State did not prove the prior unadjudicated criminal conduct by a
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preponderance of the evidence. Childs asserts that had trial counsel objected, the police reports
would not have been introduced at sentencing, and he would have received a more lenient
sentence.
Childs’s reliance on Fassero is misplaced. Fassero dealt with the admission of evidence
in sentencing before a jury. See id. at 118-19. Here, Childs was sentenced by the trial court. A
sentencing court is allowed to rely on a wide range of evidence at sentencing, including evidence
of the history and character of the defendant. State v. Berry, 168 S.W.3d 527, 536 (Mo. App.
W.D. 2005). The discretion accorded to a sentencing court includes consideration of hearsay
accounts of unadjudicated conduct. See Martin v. State, 291 S.W.3d 846, 850 (Mo. App. W.D.
2009) (distinguishing Fassero as a jury sentencing case and concluding that the sentencing court
could properly consider hearsay accounts of prior arrests in presentence investigation report).
The police reports offered by the State contained the same type of information regularly
considered by sentencing courts in presentence investigation reports and thus were properly
admitted by the trial court. See Rule 29.07.2 Accordingly, any objection made by trial counsel
to the use of the police reports at the sentencing hearing would have been without merit. Trial
counsel’s failure to object to admissible evidence is not ineffective assistance of counsel. State
v. Parker, 886 S.W.2d 908, 932 (Mo. banc 1994).
Because Childs’s has failed to allege facts that, if true, would entitle him to relief, Point
Two is denied.
2
Rule 29.07 provides that “The report of the pre-sentence investigation shall contain any prior criminal record of the
defendant and such information about his characteristics, his financial condition, his social history, and the
circumstances affecting his behavior as may be helpful in imposing sentence or in granting probation or in the
correctional treatment of the defendant.”
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