Com. v. PI DELTA PSI, Inc.

J-A04023-19
2019 Pa. Super. 167
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
PI DELTA PSI, INC., :
:
Appellant. : No. 458 EDA 2018
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, January 8, 2018,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County,
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-45-CR-0002578-2015.
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*
OPINION BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED MAY 23, 2019
I. Introduction
Near the close of the 2013 fall semester, student members of Pi Delta
Psi, Inc. traveled from their college campus in Manhattan to the Pocono
Mountains. They rented a house to perform the final rites and rituals of their
new-member program, as they had quietly done in previous semesters. This
time, something went horribly wrong.
A ritual known as “The Crossing,” a gauntlet where members tackle and
body-slam associate members,1 killed a freshman. The Commonwealth filed
charges against the student members; certain national officers; and Pi Delta
Psi, Inc., itself. A jury convicted the corporation of hazing, involuntary
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1 A.K.A. “pledges.”
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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manslaughter, aggravated assault, conspiracy to commit aggravated assault,
hindering apprehension, and conspiracy to hinder apprehension.2 The
corporation now appeals from its judgment of sentence, imposing an
aggregate of ten years of probation and fining it $112,500.00. It raises many
appellate issues, including new, constitutional theories regarding its Due
Process rights. As we will explain, none of its claims have merit.
However, the trial court imposed a probationary condition barring the
corporation from conducting any business in Pennsylvania for a decade. This
Court can find nothing in our statutes or at common law that affords a trial
court authority to outlaw a corporation from an entire state. We therefore
must vacate, sua sponte, that illegal sentence and remand for resentencing.
In all other respects, we affirm.
II. Factual Background
Pi Delta Psi, Inc. came into being on April 14, 1995, when its founders
incorporated it as non-profit corporation3 under New York law. They
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2 24 P.S. § 5353, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2504(a), 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1), 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 903, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5105(a)(3), and 18 Pa.C.S.A. § (a)(5).
3 As the corporation is a non-profit, we pause to consider our jurisdiction.
In civil matters involving non-profit corporations, this Court, applying
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 762(a)(5), has held “jurisdiction over this appeal properly lies
with the Commonwealth Court, because [one of the parties] is a non-profit
corporation.” Zikria v. W. Pennsylvania Hosp., 668 A.2d 173, 173 (Pa.
Super. 1995). The instant appeal is a criminal matter, however, and we find
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established it as a national, Asian-interest-based fraternal organization. Like
most fraternities, the corporation has constituted subsidiaries of itself (a
process known as “colonization”) on various college and university campus
throughout the United States.
The corporation developed, published, and directed a nation-wide, new-
member-education program for would-be brothers in its “Pledge Manual.” The
new-member curriculum included physical rites and rituals.
In this case, the Baruch College Colony of Pi Delta Psi took its associate
members to Pennsylvania for the final stages of the program. The members
performed the Crossing Ritual quite brutally and caused the death of an
associate member. Two other New York-based chapters of the corporation
were also present at the hazing event. The Pennsylvania State University
Chapter of Pi Delta Psi (the only functioning subsidiary in the Commonwealth)
had no involvement with or knowledge of this incident.
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nothing in our case law specifically addressing which court has jurisdiction
over it. Jurisdiction presents us with a purely legal issue, for which our
standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary; we “may
consider the issue of jurisdiction sua sponte.” Commonwealth v. Parker,
173 A.3d 294, 296 (Pa. Super. 2017).
The Superior Court has appellate jurisdiction over any appeals not within
the exclusive jurisdiction of either the Commonwealth Court or Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 742. After examining the statutes
regarding the other appellate courts’ jurisdiction (See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 722,
762), we determine that this case is properly before us.
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The corporation, by and through its national president, directly
participated in at least one new-member event of the Baruch Colony, although
no national officers attended the Crossing. The national president (who is an
alumnus member of Pi Delta Psi) also helped the student members and officers
conceal the cause of death and the corporation’s connection to it from
investigators. He instructed the student members and officers to lie to police
and to hide the fraternity’s letters, heraldry, and regalia before officers
searched the rented house.
Facing criminal homicide charges, members decided to cooperate with
prosecutors and began to implicate the corporation. The Commonwealth
eventually charged the corporation with a host of crimes, the most severe of
which was murder of the third degree.4 The jury acquitted the corporation of
murder and voluntary manslaughter but convicted it on charges of involuntary
manslaughter and many lesser offenses.
The trial court fined and sentenced the corporation to probation. The
conditions of probation required the corporation to “pay all fines, restitution,
and costs within five years;” to cease all “business within the Commonwealth
during its period of probation, which shall include maintaining, creating,
endorsing, or hosting any chapter, associate chapter, or colony at any college,
university, or other institution of higher education, and hosting, convening, or
attending any event or activity within the Commonwealth;” and to notify all
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4 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(c).
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colleges and university with a Pi Delta Psi chapter or colony of its conviction
and sentence. N.T., 1/8/18, at 28 – 29.
The corporation timely appealed.
III. Analysis
The corporation raises ten appellate issues. They are:
1. Did the trial court deprive the corporation of its
constitutional rights to present its defense by
excluding an expert opinion?
2. Did the trial court deprive the corporation of its
constitutional rights to present its defense by
excluding exhibits as irrelevant?
3. Did the trial court deprive the corporation of its
constitutional rights to present its defense by
curtailing cross-examination of a witness?
4. Did the trial court deprive the corporation of its
constitutional rights to present its defense by refusing
to grant “use immunity” to its co-defendants?
5. Did the trial court deprive the corporation of its
constitutional rights to present its defense by
impairing its closing argument?
6. Did the trial court prejudice the corporation by
allowing the Commonwealth to call it “the fraternity?”
7. Did the verdict slip violate the Due Process Clauses of
both constitutions, by shifting the burden of proof to
the corporation when the word “Guilty” preceded “Not
Guilty?”
8. Did the trial court violate the Due Process Clauses of
both constitutions when it used the term “defendant”
during jury instructions, rather than “the accused?”
9. Did the trial court err by refusing to give certain jury
instructions the corporation requested?
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10. Did the trial court err by refusing a curative instruction
regarding the prosecutor’s closing argument?
See Pi Delta Psi’s Brief at 4-5.
We will address each of the corporation’s claims of error in turn. After
explaining why they are all waived or meritless, we will consider the legality
of the corporation’s probationary sentence.
A. The Exclusion of Expert Testimony
First, the corporation claims the trial court deprived it of a fair trial by
excluding certain expert testimony. The trial court prohibited David L. Westol,
an expert on collegiate fraternities, from testifying that the corporation met
the national standard of care by promulgating and enforcing an anti-hazing
policy. The corporation argues that decision was incorrect.
Such an argument disregards our deferential standard of review for a
trial court’s evidentiary rulings. When reviewing a decision to admit or to
exclude expert opinion testimony, we use an abuse-of-discretion standard.
See Commonwealth v. Powell, 171 A.3d 294, 307 (Pa. Super. 2017),
appeal denied, 183 A.3d 975 (Pa. 2018). Abuse of discretion only “occurs if
the trial court renders a judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary
or capricious; that fails to apply the law; or that is motivated by partiality,
prejudice, bias or ill-will.” Hutchinson v. Penske Truck Leasing Co., 876
A.2d 978, 984 (Pa. Super. 2005). In other words, a reasonable judgment by
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the trial court is not an abuse of discretion, even if this Court disagrees with
that judgment.
Here, the corporation makes no argument that the trial court’s decision
to prohibit Mr. Westol from testifying about the standard of care was
manifestly unreasonable. Nor does it identify which Rule of Evidence the trial
court supposedly violated. The corporation merely contends the trial court’s
decision was incorrect and negatively impacted its defensive strategy. The
corporation’s assertion of an incorrect judgment does not persuade us that
the trial court abused its discretion.
The trial court, in preventing Mr. Westol from opining for the jury that
the corporation’s anti-hazing policy and training met Greek Life’s national
standard of care, explained its ruling as follows:
An opinion is not excludable merely because it embraces
an ultimate issue. PA R.E. 704. An expert opinion that
embraces an ultimate issue may be objectionable on other
grounds, however, as the Pennsylvania Superior Court
observed:
Pennsylvania law allows expert opinion testimony on
the ultimate issue. As with lay opinions, the trial
judge has discretion to admit or exclude expert
opinions on the ultimate issue depending on the
helpfulness of the testimony versus its potential to
cause confusion or prejudice.
McManamom v. Washko, 906 A.2d 1259, 1278-1279 (Pa.
Super. 2006).
* * * * *
As to Mr. Westol’s opinion that “[the corporation] acted
within the standard of care, custom, and practice within the
community of Greek-lettered organizations” and that it “was
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not negligent nor did it violate any duty of care towards [the
victim],” Mr. Westol did not testify using legal terms of art,
i.e., “standard of care,” “negligence,” etc., as he did in his
Report. From reading the Report, it is not clear that he
makes these assertions independent of an opinion that [the
corporation’s] conduct was consistent with the standards
within Greek-lettered organizations.
Whether [the corporation] acted in conformity with the
standards of conduct or care found in other [Greek-lettered
organizations] is of no relevance in a criminal case. It will
not help jurors understand the evidence or determine a fact
in issue. For each of these reasons, Mr. Westol’s opinion
that “[the corporation] acted within the standard of care,
custom, and practice within the community of Greek-
lettered organizations” and that it “was not negligent nor did
it violate any duty of care towards [the victim],” is irrelevant
and inadmissible.
Trial Court Opinion, 11/8/17, at 29, 35-36 (some citations and punctuation
omitted).
The trial court’s opinion rejecting Mr. Westol’s opinion testimony on the
national standard of care is firmly rooted in the Rules of Evidence, the criminal
law, and our appellate precedents. The court’s analysis is quite reasonable
and does not misapply or override the law.
Because the prosecution’s theory as to this corporation’s guilt rested
entirely upon its vicarious liability for its agents’ misconduct, we cannot say
that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the expert’s opinion on
the standard of care. “Corporations are criminally accountable for the actions
of a ‘high managerial agent’ who commits a wrongdoing in the scope of his
office. This corporate accountability is based upon a simple principal/agency
relationship and not upon a corporation affirming the officer’s act.”
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Commonwealth v. Penn Valley Resorts, Inc., 494 A.2d 1139, 1142 (Pa.
Super. 1985) (interpreting and applying 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 307).
Thus, the instant corporation would be vicariously liable for everything
that the colony’s officers and the national president did in furtherance of the
new-member-education program and its initiations rituals, regardless of
whether the corporation met the national standard of care by disavowing
hazing. To the extent that the local and national officers committed any
crimes in causing the death of this associate member, so did the corporation,
i.e., the principle whose interests all of the agents/officers were pursuing when
they physically assaulted the freshman and tried to hide their crimes.
Even if the corporation’s anti-hazing policy and training met the national
standard of care for all Greek-lettered organizations, meeting industry
standards will not excuse involuntary manslaughter, hazing, and the other
crimes for which the jury convicted this corporation, when ‘high managerial
agents’ committed those crimes specifically as part of the rites and rituals for
imitation into the corporation’s membership. Moreover, if the officers of the
Baruch Colony and the national president met the national standard of care
and this associate member died anyway, then Greek Life certainly needs to
raise its national standards. If, on the other hand, their conduct did not meet
the national standard of care by their conduct, then the corporation,
vicariously speaking, did not meet it, as well. Either way, the opinion
testimony that the corporation met the national standard of care was of no
relevance to the ultimate issue of the corporation’s criminal culpability.
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Thus, the trial court was well within its sphere of discretion in deeming
Mr. Westol’s opinion on the corporation’s conformity to the national standard
of care irrelevant in a criminal trial. Accordingly, we dismiss the first appellate
issue as meritless.
B. The Exclusion of Certain Exhibits
As its second appellate issue, the corporation argues that the trial court
erroneously excluded two exhibits from evidence. The first piece of excluded
evidence was a letter to the prosecutors, which the corporation claims would
show that the student members performed the Crossing in a manner “beyond
the normal Rituals.” Pi Delta Psi’s Brief at 14 (some punctuation omitted).
The other piece of evidence was “an excerpt from Daniel Lee’s proper
statement transcript showing the instructions by the prosecutors to the
witness . . . .” Id. at 15.
The corporation cites no case law or authority to support its contention
that the exhibits were admissible. See id. 14 – 15. It simply offers bald
assertions of error without any basis in law or citations to the record.
The Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure do not permit conclusory
arguments. Each distinct issue in the argument section of a brief must, at a
minimum, contain “citations of authorities as are deemed pertinent.”
Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). When a party “cites no pertinent authority to substantiate
[its] claim . . . appellant’s issue is waived.” Commonwealth v. Simmons,
56 A.3d 1280, 1286 (Pa. Super. 2012), affirmed, 91 A.3d 102 (Pa. 2014).
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The corporation’s conclusory argument leads to the waiver of this issue.
C. The Cross-Examination of Sheldon Wong
The corporation asserts that the trial court prohibited it from completing
its cross-examination of Sheldon Wong. It does not, however, claim that this
was an error of law or an abuse of discretion, much less explain why reversal
is in order. The corporation’s brief only summarizes and editorializes on
Wong’s testimony. See Pi Delta Psi’s Brief at 14. Because we discern no
argument from the corporation on this issue and it has, again, failed to cite
legal authority for its position, we dismiss this issues as waived. See Pa.R.A.P.
2119(a); Simmons, supra.
D. The Co-Defendants’ Privileges against Self-Incrimination
The corporation’s fourth appellate issue seeks to establish a new, state-
constitutional right. Specifically, it requests judicially imposed “use immunity”
for its 34 co-defendants – the student members who performed the physical
hazing. The corporation only called Jimmie Mei. It claims that its attempt to
examine Mei illustrates what would have transpired, if it had also called the
other 33 co-defendants.
Mei asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
The Commonwealth and the trial court both declined to immunize Mei from
prosecution. Next, the corporation asked the trial court to immunize Mei from
his testimony being used against him – hence, “use immunity.” The trial court
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refused. According to the corporation, this refusal deprived it of its rights
under the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. See Pi Delta
Psi’s Brief at 18.
In its appellate brief, the corporation quotes Government of the
Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964 (3rd Cir. 1980), overruled by United
States v. Quinn, 728 F.3d 243 (3rd Cir. 2013) (en banc), for the proposition
that a trial court may grant use immunity to co-defendant witnesses. After
admitting Smith is no longer the law of the Third Circuit, the corporation
argues that “its reasoning holds true for the Pennsylvania constitutional trial
right to present a defense.” Pi Delta Psi’s Brief at 17. The corporation would
have us graft Smith onto the Constitution of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania. See id.
The record reveals, however, that the corporation did not make this
argument to the trial court. Defense counsel mentioned neither the state
constitution nor Smith at trial. He only sought use immunity (at the time,
calling it “limited immunity”) as an afterthought, once the court and the
Commonwealth denied his original request to immunize Mei completely. See
N.T., 11/17/17, at 144.
“Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal.” Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). We have said “issues, even
those of constitutional dimension, are waived if not raised in the trial court. A
new and different theory of relief may not be successfully advanced for the
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first time on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Cline, 177 A.3d 922, 927 (Pa.
Super. 2017), appeal denied, 187 A.3d 210 (Pa. 2018).
The corporation did not argue to the trial court that its use-immunity
request was based upon a novel interpretation of Article I of the Constitution
of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Accordingly, we dismiss its fourth
appellate issue as waived.
E. Prohibition on Use of Metaphorical Shirts at Closing Argument
For its fifth claim of error, the corporation argues the trial court impaired
its closing argument by forbidding the display of empty shirts to the jury. It
asserts the “trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant’s use of
images of metaphorical shirts during closing arguments . . . The metaphorical
shirts were intended to focus the jury on the lethal tacklers and their leader,
Sheldon Wong. The court deprived the defendant of this valuable tool.” Pi
Delta Psi’s Brief at 15. The corporation then quotes two appellate cases, but
it does not analogize those precedents to its own or claim that the trial court
violated them. It simply states, “[a] new trial should be granted.” Id. at 16.
We cannot discern the point of this argument. When an appellant’s
argument is underdeveloped, we may not supply it with a better one. In such
situations, “[w]e shall not develop an argument for an appellant, nor shall we
scour the record to find evidence to support an argument; instead, we will
deem the issue to be waived.” Commonwealth v. Cannavo, 199 A.3d 1282,
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1289 (Pa. Super. 2018), reargument denied (Jan. 29, 2019); see also
Pa.R.A.P. 2119.
Because the corporation has failed to craft a discernable, legal argument
in support of this claim, we dismiss it as waived.5
F. The Commonwealth’s References to The Corporation as “The Fraternity”
Next, the corporation claims the trial court should have prohibited the
prosecution for calling it “the fraternity” during trial. It believes that label
confused the jurors by combining the corporation with its 34 co-defendants –
i.e., its members and officers. The corporation asserts the trial court “had the
authority pursuant to the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence to control the mode
of interrogating witnesses at trial in reference to ‘the fraternity.’” Id. (citing
Pa.R.A.P. 611(a)).
While that statement is correct – the trial court had such authority – it
was under no obligation to exercise its authority as the corporation desired.
We review application of Pa.R.A.P. 611 deferentially and only reverse if there
was a “clear abuse of discretion or error of law.” Commonwealth v. Boxley,
838 A.2d 608, 615 (Pa. 2003).
Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 611(a) provides:
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5 Additionally, we note that a trial court has great discretion in limiting closing
arguments. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Chamberlain, 612 A.3d 107 (Pa.
2011). Here, the corporation has not explained how the trial court’s decision
constituted to an abuse of discretion. Thus, even if this Court were to reach
the merits, we would find no grounds for reversal.
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(a) Control by the Court; Purposes. The court should
exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of
examining witnesses and presenting evidence so as to:
(1) make those procedures effective for determining
the truth;
(2) avoid wasting time; and
(3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue
embarrassment.
Pa.R.A.P. 611(a).
The corporation does not claim the trial court either abused its discretion
or misinterpreted Rule 611. The corporation simply expresses its
disagreement with how the trial court chose to manage the questioning of
witnesses and their replies. As such, its argument disregards our deferential
standard of review and fails to persuade us that an abuse of discretion
occurred.
We conclude this issue is meritless.
G. The Verdict Slip
For its seventh appellate issue, the corporation asserts a novel theory –
namely, that the trial court’s listing of “Guilty” before “Not Guilty” on the
verdict slip violated both constitutions. It claims (without reference to any
source) that, historically, verdict slips were blank, and jurors handwrote the
words “Guilty” or “Not Guilty” after each offense.
In the corporation’s view, the multiple-choice-style verdict slip violates
the constitutional presumption of innocence. It fears that this tricked the
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jurors into subconsciously thinking the corporation had to prove its own
innocence. To make this connection, the corporation cites and quotes articles
from The Legal Intelligencer, The Philadelphia Inquirer, The Tribune Democrat,
The Star-Ledger, websites seeking to abolish judicial elections, and
sociological studies correlating ballot position to election results. The only
law the corporation cites is Akins v. Secretary of State, 904 A.2d 702 (N.H.
2006) (declaring a New Hampshire statute unconstitutional, because it listed
political candidates on the ballot in alphabetical order and so irrationally
favored those with certain names over others).
The Commonwealth responds that the corporation has waived this claim
by failing to cite any authority. It also argues that we have previously rejected
this constitutional theory in Commonwealth v. Selinski, 18 A.3d 1229 (Pa.
Super. 2011), partially vacated on other grounds, 100 A.3d 206 (Pa. 2014).
Finally, the Commonwealth notes that the trial court gave the standard jury
instruction on the presumption of innocence, thereby negating the
corporation’s theory of a Due Process violation.
We disagree with the Commonwealth as to waiver. Its argument places
the corporation in a catch-22. The corporation advances a new, constitutional
theory to expand Due Process protections under both constitutions. Thus, it
cannot possibly cite precedents that support its reading of the Due Process
Clauses, because no court has yet concluded that such protections exist. That
fact may favor the Commonwealth on the merits, but it is hardly grounds for
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waiver. Otherwise, no party could ever frame a new theory of constitutional
jurisprudence for judicial review.
The Commonwealth also erroneously contends that this Court disposed
of the corporation’s claim in Selinski, supra. There, we found waiver of this
constitutional question due to an underdeveloped appellate argument. While
the panel proceeded to offer dictum that, “even if Appellant had not waived
the issue, his argument is without merit,” that observation was not
precedential. Id. at 1235. Thus, Selinski does not control the merits of this
issue.
We therefore address those merits now. In reviewing a constitutional
claim, we face a pure question of law, “for which our standard of review is de
novo and our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Veon, 109
A.3d 754, 763 (Pa. Super. 2015), vacated on other grounds, 150 A.3d 435
(Pa. 2016).
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
dictates that “No state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law . . . .” Pennsylvania courts treat Article I, § 1 as
the equivalent of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. See,
e.g., Johnson v. Allegheny Intermediate Unit, 59 A.3d 10, 20 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2012) (stating that, when applying Article I, § 1, a “due process
inquiry must take place.”). The corporation does not assert any greater rights
under Article I, § 1 than under the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, the
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Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has recently said that, under the Fourteenth
Amendment and Article I, § 1:
the amount of process which is due in a particular case is
determined by application of a test which considers three
factors: (1) the private interest affected by the
governmental action; (2) the risk of an erroneous
deprivation together with the value of additional or
substitute safeguards; and (3) the state interest involved,
including the administrative burden the additional or
substitute procedural requirements would impose on the
state.
In re Fortieth Statewide Investigating Grand Jury, 197 A.3d 712, 717
(Pa. 2018) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, (1976) and Bundy
v. Wetzel, 184 A.3d 551 (Pa. 2018)) (quotation marks omitted). We address
the corporation’s federal and state constitutional claim simultaneously.
The parties have not directly addressed their arguments to the three-
part, Mathews/Bundy test, but they have offered theories that fall roughly
within its parameters. For instance, the corporation claims that (1) the
“Guilty”-before-“Not-Guilty” verdict slip violated its fundamental right to be
presumed innocent; (2) scholarly research ties primacy of place on a ballot to
an increased chance of winning, which the corporation relates to the jury
system; and (3) amending the verdict slip would cost the Commonwealth
nothing. See Pi Delta Psi’s Brief at 25.
The Commonwealth attacks the corporation’s theory on the second
prong of the test. In the Commonwealth’s view, because the trial court
instructed the jury on burden of proof and presumption of innocence, there
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was no procedural deprivation of the corporation’s right to be presumed
innocent. The Commonwealth also emphasizes that we legally must presume
that the jury followed those instructions without any evidence to contrary.
That the corporation had a right to be presumed innocent at trial “is the
undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the
foundation of the administration of our criminal law.” Coffin v. United
States, 156 U.S. 432, 453, 15 S. Ct. 394, 403, 39 L. Ed. 481 (1895). The
corporation claims the “Guilty”-before-“Not-Guilty” verdict slip jeopardized its
most fundamental right of criminal procedure. It therefore satisfies the first
prong of the Mathews/Bundy test.
We also agree with the corporation that it would cost trial courts nothing
to list “Not Guilty” before “Guilty” on verdict slips. The Commonwealth has
not disputed this, nor has it identified any state interest for listing “Guilty”
first. We find that the third prong favors the corporation’s theory as well.
However, the corporation’s Due Process claim falters at the second step
of the Mathews/Bundy test. We are unpersuaded that the verdict slip
deprived the corporation of its right to be presumed innocent. Uninformed
electors, who mindlessly vote for the first name on a ballot, correlate poorly
to well-informed jurors, who collectively deliberate before reaching a verdict.
While the sociological studies and legal articles that the corporation cites
are worrisome commentaries on our democracy, they, fortunately, are not
indicative of how juries function. Unlike voters who may simply touch the first
name on a screen in a voting booth, the twelve jurors who tried the
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corporation were oath-bound to follow the law and instructions of a learned
trial judge, who well and fully instructed them on their duties and the law.
As the Commonwealth rightly notes and the Selinski Court said, “the
trial court instructed the jury on the presumption of innocence and the
Commonwealth’s burden of proof, following the language of Pennsylvania
Standard Jury Instruction (Criminal) 7.01.” Id. at 1235. We find this dicta
persuasive and adopt it into our analysis.
And, regarding the case at bar, the jurors were fully informed about the
corporation’s role in the hazing death. They sat through a week-long trial,
heard testimony of witnesses, and reviewed copious physical evidence. Thus,
these jurors knew far more about their decision and its implications than
electors who arbitrarily vote for the first name they see. Additionally, the
margins of error in close elections, to which the corporation’s studies referred,
do not occur in a criminal-jury trial. Criminal juries must reach a unanimous
decision.
The corporation’s jurors clearly understood their role and legal
obligations. They did not, as the corporation suggests, simply check-off the
first box of “Guilty” and return to the courtroom. Had they done so, the jurors
would have convicted the corporation of the first charge on the verdict slip –
namely, murder of the third degree. But, as the verdict slip indicates, they
did not. See Verdict at 1. Instead, the jurors left the first two charges blank,
followed their instructions, proceeded to the subsequent offenses, and
convicted the corporation of the third charge – involuntary manslaughter. See
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id. This jury demonstrated that a “Guilty”-before-“Not-Guilty” verdict slip did
not undermine the presumption of innocence.
Finally, there is no Rule of Criminal Procedure regarding the format of a
verdict slip. Any such mandate, if appropriate, must come from the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania. “The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe
general rules governing practice, procedure, and the conduct of all courts . . .
.” Pa. Const. Article V, § 10(c). If we created the rule the corporation
requests, we would usurp the power of the Supreme Court. The criminal-
defense bar may suggest this new rule to the Supreme Court’s Criminal
Procedural Rules Committee, should it so desire. We, however, may not
create it as a constitutionally enshrined right.
Because we conclude that the verdict slip did not infringe upon the
corporation’s right of presumed innocence, no Due Process violation occurred,
and no appellate relief is due.
H. The Trial Court’s Use of the Word “Defendant”
The corporation raises another, novel, constitutional theory. It claims
that the trial court violated its Due Process rights by referring to it as the
“defendant” rather than the “accused.”
The corporation again relies upon its right of presumed innocence and
claims a person “can be accused without being a defendant, that is, an accused
can be simply ‘blamed.’ . . . a defendant is always an accused, but an accused
is not even constitutionally obliged to defend.” Pi Delta Psi Brief at 27. The
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corporation thinks the term “defendant” carries a negative connotation that it
committed a crime.6
The Commonwealth again argues for waiver, on the grounds that the
corporation cited no law for its constitutional claim. We again refuse to find
waiver for the reasons above.
On the merits, the corporation reasserts its fundamental right of the
presumption of innocence. Thus, it satisfies part-one of the Mathews/Bundy
test. See also in re Fortieth Grand Jury, supra.
Also, the corporation proposes a simple remedy – namely, that trial
courts call defendants “the accused” during the jury instructions. The
Commonwealth neither argues this is impractical nor that there is a state
interest in referring to defendants as “defendants.” The corporation thus
satisfied the third part of the test.
But, again, the corporation’s theory cannot meet the second prong of
Mathews/Bundy. Requiring all trial judges to call defendants “the accused”
is a cure in search of an illness. While it is logically true that all accused are
not defendants and all defendants are accused, the corporation fails to connect
that tautology with an undermining of the presumption of innocence. Thus,
the corporation has failed to demonstrate how the trial court’s verbiage
____________________________________________
6We discussed our scope and standard of review and the test for a due process
challenge in the preceding subsection on the jury-slip issue. See Subsection
G., supra. We therefore need not restate them in this subsection.
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deprived it of any right, beyond its mere speculative belief that some harm
may have occurred.
And, as with the verdict slip above, we again note that the trial court
fully instructed the jury on the presumption of innocence, the jury acquitted
the then-accused (now-convicted) corporation of the Commonwealth’s most
serious accusations, and no Rule of Criminal Procedure or any Standard Jury
Instruction compels the result the corporation seeks. Accordingly, for all of
the reasons above, we again perceive no Due Process violation. Any request
to amend the Rules of Criminal Procedure or the Standard Jury Instruction
should be directed to the appropriate committees of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania.
Because the corporation has not shown how the trial court’s use of the
word “defendant” infringed its constitutional rights, we dismiss this appellate
issue as meritless.
I. Jury Instructions
The corporation, for its ninth claim of error, provides a list of jury
instructions it desired the trial court to give. It believes these instructions
were necessary to protect its freedom of association under the First
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
The three paragraphs of argument on this issue are muddled, at best.
They do not reference anything of record to demonstrate why the requested
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jury instructions were, as the corporation puts it, “crucial.” Pi Delta Psi’s Brief
at 28. Again, conclusory arguments are not viable under Pa.R.A.P. 2119.
The corporation has waived this claim.
J. The Prosecution’s Closing Argument
For its final issue, the corporation alleges the trial court failed to correct
the prosecution’s appeal to passion and sympathy. This argument is even less
developed than the jury-instruction claim above, in that it lacks any citation
to legal authority and is wholly conclusory. Accordingly, we also dismiss it as
waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119.
K. The Legality of the Corporation’s Sentence
Having disposed of the corporation’s ten appellate issues, we now raise,
sua sponte, an eleventh. We question whether the trial court had authority
under Pennsylvania’s criminal law to impose a condition of probation that,
practically speaking, exiles this corporation from Pennsylvania for ten years.7
The issue of “whether the trial court possessed the authority to impose a
particular sentence implicates the legality of the sentence . . . .”
Commonwealth v. Wilson, 11 A.3d 519, 525 (Pa. Super. 2010) (en banc),
vacated on other grounds, 67 A.3d 736 (Pa. 2013).
____________________________________________
7The Commonwealth recommended an exile of 20 years at sentencing. See
Commonwealth’s Sentencing Memorandum at 2-3.
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The legality of a criminal sentence is non-waivable, and this Court may
“raise and review an illegal sentence sua sponte.” Commonwealth v.
Muhammed, 992 A.2d 897, 903 (Pa. Super. 2010). Because the legality of
a sentence presents a pure question of a law, our scope of review is plenary,
and our standard of review is de novo. See Wilson, supra. “If no statutory
authorization exists for a particular sentence, that sentence is illegal and . . .
must be vacated.” Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 850 A.2d 1268, 1271
(Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc) (emphasis added).
At sentencing, the Commonwealth requested that the trial court prohibit
the corporation:
from conducting any business within the Commonwealth
during its period of probation, to include a prohibition
against maintaining, creating, endorsing, or hosting, etc.
any chapter, associate chapter, or colony at any college,
university, or other institution of higher education within the
Commonwealth and . . . from hosting, convening, or
attending any event or activity (i.e., National Convention,
National Conference, “Crossing” weekend, etc.) within the
Commonwealth.
Commonwealth’s Sentencing Memorandum at 3.
After admitting that “Pennsylvania statutes regarding sentencing do not
specifically enumerate the authorized sentence for a corporate defendant,”
the Commonwealth argued “it can be logically deduced that, while a
corporation could not be incarcerated, a corporation does have an existence
sufficient to subject it to [a trial court’s] authority to impose fines and a period
of probation.” Id. at 8 (citing 18 U.S.C.A. § 3551(c)). Relying upon the
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Federal Sentencing Code, the Commonwealth contended that the trial court
could exercise vast authority over this corporation, because nothing in the
Pennsylvania Sentencing Code expressly prohibited it from doing so. See
Commonwealth’s Sentencing Memorandum at 8.
The trial court, accepting the Commonwealth’s reasoning, stated:
In researching and reviewing cases where a corporate
defendant has been convicted – there’s nothing in
Pennsylvania – but there are some federal cases, and you
probably heard of Exxon or BP, whatever they called it at
the time. And, in reviewing the sentencing statute and the
statute for corporate liability that was applied and discussed
in a pretrial Opinion and Order, I see no - - I see nothing
that prevents the court from issuing a sentence of probation
to ensure that the court’s very specific mandates to the
fraternity be carried out.
N.T., 1/8/18, at 24. The court then imposed a sentence of ten years’ probation
and enjoined the corporation from conducting any business, owning any
subsidiary or property, or attending any event in Pennsylvania during that
time. See id. at 28 – 29.
As the Commonwealth and trial court recognized, Pennsylvania’s
criminal law, unlike the federal statutes and guidelines, does not specifically
address the punishment of corporate defendants (i.e., legal fictions). See 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9721 (drawing no distinction between organizational defendants
and living ones). Four of the seven sentencing options in Section 9721 deal
with incarceration and intermediate punishments, penalties that are
metaphysically inapplicable to corporate persons.
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One commentator has observed that convicted corporations “are treated
a bit like children; as neither can be put in prison. Instead, judges may order
them to pay fines and to make reforms.” Brandon L. Garret, TOO BIG TO JAIL:
HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH CORPORATIONS, 146 (2014). Neither
Professor Garret’s research nor this Court’s revealed any case where, as a
condition of probation, a court had outlawed a corporation from conducting
any business in an entire state. See id., Chapter 6 “The Carrot and the Stick,”
145 – 171. Moreover, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines’ chapter on the
punishment of corporate defendants does not suggest outlawry as a condition
of probation. See Chapter Eight, Federal Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.
Sentencing Comm’n 2018).
Even the case the trial court referenced at sentencing – BP’s exploded
oil rig, Deepwater Horizon – did not terminate BP’s business operations in the
United States or Louisiana. United States v. BP, 1/29/13 Order of Sentence,
2:12-cr-00292-SSV-DEK (E.D. La. 2013). As part of its plea bargaining, BP
had to hire two corporate monitors for four years to supervise safety
procedures and to focus on ethics and compliance. See id. There were other
probationary conditions, such as revising their oil-spill response plan, hiring
outside auditors, and disclosing future safety violations. The most onerous
condition was suspension of the company from entering a contract with the
United States government for one year. See id. We therefore conclude the
trial court’s reliance on BP to exile the corporation at bar from Pennsylvania
for ten years was misplaced.
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Also, the trial court’s attempt to justify the corporation’s exile by the
General Assembly’s silence is erroneous for several reasons. First, it violates
this Court’s precedents. “If no statutory authorization exists for a particular
sentence, that sentence is illegal and subject to correction.” Stevenson, 850
A.2d at 1271.
Second, the trial court’s assumption of authority based upon legislative
silence disregards the General Assembly’s mandate that its penal code “shall
be strictly construed.” 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1928(b)(1). Contrary to the claim of the
Commonwealth in its Sentencing Memorandum, a trial court may not logically
deduce that it possesses penal authority greater than what the legislature has
expressly granted to the court. The statute authorizing conditions of probation
contains no term expressly empowering a trial court to discontinue a business
entity’s commerce within this Commonwealth. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9754(c).
Most of the authorized conditions in Section 9754(c) are irrelevant to
corporations. Some examples include ordering a probationer to meet family
obligations, undergo drug and alcohol screening, attended treatment classes,
and maintain employment and a permanent residence. The Section 9754(c)
conditions that could apply to corporations are (2.1) community service; (8)
pay restitution; (10) report, through its agents, to a probation officer; (11)
pay its fines and (13) “satisfy any other conditions reasonably related to the
rehabilitation of the defendant and not unduly restrictive of his liberty or
incompatible with his freedom of conscience.” Id.
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Only 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9754(c)(13) potentially provides the authority that
the trial court exerted when it outlawed the corporation. But outlawry from
the whole Commonwealth bears no relation to the corporation’s rehabilitative
process. Instead, it is punitive in nature, and such a condition of probation
cannot be sustained under the language of subsection (c)(13). Also, this
condition of probation unjustly punishes the Penn State Chapter of Pi Delta
Psi, students who had absolutely nothing to do with the hazing death in this
case. It also totally restricts the corporation’s future expansion within this
Commonwealth at any other colleges or universities. The corporation may not
own property, attend Greek Life events, or enter contracts in Pennsylvania,
during this term of probation. It thus unduly restricts the corporation’s liberty
by completely cutting it off from the Pennsylvania marketplace.
Third, the probationary condition flies in the face of the common law of
corporations. It has long been the common law that corporations “may not
commit treason, nor be outlawed, nor excommunicated, for they have no souls
. . . .” The Case of Sutton’s Hospital, 77 Eng. Rep. 960 (K.B. 1612). The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in that same vein, declared a corporation’s
special conditions of sentencing to be illegal. See Pittsburgh, Virginia &
Charleston Railway Co. v Commonwealth, 12 W.N.C. 280 (Pa. 1882)
(holding that the only permissible sentence for a corporate defendant was a
fine, not specific performance to right the wrong it had committed). While the
Pennsylvania Sentencing Code has expanded the punishments for convicted
corporations beyond fines to include Section 9754(c)’s conditions of probation,
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we find nothing therein that supplants the common law prohibition on
outlawing a corporate entity.
Without such legislative authorization, we conclude the common law still
holds validity. The corporation cannot be criminally “outlawed, nor
excommunicated, for [it has] no [soul].” Sutton’s Hospital, supra. An
amoral corporation is no more amenable to such penalties, than it is to
incarceration in a penitentiary.
In reality, corporations have no moral compass, or, as the Lord Chief
Justice Coke put it, “no soul.” Id. A corporation cannot feel the guilt of the
harm it caused, even when that harm resulted in the tragic loss of human life,
because it feels nothing at all. This corporation, though vicariously liable to
make redress for the illegalities of its agent, did not kill anyone. While its
negligent management may have fostered a corporate culture that permitted
or even encouraged wanton behavior by student members, the corporation
did not tackle or physically attack anyone. It has no body with which to do
so. And so outlawry of a corporation makes no more sense now than it did in
the 17th century, because, like any tool, the corporation is no more morally
accountable than a hammer or a sword or a firearm. It is the wielder who
sins; not his or her weapon.
Yet the trial court is not without authority to oversee the rehabilitation
of the corporation’s culture and transfer the tool into the hands of agents who
will wield it for good. We believe a Pennsylvania trial court could impose many
of the conditions of probation used in BP, supra, against a corporation, within
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the bounds of its discretion and 42 Pa.C.S.A § 9754(c)(13). Professor Garrett
also offers many additional ideas to transform a corporate ethos that a trial
court might, if properly fitted to the circumstances at bar, order as well. See
Garrett, supra.
But, finding no authority in statute or at common law to support the trial
court’s decision to enjoin the corporation from conducting any business within
this state for ten years, we conclude that portion of its sentence is illegal. We
therefore vacate that sentence. Because this “upsets the original sentencing
scheme of the trial court,” we remand for resentencing. Commonwealth v.
Goldhammer, 517 A.2d 1280, 1283 (Pa. 1986).
The trial court may fashion new terms of probation to monitor how the
corporation conducts its business throughout this Commonwealth and whether
it is taking steps nationally to reform its corporate culture of hazing. But the
trial court may not outlaw it from participating in the commerce of this
Commonwealth.
Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded for resentencing.
Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judge Lazarus joins the Opinion.
Judge Colins files a Dissenting Opinion.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/23/19
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