DocketNumber: TC-MD 101183D.
Judges: JILL A. TANNER, Presiding Magistrate.
Filed Date: 7/20/2011
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/6/2016
Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 through 6 were received without objection. Plaintiff's post-trial brief was filed May 13, 2011, and Defendant's post-trial brief was filed May 16, 2011.
Deibele testified that "[f]ortunately, ORS
Deibele explained that Plaintiff operates "a residential psychiatric treatment program, called Cedar Bough, on the property * * * [it is] the nation's first culturally-specific Psychiatric Residential Treatment program for Native American youth and others. This site was specifically chosen for the Native American program because the 35 acres hold tremendous natural beauty in the hills, trees, river and wildlife; all of the land provides a calming, therapeutic environment for these troubled children." (Ptf's Evidence Submission List at 2.) She conceded that "ChristieCare (sic) use of the island is admittedly unconventional." (Id.) Because Plaintiff has not maintained the island nor has the means to access the subject property, Plaintiff alleges that it does "the next best use: give the children maximum visual and therapeutic use of the beauty of the island and its wildlife." (Id.) Deibele explained the subject property's use:
"The majority of the children come from Native American reservations and are accustomed to open and wild spaces; they thrive on the views of the island area as a counterbalance to the protective psychiatric setting. We intentionally conduct therapy in rooms that face the island, giving children a clear view of the calming environment, wildlife, and teepee structure on the island. Seeing its natural beauty is critical to the spiritual and emotional well-being of the Native American children who reside in our program."
(Id.) Defendant alleges that "[t]he claimed use is at such a low level, it has little relationship to the exempt facility. The island appears to be undeveloped land not presently needed. The de minim is (sic) use hardly justifies exempting the property." (Def's Ltr at 1, May 12, 2011.) *Page 3
Deibele wrote that "[t]he island also serves an important use for the agency as a buffer between us and our neighbors. * * * [T]he realities are that we are running a facility for mentally ill and emotionally troubled children, and the sights and occasional sounds from such a program can sometimes be distressing. The island gives us buffer to those neighbors across the river: the foliage on the island dissipates sound and also gives a privacy screen for our clients." (Ptf's Additional Information to Tax Court at 3.) Defendant characterized "[t]he argument that the island serves as a buffer zone * * * specious," stating that:
"[t]ypically, buffer zones are attached or adjacent to facilities that derive benefit from that use. In the case of Christie Care, the parcel is an island in the middle of the Clackamas River The river between the residential facility and island is open water and available for public use. Individuals, including families engage in many varied types of water sports. What buffer is available to them?"
(Def's Ltr at 1, May 12, 2011.)
Kryger, a licensed clinical social worker who has worked with Plaintiff for more than 12 years, testified the "native youth," ranging in age from thirteen to eighteen years of age, that participate in the "Psychiatric Residential Treatment Services program" are "one step" away from "a hospital." He described the characteristics and culture of individuals1 who are treated at the facility. He also testified about the incorporation of native healing practices, e.g., "drumming," "sweats," "smudging," "talking circles," "walk abouts," and beading and art, used in therapy. Kryger emphasized that the subject property was selected because the island was once used by the Siletz and Grande Ronde tribes as "hunting and fishing lands" and "creates a *Page 4 natural environment for healing." He testified that the subject property "was blessed by native elders to cleanse it" prior to Plaintiff's use.
Dunn testified that Defendant was "denied access" to the subject property because it "was not safe." Dunn stated that the subject property has not been "tax exempt since 2005." She further testified that if Defendant "cannot review [the property], it cannot reasonably grant exemption." Dunn testified that there is no evidence that the subject property has been "maintained."
Deibele testified that "ChristieCare is providing therapeutic and rehabilitative activities for children on the property in question. * * * [T]he County agrees that we are a rehabilitation facility and therefore we should be exempt from taxation on ``all real or personal property of a rehabilitation facility . . .' (ORS Sec.
Deibele concluded by stating:
"Our use of the island parcel contributes substantially to the furtherance of ChristieCare's charitable purposes — to bring healing and support to children recovering from trauma or managing mental illness."
(Id. at 3.)
Plaintiff asserts that the subject property qualifies for exemption from property taxation as of July 1, 2010, because it meets the statutory requirements of ORS
*Page 6"Upon compliance with ORS
307.162 , the following property owned or being purchased by * * * charitable * * * institutions shall be exempt from taxation:"(a) Except as provided in ORS
748.414 , only such real or personal property, or proportion thereof, as is actually and exclusively occupied or used in the * * * charitable * * * work carried on by such institutions."
The parties agree that Plaintiff is a charitable institution. The issue before the court is whether the use made of the subject property qualifies for exemption under the statute. Property or a portion of a property shall be exempt from taxation if it is "actually and exclusively occupied or used in the * * * charitable * * * work carried on by such institutions." ORS
ORS
There is no dispute that Plaintiff is not occupying the subject property, an island located in the Clackamas River. Plaintiff describes its use of the subject property, stating "[the children] use the island in a therapeutic sense every day." (Ptf's Additional Information to Tax Court at 2.) Plaintiff explained that it makes the "best possible use of the island by using rooms in the riverside lodge for therapy sessions with our psychiatrists, counselors and therapists. The wild beauty of the island, complete with fish, deer, and osprey provides a soothing counterweight to the emotional troubles faced by the children." (Id.) Plaintiff's self-described "best possible use" of the subject property is limited to line of sight from the "riverside lodge" therapy rooms. This is evidence that Plaintiff's use of the subject property is incidental rather than primary. There is no evidence stating that Plaintiff's therapy sessions would be substantially different or terminated if it did not own the subject property or lost its line of sight view of the island. The location of the subject property is undeniably a benefit to Plaintiff, but its use is not primary to achieving its charitable purpose. Plaintiff's use of the subject property is incidental and does not meet the statutory requirement of actual and exclusive use by Plaintiff.
Plaintiff puts forth an alternate argument that the subject property qualifies for exemption, stating that Plaintiff's "activities all meet the definition of a ``rehabilitation facility' under ORS
"nonprofit sheltered or community-based service established and operated by a public or private organization to provide two or more of the following services for individuals with disabilities:
"(1) Vocational assessment.
"(2) Community integration.
"(3) Training.
"(4) Employment."
In summary, ORS
IT IS THE DECISION OF THIS COURT that Plaintiff's appeal is denied.
Dated this ___ day of July 2011.
If you want to appeal this Decision, file a Complaint in theRegular Division of the Oregon Tax Court, by mailing to:1163 State Street, Salem, OR 97301-2563; or by hand delivery to:Fourth Floor, 1241 State Street, Salem, OR. Your Complaint must be submitted within 60 days after the date ofthe Decision or this Decision becomes final and cannot be changed. This document was signed by Presiding Magistrate Jill A. Tanneron July 20, 2011. The Court filed and entered this documenton July 20, 2011.
Multnomah School of Bible v. Multnomah County ( 1959 )
German Apostolic Christian Church v. Department of Revenue ( 1977 )
Christian Life Fellowship, Inc. v. Department of Revenue ( 1991 )
North Harbour Corp. v. Department of Revenue ( 2002 )