Com. v. Palyani, S.

J-S21042-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
SELIM PALYANI
Appellant No. 2799 EDA 2012
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence September 14, 2012
In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-09-CR-0000162-2011
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., ALLEN, J., and OTT, J.
MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED OCTOBER 01, 2014
Selim Palyani appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed on
September 14, 2012, in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County. On
August 16, 2012, the trial court, sitting without a jury, convicted Palyani of
intentional possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug
paraphernalia.1 The court imposed a term of six to 12 months’ incarceration
for the intentional possession of a controlled substance offense and a
consecutive one year period of probation for the paraphernalia crime. On
appeal, he raises the following two issues: (1) the trial court erred in
admitting physical evidence seized as a result of a warrantless search of the
vehicle which Palyani was driving prior to his arrest; and (2) the court erred
____________________________________________
1
35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(16) and (a)(32), respectively.
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in finding there was sufficient evidence to establish that he constructively
possessed contraband that was seized from the vehicle. After a thorough
review of the submissions by the parties, the certified record, and relevant
law, we affirm.
The trial court set forth the facts as follows:
The facts of this case arise from the Defendant, Selim
Palyani (Palyani), a citizen of the country of Georgia, being found
to be in constructive possession of a controlled substance,
namely heroin and cocaine residue, as well as drug
paraphernalia in the form of two syringes.
On October 30, 2010 at approximately 2:13 P.M., Sergeant
Michael Rihl of the Bensalem Township Police Department
(BTPD) was on duty driving a marked patrol vehicle. He
observed the vehicle Palyani was operating stopped in the left
oncoming traffic lane. Palyani was, therefore, parked in a lane
of travel facing the wrong direction at the intersection of Street
Road and Old Street Road in Bensalem Township, Bucks County.
Sergeant Rihl pulled up alongside [Palyani]’s vehicle and was
situated in the left only turning lane at a red light. Had the light
turned green, [Palyani]’s vehicle would have been blocking
oncoming traffic and ultimately “impeding the flow of traffic.”
Both [Palyani] and the passenger of the vehicle appeared
lethargic and “hazy.” Once Sergeant Rihl eventually got his
attention, he instructed Palyani that he was on the wrong side of
the road and should make a left at the light when it turns green.
As a result, [Palyani] proceeded to make a left into the
intersection onto Street Road in front of Sergeant Rihl.
At this point, Sergeant Rihl effectuated a traffic stop of
[Palyani]’s vehicle on the shoulder around the forty-seven-
hundred block of Street Road. Both the prosecution and defense
counsel introduced Google Maps of the specific intersection into
evidence. Additionally, both patrol vehicles Sergeant Rihl and
Officer Patrick Moore (a responding officer) were operating were
equipped with visual and audio recording devices. [Palyani] was
informed of this and did not object to their use.
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Upon approaching [Palyani], the sergeant again noticed he
was lethargic, the pupils of his eyes were constricted, he had
slurred speech, and his eyes were glassy. It took a “long time”
for [Palyani] to retrieve the necessary papers, i.e., his license
and registration. The sergeant ran the passenger’s information
and he was immediately taken into custody based on an active
warrant. Thereafter, based on the traffic violation and the
sergeant[’s] observations of Palyani, as set forth above, field
sobriety tests were administered. The sergeant determined that
[Palyani] did not properly and/or successfully complete the field
sobriety tests, which, coupled with the above observations, led
him to opine that “[Palyani] was unable to operate a motor
vehicle safely.” [Palyani] was then placed under arrest for
suspicion of DUI.
Sergeant Rihl next determined that because both
occupants were being taken into custody, the vehicle would need
to be impounded. Sergeant Rihl referenced the BTPD’s
“Procedural Field Directive #2-14,” which directs that “Officers
will have vehicles removed from the highway when they create
[a] substantial hazard to motorists.” Sergeant Rihl determined
that there was no place on the highway to safely leave
[Palyani]’s vehicle and we also found that doing so would be
dangerous and present a serious public safety issue. The
inventory policy provides that if an officer makes the decision to
impound a vehicle, they are to advise Bucks County Radio to
contact the on-call tow service. Additionally, an inventory form
is required detailing the items taken from the vehicle in order to
protect BTPD from liability. Pursuant to BTPD’s inventory policy,
Officer Moore directed Bucks County radio to contact the on-call
tow.
Sergeant Rihl thereafter conducted the inventory search.
First, he located [Palyani]’s wallet so it could be transported with
[Palyani]. During the inventory search, Sergeant Rihl also
located two syringe needles, one in the driver’s side door pocket
and the other on the backseat, as well as a baggie commonly
used to package controlled substances on the floor in front of the
passenger seat. The syringes and baggie were submitted to the
Bucks County Crime lab for analysis, and were found to contain
cocaine and heroin residue, respectively.
Selim Palyani, the operator of the vehicle, was charged
with Count 1 - DUI: General Impairment/Incapable of Driving
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Safely – 3d Offense, Count 2 - DUI: Controlled Substance –
Impaired Ability – 3d Offense, Count 3 – Intentional Possession
of a Controlled Substance, Count 4 – Possession of Drug
Paraphernalia, and Count 5 – Careless Driving.
On April 4, 2011, [Palyani] pled guilty to all counts before
the Honorable Jeffery L. Finely of this Court. On Count 1,
[Palyani] was sentenced to not less than one (1), nor more than
three (3) years’ incarceration. The Court directed that [Palyani]
could be screened for house arrest and work release and that he
could be presumptively paroled upon completing his minimum
term of incarceration with good conduct. On Count 3, [Palyani]
received one (1) year of probation. On Count 4, [Palyani]
received an additional one (1) year of probation. The Court
directed that the sentences on Counts 3 and 4 would run
consecutive to each other, but concurrent to the sentence
imposed on Count 1.
On November 21, 2011, [Palyani] filed his first petition
pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), claiming
that he was subject to deportation due to his guilty plea.
[Palyani] claimed that plea counsel failed to advise him of the
collateral consequences of his plea as required by Padilla v.
Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. 1473 (2010). On January 30, 2012, the
Commonwealth filed a response thereto. Judge Finley conducted
hearings on February 3, 2012 and April 30, 2012. On April 30,
2012, the Court granted [Palyani]’s motion to withdraw his guilty
plea. The case was assigned to the undersigned and proceeded
to trial.
Through newly-retained counsel (“trial counsel”), [Palyani]
filed omnibus pre-trial motions on June 22, 2012 and June 26,
2012. [Palyani] sought to suppress statements made to the
officers and physical evidence in the form of syringes and
baggies containing heroin and cocaine residue recovered from
his vehicle. On June 26 and 27, 2012, after a full and complete
suppression hearing we denied [Palyani]’s motion to suppress
physical evidence and also denied [Palyani]’s motion in limine to
suppress his refusal to consent to a blood draw. We deferred
ruling, however, on [Palyani]’s motion to suppress statements
made to the officers for thirty (30) days to allow the attorneys to
submit briefs. Specifically, we directed the Commonwealth to
provide transcripts from the video recordings captured by
cameras on the officers’ vehicles. On August 15, 2012, at the
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continued suppression hearing, we granted [Palyani]’s motion to
suppress all of his statements to the officers.
Following the suppression hearing, [Palyani] waived a jury
trial and proceeded on a stipulated waiver trial. The
Commonwealth and trial counsel stipulated to the exhibits. The
Commonwealth also presented the testimony of Dr. Thomas
Bretell, an expert witness in forensic toxicology, who testified as
to the effects of heroin on a user’s body.
We found [Palyani] not guilty of Count 2 - DUI: Controlled
Substance – Impaired Ability – 3d offense and the summary
offense of Careless Driving. We found [Palyani] guilty of
Intentional Possession of a Controlled Substance and Possession
of Drug Paraphernalia. The Commonwealth moved to nolle pros
Count 1 – DUI: General Impairment/Incapable of Driving Safely
– 3d Offense, which we granted. At [Palyani]’s request, we
deferred sentencing.
On September 14, 2012, on Intentional Possession of a
Controlled Substance, we sentenced [Palyani] to not less than
six (6), nor more than twelve (12) months’ incarceration. On
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, we sentenced [Palyani] to a
consecutive one (1) year period of probation. [Palyani] received
credit from July 6, 2011 to September 14, 2012, and,
accordingly, we directed that the parole portion of his sentence
was closed out and his probation was to commence upon his
release from custody.7
7
Palyani was in custody on an immigration detainer and
therefore never posted bail on this case. Because he had
not yet had an immigration hearing we exercised our
discretion and granted him credit for the entire six (6) to
twelve (12) month sentence on possession which is why
we closed out that portion of his sentence.
Trial Court Opinion, 9/4/2013, at 1 5 (record citations and some footnotes
omitted). This appeal followed.
In Palyani’s first argument, he claims the trial court erred in denying
his motion to suppress, in part, by finding that the warrantless search of his
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vehicle constituted a valid inventory search. Palyani’s Brief at 9. Palyani
contends that “although the vehicle may have been headed for a lawful tow
away from the site of the arrest, the motive in searching the interior of the
vehicle was to further an investigatory purpose.” Id. (italics in original).
Specifically, he states, “Police were investigating a specific crime (driving
under the influence of narcotics), questioned [him] regarding that crime,
received critical information regarding evidence of that crime, and then
immediately searched the vehicle to uncover and seize that evidence.” Id.
at 10. Moreover, Palyani claims he told the officers that it was his
girlfriend’s car and, therefore, the officers’ actions were inconsistent with the
holding in Commonwealth v. Germann, 621 A.2d 589 (Pa. Super. 1993),
because the vehicle did not pose a public safety risk, there was no need for
a full-scale search of the vehicle, and the property owner should have been
given the opportunity to determine how her property should be secured. Id.
at 11. Furthermore, Palyani asserts that no attempt was made to obtain a
search warrant to uncover evidence, which the police had reason to believe
was secreted in the vehicle.
With respect to suppression issues, we are guided by the following:
Our scope and standard of review from the denial of a
suppression motion are well settled:
An appellate court’s standard of review in addressing
a challenge to a trial court's denial of a suppression
motion is limited to determining whether the factual
findings are supported by the record and whether
the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are
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correct. [Because] the prosecution prevailed in the
suppression court, we may consider only the
evidence of the prosecution and so much of the
evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted
when read in the context of the record as a whole.
Where the record supports the factual findings of the
trial court, we are bound by those facts and may
reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom
are in error.
Commonwealth v. Smith, 85 A.3d 530, 534 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation
omitted).
In addition, “[i]t is within the suppression court’s sole province
as factfinder to pass on the credibility of witnesses and the
weight to be given their testimony.” Commonwealth v.
Elmobdy, 2003 PA Super 158, 823 A.2d 180, 183 (Pa. Super.
2003). The suppression court is also entitled “to believe all, part
or none of the evidence presented.” Commonwealth v.
Benton, 440 Pa. Super. 441, 655 A.2d 1030, 1032 (Pa. Super.
1995). Finally, at a suppression hearing, the Commonwealth
has the burden of “establish[ing] by a preponderance of the
evidence that the evidence was properly obtained.”
Commonwealth v. Culp, 378 Pa. Super. 213, 548 A.2d 578,
581 (Pa. Super. 1988).
Commonwealth v. Galendez, 27 A.3d 1042, 1046 (Pa. Super. 2011).
In Commonwealth v. Hennigan, 753 A.2d 245 (Pa. Super. 2000),
this Court explained:
Inventory searches are a well-defined exception to the search
warrant requirement. The purpose of an inventory search is not
to uncover criminal evidence. Rather, it is designed to safeguard
seized items in order to benefit both the police and the
defendant. Inventory searches serve one or more of the
following purposes: (1) to protect the owner’s property while it
remains in police custody; (2) to protect the police against
claims or disputes over lost or stolen property; (3) to protect the
police from potential danger; and (4) to assist the police in
determining whether the vehicle was stolen and then
abandoned.
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A warrantless inventory search of an automobile is different from
a warrantless investigatory search of the same. An inventory
search of an automobile is permitted where: (1) the police have
lawfully impounded the automobile; and (2) the police have
acted in accordance with a reasonable, standard policy of
routinely securing and inventorying the contents of the
impounded vehicle….
In determining whether a proper inventory search has occurred,
the first inquiry is whether the police have lawfully impounded
the automobile, i.e., have lawful custody of the automobile. The
authority of the police to impound vehicles derives from the
police’s reasonable community care-taking functions. Such
functions include removing disabled or damaged vehicles from
the highway, impounding automobiles which violate parking
ordinances (thereby jeopardizing public safety and efficient
traffic flow), and protecting the community’s safety.
The second inquiry is whether the police have conducted a
reasonable inventory search. An inventory search is reasonable
if it is conducted pursuant to reasonable standard police
procedures and in good faith and not for the sole purpose of
investigation. Said another way, the inventory search must be
pursuant to reasonable police procedures, and conducted in good
faith and not as a substitute for a warrantless investigatory
search.
Id. at 254-255 (internal citations, quotations and footnotes omitted).
In the present case, the testimony from the June 26, 2013,
suppression hearing reveals that on October 30, 2010, police stopped
Palyani for a Motor Vehicle Code violation, in which the defendant was
stopped in the oncoming traffic lane. N.T., 6/26/2013, at 100. At the time
of the stop, Palyani pulled the car onto the shoulder of Street Road in
Bensalem Township, Bucks County. Id. at 26. Sergeant Rihl testified that
both Palyani and his passenger were being taken into custody following the
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vehicle stop. With respect to the passenger, he was taken into custody
because he had a warrant for his arrest. Id. at 38. With regard to Palyani,
Sergeant Rihl stated that based on his observations of the defendant and the
field sobriety tests, he “made the determination in [his] opinion [that
Palyani] was unsafe to operate a motor vehicle[.]” Id. at 46. The sergeant
then placed Palyani under arrest for suspicion of DUI. Sergeant Rihl testified
that he was conducting an inventory search because “both of them were
under arrest and [he] can’t leave their vehicle abandoned on the highway.”
Id. at 50.
The Bensalem Township Police Department’s (BTPD) “Procedural Field
Directive #2-14,” provides, in pertinent part:
F. Removing Vehicles from the Roadway
1. Officers will have vehicles removed from the highway when
they create substantial hazard to motorists. The on-call tow
service will be contacted by the Bucks County Police Radio. The
vehicle will be taken to the on duty tow service secured facility.
2. In the event that the removed vehicle is of investigative
importance or physical evidence, it will be taken to a secured
designated location.
3. Officers … in the event that they direct the removal of a
vehicle will complete a vehicle-impoundment report and incident
report. All vehicles secured by officers will be inventoried and an
inventory report completed.
4. Officers will attempt to make contact with the last registered
owner to advise the owner that his vehicle has been removed.
Exhibit CS-5, “Procedural Field Directive #2-14 Traffic Ancillary Services,”
1/31/1997, at 5-6. It was uncontested that there was no safe place on the
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highway to leave the vehicle. N.T., 6/26/2013, at 66. During the inventory
search, Officer Moore told Sergeant Rihl that Palyania has informed him
there may be a needle on the floor or in the door. Id. During his search,
Sergeant Rihl discovered two syringes and a glassine baggie with residue in
it. Id. at 57.
Based on the evidence, the court found the following:
This car … was truly inventoried, as noted on the vehicle
impound and inventory record, it was towed by Bakers Towing
and it was towed to Bakers. So, the towing company had total
control of the vehicle after it was towed from the highway. The
only thing[s] seized here were the GPS, cell phone, the
sunglasses, the cleaning supplies, the battery cables and the
trash that was seized, all after the officer seized the controlled
substances and the paraphernalia that were related to them. I
meant to make that shorter, but I do think that this is the proper
inquiry and not just the DUI.
Id. at 133.
In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the court further opined:
At the suppression hearing, we found the search was a valid
inventory search in keeping with [BTPD’s] written policy
concerning inventory searches.
…
Both the Googles Maps depicting the area in which the
vehicle was stopped as well as the footage from Sergeant Rihl
and Officer Moore’s patrol vehicles demonstrates that in this
particular area vehicles are numerous and traffic is constant, as
there were cars lining up at the nearby traffic lights even in the
middle of the day. Furthermore, Sergeant Rihl explained that if
left on the side of the road, someone could “steal” or “break
into” the vehicle and, additionally, it presented a hazard to
motorists as it would be left on the shoulder of the road next to
the right travel lane without its lights on. Therefore, the only
safe course of action was to order the vehicle be towed, as under
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the BTPD inventory policy where the location of a vehicle creates
a “substantial hazard to motorists,” the officer is to direct Bucks
County Radio to contact the on-call tow service. At this point,
Officer Moore did in fact direct a duty tow to their location.
With regard to the second requirement, Sergeant Rihl
explained that he was familiar with his department’s inventory
policy, and identified the relevant sections from said policy. In
addition, Sergeant Rihl explained that because both occupants
were under arrest and the vehicle was seized, the policy dictates
that an inventory search of the vehicle for valuables is to be
conducted. Sergeant Rihl also completed an inventory form
after searching the vehicle, as is required by the policy. During
the search, he located two syringes, one in the driver’s side
pocket and the other on the backseat, as well as a small plastic
baggie on the passenger side floor, all containing heroin and/or
cocaine residue. There is no indication that the inventory policy
of the Bensalem Township Police Department in place at the time
of the stop was unreasonable.
We concluded, therefore, that Sergeant Rihl had lawful
custody of the vehicle and his inventory of personal items
therein was a valid search without warrant.
Trial Court Opinion, 9/4/2013, at 7-8, 9-10.
We discern no error in the trial court’s conclusion. The first inquiry is
whether the police have lawfully impounded the automobile. See
Hennigan, 753 A.2d at 255. Here, the police took lawful custody of the
vehicle at issue as both the driver and passenger were arrested, and
therefore, there was no one available to drive the vehicle. Indeed, the
police’s impoundment of the vehicle was based on protecting the
community’s safety. Moreover, the second inquiry is whether the police
have conducted a reasonable inventory search. Id. An inventory search is
“reasonable if it is conducted pursuant to reasonable standard police
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procedures and in good faith and not for the sole purpose of investigation.”
Id. Contrary to Palyani’s argument, that Sergeant Rihl’s motive in searching
the interior of the vehicle was to further an investigatory purpose because
he had received information about contraband in the car, we note that
Sergeant Rihl had already initiated the inventory search prior to receiving
that information. As indicated by the court, he properly conducted the
search in accordance with BTPD’s Procedural Field Directive #2-14 because
both men were being taken into custody. Furthermore, it bears mentioning
the BTPD’s inventory search policy only requires the police officer attempt to
make contact with the last registered owner to advise the owner that his or
her vehicle had been removed. The policy does not require the property
owner be given an opportunity to determine how the car should be secured,
as contended by Palyani.
Moreover, we note Palyani relies on Commonwealth v. Germann,
621 A.2d 589 (Pa. Super. 1993), to support his argument. In Germann, a
panel of this Court held the police conducted an improper inventory search
based on a vehicle’s bearing fraudulent inspection validation stickers and the
vehicle’s poor condition. Germann is distinguishable from the present
matter because in that case, this Court determined there was no justification
for towing the vehicle, and there was no evidence that the vehicle at issue
was obstructing traffic or otherwise creating a safety hazard. In the case
sub judice, there was justification for towing the vehicle and there was
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evidence that the car created a safety hazard. As such, we conclude the
police had lawful custody of Palyani’s vehicle and conducted a reasonable
inventory search pursuant to the inventory search exception to the warrant
requirement. Accordingly, there is no basis upon which to disturb the court’s
ruling that denied Palyani’s suppression motion. Therefore, his first
argument fails.
In his second argument, Palyani claims there was insufficient evidence
to support his convictions for possession of a controlled substance and
possession of drug paraphernalia. Palyani’s Brief at 12. Specifically, he
asserts that because his incriminating statements made to police were
suppressed, there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s finding
that he constructively possessed the items seized from the vehicle because
the facts did not establish that he had the power/ability to control the
contraband and the intent to exercise that control. Id. at 12-13. Palyani
states there was no evidence as to how long he was in control of the vehicle
“[n]or was the incriminating evidence found in areas of the car which the
driver would be expected to be aware of.” Id. at 13. Likewise, he argues
“[n]o furtive movements or other suspicious actions were observed that
might suggest that [he] had any physical connection to any of the evidence
prior to the time he was taken out of the vehicle, which he did not own.” Id.
Our review of a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is well-
settled:
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A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence presents a
question of law. Commonwealth v. Widmer, 560 Pa. 308,
744 A.2d 745, 751 (2000). We must determine “whether the
evidence is sufficient to prove every element of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Hughes, 521
Pa. 423, 555 A.2d 1264, 1267 (1989). We “must view evidence
in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict
winner, and accept as true all evidence and all reasonable
inferences therefrom upon which, if believed, the fact finder
properly could have based its verdict.” Id.Our Supreme Court has instructed:
[T]he facts and circumstances established by the
Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of
innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may
be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so
weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no
probability of fact may be drawn from the combined
circumstances. Moreover, in applying the above test, the
entire record must be evaluated and all evidence actually
received must be considered. Finally, the trier of fact
while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the
weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part
or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Ratsamy, 594 Pa. 176, 934 A.2d 1233,
1236 n. 2 (2007).
Commonwealth v. Thomas, 65 A.3d 939, 943 (Pa. Super. 2013).
A person is guilty of possession of a controlled substance if he
“[k]nowingly or intentionally possess[es] a controlled or counterfeit
substance[.]” 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16). A person is guilty of possession of
drug paraphernalia if he engages in the “use of, or possession with intent to
use, drug paraphernalia for the purpose of planting, propagating, cultivating,
growing, harvesting, manufacturing, compounding, converting, producing,
processing, preparing, testing, analyzing, packing, repacking, storing,
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containing, concealing, injecting, ingesting, inhaling or otherwise introducing
into the human body a controlled substance in violation of this act.” 35 P.S.
§ 780-113(a)(32).
When a prohibited item is not discovered on a defendant’s person, or
in their actual possession, as is the case here, the Commonwealth may
prove the defendant had constructive possession of the item.
Constructive possession is a legal fiction, a pragmatic
construct to deal with the realities of criminal law
enforcement. Constructive possession is an inference
arising from a set of facts that possession of the
contraband was more likely than not. We have defined
constructive possession as conscious dominion. We
subsequently defined conscious dominion as the power to
control the contraband and the intent to exercise that
control. To aid application, we have held that constructive
possession may be established by the totality of the
circumstances.
Commonwealth v. Brown, 48 A.3d 426, 430 (Pa.
Super.2012), appeal denied, [] 63 A.3d 1243 (2013) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Additionally, it is possible
for two people to have joint constructive possession of an item of
contraband. Commonwealth v. Sanes, 955 A.2d 369, 373
(Pa. Super. 2008), appeal denied, 601 Pa. 696, 972 A.2d 521(2009).
Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 67 A.3d 817, 820-821 (Pa. Super. 2013),
appeal denied, 78 A.3d 1090 (Pa. 2013). “An intent to maintain a conscious
dominion may be inferred from the totality of the circumstances, and
circumstantial evidence may be used to establish a defendant’s possession
of drugs or contraband.” Commonwealth v. Harvard, 64 A.3d 690, 699
(Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 77 A.3d 636 (Pa. 2013).
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Here, the trial court found the following:
In this case, we noted that [Palyani] was the operator of the
motor vehicle in which the controlled substance(s) and
paraphernalia were located and there was only one other
passenger present in the vehicle. During an inventory search of
said vehicle after [Palyani] was taken into custody, Sergeant
Michael Rihl, the investigating officer, located “two syringe
needles and a baggie commonly used to package controlled
substances.” Further, he testified that one syringe was located
in the driver’s door pocket, the other syringe was located on the
backseat, and the baggie was “recovered from the passenger’s
floor.” Furthermore, there was no testimony indicating or
explaining that any third party had the ability to exercise any
control or dominion over the syringes.
Accordingly, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, we
believe that there exists sufficient evidence to find [Palyani]
guilty of Possession of a Controlled Substance and Possession of
Drug Paraphernalia.
Trial Court Opinion, 9/4/2013, at 12-13 (record citations omitted).
Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, and drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom, we agree
with the trial court’s determination. Palyani attempts to argue that because
there was no evidence indicating how long he was in control of the vehicle or
any furtive movements on his part, there was insufficient evidence to
connect him to the contraband. However, this argument ignores the fact
that one syringe was found in the driver’s door pocket, the other was
found on the backseat, and a baggie was found on the passenger-side floor.
Sergeant Rihl, an experienced police officer trained in drug matters, opined
that the items were consistent with drug use and drug paraphernalia. N.T.,
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4/26/2012, at 57-58. Given the testimony as set forth by the trial court, a
permissible inference could be made that the syringes and baggie at issue
belonged to Palyani and he had the “ability” and “intent” to exercise control
or dominion over the contraband found next to the bag. See Hopkins, 67
A.3d at 820-821. Therefore, we conclude the Commonwealth presented
sufficient circumstantial evidence from which the trial court could reasonably
infer that Palyani constructively possessed the contraband. Accordingly, his
second argument also fails, and we affirm the judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/1/2014
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