DocketNumber: No. 2007-CA-100.
Judges: GWIN, J.
Filed Date: 6/3/2008
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/6/2016
{¶ 2} "I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF APPELLANT AND/OR AS A MATTER OF LAW BY DENYING APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL.
{¶ 3} "II. THE TRIALCOURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELANT'S MOTION TO FIND THE ARRESTING OFFICE INCOMPETENT TO TESTIFY.
{¶ 4} "III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF APPELLANT BY DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS STATEMENTS ATTRIBUTED TO APPELLANT.
{¶ 5} "IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING APPELLNAT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE BLOOD TEST AND REPORTED RESULTS HEREIN."
{¶ 7} Appellant was originally cited on September 18, 2006, by Trooper Kevin Milligan of the Ohio State Highway Patrol. A suppression hearing was set for December 7, 2006, but Trooper Milligan failed to appear and the State dismissed the matter.
{¶ 8} Trooper Milligan served appellant with a new citation on March 15, 2007, with reference to the September 18, 2006 traffic accident. The trial court conducted a suppression hearing on June 22, 2007. After the court overruled the motion to suppress, appellant changed his plea from not guilty to no contest.
{¶ 9} Appellant argues at the time of the dismissal of the original case, the State had all the evidence necessary to proceed to trial. The State elected to dismiss the matter rather than requesting a continuance until the arresting officer could appear. Appellant argues the within case presents an unjustified pre-complaint delay, which should be attributable to the State for speedy trial purposes, citing State v.Meeker (1971),
{¶ 10} Meeker is distinguishable from the case at bar. InMeeker, the state knew the defendant committed acts which would constitute four separate crimes. The state elected in June 1963 to charge the defendant with only one of those crimes. The Ohio Supreme Court held to indict the defendant on the other three crimes, in April 1969 violates the defendant's right to a speedy trial. The court found delay in prosecution was not legally justified by the fact that defendant pleaded guilty in 1963 to a lesser included offense under the original charge, and was sentenced to prison but in 1969 secured post-conviction relief voiding his 1963 guilty plea. (Syllabus by the court, paragraph 4.) *Page 4
{¶ 11} As appellant rightly points out, speedy trial rights are strictly construed against the State and liberally construed in favor of appellant, see, e.g., State v. Pachay (1980),
{¶ 12} The State replies a three-month delay between the dismissal of the original action and its re-filing is not an unreasonable delay. The State concedes speedy trial rights apply to delays in commencing prosecution as well as delays after indictment, State v. Selvage (1997),
{¶ 13} In State v. Broughton (1991),
{¶ 14} We find the record does not contain evidence supporting appellant's assertion the three months between the State's dismissal of the original action and its re-filing should not be tolled. Accordingly, those days between the dismissal of the original citation and the filing of the second are not counted in calculating appellant's speedy trial date.
{¶ 15} Pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 16} We find the record demonstrates appellant was brought to trial within the speedy trial time, and the trial court did not err in overruling the motion to dismiss.
{¶ 17} The first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 19} While appellant apparently concedes in issuing the first citation Trooper Milligan was in uniform and using a properly marked vehicle, when he served the second citation, he was using an unmarked vehicle and not in uniform. The State argues the crucial point in time is the time of the arrest. We agree.
{¶ 20} We find Trooper Milligan was competent to testify at the hearing on the motion to suppress.
{¶ 21} The second assignment of error is overruled. *Page 6
{¶ 23} Trooper Milligan testified one of the witnesses to the accident told him appellant had been knocked unconscious, but when the trooper spoke with appellant he was conscious in the ambulance, being treated by EMS personnel. Trooper Milligan followed the ambulance to the emergency room, where he observed hospital personnel stapling a gash to the back of appellant's head. Trooper Milligan testified he asked appellant routine questions and wrote out his answers. Some of appellant's family members were present. Trooper Milligan testified he did not arrest appellant at the hospital because the accident investigation was not completed.
{¶ 24} The State argues appellant was not in custody at the hospital, and he made a voluntary statement in the course of the investigation. The State urges the trooper was not required to inform appellant of his Miranda rights. We agree the record contains evidence Trooper Milligan was investigating the cause of the accident when he questioned appellant at the hospital, and appellant was not in custody. The record does not contain any evidence appellant's injuries were so serious he was unable to make a voluntary statement.
{¶ 25} The third assignment of error is overruled. *Page 7
{¶ 27} R.C.
{¶ 28} The fourth assignment of error is overruled. *Page 8
{¶ 29} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Municipal Court of Licking County, Ohio, is affirmed.
Gwin, J., Hoffman, P.J., and Wise, J., concur.