Commonwealth v. Williams

J-S47007-16
2016 PA Super 262COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
HENRY L. WILLIAMS,
Appellant No. 2078 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence October 16, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-36-CR-0001747-2010
BEFORE: SHOGAN, LAZARUS, and JENKINS, JJ.
OPINION BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 23, 2016
Appellant, Henry L. Williams, appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered on October 16, 2015. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.1
On April 19, 2011, Appellant was found guilty by a jury of corrupt
organizations, criminal conspiracy, criminal use of a communication facility,
and four counts of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance.
On August 4, 2011, Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate term of eleven
to twenty-two years of incarceration. The sentence included mandatory
minimum sentences based on the weight of the controlled substances
pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 7508. Appellant filed a direct appeal to this Court,
1
This appeal was quashed on August 1, 2016, because Appellant’s
counseled notice of appeal was untimely, and Appellant’s pro se notice of
appeal, while timely, was initially considered a nullity as hybrid
representation. Reconsideration was granted on September 28, 2016, to
allow this Court to address the effect of Appellant’s pro se notice of appeal.
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and we affirmed the judgment of sentence on May 8, 2013.
Commonwealth v. Williams, 1399 MDA 2011, 81 A.3d 993 (Pa. Super.
filed May 8, 2013), appeal denied, 80 A.3d 777 (Pa. filed November 19,
2013).
While Appellant’s direct appeal was pending, the United States
Supreme Court decided Alleyne v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013).
In Alleyne, the Supreme Court held, “Any fact that, by law, increases the
penalty for a crime is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury and
found beyond a reasonable doubt.” Alleyne, 133 S.Ct. at 2155. In applying
Alleyne, this Court has held that, generally, Pennsylvania’s mandatory
minimum sentencing statutes are unconstitutional because the mandatory
sentencing statutes “permit[] the trial court, as opposed to the jury, to
increase a defendant’s minimum sentence based upon a preponderance of
the evidence” standard. Commonwealth v. Newman, 99 A.3d 86, 98 (Pa.
Super. 2014) (en banc), appeal denied, 121 A.3d 496 (Pa. 2015); and see
Commonwealth v. Vargas, 108 A.3d 858, 876-877 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en
banc) (holding 18 Pa.C.S. § 7508 unconstitutional under Alleyne), appeal
denied, 121 A.3d 496 (Pa. 2015). Additionally, this Court has concluded
that if a defendant’s case was pending on direct appeal when Alleyne was
decided, that defendant was entitled to retroactive application of the holding
from Alleyne. Newman, 99 A.3d at 90.
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Appellant filed a timely petition for collateral relief pursuant to the Post
Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. In light of
Alleyne and the Pennsylvania cases interpreting that decision, the PCRA
court granted Appellant’s PCRA petition, vacated his judgment of sentence,
and directed Appellant to be resentenced. PCRA Order, 9/16/15. On
October 16, 2015, the trial court resentenced Appellant.
Following resentencing, Appellant filed a timely counseled post-
sentence motion on October 26, 2015. The trial court denied the motion in
an order that was filed on October 29, 2015. Appellant had until November
28, 2015, thirty days from October 29, 2015, in which to file a timely
appeal. Pa.R.A.P. 903; Pa.R.Crim.P. Rule 720(A)(2)(a). However, because
November 28, 2015 fell on a Saturday, Appellant had until Monday,
November 30, 2015, to file his notice of appeal. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1908.
The docket reflects that Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal on
November 19, 2015. Because Appellant was represented by counsel, the
notice of appeal was docketed in the trial court and forwarded to counsel on
November 25, 2015 pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 576(A)(4). The pro se notice
of appeal was not forwarded to this Court. Appellant’s counsel subsequently
filed an untimely notice of appeal on December 1, 2015.
In this Commonwealth, hybrid representation is not permitted. See
Commonwealth v. Jette, 23 A.3d 1032, 1036 (Pa. 2011) (concluding that
a petitioner’s pro se motion for remand when that petitioner is represented
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by counsel is impermissible as hybrid representation). Accordingly, this
Court will not accept a pro se motion while an appellant is represented by
counsel; indeed, pro se motions have no legal effect and, therefore, are legal
nullities. See Commonwealth v. Nischan, 928 A.2d 349, 355 (Pa. Super.
2007) (discussing a pro se post-sentence motion filed by a petitioner who
had counsel). When a counseled defendant files a pro se document, it is
noted on the docket and forwarded to counsel pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P.
576(A)(4), but no further action is to be taken. Moreover, a pro se filing has
no tolling effect. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 576 cmt. (“The requirement that the
clerk time stamp and make docket entries of the filings in these cases only
serves to provide a record of the filing, and does not trigger any deadline
nor require any response.”).
We point out, however, that Superior Court Internal Operating
Procedure (“I.O.P.”) 65.24 addresses hybrid representation in the context of
a notice of appeal as follows:
Where a litigant is represented by an attorney before the
Court and the litigant submits for filing a petition, motion, brief
or other type of pleading in the matter, it shall not be accepted
for filing, but noted on the docket and forwarded to counsel of
record.
Exceptions:
1. A pro se notice of appeal received from the trial
court shall be docketed, even in instances where
the pro se [appellant] was represented by
counsel in the trial court.
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2. A motion by the pro se for appointment of new
counsel, for reasons such as abandonment by
counsel, or to proceed pro se shall be docketed and
referred to Central Legal Staff, or the merits panel if
constituted, for review and further action by the
Court.
3. A pro se brief or writing filed in response to
counsel’s petition to withdraw from representation.
210 Pa. Code § 65.24 (emphasis added). Thus, we must address the
difference between pro se filings, generally, that are “noted on the docket”
under Pa.R.Crim.P. 576(A)(4), as opposed to a notice of appeal being
“docketed” under I.O.P. 65.24.
In Commonwealth v. Ellis, 626 A.2d 1137 (Pa. 1993), the Supreme
Court addressed issues created where a criminal defendant is represented by
counsel, yet files a pro se appellate brief. The Court noted that while there
is no right to hybrid representation, there is right of appeal pursuant to
Article 5, § 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Ellis, 626 A.2d at 1138. The
Ellis Court distinguished between overburdening appellate courts with pro se
briefs and allowing for the protection of one’s constitutional right to an
appeal. Id. at 1141.2
Because a notice of appeal protects a constitutional right, it is
distinguishable from other filings that require counsel to provide legal
2
Cf. Commonwealth v. Cooper, 27 A.3d 994 (Pa. 2011) (discussing a
procedural “quagmire” and holding that a pro se notice of appeal that was
filed before a counseled post-sentence motion and a subsequent counseled
notice of appeal should have been considered timely where the Superior
Court administratively quashed the counseled appeal).
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knowledge and strategy in creating a motion, petition, or brief.3 We thus
hold that this Court is required to docket a pro se notice of appeal despite
Appellant being represented by counsel, based on the rationale in Ellis and
I.O.P. 65.24. Additionally, in the case at bar, Appellant’s pro se notice of
appeal was docketed in the trial court but not forwarded to this Court
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 902 (note).4 We deem this a breakdown in the
operation of the courts.5 Therefore, we shall accept this appeal as timely.
On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for this Court’s
consideration:
1. Did sufficient evidence exist for the jury to find [Appellant]
guilty of criminal conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance, or
any counts of possession with the intent to deliver a controlled
substance, where no drugs or physical evidence was presented
at trial?
3
As noted by Justice Todd in her dissent in Cooper, the pro se filing of a
notice of appeal where a defendant is represented by counsel is without
question hybrid representation, and difficulties will arise; e.g., where a pro
se appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction under Pa.R.A.P. 1701 before a
counseled post-sentence motion is filed. Cooper, 27 A.3d at 1009 (Todd, J.,
dissenting). However, this concern appears to have been addressed by the
Majority in Cooper wherein such an appeal was labeled “merely premature”
when the trial court addressed the post-sentence motion. Cooper, 27 A.3d
at 1007.
4
The notice of appeal that was forwarded to this Court and docketed was
the counseled notice of appeal filed on December 1, 2015.
5
See Commonwealth v. Leatherby, 116 A.3d 73, 79 (Pa. Super. 2015)
(“[An appellant] should not be precluded from appellate review based on
what was, in effect, an administrative breakdown on the part of the trial
court.”).
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2. Did the court err by using “enhanced” sentencing guidelines,
thereby elevating the offense gravity scores of the crimes due to
the alleged weight of the controlled substances involved, without
making any finding on the record at either the sentencing
hearing or the resentencing hearing as to the weights of the
controlled substances and relying on the weights of the
controlled substances determined by the jury at the time of the
trial?
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
In his first issue, Appellant presents a challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence underlying his 2011 convictions in this matter. Before we
proceed further, we address the Commonwealth’s argument that Appellant’s
issue is not properly before us. Commonwealth’s Brief at 13. In support of
its argument, the Commonwealth cites to this Court’s decision in
Commonwealth v. Anderson, 801 A.2d 1264 (Pa. Super. 2002).
In Anderson, we addressed the limited issues an appellant could raise
in a second direct appeal where the appellant already had the benefit of a
direct appeal and was later resentenced:
As noted supra, however, appellant has already had the benefit
of a direct appeal, and at that time did not challenge his
conviction on any basis, including counsel’s ineffectiveness.
Rather, the only issues he raised concerned the
unconstitutionality of his sentence. Having succeeded on these
issues and having been re-sentenced following remand,
appellant could not file another direct appeal attacking his
conviction: the only issues reviewable in a direct appeal would
be challenges to the sentence imposed following remand.
Anderson, 801 A.2d at 1266. We agree with the Commonwealth.
As stated previously, Appellant has already litigated a direct appeal
challenging his convictions and judgment of sentence. In that appeal,
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Appellant raised one issue challenging the trial court’s ruling that allowed an
FBI agent to testify in his capacity as both an expert and a lay witness.
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement, 8/24/11. This Court affirmed Appellant’s
judgment of sentence in a Judgment Order filed on May 8, 2013.
Because Appellant had the benefit of a direct appeal, he is barred from
raising any issues other than a challenge to the sentence imposed on
remand. Anderson, 801 A.2d at 1266. Accordingly, Appellant’s first issue
wherein he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence is waived for
Appellant’s failure to raise it in his first direct appeal.
In his second issue, Appellant alleges that the trial court abused its
discretion in applying an elevated offense gravity score (“OGS”) that was
based on the weight of the controlled substances. A claim that the
sentencing court used an incorrect OGS is a challenge to the discretionary
aspects of one’s sentence. Commonwealth v. Lamonda, 52 A.3d 365,
370-371 (Pa. Super. 2012).
It is well settled that a challenge to the discretionary aspects of a
sentence is a petition for permission to appeal, as the right to pursue such a
claim is not absolute. Commonwealth v. Treadway, 104 A.3d 597, 599
(Pa. Super. 2014). Before this Court may review the merits of a challenge
to the discretionary aspects of a sentence, we must engage in the following
four-pronged analysis:
[W]e conduct a four part analysis to determine: (1) whether
appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902
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and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at
sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence,
see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal
defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial
question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate
under the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(b).
Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citing
Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa. Super. 2006)).
As discussed above, we have determined that Appellant filed a timely
appeal. Appellant also properly included a statement pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) in his brief. However, we are constrained to agree with
the positions taken by both the trial court and the Commonwealth that
Appellant failed to preserve this challenge to the OGS at the time of
sentencing or in a post-sentence motion. Trial Court Opinion, 1/29/16, at
14-16; Commonwealth’s Brief at 20. A review of the record reveals that
while Appellant did file a timely post-sentence motion, he never mentioned
the OGS. Appellant only argued that his aggregate sentence was excessive
due to the individual sentences being ordered to run consecutively as
opposed to concurrently. Post-Sentence Motion, 10/26/15. Because the
OGS was not raised in any manner, we conclude Appellant has waived this
challenge to the discretionary aspects of his sentence. Moury, 992 A.2d at
170.
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For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that Appellant is entitled
to no relief. Accordingly, we affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/23/2016
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