State ex rel. Union Twp. v. Union Twp. Professional Firefighters, IAFF Loc. 3412

[Cite as State ex rel. Union Twp. v. Union Twp. Professional Firefighters, IAFF Loc. 3412, 2014-Ohio-1582.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
CLERMONT COUNTY
STATE EX REL. UNION TOWNSHIP, :
CLERMONT COUNTY, OHIO,
: CASE NO. CA2013-08-064
Relators-Appellees,
: OPINION
4/14/2014
- vs - :
:
UNION TOWNSHIP PROFESSIONAL
FIREFIGHTERS, IAFF LOC. 3412. :
Respondent-Appellant. :
CIVIL APPEAL FROM CLERMONT COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
Case No. 2012CVH00693
Schroeder, Maundrell, Barbiere & Powers, Lawrence E. Barbiere, 5300 Socialville-Foster
Road, Suite 200, Mason, Ohio 45040, for relators-appellees
Livorno and Arnett Co., LPA, Henry A. Arnett, 1335 Dublin Road, Suite 108-B, Columbus,
Ohio 43215, for respondent-appellant
RINGLAND, P.J.
{¶ 1} Respondent-appellant, Union Township Professional Firefighters, IAFF Local
3412 (IAFF Local 3412), appeal a decision of the Clermont County Court of Common Pleas
granting a writ of mandamus in favor of relators-appellees, Union Township and the Union
Township Board of Trustees (Union Township), ordering IAFF Local 3412 to sign a collective
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bargaining agreement.
{¶ 2} This case is before this court for a second time on appeal. The following facts
were originally set forth in State ex rel. Union Twp. v. Union Twp. Prof. Firefighters, IAFF Loc.
3412, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2012-09-067, 2013-Ohio-1611 (IAFF Loc. 3412 I):
Union Township and IAFF Local 3412 entered into a collective
bargaining process, whereby the parties hoped to reach a
contract governing the terms of the employment relationship
between Union Township and its firefighters, lieutenants, and
captains. However, the parties were not able to reach an
agreement. According to R.C. 4117.14, the parties submitted
their dispute to a conciliator appointed by the State Employment
Relations Board (SERB).
The conciliator held a hearing on October 11, 2011, during which
both parties were represented and offered evidence in support of
their respective last and final offers. The conciliator then filed a
report and recommendation, ordering that IAFF Local 3412's
final offers be accepted regarding wages, sick leave, and
staffing, and that Union Township's final offers be accepted
regarding safety and hours of work/overtime.
Specifically, the conciliator awarded a one percent wage increase to IAFF Local 3412. The
wage increase was made retroactive to January 1, 2011, based on a retroactivity clause
agreed to by the parties. The conciliator also changed the standard number of hours for a
continuous operation employee from 2,600 to 2,756 hours.
{¶ 3} Pursuant to R.C. 4117.14(H), Union Township filed a motion to vacate the
conciliator's order in the Clermont County Court of Common Pleas. Union Twp. Bd. of
Trustees v. The Union Twp. Prof. Firefighters, IAFF Local 3412, Clermont C.P. No. 2012-
1
CVH-0090 (Mar. 14, 2012) (U.T. Trustees). Union Township requested the court vacate,
modify, or correct the portion of the conciliator's order which awarded a one percent wage
increase retroactive to January 1, 2011. The motion was denied by Judge Herman.
1. Final offer settlement awards made under Chapter 4117 are subject to and reviewable by the trial court as
provided in Chapter 2711, related to arbitration awards. R.C. 4117.14(G)(8) and (H).
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{¶ 4} Union Township then prepared a collective bargaining agreement consistent
with the conciliator's orders issued on October 26, 2011 (Agreement), and indicated it was
willing to execute the Agreement. However, IAFF Local 3412 refused to sign the Agreement.
{¶ 5} In response, Union Township filed two actions. Union Township first filed an
unfair labor practice claim against IAFF Local 3412 with SERB claiming IAFF Local 3412
engaged in an unfair labor practice by not signing the Agreement.
{¶ 6} Union Township also filed the instant action, a complaint for a writ of
mandamus with the trial court. In its complaint, Union Township asked the trial court to
command IAFF Local 3412 to sign the Agreement. IAFF Local 3412 moved to dismiss Union
Township's complaint. The trial court denied the motion. IAFF Local 3412 then filed its
answer. Based on the admissions included in IAFF Local 3412's answer, Union Township
filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Upon review of the pleadings, the trial court
dismissed Union Township's mandamus complaint, finding it lacked jurisdiction because
SERB had exclusive jurisdiction over the matter based on the unfair labor practice complaint
filed with SERB.
{¶ 7} Union Township appealed the trial court's decision. See IAFF Loc. 3412 I,
2013-Ohio-1611. On appeal, this court reversed the decision of the trial court holding "the
trial court has the jurisdiction to determine whether Union Township is entitled to a writ of
mandamus." IAFF Loc. 3412 I at ¶ 18. Accordingly, the matter was remanded to the trial
court to rule on the merits of Union Township's writ of mandamus.
{¶ 8} On remand, the trial court considered Union Township's original motion on the
pleadings. The trial court concluded that both the one percent wage increase and the
increase in annual hours from 2,600 to 2,756 awarded by the conciliator were retroactive to
January 1, 2011. The trial court granted the writ of mandamus and ordered IAFF Local 3412
to sign the Agreement. IAFF Local 3412 now appeals the trial court's decision, raising the
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following assignment of error:
{¶ 9} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE RELATORS' MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS.
{¶ 10} In its sole assignment of error, IAFF Local 3412 challenges the trial court's
decision granting Union Township's motion for judgment on the pleadings and the resulting
writ of mandamus and argues that the trial court erred as: (1) the trial court lacked jurisdiction
to grant the writ of mandamus; (2) Union Township was barred under the doctrine of
collateral estoppel or issue preclusion from arguing that the increase in hours worked should
be applied retroactively; (3) mandamus should not lie against a private entity such as IAFF
Local 3412; and (4) Union Township had an adequate legal remedy such that a mandamus
action was inappropriate.
{¶ 11} An appellate court reviews a trial court's decision on a Civ.R. 12(C) motion for
judgment on the pleadings de novo. J.H. v. Hamilton City School Dist., 12th Dist. Butler No.
CA2012-11-236, 2013-Ohio-2967, ¶ 8. Civ.R. 12(C) motions are specifically reserved for
resolving questions of law and may be filed "[a]fter the pleadings are closed but within such
time as not to delay the trial." Id. A Civ.R. 12(C) motion "requires a determination that no
material factual issues exist and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
McGlothin v. Schad, 194 Ohio App. 3d 669, 2011-Ohio-3011, ¶ 10 (12th Dist.), quoting State
ex rel. Midwest Pride IV, Inc. v. Pontious, 75 Ohio St.3d 565, 570 (1996).
{¶ 12} R.C. 2731.01 defines mandamus as "a writ * * * commanding the performance
of an act which the law specially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station."
In order to be entitled to a writ of mandamus, the relator must show (1) a clear legal right to
relief, (2) a clear legal duty on the part of the respondent to perform the requested act, and
(3) no plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. State ex rel. Harris v.
Rhodes, 54 Ohio St.2d 41, 42 (1978); State ex rel. Am. Legion Post 25 v. Ohio Rights
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Comm., 12th Dist. Fayette No. CA2006-01-006, 2006-Ohio-5509, ¶ 38. The court must
determine, in its sound discretion, whether mandamus is warranted under all the
circumstances. State ex rel. Pressley v. Indus. Comm., 11 Ohio St.2d 141 (1967), paragraph
seven of the syllabus.
A. Trial Court's Jurisdiction
{¶ 13} IAFF Local 3412 once again asserts the trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue
the writ of mandamus. Although this court found the issue raised in the mandamus action
was different from the issue raised before SERB, IAFF Local 3412 maintains "it is now
apparent that the issues were exactly the same." IAFF Local 3412 asserts that exclusive
jurisdiction rests with SERB because the complaint for writ of mandamus alleges conduct that
would constitute an unfair labor practice and because Union Township's claims are "solely
based upon Revised Code Chapter 4117."
{¶ 14} In the present case, any arguments related to the trial court's subject matter
jurisdiction are barred by the doctrine of the law of the case. "The law-of-the-case doctrine is
rooted in principles of res judicata and issue preclusion." State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d
92, 2010-Ohio-6238, ¶ 35. Pursuant to this doctrine, the "decision of a reviewing court in a
case remains the law of that case on the legal questions involved for all subsequent
proceedings in the case at both the trial and reviewing levels." Brackett v. Moler Raceway
Park, L.L.C., 12th Dist. Brown No. CA2012-06-009, 2013-Ohio-1102, ¶ 8, quoting City of
Hubbard ex rel. Creed, Admr. v. Sauline, 74 Ohio St.3d 402, 404 (1996). "Absent
extraordinary circumstances, such as an intervening decision by the Ohio Supreme Court, an
inferior court has no discretion to disregard the mandate of a superior court in a prior appeal
in the same case." Roush v. Brown, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2009-09-225, 2010-Ohio-1520,
¶ 15.
{¶ 15} In our prior decision, this court expressly found that the trial court had subject
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matter jurisdiction to determine whether Union Township was entitled to the writ of
mandamus. IAFF Loc. 3412 I at ¶ 18. In so holding, this court considered and rejected each
of the arguments now advanced by IAFF Local 3412 regarding the trial court's alleged lack of
jurisdiction. See IAFF Loc. 3412 I at ¶ 11-12.
{¶ 16} As this court has previously decided the trial court had jurisdiction over this
matter, and there were no extraordinary circumstances which would permit the trial court to
disregard this holding, we find the trial court had jurisdiction to issue the writ of mandamus in
this case. See IAFF Loc. 3412 I at ¶ 8-18.
B. Collateral Estoppel
{¶ 17} IAFF Local 3412 also asserts Union Township is barred by collateral estoppel
from arguing that the change in hours should be applied retroactively to January 1, 2011.
IAFF Local 3412 contends that two other tribunals, SERB and Judge Herman, previously
considered the issue of retroactivity and found that the increase in the number of hours could
not be applied retroactive to January 1, 2011.
{¶ 18} Collateral estoppel "preclu[des] the relitigation in a second action of an issue or
issues that have been actually and necessarily litigated and determined in a prior action."
Providence Manor Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Rogers, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2011-10-189,
2012-Ohio-3532, ¶ 40, quoting Goodson v. McDonough Power Equip., Inc., 2 Ohio St.3d
193, 195 (1983). To successfully assert collateral estoppel, a party must plead and prove
that: (1) the party against whom estoppel is sought was a party or in privity with a party to the
prior action; (2) there was a final judgment on the merits in the previous case after a full and
fair opportunity to litigate the issue; (3) the issue must have been tried and decided and must
be necessary to the final judgment; and (4) the issue must have been identical to the issue
involved in the prior suit. DLK Co. of Ohio v. Meece, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2012-07-060,
2013-Ohio-860, ¶ 41.
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{¶ 19} As an initial matter, we note IAFF Local 3412 did not argue to the trial court that
Union Township's suit was precluded because the issue of retroactivity was decided by
SERB. In fact, SERB's decision, which IAFF Local 3412 argues bars the instant matter, was
not filed with the trial court. Accordingly, as this issue was not raised below, IAFF Local 3412
has waived such argument on appeal. See State ex rel. Quarto Mining Co. v. Foreman, 79
Ohio St.3d 78, 81 (1997).
{¶ 20} IAFF Local 3412's assertion that the instant matter is barred because the issue
of retroactivity was decided in the proceeding before Judge Herman is properly before this
court. In the proceeding before Judge Herman, Union Township argued the conciliator's
order should be vacated, modified, or corrected because the conciliator exceeded his
authority when he awarded the retroactive one percent wage increase. Union Township
asserted IAFF Local 3412 had repudiated the retroactivity provision in an agreement entered
into by the parties by refusing to implement the change in hours worked, and therefore the
conciliator did not have the authority to make the wage increase retroactive. See R.C.
4117.14(D) and (G)(11). Judge Herman disagreed, finding it was "impossible" to perform the
increased hours in 2011 as the conciliator's decision was not issued until October 2011, and
therefore, IAFF Local 3412 did not repudiate the agreement. Accordingly, Judge Herman
found the conciliator had the authority to order the retroactive wage increase and denied
Union Township's motion.
{¶ 21} From a review of Judge Herman's decision, there is no indication that Union
Township asserted any arguments with regards to the retroactive nature of the increase in
the number of hours worked. Rather, the sole issue Union Township sought to have
modified or vacated by way of that action was the retroactive nature of the one percent wage
increase. While the court mentioned that it was "impossible" for the firefighters to perform the
increased hours in 2011, there was no finding with regards to whether the standard number
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of hours worked should be applied retroactively. Therefore, we cannot say the issue of the
retroactivity of hours worked was tried, decided, and necessary to the final judgment before
Judge Herman.
{¶ 22} In addition, the issue before the trial court below and the court in U.T. Trustees
is not identical. The issue before the trial court in this action was whether IAFF Local 3412
should be compelled to sign the Agreement that incorporated the conciliator's order. In the
proceeding before Judge Herman in U.T. Trustees, the issue was whether the conciliator had
exceeded his authority in issuing the order. In U.T. Trustees, the trial court essentially
affirmed the order of the conciliator. In the current proceeding, Union Township is merely
attempting to enforce the order that was confirmed in U.T. Trustees.
{¶ 23} As IAFF Local 3412 has failed to show that the issue of the retroactive nature of
the standard hours for continuous operation employees was tried and decided by Judge
Herman in U.T. Trustees or that the issue in the two proceedings was identical, we find it
failed to establish Union Township was barred under the doctrine of collateral estoppel from
arguing that the increase in hours worked should be applied retroactively. Therefore, the trial
court was free to consider and decide whether the increase in hours worked, as ordered by
the conciliator, would apply retroactively.
C. Mandamus Action
{¶ 24} Finally, IAFF challenges the merits of the mandamus action. IAFF Local 3412
contends that a mandamus action was inappropriate in the instant matter as it is a private
entity and Union Township had an adequate legal remedy.
{¶ 25} IAFF Local 3412 contends that mandamus is an action to force public officials
to comply with their duty, and therefore, a mandamus action is not applicable to a private
entity such as IAFF Local 3412. IAFF Local 3412 is correct, "[m]andamus will not lie to
enforce a private right against a private person." State ex rel. Pressley v. Indus. Comm. 11
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Ohio St.2d 141, (1967), paragraph eight of the syllabus. However, mandamus will lie to
compel the performance of an act which is clearly enjoyed by law upon a respondent. State
ex rel. Freeman v. Valentine, 25 Ohio St.2d 184 (1971). In the present case, Union
Township is not attempting to enforce a private right. Rather, Union Township is seeking to
enforce performance of an act by IAFF Local 3412 which is required by law.
{¶ 26} R.C. 4117.14 specifically provides that a party may enforce a conciliation
award. IAFF Loc. 3412 I at ¶ 9. In addition, R.C. 4117.14(I) states, "[t]he issuance of a final
offer settlement award constitutes a binding mandate to the public employer and the
exclusive representative to take whatever actions are necessary to implement the award."
(Emphasis sic.) IAFF Local 3412 is the exclusive representative of "all firefighters,
lieutenants and captains employed by Union Township who work in Union Township's Fire
Department." Therefore, it is by virtue of the parties' relationship as a public employer and
the exclusive representative of these public employees that compels IAFF Local 3412 to act.
Union Township is simply attempting to enforce the conciliation award and is taking the
necessary actions to implement the award by requesting the court to order IAFF Local 3412
to sign the Agreement.
{¶ 27} IAFF Local 3412 also contends that mandamus was inappropriate as Union
Township had an adequate remedy at law. IAFF Local 3412 asserts that Union Township
had, and availed itself to, an available and adequate remedy at law by way of the unfair labor
practice complaint before SERB.
{¶ 28} As mentioned above, "[i]n order to be entitled to a writ of mandamus, relator
must show (1) that he has a clear legal right to the relief prayed for, (2) that respondents are
under a clear legal duty to perform the acts, and (3) that relator has no plain and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of the law." State ex rel. Harris v. Rhodes, 54 Ohio St.2d 41,
42 (1978). In order to be considered an adequate legal remedy, the alternative remedy must
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be "complete, beneficial, and speedy." State ex rel. Am. Legion Post 25 v. Ohio Rights
Comm., 12th Dist. Fayette No. CA2006-01-006, 2006-Ohio-5509, ¶ 55, quoting State ex rel.
United Auto., Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of Am. v. Bur. of Workers' Comp.,
108 Ohio St.3d 432, 2006-Ohio-1327, ¶ 54.
{¶ 29} In the present case, Union Township's request for relief was for IAFF Local
3412 to be commanded to immediately sign the Agreement in accordance with its clear legal
duty pursuant to R.C. 4117.14. This Agreement incorporates the conciliator's order which
resulted from the conciliation process under R.C. 4117.14. Pursuant to R.C. 4117.14(I), "the
issuance of a final offer settlement award constitutes a binding mandate to the public
employer and the exclusive representative to take whatever actions are necessary to
implement the award." In addition, R.C. 4117.09(A) requires parties to a collective bargaining
agreement to reduce their agreement to writing and execute it. Accordingly, these statutory
provisions provide a clear legal duty upon both Union Township and IAFF Local 3412 to
execute the Agreement. See IAFF Loc. 3412 I at ¶ 16.
{¶ 30} IAFF Local 3412 asserts that the proceedings before SERB represented an
adequate legal remedy, and therefore Union Township was not entitled to a writ of
mandamus. However, the remedies presented by the proceedings before SERB and before
the trial court are "two different remedies [which] are not interdependent upon one another,
nor do they depend upon a preliminary finding by either SERB or the trial court." IAFF Loc.
3412 I at ¶ 15. Union Township was requesting a specific finding and determination from
SERB and a specific finding and determination from the trial court. Id. "By filing its
mandamus claim with the common pleas court, Union Township asked the trial court to
compel IAFF Local 3412 to sign the Agreement, which was a completely separate and
distinct request from asking SERB to declare IAFF Local 3412's refusal to sign an unfair
labor practice." Id. at ¶ 12. Accordingly, under the facts of this case, as there is no indication
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that Union Township's unfair labor practice charge before SERB can rectify IAFF Local
3412's repeated refusal to comply with the conciliation process and sign the award, this
remedy is not complete, and therefore it is not an adequate remedy.
{¶ 31} Based on the foregoing, the trial court did not err in granting Union Township's
motion for judgment on the pleadings and issuing a writ of mandamus commanding IAFF
Local 3412 to sign the Agreement. IAFF Local 3412's sole assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 32} Judgment affirmed.
HENDRICKSON and PIPER, JJ., concur.
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