State v. Smathers

NO. COA13-496
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 21 January 2014
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Transylvania County
No. 10CRS51037
AUDRA LINDSEY SMATHERS
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 28 July 2012 by
Judge Mark E. Powell in Transylvania County Superior Court. Heard
in the Court of Appeals 9 October 2013.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Martin T. McCracken, for the State.
Leslie C. Rawls for defendant-appellant.
HUNTER, Robert C., Judge.
Audra Lindsey Smathers (“defendant”) appeals from judgment
entered pursuant to her Alford plea to driving while impaired.
Specifically, defendant challenges the order entered by the trial
court denying her motion to suppress evidence gathered during a
traffic stop. On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court
erred by denying her motion because the officer had neither
reasonable suspicion nor probable cause to seize her, and the
seizure was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
-2-
After careful review, we affirm the trial court’s order.
Background
The facts of this case are largely undisputed. Shortly after
10:00 p.m. on 27 May 2010, Transylvania Sheriff’s Deputy Brian
Kreigsman (“Officer Kreigsman”) was traveling down Highway 280 in
the interior lane adjacent to the center turning lane roughly one
car length behind defendant, who was driving a red Corvette in the
right lane. Defendant was traveling at speeds close to the posted
limit of 45 miles per hour, and Officer Kreigsman did not observe
anything illegal or suspicious about her driving.
Officer Kreigsman then saw a large animal run in front of
defendant’s vehicle. Defendant struck the animal, causing her
vehicle to bounce and produce sparks as it scraped the road.
Officer Kreigsman pulled his police cruiser behind defendant, who
had decreased her speed to about 35 miles per hour, and activated
his blue lights. He testified that because he knew Corvettes have
a fiberglass body, he stopped defendant to ensure that she and the
vehicle were “okay.” Defendant continued without stopping after
Officer Kreigsman activated his blue lights, so he turned on his
siren; defendant continued for about 1.1 to 1.2 miles before
-3-
stopping.1 Officer Kreigsman called in for backup after defendant
did not immediately stop her vehicle and relayed over the radio
that he was making a stop because the vehicle had struck an animal.
Deputy Justin Bell (“Deputy Bell”) arrived shortly thereafter with
other officers.
Once stopped, Officer Kreigsman approached the driver’s side
of the vehicle and saw defendant crying. She and her passenger
told Officer Kreigsman that they had hit a dog. He examined
defendant’s vehicle and saw that the front had been cracked and
damaged, presumably by the collision with the animal. Both Officer
Kreigsman and Deputy Bell detected the scent of alcohol coming
from defendant. Officer Bell noticed that she also had glassy
eyes and slurred speech. He conducted roadside sobriety tests,
which defendant failed. After failing the field tests, defendant
submitted to roadside breath tests, which produced a positive
indication of alcohol consumption. Defendant was then taken into
custody and charged with driving while impaired. Later testing
showed that her blood alcohol concentration was .18.
1 Officer Kreigsman testified that this procedure was not uncommon
due to “blue light bandits” in the area who would impersonate
police officers by attaching blue lights to their vehicles. It is
uncontested that defendant’s continued driving did not produce
reasonable suspicion of illegal activity.
-4-
Defendant pled guilty to the charge of driving while impaired
in District Court and appealed to the Superior Court. She moved
to suppress all evidence gathered from Officer Kreigsman’s
stopping of her vehicle on the ground that he had neither probable
cause nor reasonable suspicion to seize her and that the seizure
was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The trial court
denied defendant’s motion. Defendant entered an Alford plea on 20
December 2012 and appealed in open court from the judgment and
ruling on her motion to suppress.
Discussion
I. The Community Caretaking Doctrine
Defendant’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court
erred by denying her motion to suppress. Specifically, she claims
that Officer Kreigsman had neither probable cause nor reasonable
suspicion to seize her, and the seizure was unreasonable under the
totality of the circumstances, thereby violating the Fourth
Amendment. The State concedes that Officer Kreigsman had neither
probable cause nor reasonable suspicion to seize defendant, but
instead asks this Court to adopt a version of the “community
caretaking” doctrine to affirm the trial court’s order. After
careful review, we formally recognize the community caretaking
doctrine as an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth
-5-
Amendment, and we hold that Officer Kreigsman’s seizure of
defendant falls under this exception. Therefore, we affirm the
trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion to suppress.
Our review of a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress
is “strictly limited to determining whether the trial judge’s
underlying findings of fact are supported by competent evidence,
in which event they are conclusively binding on appeal, and whether
those factual findings in turn support the judge’s ultimate
conclusions of law.” State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 134, 291 S.E.2d
618, 619 (1982). “The trial court’s conclusions of law . . . are
fully reviewable on appeal.” State v. Hughes, 353 N.C. 200, 208,
539 S.E.2d 625, 631 (2000).
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article I, Section 20 of the North Carolina Constitution prohibit
unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; N.C.
Const. art. I, § 20. Traffic stops are recognized as seizures
under both constitutions. See State v. Styles, 362 N.C. 412, 414,
665 S.E.2d 438, 439 (2008) (“A traffic stop is a seizure even
though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting
detention quite brief.”) (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.
648, 653, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660, 667 (1979)). Although a warrant
supported by probable cause is typically required for a search or
-6-
seizure to be reasonable, State v. Phillips, 151 N.C. App. 185,
191, 565 S.E.2d 697, 702 (2002), traffic stops are analyzed under
the “reasonable suspicion” standard created by the United States
Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889(1968). Styles, 362 N.C. at 414, 665 S.E.2d at 439. “Reasonable
suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause and
requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the
evidence. The standard is satisfied by some minimal level of
objective justification.” Id. (citation and quotation marks
omitted). “A court must consider ‘the totality of the
circumstances—the whole picture’ in determining whether a
reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop exists.” State
v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 441, 446 S.E.2d 67, 70 (1994) (quoting
U.S. v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621, 629 (1981)).
“When a defendant in a criminal prosecution makes a motion to
suppress evidence obtained by means of a warrantless search, the
State has the burden of showing, at the suppression hearing, how
the [warrantless search] was exempted from the general
constitutional demand for a warrant.” State v. Nowell, 144 N.C.
App. 636, 642, 550 S.E.2d 807, 812 (2001).
Here, the trial court concluded, and the State concedes, that
no reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity existed
-7-
when defendant was seized. Officer Kreigsman’s seizure of
defendant was not predicated on criminal investigation or
prevention of any kind; rather, he was checking to make sure that
defendant and her vehicle were “okay” after hitting a large animal.
Thus, the trial court did not apply the Terry doctrine, but instead
utilized an unspecified “balancing test” to conclude that a seizure
was made on defendant, but the seizure was “justified under the
situation as observed by Officer Kreigsman.” In so concluding,
the trial court rejected defendant’s contention that the stop was
arbitrary and unreasonable, but also rejected the State’s argument
that the community caretaking exception was applicable, noting
that the doctrine has not yet been explicitly recognized in North
Carolina. We find that the generic “balancing test” applied by
the trial court is not one of the “specifically established and
well-delineated exceptions” which would otherwise render Officer
Kreigsman’s warrantless seizure of defendant constitutional. See
State v. Grice, __ N.C. App. __, __, 735 S.E.2d 354, 356-57 (2012)
(“As a general rule, searches and seizures conducted outside the
judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate,
are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to
a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”)
(citation and quotation marks omitted). These exceptions, such as
-8-
exigent circumstances, Nowell, 144 N.C. App. at 643, 550 S.E.2d at
812, or the automobile exception, State v. Corpening, 109 N.C.
App. 586, 589, 427 S.E.2d 892, 894 (1993), are unhelpful here,
because they apply only to situations where officers are
investigating or preventing criminal activity. Thus, we address
the State’s alternative argument – that this Court should recognize
some variant of the community caretaking exception to affirm the
order denying defendant’s motion to suppress.
So far, North Carolina courts have only referenced the
community caretaking exception in the limited context of
impounding abandoned vehicles. See State v. Phifer, 297 N.C. 216,
219, 254 S.E.2d 586, 587 (1979) (“In the interests of public safety
and as part of what the Court has called ‘community caretaking
functions,’ automobiles are frequently taken into police
custody.”) (quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368-
69, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1000, 1002 (1976)); see also State v. Peaten, 110
N.C. App. 749, 752-53, 431 S.E.2d 237, 239 (1993). Application of
this doctrine outside the context of vehicle impoundment,
specifically in regard to the seizure of citizens, is a matter of
first impression. As such, an overview of how the exception has
developed in similar contexts by courts in other jurisdictions is
helpful to our determination here.
-9-
The community caretaking exception was established by the
United States Supreme Court in Cady v. Dombrowksi, 413 U.S. 433,
37 L. Ed. 2d 706 (1973). In Cady, the Supreme Court held that the
warrantless search of the defendant’s vehicle after impoundment
did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the vehicle was
damaged and constituted a nuisance on the highway, the defendant
could not arrange for the vehicle to be moved, and the standard
police procedure of impounding the vehicle and searching it was
reasonable under the circumstances to promote public safety. Cady,
413 U.S. at 443, 447-478, 37 L. Ed. 2d at 715-18. The Court
reasoned that:
Because of the extensive regulation of motor
vehicles and traffic, and also because of the
frequency with which a vehicle can become
disabled or involved in an accident on public
highways, the extent of police-citizen contact
involving automobiles will be substantially
greater than police-citizen contact in a home
or office. Some such contacts will occur
because the officer may believe the operator
has violated a criminal statute, but many more
will not be of that nature. Local police
officers, unlike federal officers, frequently
investigate vehicle accidents in which there
is no claim of criminal liability and engage
in what, for want of a better term, may be
described as community caretaking functions,
totally divorced from the detection,
investigation, or acquisition of evidence
relating to the violation of a criminal
statute.
Cady, 413 U.S. at 441, 37 L. Ed. 2d at 714-15.
-10-
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Cady, a large majority
of state courts have recognized the community caretaking doctrine
as a valid exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment. State v. Moats, 403 S.W.3d 170, 187, n. 8 (Tenn. 2013);
see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Evans, 764 N.E.2d 841, 843 (Mass. 2002);
State v. Martinez, 615 A.2d 279, 281 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1992). The overarching public policy behind this widespread
adoption is the desire to give police officers the flexibility to
help citizens in need or protect the public even if the
prerequisite suspicion of criminal activity which would otherwise
be necessary for a constitutional intrusion is nonexistent.
The doctrine recognizes that, in our
communities, law enforcement personnel are
expected to engage in activities and interact
with citizens in a number of ways beyond the
investigation of criminal conduct. Such
activities include a general safety and
welfare role for police officers in helping
citizens who may be in peril or who may
otherwise be in need of some form of
assistance.
Ullom v. Miller, 705 S.E.2d 111, 120-23 (W.Va. 2010) (holding that
an officer’s seizure of the defendant was reasonable under the
community caretaking exception where the officer saw the
defendant’s vehicle on the side of a dirt road at dusk with its
parking lights on, the officer had a sense that something was
wrong, and the “road safety check” that constituted the seizure
-11-
was based solely on safety and welfare considerations); see also
State v. Deneui, 775 N.W.2d 221, 242 (S.D. 2009) (“Modern society
has come to see the role of police officers as more than basic
functionaries enforcing the law. From first responders to the sick
and injured, to interveners in domestic disputes, and myriad
instances too numerous to list, police officers fulfill a vital
role where no other government official can.”). As these courts
have demonstrated, there are countless situations where government
intrusion into individual privacy for the purposes of rendering
aid is reasonable, regardless of whether criminal activity is
afoot. We find the analysis utilized by these courts persuasive,
and we can identify no reason why the community caretaking
exception should not apply in North Carolina when it has been
recognized by the United States Supreme Court and widely adopted
by a majority of state courts throughout the country.
Thus, we now formally recognize the community caretaking
exception as a means of establishing the reasonableness of a search
or seizure under the Fourth Amendment. See State v. Browning, 28
N.C. App. 376, 379, 221 S.E.2d 375, 377 (1976) (adopting a new
rule of law based on well-reasoned decisions in other jurisdictions
that was consistent with, although not directly supported by,
precedent from the North Carolina Supreme Court). In recognizing
-12-
this exception, we must apply a test that strikes a proper balance
between the public’s interest in having officers help citizens
when needed and the individual’s interest in being free from
unreasonable governmental intrusion. See State v. Scott, 343 N.C.
313, 327, 471 S.E.2d 605, 613-14 (1996) (“In creating exceptions
to the general [warrant requirement], this Court must consider the
balance between the public interest and the individual’s right to
personal security free from arbitrary interference by law
officers.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Despite its wide recognition, “[n]o single set of specific
requirements for applicability of the community caretaker
exception has been adopted by a majority of those states
recognizing the exception.” Ullom, 705 S.E.2d at 122.
Courts are split as to how the community caretaking doctrine
should be classified from a Fourth Amendment perspective. A
minority of jurisdictions characterizes community caretaking
activities as consensual police-citizen encounters which do not
rise to the level of “searches” or “seizures” under the Fourth
Amendment. See Moats, 403 S.W.3d at 182, 187 n. 8 (“[T]he
community caretaking function exists [in Tennessee] within the
third tier of consensual police-citizen encounters that do not
require probable cause or reasonable suspicion[.]”). However,
-13-
North Carolina courts, as well as most courts in other
jurisdictions, recognize that police interactions with citizens
that do not amount to “searches” or “seizures” under the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment do not trigger its safeguards. See State
v. Sugg, 61 N.C. App. 106, 108-9, 300 S.E.2d 248, 250 (1983); see
also People v. Luedemann, 857 N.E.2d 187, 198-99 (Ill. 2006).
Thus, we need not create an exception to the Fourth Amendment under
the community caretaking doctrine to justify already permissible
police-citizen interactions. See State v. Isenhour, 194 N.C. App.
539, 544-45, 670 S.E.2d 264, 268-69 (2008) (holding that reasonable
suspicion was not required to justify an interaction that did not
amount to a seizure under the Fourth Amendment).
There are also competing viewpoints as to the manner in which
the subjective motivation of an officer should be taken into
account when applying the community caretaking exception. A
primary concern amongst courts which apply these tests is that the
community caretaking exception not serve as pretext for
impermissible criminal investigation. See, e.g., Com. v. Waters,
456 S.E.2d 527, 530 (Va. Ct. App. 1995) (“No seizure, however
limited, is a valid exercise of the community caretaking function
if credible evidence indicates that the stop is a pretext for
investigating criminal activity.”). Some courts, like those in
-14-
the state of Washington, have adopted tests which contain both
objective and subjective requirements and only allow a search or
seizure if the officer’s motivation is not primarily related to
criminal investigation. See State v. Angelos, 936 P.2d 52, 54
(Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (“[T]he [government] must show that the
officer, both subjectively and objectively, is actually motivated
by a perceived need to render aid or assistance. The search must
not be primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize
evidence.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Other courts,
like the Fourth Circuit and the Wisconsin Supreme Court, hold that
a warrantless search or seizure will be upheld if there is an
objectively reasonable basis for the community caretaking action,
regardless of a coinciding subjective intent on the officer’s part
to investigate crime. See State v. Kramer, 759 N.W.2d 598, 608
(Wis. 2009) (“[W]e conclude that the ‘totally divorced’ language
from Cady does not mean that if the police officer has any
subjective law enforcement concerns, he cannot be engaging in a
valid community caretaker function. Rather, we conclude that in
a community caretaker context, when under the totality of the
circumstances an objectively reasonable basis for the community
caretaker function is shown, that determination is not negated by
the officer’s subjective law enforcement concerns.”); United
-15-
States v. Newbourn, 600 F.2d 452, 456 (4th Cir. 1979) (“An interest
in furthering a criminal investigation supplements justifiable
concern about hazards presented by an automobile’s contents; it
does not negate it, and Cady supports the warrantless intrusion.
Thus the warrantless search should be upheld, whatever the
policeman’s subjective state of mind[,] if the objective facts
present a reasonable basis for a belief that there is a potential
danger similar to or greater than that presented in Cady, which
danger should be inactivated.”).
The North Carolina Supreme Court, in two relatively recent
opinions, has made clear that the subjective mentality of a police
officer will not make a seizure under the Terry doctrine
unconstitutional if the intrusion was objectively reasonable under
the totality of the circumstances. See State v. Barnard, 362 N.C.
244, 248, 658 S.E.2d 643, 645 (2008) (noting that “[t]he
constitutionality of a traffic stop depends on the objective facts,
not the officer’s subjective motivation” in holding that an
officer’s subjective mistake of law did not cause a traffic stop
to be unconstitutional where there was articulable, reasonable
suspicion that the individual was violating a different, actual
law), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 914, 172 L. Ed. 2d 198 (2008); State
v. Heien, 366 N.C. 271, 283, 737 S.E.2d 351, 359 (2012) (holding
-16-
that where an officer’s subjective mistake of law was itself
objectively reasonable, there may still be reasonable suspicion to
justify a warrantless traffic stop). Thus, in keeping with the
“foundational principle” recognized by our Supreme Court that the
Fourth Amendment requires only that an officer’s actions be
“objectively reasonable in the circumstances,” Heien, 366 N.C. at
278, 737 S.E.2d at 356 (citation omitted), we adopt an objective
method of inquiry into the purpose of a seizure in the community
caretaking context. The public safety concerns which underlie the
community caretaking exception are not mutually exclusive of
criminal prevention and investigation, and therefore we decline to
formulate a test where existence of the latter negates the former.
As the Wisconsin Supreme Court aptly noted, “to interpret . . .
[Cady] to mean that an officer could not engage in a community
caretaker function if he or she had any law enforcement concerns
would, for practical purposes, preclude police officers from
engaging in any community caretaker functions at all. This result
is neither sensible nor desirable.” Kramer, 759 N.W.2d at 609.
After assessing the analytical methods developed by courts in
other jurisdictions, we find that the current three-pronged test
used by courts in Wisconsin in applying the community caretaking
exception provides a flexible framework within which officers can
-17-
safely perform their duties in the public’s interest while still
protecting individuals from unreasonable government intrusions.
See State v. Anderson, 417 N.W.2d 411, 414 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987),
rev’d on other grounds, 454 N.W.2d 763 (Wis. 1990); Kramer, 759
N.W.2d at 608. Under this test, which we now adopt, the State has
the burden of proving that: (1) a search or seizure within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment has occurred; (2) if so, that under
the totality of the circumstances an objectively reasonable basis
for a community caretaking function is shown; and (3) if so, that
the public need or interest outweighs the intrusion upon the
privacy of the individual. See Anderson, 417 N.W.2d at 414;
Kramer, 759 N.W.2d at 608. Relevant considerations in assessing
the weight of public need against the intrusion of privacy include,
but are not limited to:
(1) the degree of the public interest and the
exigency of the situation; (2) the attendant
circumstances surrounding the seizure,
including time, location, the degree of overt
authority and force displayed; (3) whether an
automobile is involved; and (4) the
availability, feasibility and effectiveness
of alternatives to the type of intrusion
actually accomplished.
Anderson, 417 N.W.2d at 414. We note that many courts which apply
a similar balancing test place great weight on the exigency of the
situation, with some holding that only imminent danger to life or
-18-
limb can outweigh the individual’s privacy interest. See, e.g.,
Provo City v. Warden, 844 P.2d 360, 364-65 (Utah Ct. App. 1992),
aff’d, 875 P.2d 557 (Utah 1994). Because such a requirement may
prevent aid in situations where danger to life and limb may not be
imminent, but could be prevented by swift action,2 we decline to
make imminent danger to life or limb a required element of our
test. However, we agree with the proposition espoused by many
courts that this exception should be applied narrowly and carefully
to mitigate the risk of abuse. See, e.g. State v. Rinehart, 617
N.W.2d 842 (S.D. 2000); Wright v. State, 7 S.W.3d 148 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1999); see also United States v. Dunbar, 470 F. Supp. 704,
708 (D. Conn. 1979) (“The investigative stop authority announced
in Terry v. Ohio has led to cases where the officer says, ‘He
looked suspicious.’ The Fourth Amendment stands against initiating
a new line of cases in which the officer says, ‘I thought he was
lost.’”) (citation and quotation omitted), aff’d, 610 F.2d 807 (2d
Cir. 1979).
Having set out a community caretaking exception that we feel
properly frames our inquiry into the reasonableness of a search or
seizure under the Fourth Amendment, we must apply our rule to the
2 For example, where an officer executes a search or seizure to
fix a gas leak before an explosion might have occurred.
-19-
facts of this case. After careful review, we hold that all three
elements are met. First, it is uncontested that the traffic stop
was a seizure under the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See
Styles, 362 N.C. at 414, 665 S.E.2d at 439. Second, given that
Officer Kreigsman witnessed defendant strike a large animal and
saw sparks fly when her car struck the road, there was an
objectively reasonable basis under the totality of the
circumstances to conclude that the seizure was predicated on the
community caretaking function of ensuring the safety of defendant
and her vehicle. Third, as discussed below, we find that the
public need and interest in having Officer Kreigsman seize
defendant outweighed her privacy interest in being free from the
intrusion.
The facts that weigh in favor of defendant are as follows.
First, the trial court entered an uncontested finding of fact that
defendant was only affected by the collision with the animal at
the point of impact. According to Officer Kreigsman, at that
moment “a little bit of sparks [came] from the rear end where the
car struck the roadway. And then the car continued on.” Officer
Kreigsman followed defendant at a steady speed for almost two miles
without noticing anything which indicated that defendant was
injured or otherwise unfit to drive, or that the vehicle itself
-20-
could not be operated safely. Although later inspection revealed
that the front of defendant’s car was damaged by the collision,
Officer Kreigsman was unaware of this fact at the time he executed
the seizure. Thus, the circumstances lacked an exigency that would
weigh in favor of police intervention. Second, this was a
substantial intrusion on defendant’s liberty. Unlike a situation
where an officer might approach an already stopped vehicle to check
on its occupants, Officer Kreigsman interrupted defendant’s
mobility by executing a traffic stop, using his blue lights and
siren as displays of overt authority to do so. The United States
Supreme Court has noted that traffic stops may create “substantial
anxiety” and may be brought about by an “unsettling show of
authority;” further, they “interfere with freedom and movement”
and are “inconvenient.” Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 657, 59
L. Ed. 2d 660, 666 (1979). Thus, the “possibly unsettling show of
authority,” id., used to seize defendant, in addition to the
interruption of her freedom to travel, weigh in favor of
defendant’s argument that the seizure was unreasonable.
Although these factors support defendant’s argument, we hold
that the public’s need and interest in Officer Kreigsman’s actions
outweigh defendant’s competing privacy interest. First, the
seizure occurred at nighttime in what was described by Officer
-21-
Kreigsman as a rural and dimly lit stretch of road. Since there
was a lower probability that defendant could have gotten help from
someone if she needed it, compared to if she had a similar
collision during the day time in a highly populated area, this
setting weighs in favor of the State’s argument that the public
need or interest was furthered by Officer Kreigsman’s conduct.
Second, Officer Kreigsman witnessed defendant strike a large
animal with her vehicle and saw sparks when the car bounced on the
road. Thus, he was able to identify specific facts which led him
to believe that help may have been needed, rather than a general
sense that something was wrong. Finally, defendant was operating
a vehicle when she was seized rather than enjoying the privacy of
her home. As this Court has noted, “[o]ne has a lesser expectation
of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is
transportation and it seldom serves as one’s residence or as the
repository of personal effects . . . . It travels public
thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in
plain view.” State v. Francum, 39 N.C. App. 429, 432, 250 S.E.2d
705, 707 (1979) (quoting Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590, 41
L. Ed. 2d 325, 335 (1974)). Thus, the lessened expectation of
privacy weighs in favor of the State’s argument that the seizure
was reasonable.
-22-
Furthermore, because defendant was involved in a motor
vehicle collision, a number of relevant statutory provisions are
implicated. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-4.01(33b) defines a “reportable
crash” as one resulting in death or injury to a human being or in
property damage of over $1000.00. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-4.01(4b)
defines a “crash” as “[a]ny event that results in an injury or
property damage attributable directly to the motion of a motor
vehicle or its load. The terms collision, accident and crash and
their cognates are synonymous.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-166.1(e)
states that the “appropriate law enforcement agency must
investigate a reportable accident.” In addition to the other
factors that weigh in favor of the State, these statutes underscore
the significance of the public interest involved. Based upon
Officer Kreigsman’s statutory duty under section 20-166.1(e), he
had an objectively reasonable basis to seize defendant in order to
ascertain the nature and extent of the damage to defendant’s
vehicle. Thus, when considering this statutory duty along with
all of the other factors that support the public need and interest
in Officer Kreigsman’s actions, the scales are tipped in favor of
the State.
After weighing these facts, keeping in mind the general
principle that the community caretaking exception should be
-23-
applied narrowly to prevent potential abuses, we hold that the
public need and interest did outweigh defendant’s privacy interest
in being free from government seizure here. Thus, because the
stop fits into the community caretaking exception as we apply it,
it was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
Conclusion
After careful review, we recognize the community caretaking
doctrine as a valid exception to the warrant requirement of the
Fourth Amendment and hold that Officer Kreigsman’s seizure of
defendant fits into this exception as we apply it. Thus, we affirm
the trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion to suppress.
AFFIRMED.
Judges BRYANT and STEELMAN concur.