eCases

[Cite as In re J.S., 2020-Ohio-3413.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
HANCOCK COUNTY
IN RE:
CASE NO. 5-19-22
J.S.,
OPINION
ALLEGED DELINQUENT CHILD.
IN RE:
CASE NO. 5-19-23
J.S.,
OPINION
ALLEGED DELINQUENT CHILD.
IN RE:
CASE NO. 5-19-24
J.S.,
OPINION
ALLEGED DELINQUENT CHILD.
Appeals from Hancock County Common Pleas Court
Juvenile Division
Trial Court Nos. 20182254, 20192131 and 20192119
Judgments Affirmed
Date of Decision:    June 22, 2020
APPEARANCES:
Abigail Christopher for Appellant
Heather M. Pendleton for Appellee
Case Nos. 5-19-22, 5-19-23 and 5-19-24
PRESTON, J.
{¶1} Juvenile-appellant, J.S., appeals the June 7, 2019 judgment of
disposition of the Hancock County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division. For
the reasons that follow, we affirm.
{¶2} On December 17, 2018, J.S. went absent without leave from the Doug
Lee Group Home located in Fulton County, Ohio. Subsequently, on December 19,
2018, a complaint was filed in the Fulton County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile
Division charging J.S. with four counts: Count One of burglary in violation of R.C.
2911.12(A)(2), a second-degree felony if committed by an adult; Count Two of
grand theft of a firearm in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(1), a third-degree felony if
committed by an adult; Count Three of safecracking in violation of R.C.
2911.31(A), a fourth-degree felony if committed by an adult; and Count Four of
possessing criminal tools in violation of R.C. 2923.24(A), a fifth-degree felony if
committed by an adult. (Case No. 20182254, Doc. No. 1). On December 27, 2018,
the case was transferred to the Hancock County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile
Division and assigned case number 20182254. (Id.).
{¶3} On December 28, 2018, J.S. attended an initial appearance where he
entered denials to the charges. (Case No. 20182254, Doc. No. 4). On March 1,
2019, J.S. appeared before the trial court, withdrew his denials, and entered
admissions to all charges. (Case No. 20182254, Doc. No. 11). The trial court
-2-
Case Nos. 5-19-22, 5-19-23 and 5-19-24
accepted J.S.’s admissions, found him to be a delinquent child as defined by R.C.
2152.02, and ordered a psychological evaluation. (Id.).
{¶4} On March 22, 2019, while in the Wood County Juvenile Detention
Center awaiting disposition in Case Number 20182254, J.S. intentionally removed
the cover from the sprinkler head in his room causing the device to spray water and
flood the wing, resulting in the evacuation of the entire facility.      (Case No.
20192119, Doc. No. 1). Consequently, on March 26, 2019, a complaint was filed
in the Wood County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division charging J.S. with
a single count of vandalism in violation of R.C. 2909.05(B)(1)(b), a fifth-degree
felony if committed by an adult. (Id.). On May 2, 2019, J.S. entered an admission
to the charge in the complaint. (Id.). The trial court accepted J.S.’s admission and
found him to be a delinquent child as defined by R.C. 2152.02. (Id.). That same
day, the case was transferred to the Hancock County Court of Common Pleas,
Juvenile Division for adjudication and assigned case number 20192119. (Id.). The
order of transfer was filed on May 10, 2019. (Id.).
{¶5} On May 29, 2019, while in the Wood County Juvenile Detention Center
awaiting disposition in case numbers 20182254 and 20192119, J.S. crawled
between a gap in the recreation yard fencing and left the property. (Case No.
20192131, Doc. No. 1). On May 31, 2019, a complaint was filed in the Wood
County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division charging J.S. with escape in
-3-
Case Nos. 5-19-22, 5-19-23 and 5-19-24
violation of R.C. 2921.34(A)(1), a second-degree felony if committed by an adult.
(Id.). That same day, the matter was transferred to the Hancock County Court of
Common Pleas, Juvenile Division and assigned case number 20192131. (Id.).
{¶6} On June 7, 2019, J.S. appeared before the trial court for adjudication in
case number 20192131 and disposition in case numbers 20182254 and 20192119.1
(Case No. 20182254, Doc. No. 25); (Case No. 20192119, Doc. No. 3); (Case No.
20192131, Doc. No. 3). At the hearing, J.S. first entered an admission to the charge
in the complaint in case number 20192131. (Case No. 20192131, Doc. No. 3); (June
7, 2019 Tr. at 11-13). The trial court accepted J.S.’s admission and found him to be
a delinquent child. (Case No. 20192131, Doc. No. 3); (June 7, 2019 Tr. at 13-14).
The trial court then proceeded to disposition for the four counts in case number
20182254, the single count of vandalism in case number 20192119, and the single
count of escape in case number 20192131. (Case No. 20182254, Doc. No. 25);
(Case No. 20192119, Doc. No. 3); (Case No. 20192131, Doc. No. 3).
{¶7} With respect to Count One in case number 20182254, the trial court
committed J.S. to the legal care and custody of the Ohio Department of Youth
Services (“DYS”) for a minimum of one year and a maximum period not to exceed
J.S.’s 21st birthday. (Case No. 20182254; Doc. No. 25); (June 7, 2019 Tr. at 26).
1
Although the three cases were transferred to the Hancock County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile
Division, a visiting judge who was familiar with J.S. and his history in the juvenile court system presided
over the matter. (See Case No. 20182254, Doc. No. 25; Case No. 20192119, Doc. No. 3; Case No.
20192131, Doc. No. 3); (June 7, 2019 Tr. at 21).
-4-
Case Nos. 5-19-22, 5-19-23 and 5-19-24
As to each of Counts Two, Three, and Four in case number 20182254, the trial court
committed J.S. to the legal care and custody of DYS for a minimum of six months
and a maximum period not to exceed J.S.’s 21st birthday. (Case No. 20182254;
Doc. No. 25); (June 7, 2019 Tr. at 26-27). The trial court ordered that the
commitments for all four counts run consecutively to each other for an aggregate
minimum term of two years and six months in case number 20182254. (Id.); (Id.).
With respect to case number 20192119, the trial court committed J.S. to DYS for a
minimum of six months and a maximum period not to exceed J.S.’s 21st birthday.
(Case No. 20192119, Doc. No. 3); (June 7, 2019 Tr. at 26). With respect to case
number 20192131, the trial court committed J.S. to DYS. for a minimum of one
year and a maximum period not to exceed J.S.’s 21st birthday. (Case No. 20192131,
Doc. No. 3); (June 7, 2019 Tr. at 26). The trial court further ordered that the
commitments in all three cases run consecutively for an aggregate minimum term
of four years. (Case. No. 20182254, Doc. No. 25); (Case No. 20192119, Doc. No.
3); (Case No. 20192131, Doc. No. 3); (June 7, 2019 Tr. at 26-27). That same day,
the trial court filed its judgment entries of adjudication. (Case No. 20182254, Doc.
No. 25); (Case No. 20192119, Doc. No. 3); (Case No. 20192131, Doc. No. 3).
-5-
Case Nos. 5-19-22, 5-19-23 and 5-19-24
{¶8} On July 12, 2019, J.S. filed his notices of appeal.2 (Case No. 20182254,
Doc. No. 30); (Case No. 20192119, Doc. No. 6); (Case No. 20192131, Doc. No. 6).
He raises one assignment of error.
Assignment of Error
The Court abused its discretion by failing to consider the
overriding purposes of juvenile dispositions when it imposed a
minimum four-year cumulative commitment to DYS as a
disposition. (6/7/2019 T. pp. 24-26; 29-30)
{¶9} In his assignment of error, J.S. argues that the trial court abused its
discretion by imposing a commitment to DYS and therefore punishing J.S., rather
than focusing on the overriding purposes of juvenile court dispositions.
(Appellant’s Brief at 2-3). For the reasons that follow, we disagree.
{¶10} We review a juvenile court’s disposition for a child adjudicated
delinquent under an abuse-of-discretion standard. In re L.R., 3d Dist. Defiance No.
4-19-19, 2020-Ohio-2990, ¶ 7. The term “abuse of discretion” connotes more than
an error of law or of judgment; it implies that the court’s attitude is unreasonable,
arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 

5 Ohio St. 3d 217

, 219
(1983). Under this standard, an appellate court may not substitute its judgment for
that of the trial court.

Id. 2 J.S.

filed a motion for leave to file a delayed appeal contemporaneously with his notice of appeal. (Case
No. 20182254, Doc. No. 30); (Case No. 20192119, Doc. No. 6); (Case No. 20192131, Doc. No. 6). On
August 1, 2019, this Court granted J.S.’s motion for leave to file a delayed appeal. (Case No. 20182254,
Doc. No. 38); (Case No. 20192119, Doc. No. 14); (Case No. 20192131, Doc. No. 14).
-6-
Case Nos. 5-19-22, 5-19-23 and 5-19-24
{¶11} “[A] juvenile court has broad discretion to craft an appropriate
disposition for a child adjudicated delinquent.” In re D.S., 

111 Ohio St. 3d 361

,
2006-Ohio-5851, ¶ 6, citing R.C. 2152.19(A)(4). The overriding purposes for
disposition of juvenile offenders are “to provide for the care, protection, and mental
and physical development of children * * *, protect the public interest and safety,
hold the offender accountable for the offender’s actions, restore the victim, and
rehabilitate the offender.” R.C. 2152.01(A). “These purposes shall be achieved by
a system of graduated sanctions and services.” R.C. 2152.01(A).
{¶12} “‘The various traditional juvenile dispositions available to a trial court
are delineated in R.C. 2152.16, 2152.17, 2152.19, and 2152.20.’” In re L.R. at ¶ 9,
quoting In re H.V., 

138 Ohio St. 3d 408

, 2014-Ohio-812, ¶ 32 (O’Connor, C.J.,
dissenting). Specifically, a juvenile court may commit the juvenile to the care and
custody of DYS, place the juvenile in a detention facility or on house arrest, impose
fines, or impose any of the other options or a combination of options described in
R.C. Chapter 2152.

Id., citing In

re H.V. at ¶ 33 (O’Connor, dissenting), citing R.C.
2152.16, 2152.19(A)(3), (4)(j), and 2152.20(A)(1).
{¶13} “Because the juvenile court ‘has the opportunity to see and hear the
delinquent child, to assess the consequences of the child’s delinquent behavior, and
to evaluate all the circumstances involved,’ [R.C. 2152.01] authorizes it to issue
orders of disposition appropriate to each child.” In re B.K., 2d Dist. Greene No.
-7-
Case Nos. 5-19-22, 5-19-23 and 5-19-24
2017-CA-32, 2018-Ohio-864, ¶ 10, quoting In re Caldwell, 
76 Ohio St. 3d 156
, 160-
161 (1996). Accordingly, “the juvenile court considers not only the delinquent act,
but ‘the overall conduct and behavior of the juvenile, the juvenile’s history, the
remorse shown by the juvenile and other societal factors[.]’”
 Id., quoting In 
re
Caldwell at 160.
{¶14} As second-degree felonies if committed by an adult, burglary and
escape carry the possibility of commitment to the legal care and custody of DYS
“for an indefinite term consisting of a minimum period of one year and a maximum
period not to exceed the child’s attainment of twenty-one years of age.” R.C.
2152.16(A)(1)(d); R.C. 2911.12(A)(2), (D); R.C. 2921.34(A)(1), (C)(2)(a). Here,
with respect to the adjudications for burglary and escape, the juvenile court
committed J.S. to the legal care and custody of DYS for a minimum period of one
year and a maximum period not to exceed J.S.’s attainment of 21 years of age. As
third, fourth, or fifth degree felonies if committed by an adult, grand theft of a
firearm, safecracking, possessing criminal tools, and vandalism carry the possibility
of commitment to the legal care and custody of DYS “for an indefinite term
consisting of a minimum period of six months and a maximum period not to exceed
the child’s attainment of twenty-one years of age.” R.C. 2152.16(A)(1)(e); R.C.
2913.02(A)(1),     (B)(4);   R.C.   2911.31(A),    (B);   2923.24(A),    (C);   R.C.
2909.05(B)(1)(b), (E). Here, with respect to each of the adjudications for grand
-8-
Case Nos. 5-19-22, 5-19-23 and 5-19-24
theft of a firearm, safecracking, possessing criminal tools, and vandalism, the
juvenile court committed J.S. to the legal care and custody of DYS for a minimum
term of six months and a maximum period not to exceed J.S.’s attainment of 21
years of age. Accordingly, J.S.’s dispositions fall within the statutory ranges.
{¶15} Nevertheless, J.S. argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion
by imposing “a solely punitive disposition.” (Appellant’s Brief at 3-4). J.S.
contends that rather than committing him to DYS, the trial court should have
considered alternative placement options, such as residential treatment facilities.
First, despite J.S.’s argument that his commitment to DYS is “solely punitive,”
“commitment to DYS is substantially different from a prison sentence.” In re D.C.,
1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-180354, 2019-Ohio-4860, ¶ 38. “A commitment to DYS
allows the state to protect a child from negative outside influences and allows the
child to obtain treatment, support and education.”
 

Id., citing In

re J.T., 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga Nos. 105311 and 105316, 2017-Ohio-7723, ¶ 33.                    Additionally,
“[p]rotection of the public interest and safety and holding a juvenile offender
accountable for his actions are among the ‘overriding purposes’ of juvenile
disposition.” In re K.M.C., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103449, 2016-Ohio-5322, ¶ 9.
{¶16} Here, it is clear from the record that the trial court entered its
disposition after considering the purposes of juvenile dispositions.             At the
disposition hearing, the trial court specifically stated that it made a reasonable effort
-9-
Case Nos. 5-19-22, 5-19-23 and 5-19-24
finding “that the court has exhausted everything else available to it to” “rehabilitate
this young man” and “protect the community” because J.S. “has shown by his
actions that the community is not safe when he is not locked up.” (June 7, 2019 Tr.
at 28-29).
{¶17} Further, the record supports the trial court’s findings. At the
disposition hearing, J.S.’s guardian ad litem (“GAL”) recognized that J.S. “has had
a hard start to his life.” (June 7, 2019 Tr. at 18). The GAL acknowledged that from
the time of J.S.’s first involvement in the juvenile court system approximately four
years prior, the juvenile court system “[has] tried everything” including committing
J.S. to less restrictive facilities. (Id. at 18-19). However, J.S. “has caused problems
and committed crimes at every step of the way.” (Id. at 19). The GAL stated that
he did not “have any confidence that if [J.S. is] put in a residential facility or
anything other than a secured environment that he’s not going to commit crimes”
and it is “not in his best interests if he is released.” (Id.). Further, the GAL stated
he is “not sure [he has] ever made a recommendation like this,” but given the
circumstances, he believes J.S. “needs to be confined until he learns that when he is
in a less-restricted environment * * * that he cannot commit crimes.” (Id.).
{¶18} J.S.’s father also stated that “putting [J.S.] in a lesser environment than
DYS is not going to be suitable for him.” (Id. at 20). In support of his statement,
-10-
Case Nos. 5-19-22, 5-19-23 and 5-19-24
J.S.’s father referenced “multiple” escape attempts J.S. made during his
commitment to a less restrictive facility. (Id.).
{¶19} In support of his contention that the trial court was concerned
primarily with punishing him rather than furthering the goals of juvenile court
dispositions, J.S. references the psychological evaluation performed in preparation
for the disposition hearing. (Id. at 26.) (See Case No. 20182254, Doc. No. 15).
Specifically, J.S. references the report’s acknowledgement of his lack of familial
support and history of untreated mental health and substance abuse issues that could
be addressed at a treatment facility. (Appellant’s Brief at 3). (See Case No.
20182254, Doc. No. 15). The report also states that treating J.S.’s underlying
mental illness and substance abuse issues and providing J.S. with a consistent
placement would decrease his likelihood of recidivism. (Appellant’s Brief at 3).
(See Case No. 20182254, Doc. No. 15).
{¶20} However, the report concludes that “[J.S.] presents us with a dilemma
as he claims he just wants one more chance in a therapeutic environment. However,
he does not appear to be able to benefit from that because he keeps getting into more
trouble.” (Doc. No. 15). The report also acknowledges that “[f]or the most part,
[J.S.] does appear to be scrambling to keep from going back to DYS.” (Id.).
{¶21} Moreover, the juvenile probation department prepared a report in
anticipation of J.S.’s disposition hearing which outlined the department’s
-11-
Case Nos. 5-19-22, 5-19-23 and 5-19-24
assessment of J.S. and recommendation for disposition. (See Case No. 20182254,
Doc. No. 14). The trial court referenced this document at the hearing. (June 7, 2019
Tr. at 21). (See Case No. 20182254, Doc. No. 14). The reporting officer stated that
J.S. received a score of 29 on the Ohio Youth Assessment System Disposition Tool,
which signifies that J.S. is at a high level of risk of committing future delinquent or
criminal acts. (Case No. 20182254, Doc. No. 14). The reporting officer noted that
J.S. “has been afforded multiple attempts at counseling, treatment, and bouts of
incarceration, all to little avail.” (Id.). Further, the report stated that “[b]ased upon
his history and level of non-compliance with prior and current Court Orders, as well
as his continued defiance of staff directions while in detention, it is this writer’s
opinion that [J.S.]’s prognosis, at this time, remains grave.” (Id.). The reporting
officer concluded that “[u]nfortunately, based upon the significantly high level of
risk, protecting others from [J.S.] must be the priority at this time.” (Id.).
{¶22} At the disposition hearing, the trial court stated that he was “very well
aware of and intimately familiar with [J.S.’s] past history because [he] handled a
great deal of it.” (June 7, 2019 Tr. at 21). Additionally, prior to pronouncing his
disposition, the trial court stated that it is “very concerned about several things.”
(Id.). The trial court referenced the charges of burglary and grand theft of a firearm
and noted that “the danger of [J.S.’s] actions seem[ ] to be going up.” (Id. at 21-
22). The trial court stated that it was particularly troubled because J.S.’s actions
-12-
Case Nos. 5-19-22, 5-19-23 and 5-19-24
underlying the charges of burglary and grand theft of a firearm involved entering
the homes of individuals who are likely to be in possession of firearms. (Id.). J.S.
was therefore putting himself at risk of being shot or shooting someone. (Id. at 22).
The trial court also expressed its concern over J.S.’s charge of escape and noted that
not only did J.S. attempt to escape from a secured facility, he was actually successful
in doing so. (Id.). Thus, the trial court noted that “things are getting more serious.”
(Id.). The trial court further acknowledged that the six offenses before the court for
disposition all occurred in a short period of time. (Id. at 22-23).
{¶23} The trial court then outlined its previous attempts at rehabilitating J.S.
as follows:
We have previously tried multiple things with you, basically
everything the court has available to it. Short-term house arrest, short-
term detention, we’ve sent you to the facility in Bowling Green which
subsequently recently you escaped from, the Children’s Center of
Ohio which is a treatment center, probation, electronic monitoring,
drug testing, counseling including intensive home-based therapy, and
the list goes on.
We have literally exhausted what the court has available to it to try to
deal with you at the level of offenses that you have put yourself in. *
**
-13-
Case Nos. 5-19-22, 5-19-23 and 5-19-24
(Id. at 23).
{¶24} Nevertheless, although J.S. acknowledges that “the record shows that
[he] had a history of court involvement and that he had been unsuccessful in less
restrictive placements and on community control,” J.S. argues that the language the
trial court used during the disposition hearing “shows that the Court was concerned
primarily with punishing J.S. and treating J.S. like an adult, not furthering the goals
of juvenile court.” (Appellant’s Brief at 3).
{¶25} In support of his position that the trial court was focused solely on
punishment, J.S. references several statements the trial court made at the disposition
hearing. First, after telling J.S. that DYS was his “last stop” before entering the
adult criminal justice system, the trial court warned J.S. as follows:
You’re not going to fare well in the adult system. You’re a young boy
from a rural area and you may think you’re tough but when you go to
big boy prison it’s a whole new game. You’re going to be beaten,
going to be raped inside the first week there, by the time it’s over your
anus is going to look like a glazed donut. You understand what I’m
saying? The difference is doughnuts don’t bleed and you will. It’s
going to be painful and it’s going to be nasty * * *.
(June 7, 2019 Tr. at 24).
-14-
Case Nos. 5-19-22, 5-19-23 and 5-19-24
{¶26} The trial court then gave J.S. a specific example of a juvenile who died
after entering the adult criminal justice system:
I have had a lot of clients * * * who have gone down [to the adult
criminal justice system] at your age from rural Northwest Ohio and
they fare much worse than city kids do because city kids who get sent
have a tendency to be a lot harder core kids. And a boy by the name
of [J.D.] that I represented had a lot more street cred going down there
than what you’re going to have because he was in for first degree
murder with a death sentence. And inside of the first month he was
the cause of a gang war because the leader of two different gangs
wanted him for his woman, and by the end of the first year before his
appeals [were] even over he ended up dead. They found him with a
bag over his head and his arms straight down to his side. They called
it suicide and there’s no way in the world it was a suicide. The leader
of the gang that didn’t get him decided if he ain’t going to have him
nobody else was.
That’s the way you’re going to end up if you don’t change. You can
cry and whine all you want that DYS ain’t going to help you and
you’re right because there’s only one person in the world that can help
you at this age and that’s you. You can go the way of [J.D.] or you
-15-
Case Nos. 5-19-22, 5-19-23 and 5-19-24
can do what you’ve got to do and straighten your butt up and act like
a man because you almost are.
(Id. at 25-26).
{¶27} While we do not condone the language and graphic examples
employed by the trial court, we do not find that these statements, in the context of
the record, demonstrate that the trial court was solely focused on punishing J.S.
When considered in context, the trial court’s statements appear to have been made
with the intention of encouraging J.S. to cease engaging in criminal activities so that
he does not enter the adult criminal justice system in the future. Accordingly, we
do not find that the statements support J.S.’s position that the trial court’s disposition
was entered without reference to the overriding purposes of juvenile dispositions.
{¶28} Accordingly, the record indicates that the trial court made numerous
previous, unsuccessful attempts to rehabilitate J.S. in less restrictive placements and
employed a system of graduated sanctions and services. See R.C. 2152.01(A).
Where all reasonable, less restrictive efforts failed, the juvenile court exercised its
broad discretion in committing J.S. to DYS. In re H.V., 
138 Ohio St. 3d 408
, 2014-
Ohio-812, at ¶ 20 (holding that it would have been contrary to R.C. 2152.01(A) for
the juvenile court to continue to order the same sanction “despite escalating and
dangerous criminal behavior”).        The trial court’s disposition was reasonably
calculated to serve the purposes of R.C. 2152.01(A) and did not amount to an abuse
-16-
Case Nos. 5-19-22, 5-19-23 and 5-19-24
of discretion. See In re D.C., 2019-Ohio-4860, at ¶ 44-46; In re R.E., 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 100954, 2014-Ohio-3595, ¶ 18 (holding that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by committing the delinquent child to a term in DYS where the
child “repeatedly failed to comply” with less restrictive efforts).
{¶29} Accordingly, J.S.’s assignment of error is overruled.
{¶30} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the
particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
Judgments Affirmed
WILLAMOWSKI and ZIMMERMAN, J.J., concur.
/jlr
-17-