STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. VICTOR F. HUERTAS (17-03-0853 AND 15-06-1721, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1959-17T3
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
VICTOR F. HUERTAS,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________
Submitted October 17, 2019 - Decided October 25, 2019
Before Judges Gooden Brown and Mawla.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Camden County, Indictment Nos. 17-03-0853
and 15-06-1721.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Cody Tyler Mason, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
Mary Eva Colalillo, Camden County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Kevin Jay Hein, Assistant
Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
Appellant filed a pro se supplemental brief.
PER CURIAM
Defendant Victor F. Huertas appeals from the November 29, 2017
judgment of conviction entered after a guilty plea subsequent to the denial of his
motion to suppress evidence of a warrantless search of his vehicle. He also
challenges his sentence. We affirm in all respects, but remand for correction of
the judgment of conviction to reflect the appropriate jail credits.
In 2016, Cherry Hill Township Police Officer James Harmon stopped a
GMC Yukon sports utility vehicle (SUV) operated by defendant. Harmon
observed defendant's vehicle traveling on the right-hand shoulder of a highway,
for some distance, attempting to overtake traffic before merging into the right-
most lane. When Harmon approached the vehicle, he smelled burnt marijuana
coming from the passenger compartment.
Harmon asked defendant to step out of his car, informed him he could
smell the marijuana "plain as day," and asked if there were any illegal items in
the vehicle. Defendant responded a friend smoked marijuana in the car earlier,
but claimed there was nothing else in the car. Harmon informed defendant he
had probable cause to search the vehicle. Defendant cooperated and stepped out
of the vehicle as Harmon searched the passenger compartment.
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According to Harmon, the search of the passenger compartment
uncovered "a significant quantity of heroin or cocaine" and "rubber bands and
bags everywhere." Harmon administered Miranda1 warnings to defendant and
asked him if he was on his way to "make a drop," or if he was dealing drugs out
of the car. Defendant volunteered that he was dealing drugs out of his car. A
search of the rear passenger compartment yielded a bag, which contained bags
of rice,2 a blender, a scale, and a brownish powder substance.
Officer Harmon then searched the rear cargo area of the vehicle and
discovered three guns inside a black trash bag: an Uzi style machine gun, a
sawed-off shotgun, and a smaller compact handgun. Defendant was arrested.
Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the
search. He argued Harmon did not have probable cause to make the initial traffic
stop and therefore the subsequent search and arrest were improper. The motion
judge found there was a reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop defendant
because Harmon's testimony established defendant did not merely drift into the
1
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2
Based on his training and experience, Harmon testified heroin is often
packaged and stored in rice because it acts like a desiccant and keeps the drug
free from contamination.
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shoulder of the highway, but was driving on it, which constituted a motor vehicle
violation.
The judge found Harmon testified credibly because "he is well[-]spoken,
he is articulate" and his "body language exuded that of someone with
confidence." She noted Harmon conducted over 100 car searches throughout
his career involving the seizure of marijuana. She found Harmon had probable
cause to search defendant's car when he smelled burnt marijuana. The judge
denied the suppression motion.
Thereafter, in accordance with a plea agreement, defendant pled guilty to
one count of second-degree certain persons not to have weapons, N.J.S.A.
2C:39-7(b)(1). Pursuant to the plea agreement, the motion judge sentenced
defendant to eight years' incarceration, with a five-year period of parole
ineligibility, to run concurrently with a previously-negotiated sentence of four
years of probation with 270 days incarceration on a separate indictment.
Defendant's plea resulted in a violation of probation (VOP), which was imposed
pursuant to defendant's guilty plea on third-degree drug distribution charges in
2015. As a result, the judge revoked and terminated probation, and sentenced
defendant to a three-year term of incarceration to run concurrently with the plea
sentence, and accorded defendant 510 days of jail credit on the VOP.
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Defendant raises the following arguments on appeal:
POINT I - THE MOTION COURT ERRED IN
DENYING THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS
EVIDENCE BECAUSE THE OFFICERS DID NOT
HAVE PROBABLE CAUSE TO SEARCH THE CAR
TRUNK.
POINT II – A REMAND IS REQUIRED BECAUSE
THE SENTENCING COURT DID NOT EXPLAIN
THE SENTENCE, DID NOT HEAR FROM DEFENSE
COUNSEL, AND WITHHELD EARNED JAIL
CREDIT.
A. A Remand Is Required Because the Court
Did Not Adequately Explain the Eight-Year
Sentence Imposed.
B. Resentencing Is Required Because the
Court Imposed Sentence Without Hearing from
Defense Counsel.
C. A Remand Is Required to Award
Defendant Additional Jail Credit and Prior
Service Credit for His 2015 Conviction.
I.
"When reviewing a claim with respect to an issue of suppression, a
reviewing court must accept the factual findings made by the trial court in
analyzing the question, provided those factual findings are 'supported by
sufficient credible evidence in the record.'" State v. Smith, 212 N.J. 365, 387
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(2012) (quoting State v. Handy, 206 N.J. 39, 44 (2011)). "In considering the
legal conclusions to be drawn from those facts, our review is de novo." Ibid.
When a sentence is challenged, unless the appeal raises a question of law,
a court reviews a sentence imposed pursuant to a plea agreement under the abuse
of discretion standard. State v. Sainz, 107 N.J. 283, 292 (1987). Where a
defendant receives the exact sentence bargained for, a presumption of
reasonableness attaches to the sentence. State v. S.C., 289 N.J. Super. 61, 71
(App. Div. 1996).
II.
Although defendant's counseled brief stipulates the motor vehicle stop
was valid, defendant's pro se brief challenges the stop. In his counseled brief,
defendant argues the motion to suppress was wrongly decided because police
lacked probable cause to search the entirety of his vehicle. Specifically, he
contends the smell of burnt marijuana emanating from the passenger
compartment did not provide probable cause to search the cargo section of the
vehicle. We address these arguments in turn.
A.
"[A] police officer may stop a motor vehicle where there is a reasonable
or articulable suspicion that a motor vehicle violation has occurred." State v.
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Cohen, 347 N.J. Super. 375, 378 (App. Div. 2002) (citing Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979)). "[T]he State is not required to prove that the
suspected motor vehicle violation occurred." State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463,
470 (1999) (quoting State v. Williamson, 138 N.J. 302, 304 (1994)).
The judge credited Harmon's testimony that he observed defendant driving
on the shoulder of the highway in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-88B, while
attempting to overtake another vehicle in the right lane. In the absence of any
objective evidence refuting Harmon's testimony, the motor vehicle violation
provided a reasonable, articulable suspicion and the stop was lawful.
B.
The odor of marijuana emanating from a car will generally establish
probable cause to search its passenger compartment. State v. Birkenmeier, 185
N.J. 552, 563 (2006). New Jersey's automobile exception authorizes a
warrantless search of an automobile when police have probable cause, and the
circumstances giving rise to the probable cause are "unforeseeable and
spontaneous[.]" State v. Witt, 223 N.J. 409, 450 (2015).
In State v. Guerra, the Court held a warrantless search of the trunk and its
contents was justified under the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement. 93 N.J. 146, 151-52 (1983). There, police stopped a vehicle and
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detected a strong odor of marijuana that could not have come from a small
suitcase visible in the passenger compartment. Id. at 149. The driver declined
consent to search the trunk. Ibid. The Court found officers were justified in
performing a warrantless search of the trunk, and "every part of the vehicle"
based on their detection of a strong odor of marijuana. Id. at 151.
Lawful observation of contraband can create probable cause to search an
area beyond which the initial probable cause permitted. State v. Nishina, 175
N.J. 502, 515-16 (2003). In Nishina, an officer smelled the "odor of burnt
marijuana coming out from" the defendant's clothes after the defendant exited
his vehicle. Id. at 508. Based on the smell, the officer patted down the defendant
and discovered a pen and a pack of rolling papers, which the officer recognized
as "drug paraphernalia used for marijuana cigarettes." Ibid. The officer then
shined a flashlight into the defendant's car and saw a "clear plastic bag
protruding out of the console" which contained more marijuana. Ibid. The Court
concluded the odor of marijuana on defendant's person, the discovery of drug
paraphernalia as a result of a lawful search of defendant's person, and the plain
view observation of the plastic bag in the car, "amply supplied the officer with
probable cause to suspect that drugs would be found in defendant's vehicle." Id.
at 517-18.
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Here, Harmon testified that after stopping the vehicle he immediately
smelled burnt marijuana emanating from it while speaking with defendant.
Defendant admitted his friend smoked marijuana in the car earlier. Based on
the odor, Harmon conducted a lawful search of the vehicle where he found
heroin and heroin paraphernalia in the passenger compartment.
The recovery of heroin and paraphernalia in the center console, and the
fact it was not marijuana and yet there was a marijuana odor in the car, provided
the probable cause to search the rest of the vehicle. 3 Therefore, the discovery
and seizure of the drugs, paraphernalia, and guns in the rear cargo area was
constitutional.
C.
We reject defendant's challenge to the sentence on the grounds the judge
did not provide a basis for the aggravating factors. We also reject the claim his
attorney was not permitted to address the court at sentencing.
Our Supreme Court stated findings regarding the aggravating and
mitigating factors ensure the "sentence imposed is tailored to the indivi dual
offender and to the particular crime he or she committed." Sainz, 107 N.J. at
3
Although not determinative, we note the vehicle did not have a trunk per se,
but a contiguous rear cargo area commonly found in SUVs.
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288. The sentencing record readily demonstrates the judge made the proper
findings to support the applicable aggravating factors. Indeed, the judge
reviewed the pre-sentence report and found defendant's prior contact with the
court system, including adjudications of juvenile delinquency and indictable
convictions as an adult, were sufficient to find the aggravating factors. She also
concluded defendant's prior convictions for aggravated manslaughter,
aggravated assault, and numerous drug offenses justified finding the applicable
aggravating factors. The judge's findings were individualized to defendant and
supported the application of aggravating factors N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3), (6), and
(9).
We also reject the claim the judge erred when imposing the State
recommended sentence without hearing from defense counsel, who could argue
for mitigation and a lower sentence. The sentencing record does not support
defendant's argument his attorney was prevented from addressing the court. The
judge inquired if defendant wished to place a statement on the record. The
reason defendant did not is because, as the sentencing judge noted, "[t]his [was]
a negotiated agreement between the prosecutor and the defendant." We find no
reversible error in this regard.
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D.
Defendant argues he is entitled to the following: three days additional jail
credit from April 16 through April 18, 2016; relabeling of jail credit from April
11 through September 19, 2015, and February 25 through April 18, 2016, as
"prior service time" credit; and twenty-seven additional days of jail credit on his
VOP sentence for the time spent in jail following his arrest.
We agree the sentencing judge undercounted defendant's credit by three
days because he was incarcerated from April 16 until April 18, 2016, not April
15, 2016. The State concedes this point, and does not object to relabeling the
three days as prior service credit to "avoid inaccuracy and confusion." For these
reasons, we remand this aspect of the sentence to correct the judgment of
conviction.
Finally, defendant was provided jail credit starting on January 24, 2017,
but argues that since he was arrested on December 28, 2016, the court withheld
twenty-seven days to which he was entitled. We disagree.
We previously stated "[a]bsent a showing of an abusive exercise of
authority, it would be unreasonable to grant defendant credit for the custodial
time elapsing prior to the filing of a VOP statement of charges." State v.
DiAngelo, 434 N.J. Super. 443, 462 (App. Div. 2014). Here, the statement of
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charges was filed on January 19, 2017. Pursuant to DiAngelo, defendant's credit
for custodial time commenced on that date, not the date of his arrest. At best,
this calculation entitled defendant to five additional days credit on the VOP
sentence. However, as the State notes, these alterations will have no practical
effect, since it is uncontested defendant received the correct number of credits
on his eight-year weapons sentence to which the three-year flat sentence for the
VOP runs concurrently.
Affirmed in part and remanded in part. We do not retain jurisdiction.
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