Judges: W.A. DREW EDMONDSON, Attorney General of Oklahoma
Filed Date: 11/29/2010
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/6/2016
Dear Dr. Wilbanks:
This office has received your request for an official Attorney General Opinion in which you ask, in effect, the following questions:
1. Does the State Board of Education and the State Board of Career and Technology Education have a statutory obligation under 70 Ohio St. 2001, § 17-108.2[
70-17-108.2 ], to transfer appropriated money every year, as prescribed by subsection A of this section, to the Teachers' Retirement System for the funding of the Contributions Credit?2. If the answer to the first question is yes, does the failure of the Legislature to provide a line item or limits bill directing the State Board to fund the Contributions Credit described in 70 Ohio St. 2001, § 17-108.2[
70-17-108.2 ], from the sums appropriated, change the statutory obligation of the State Board to pay amount necessary to fund the credit, as prescribed in this section?
Given that the total appropriation, as provided in Section 7 of the bill for the support of public school activities to the State Board of Education was $419,789,004, as compared to approximately $491 million for the same expenses the prior year, the SBE was faced with reducing its expenditures.2 See 2010 Okla. Sess. Laws ch.
THE STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE STATE BOARD OF CAREER AND TECHNOLOGY EDUCATION HAVE A STATUTORY OBLIGATION UNDER 70 Ohio St. 2001, § 17-108.2[70-17-108.2 ], TO TRANSFER APPROPRIATED MONEY EVERY YEAR AS PRESCRIBED BY SUBSECTION A OF THIS SECTION, TO THE TEACHERS' RETIREMENT SYSTEM FOR THE FUNDING OF THE CONTRIBUTIONS CREDIT.
Whether SBE and the Career Tech have an obligation under 70 Ohio St. 2001, § 17-108.2[
The intent of the Legislature, as expressed in 70 Ohio St. 2001, § 17-108.2[
[F]or each plan year thereafter, a teacher employed by any school district or employed by a technology center school district who qualifies for a minimum salary pursuant to the schedule . . . shall have credited against the employee contribution amount, as applicable to the amount of compensation required to be paid to the teacher as a minimum salary . . . an annual amount based upon qualifying years of service[.]
Id. (emphasis added). Much of the legislative intent is clear on the face of the statute. However, the legislative intent with regard to the obligations imposed upon the various entities is susceptible to interpretation. Although the subject statute lacks clarity with regard to those obligations, legislative intent "is ascertained from the whole act in the light of the general purpose and object." City of Midwest City v.Harris,
It is unnecessary to apply rules of construction to discern Legislative intent if the will is clearly expressed. However, if an ambiguity exists, a statute will be given a reasonable construction-one that will avoid absurd consequences while preserving legislative intent.
Okla. Ass'n for Equitable Taxation v. City of Okla. City,
Subsection B provides, "[t]he state shall pick up and pay the annual amount prescribed by subsection A of this section, . . . to the Teachers'Retirement System." Id. (emphasis added). Much *Page 4 emphasis has been placed on the single phrase "the state shall pick up and pay," as it might pertain to the relative obligations imposed by the statute. In light of the fact that the legislative appropriation did not provide a line item directing that money be sent to TRS, the SBE interpreted this phrase in the statute to mean that (despite the appropriation in SB 1561), the State Legislature, rather than the SBE had on that day an obligation to fund the credit and pay the TRS.6 The Board, accordingly, voted to apply the appropriated monies elsewhere and to call on the Legislature to fund the credit.7
Subsection C provides:
If an eligible teacher terminates service prior to June 30 of any applicable plan year, the amounts prescribed by subsection A of this section, and transferred to the Teachers' Retirement System from the State Board of Education and the State Board of Career and Technology Education shall be retained by the Teachers' Retirement System of Oklahoma and treated as an actuarial gain of the System.
Id. (emphasis added).
In the event of an overpayment to TRS in any plan year due to teachers terminating service prior to June 30, TRS is to retain the excess (appropriated estimated amount exceeds actual amount needed to fund credit for every qualifying teacher), and treat it as "actuarial gain of the system." Id. Within this subsection we find the only reference to the funding mechanism for the transfer of funds to TRS. The funds are required to be "transferred to the Teachers' Retirement System from the State Board of Education and the State Board of Career and Technology Education" as a matter of course. Id.
It should be noted that TRS is not an "appropriated agency." It receives no direct legislative appropriations.8 Further, there is no mechanism in 70 Ohio St. 2001, § 17-108.2[
In the interpretation of statutes, courts do not limit their consideration to a single word or phrase in isolation to attempt to determine their meaning, but construe together the various provisions of relevant legislative enactments to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intention and will, and attempt to avoid unnatural and absurd consequences. Words and phrases of a statute are to be understood and used not in an abstract sense, but with due regard for context and they must harmonize with other sections of the act to determine the purpose and intent of the legislature.
McNeill v. City of Tulsa,
We also view this subsection with its expression of legislative intent that any excess paid to TRS should be retained by TRS to strengthen the actuarial health of the system, as a recognition and affirmation of the legislative obligation to fully fund the TRS. Maintaining a stable and reliable teachers' retirement system is a fundamental part of the Legislature's obligation under the Constitution.9
The obligations of the school district are detailed in subsequent subsections. If an employing school district has contractually committed to making payments of the employee contribution payment to the TRS, and the member is eligible for the State Credit amount for the fiscal year, "using funds available to the district and not by effecting the employee contribution through a deduction from the member's gross salary, the district shall pay additional compensation to each of its eligible teachers in an amount equal to the amount prescribed by subsection A. . . ." 70 Ohio St. 2001, § 17-108.2[
Oklahoma Attorney General Opinion 03-15 concerned a reduced legislative appropriation to the flexible benefit allowance for school district employees. There, the reduction in the allocation from SBE to the school districts did not operate to reduce the statutory obligation of the school district to *Page 6
pay the required 75% of the cost of healthcare coverage less the allowance amount. Id. at 84. Similarly, a reduction in the appropriation to SBE merely reduces the available amount that SBE has to allocate among its programs and expenses. None of the obligations imposed by 70 Ohio St. 2001, § 17-108.2[
Therefore, the answer to your first question is that the SBE and Career Tech have a statutory obligation to transfer appropriated money every year, as prescribed by 70 Ohio St. 2001, § 17-108.2[
THE STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE STATE BOARD OF CAREER AND TECHNOLOGY EDUCATION HAVE A STATUTORY OBLIGATION TO TRANSFER APPROPRIATED MONEY EVERY YEAR TO FUND THE CONTRIBUTIONS CREDIT FROM THE SUMS APPROPRIATED, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE LEGISLATURE PROVIDES A LINE ITEM OR LIMITS BILL DIRECTING SUCH ALLOCATION.
Essentially, you ask whether the fact that the Legislature failed to provide a specific or line item directive to fund the Credit in its appropriations bill, when it had done so in all previous years since enactment of the Contributions Credit statute, somehow changed or alleviated the statutory obligation of each entity to fund the Credit from the appropriated sums.
Clearly, although different in degree of specificity than in past years, appropriations were made to the SBE in each of Sections 1 through 10 and 139 of SB 1561. We understand that the appropriation made in Section 7, in the amount of $419,789,004.00 "for the support of public school activities" is the appropriation from which the TRS credit has historically been paid. Further, it was from this specific appropriated amount that the SBE determined, when making its allocations and budgeting among numerous programs and expenditures, to expend the bulk of the funds for other programs, including the Flexible Benefit Allowance, and to exclude the funding for the Teacher Retirement Credit.
The "appropriation of money" is setting it apart formally or officially for a special use or purpose, and where that is done by the Legislature in clear and unequivocal terms in a duly enacted law, it is an "appropriation." State ex rel. Bonsteel v. Allen,
After review of 70 Ohio St. 2001, § 17-108.2[
If there is any doubt as to the Legislature's power to act in any given situation, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the action taken by the Legislature. Restrictions and limitations upon legislative power are to be construed strictly, and are not to be extended to include matters not covered or implied by the language used.
Draper v. State,
Further, there is no indication or argument that the Legislature was obligated to provide a line item in order to validate the obligation of SBE to fund the credit, simply because it had done so in previous years. The Legislature did not line item a number of programs that SBE determined, in its discretion, to fund from the $419 million. Further, within SB 1561, the Legislature appropriated funds to numerous agencies and provided no line items. Finally, as indicated above, SBE did choose to fund numerous programs without the necessity of a line item from the Legislature.
We, therefore, find no justification within the text of the statute for the argument that the Legislature's decision not to provide a line item or limits bill, thereby presumably conferring discretion for allocation to the SBE, either nullified the obligation of the SBE or alternatively, and as asserted by SBE, equated to the failure of the Legislature to appropriate money for the funding of the credit.
We note that any interpretation or characterization of the Legislative decision to appropriate funds to SBE without providing a limits bill, as a failure on the part of the Legislature to fund the Credit, is without merit. Further, relying on such an interpretation of the statute in conjunction with the appropriations bill at least potentially creates the implication that the Legislature has acted, whether mindfully or not, to deprive the TRS of funds needed to fund the Credit, thereby diverting funds from the system. Such action could potentially result in impairment of the "actuarial soundness" of the TRS, and is completely contrary both to the expression of intent within subsection C of 70 Ohio St. 2001, § 17-108.2[
Acts of the Legislature are presumed valid. Therefore, we reject this interpretation as inconsistent with the principles of statutory construction. "This court will not assume that the Legislature has done a vain and useless act. Rather it must interpret legislation so as to give effect to every word and sentence." Hill v. Bd. of Educ.,
We are left then with the situation at hand. The Legislature, in a tight budget year, bestowed discretion on SBE for allocating the appropriated funds among programs, some statutorily mandated and some not. "Executive discretion is not unfettered. Agencies or departments with statutory requirements, substantive or procedural, pertaining to the selection of their funding recipients obviously are bound thereby. The same is true of any applicable agency rules, regulations, or other administrative procedures pertaining to the selection and funding of otherwise lawful agency programs." A.G. Opin. 87-100, at 192.
It is, therefore, the official Opinion of the Attorney Generalthat:
1. The State Board of Education and the State Board of Career and Technology Education have a statutory obligation under 70 Ohio St. 2001, § 17-108.2[
70-17-108.2 ], to transfer appropriated money every year, as prescribed by subsection A of this Section to the Teachers' Retirement System for the funding of the Contributions Credit. McNeill v. City of Tulsa,953 P.2d 329 ,332 (Okla. 1998)2. The State Board of Education and State Board of Career and Technology Education have a statutory obligation to transfer appropriated money every year to fund the Contributions Credit from the sums appropriated, regardless of whether the Legislature provides a line item directing such allocation or whether it defers such discretion to the State Board of Education. Menefee v. Askew,
107 P. 159 ,162 (Okla. 1910). Whether the State Board of Education abused its discretion is a matter of proof, dependent upon matters of fact which cannot be determined in an Attorney General's Opinion. 74 Ohio St. 2001, § 18b[74-18b ](A)(5).
W.A. DREW EDMONDSON ATTORNEY GENERAL OF OKLAHOMA
REGINA SWITZER ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
Jackson v. Independent School District No. 16 , 648 P.2d 26 ( 1982 )
Taylor v. ST. & EDUC. EMPLOYEES GROUP INS. PROGRAM , 897 P.2d 275 ( 1995 )
Lincoln v. Lincoln , 840 P.2d 41 ( 1992 )
Oklahoma Ass'n for Equitable Taxation v. City of Oklahoma ... , 901 P.2d 800 ( 1995 )
City of Midwest City v. Harris , 561 P.2d 1357 ( 1977 )