State v. Farris

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA13-702
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 15 April 2014
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Burke County
No. 11 CRS 52086
SCOTT WESLEY FARRIS,
Defendant.
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 4 December 2012
by Judge Nathaniel J. Poovey in Burke County Superior Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals 21 November 2013.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Carrie D. Randa, for the State.
Wayne O. Clontz for defendant-appellant.
GEER, Judge.
Defendant Scott Wesley Farris appeals from his conviction
of driving while impaired. On appeal, defendant contends that
the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence
obtained during a checkpoint stop. He primarily argues that the
checkpoint was unreasonable because, according to defendant, at
least one vehicle was able to drive through the checkpoint
without being stopped. Because, however, the trial court's
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findings are supported by competent evidence and those findings
support the court's conclusion that the primary programmatic
purpose of the checkpoint was proper and the checkpoint was
reasonable, we hold that the trial court did not err in denying
defendant's motion to suppress.
Facts
The State's evidence tended to show the following facts.
Beginning around 9:00 p.m. on the evening of 14 July 2011, five
members of the North Carolina State Highway Patrol conducted a
checkpoint on the I-40 Westbound off-ramp at exit 103 in
Morganton, North Carolina. Three Highway Patrol vehicles were
parked at the intersection at the top of the ramp and had their
flashing blue lights on to alert motorists of the checkpoint.
The stoplights at the intersection at the end of the off-ramp
and the flashing lights of the police cars were not, however,
visible to drivers when they first entered the off-ramp due to a
slight curve in the ramp.
Sergeant Mark Cline, the supervisor on scene, had chosen
the time and location of the checkpoint. The checkpoint was
conducted within the written guidelines of the Highway Patrol
and also complied with a standing order from the captain
requiring that a supervisor be on site at all times during
nighttime checkpoints. Each car that came through the
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checkpoint was required to show a valid driver's license,
registration, and proof of insurance. The officers did not have
any discretion as to which vehicles they stopped, but rather all
cars were supposed to be stopped.
Around 9:45 p.m., defendant approached the checkpoint in a
Ford Ranger pickup truck. Trooper Jason Goudelock asked
defendant for his driver's license and registration and
immediately smelled a strong odor of alcohol coming from the
vehicle. He also noticed that defendant's eyes were glassy.
Trooper Goudelock asked defendant to turn off the engine and
step out of the truck. After observing defendant, Trooper
Goudelock formed the opinion that defendant was impaired, and he
arrested defendant for driving while impaired.
On 5 June 2012, the district court found defendant guilty
of impaired driving. Defendant appealed to superior court, and,
at a pretrial hearing, defendant made an oral motion to
suppress. Although, contrary to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-977
(2011), defendant did not file a written motion to suppress, the
State did not object to proceeding with a hearing on the merits.
After hearing the testimony of Trooper Goudelock and defendant,
the trial court orally denied the motion to suppress and
dictated its findings of fact and conclusions of law into the
record.
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Following the denial of his motion, defendant pled no
contest to the charge of driving while impaired. Defendant was
sentenced to an active term of 60 days imprisonment. That
sentence was suspended, and defendant was placed on 18 months of
supervised probation. Defendant timely appealed to this Court.
Discussion
Defendant's sole argument on appeal is that the trial court
erred in denying his motion to suppress. Our review of a trial
court's denial of a motion to suppress is "strictly limited to
determining whether the trial judge's underlying findings of
fact are supported by competent evidence, in which event they
are conclusively binding on appeal, and whether those factual
findings in turn support the judge's ultimate conclusions of
law." State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 134, 291 S.E.2d 618, 619
(1982). "The trial court's conclusions of law . . . are fully
reviewable on appeal." State v. Hughes, 353 N.C. 200, 208, 539
S.E.2d 625, 631 (2000).
Defendant contends that the trial court should have granted
his motion to suppress because the checkpoint constituted an
unconstitutional seizure. "'[P]olice officers effectuate a
seizure when they stop a vehicle at a checkpoint. As with all
seizures, checkpoints conform with the Fourth Amendment only if
they are reasonable.'" State v. Jarrett, 203 N.C. App. 675,
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677, 692 S.E.2d 420, 423 (2010) (quoting State v. Rose, 170 N.C.
App. 284, 288, 612 S.E.2d 336, 339 (2005)). "Thus, 'police may
briefly detain vehicles at a roadblock checkpoint without
individualized suspicion, so long as the purpose of the
checkpoint is legitimate and the checkpoint itself is
reasonable.'" Id. (quoting State v. Veazey, 191 N.C. App. 181,
184, 662 S.E.2d 683, 686 (2008)).
With respect to review of the constitutionality of a
checkpoint, this Court has held:
"When considering a challenge to a
checkpoint, the reviewing court must
undertake a two-part inquiry to determine
whether the checkpoint meets constitutional
requirements. First, the court must
determine the primary programmatic purpose
of the checkpoint. . . . Second, if a court
finds that police had a legitimate primary
programmatic purpose for conducting a
checkpoint . . . [the court] must judge its
reasonableness, hence, its
constitutionality, on the basis of the
individual circumstances."
Id. (quoting Veazey, 191 N.C. App. at 185-86, 662 S.E.2d at 686-
87). Defendant contends that the trial court erred both in
concluding that the officers had a legitimate primary
programmatic purpose and that the checkpoint was reasonable.
Defendant argues generally that "it was never established"
that the primary programmatic purpose of the checkpoint was
proper. Given the finding by the trial court that "[t]he
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purpose for the license checkpoint was to check driver's
license, registration, and proof of insurance[,]" it is unclear
whether defendant is arguing that this finding is not supported
by competent evidence in the record or that this finding is
insufficient to establish that this purpose was also "primary,"
"programmatic," and "proper." With regard to whether the trial
court's finding is supported by the evidence in the record,
defendant does not point to any contrary evidence or make any
specific argument that the trial court erred in making the
finding. Based on our review of the record, we find that the
trial court's finding regarding the purpose of the checkpoint is
supported by competent evidence.
As for whether the purpose found by the trial court is
proper, courts have recognized as constitutionally permissible
checkpoints for the purpose of checking drivers' licenses, proof
of insurance, and vehicle registration. See, e.g., Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660, 673-74, 99 S. Ct.
1391, 1401 (1979) (indicating that checkpoint with primary
purpose of checking drivers' licenses and vehicle registrations
would be permissible under the Fourth Amendment); United States
v. Brugal, 209 F.3d 353, 357 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that "a
brief stop at a checkpoint for the limited purpose of verifying
a driver's license, vehicle registration, and proof of insurance
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is a reasonable intrusion into the lives of motorists and their
passengers even in the absence of reasonable suspicion that a
motorist or passenger is engaged in illegal activity"); State v.
Mitchell, 358 N.C. 63, 66, 592 S.E.2d 543, 545 (2004) (driver's
license checkpoint held constitutional); State v. Tarlton, 146
N.C. App. 417, 423, 553 S.E.2d 50, 53 (2001) (license and
registration checkpoint held constitutional).
Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not err in
finding that there was a proper programmatic purpose for the
checkpoint. However, even if a trial court concludes that the
primary programmatic purpose was lawful, the court "must still
determine 'whether the checkpoint itself was reasonable.'"
Jarrett, 203 N.C. App. at 679, 692 S.E.2d at 424 (quoting
Veazey, 191 N.C. App. at 191, 662 S.E.2d at 689–90). This Court
balances the public's interest and the individual's privacy
interest by applying the three-prong test set out in Brown v.
Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357, 361, 99 S. Ct. 2637,
2640 (1979). "Under Brown, the trial court must consider '[1]
the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure[;] [2]
the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest[;]
and [3] the severity of the interference with individual
liberty.'" Jarrett, 203 N.C. App. at 679, 692 S.E.2d at 425(quoting Rose, 170 N.C. App. at 293-94, 612 S.E.2d at 342).
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Defendant argues that the stop was not reasonable because
there was a factual dispute regarding whether every vehicle was,
in fact, stopped.1 The trial court found (1) that the checkpoint
complied with the Highway Patrol's written policy for conducting
checkpoints, (2) the checkpoint complied with the pre-designated
pattern of stopping every vehicle, and (3) "[t]he officers did
not have any discretion . . . as to which vehicle they
stopped[.]"
Trooper Goudelock's testimony amply supported the trial
court's findings. Although defendant testified that while he
was stopped at the checkpoint, he witnessed one car that went
through the checkpoint without being stopped, he also testified
that he had been drinking that evening and that his blood
alcohol level was .14. As the trier of fact, the trial judge
was free to weigh the credibility of the witnesses and chose to
believe Trooper Goudelock over defendant. It is beyond the
scope of our review to revisit the trial court's credibility
determinations.
Even assuming arguendo that one car was not stopped,
defendant, citing only generally to this Court's decision in
Rose, does not point to any authority suggesting that if one car
1
Defendant does not articulate how this argument fits into
the Brown analysis or allege that the trial court made
insufficient findings regarding any of the three prongs of
Brown.
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is not stopped according to the pre-designated pattern, the
checkpoint is invalid. Nor does defendant point to any evidence
showing that the car passed as a result of a discretionary
decision of any of the officers to allow the car to pass. Even
if such evidence existed, officer discretion, as only one of
many factors to consider, "is not a 'lynchpin,' but instead is a
circumstance to be considered as part of the totality of the
circumstances in examining the reasonableness of a checkpoint."
Rose, 170 N.C. App. at 298, 612 S.E.2d at 345. The possibility
that one car was able to sneak past the checkpoint is
insufficient to undermine the trial court's finding that the
officers did not have discretion in deciding which car to stop,
much less render the entire checkpoint unreasonable. See
Tarlton, 146 N.C. App. at 421, 553 S.E.2d at 53 (concluding
checkpoint reasonable based in part upon trial court's finding
that officers "'checked every vehicle in both directions except
when they were writing citations'" (emphasis added)).
In conclusion, we hold that there is competent evidence to
support the trial court's finding that all the vehicles were
stopped. We also hold that, regardless whether one car did, in
fact, pass through the checkpoint without being stopped, there
is competent evidence to support the trial court's finding that
the officers did not have discretion in deciding which vehicles
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were stopped. This finding, in turn, supports the trial court's
conclusion that the checkpoint was constitutional.
No error.
Judges STEPHENS and ERVIN concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).