Com. v. Gurung, S.

J-S30030-20
2020 Pa. Super. 226
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
SUJAN GURUNG : No. 1872 WDA 2019
Appeal from the Order Entered December 4, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Criminal Division at No(s):
CP-25-CR-0001960-2019
BEFORE: MURRAY, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
OPINION BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 17, 2020
The Commonwealth appeals from the order granting the motion to
suppress filed by Sujan Gurung. The Commonwealth argues that the police
had probable cause to stop Gurung’s vehicle when Gurung failed to use a turn
signal before moving from one lane of traffic to another. We agree and
therefore reverse the order of the suppression court and remand for further
proceedings.
Pennsylvania State Police stopped Gurung’s vehicle on March 28, 2019,
in Summit Township, Erie, Pennsylvania. Thereafter, Gurung was ultimately
charged with Driving under the Influence of Alcohol (General Impairment),
Driving under the Influence of Alcohol (High Rate of Alcohol) and the summary
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S30030-20
offenses of Turning Movements and Required Signals, Careless Driving, and
Unlawful Activities.1
Prior to trial, on October 7, 2019, Gurung filed the suppression motion.
Gurung claimed that the police lacked reasonable suspicion or probable cause
to stop his vehicle and therefore the court should suppress all evidence
emanating from the stop. The suppression court conducted an evidentiary
hearing at which Pennsylvania State Police Trooper Nathan Hartless testified
regarding his stop of Gurung’s vehicle.
Trooper Hartless explained that on the night in question, the Presque
Isle Downs Casino had placed a call to police barracks stating Gurung and two
others were intoxicated and had recently left the premises, and gave a
description of their vehicle. N.T. 12/4/19, at 5. Trooper Hartless spotted a
vehicle resembling the one the casino had reported – later identified as
Gurung’s vehicle – and followed it on Interstate 90 westbound. Id. at 5-6. The
Trooper testified that he observed Gurung twice fail to activate his turn signal
when changing lanes on an off-ramp. Id. at 6-8. First, Trooper Hartless saw
Gurung move from the left lane to the right without a turn signal and then the
Trooper observed Gurung move from the center lane to the right lane without
a signal when the ramp widened. Id. The Trooper did acknowledge that
Gurung activated his turn signal when he made a right-hand turn at the end
of the exit ramp. Id.
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1 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3802(a)(1), 3802(b), 3334(a), 3714(a), and 4107(b)(2),
respectively.
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Trooper Hartless stated that he believed he had probable cause to stop
Gurung under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3334 (Turning Movements and Required Signals)
because Gurung did not use a turn signal when changing lanes. Id. He did
confirm that other than Gurung’s failure to activate his turn signal, Gurung
changed lanes safely.2 Id. at 13-14. Hence, the Trooper admitted that the
only basis he had to stop Gurung was his violation of Section 3334. Id. at 15-
16.
At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, Gurung argued that the
plain wording of Section 3334 does not require drivers to activate a turn signal
when changing lanes of traffic, as long as the driver can make the change
safely. Id. at 19-24. The suppression court agreed. It thus found that the
Commonwealth had failed to establish that Trooper Hartless had probable
cause to stop Gurung, and granted the motion. Id. at 31-32. The
Commonwealth filed the instant timely appeal and certified that the
suppression order would “terminate or substantially handicap the
prosecution.” Notice of Appeal, filed Dec. 4, 2019. The Commonwealth and
the suppression court both complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
The Commonwealth raises the following issues for our review:3
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2 A mobile video recording (MVR), as recorded from Trooper Hartless’s police
cruiser, confirmed the Trooper’s testimony.
3The suppression court concludes that the Commonwealth waived its issues
on appeal by finding that the Commonwealth’s Rule 1925(b) statement lacked
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1. Did the arresting Pennsylvania State Police Trooper
possess reasonable suspicion and/or probable cause to
believe that [Gurung] had committed a violation of the
Motor Vehicle Code, and was he, therefore, justified in
executing a traffic stop of [Gurung’s] vehicle?
2. Did the lower court abuse its discretion in granting
[Gurung’s] [suppression motion]?
Commonwealth’s Br. at 4.
The Commonwealth’s issues on appeal are intertwined and therefore we
will address them together. The root of the Commonwealth’s claims lies in its
contention that the suppression court erred by construing 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3334
as not requiring drivers to employ a turn signal when changing traffic lanes.
Thus, the Commonwealth asserts, Trooper Hartless had probable cause to
stop Gurung’s vehicle because he failed to use his turn signal when changing
lanes. Therefore, according to the Commonwealth, the suppression court
erred by granting Gurung’s suppression motion. We agree.
We apply the following standard of review to orders granting motions to
suppress:
[We] consider only the evidence from the defendant’s
witnesses together with the evidence of the prosecution
that, when read in the context of the entire record, remains
uncontradicted. The suppression court’s findings of fact bind
an appellate court if the record supports those findings. The
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detail and the court was unable to discern the issue. The issue the
Commonwealth presented in its Rule 1925(b) statement was: “The Honorable
Trial Court erred in granting the defendant’s Motion to Suppress. The arresting
officer possessed reasonable suspicion and/or probable cause to believe that
the defendant had committed a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code, and was
justified in executing a traffic stop of the defendant’s vehicle.” This was
sufficiently clear under the circumstances, and we decline to find waiver.
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suppression court’s conclusions of law, however, are not
binding on an appellate court, whose duty is to determine if
the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts.
Commonwealth v. Newsome, 170 A.3d 1151, 1153-54 (Pa.Super. 2017)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Korn, 139 A.3d 249, 253-54 (Pa.Super. 2016)).
We therefore apply a de novo review over the suppression court’s legal
conclusions. Id. at 1154 (quoting Korn, 139 A.3d at 253).
Where a traffic stop is “based on the observed violation of the Vehicle
Code or [an] otherwise non-investigable offense, an officer must have
probable cause to make a constitutional vehicle stop.” Commonwealth v.
Harris, 176 A.3d 1009, 1019 (Pa.Super. 2017) (citing Commonwealth v.
Feczko, 10 A.3d 1285, 1291 (Pa.Super. 2010) (en banc)). “[A] police officer
has probable cause to stop a motor vehicle if the officer observes a traffic code
violation, even if it is a minor offense.” Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Chase,
960 A.2d 108 (Pa. 2008)).
Here, the traffic stop was based on a failure to use a turn signal and,
therefore, the officer properly needed probable cause to effectuate the stop.
Commonwealth v. Brown, 64 A.3d 1101, 1105 (Pa.Super. 2013) (finding
probable cause needed where driver stopped for failing to use turn signal).
The suppression court interpreted the Vehicle Code and determined that
Trooper Hartless lacked probable cause to stop Gurung’s vehicle because
Gurung’s failure to use a turn signal did not violate Section 3334. That section
provides:
(a) General rule.--Upon a roadway no person shall turn a vehicle
or move from one traffic lane to another or enter the traffic stream
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from a parked position unless and until the movement can be
made with reasonable safety nor without giving an appropriate
signal in the manner provided in this section.
(b) Signals on turning and starting.--At speeds of less than
35 miles per hour, an appropriate signal of intention to turn right
or left shall be given continuously during not less than the last
100 feet traveled by the vehicle before turning. The signal shall
be given during not less than the last 300 feet at speeds in excess
of 35 miles per hour. The signal shall also be given prior to entry
of the vehicle into the traffic stream from a parked position.
(c) Limitations on use of certain signals.--The signals
required on vehicles by section 3335(b) (relating to signals by
hand and arm or signal lamps) shall not be flashed on one side
only on a disabled vehicle, flashed as a courtesy or “do pass”
signal to operators of other vehicles approaching from the rear,
nor be flashed on one side only of a parked vehicle except as may.
be necessary for compliance with this section.
(d) Discontinuing turn signals.--Turn signals shall be
discontinued immediately after completing the turn or movement
from one traffic lane to another traffic lane.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3334.
When interpreting a statute, we apply the principles set forth in the
Statutory Construction Act, including the “maxim that the object of statutory
construction is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent.”
Commonwealth v. Shiffler, 879 A.2d 185, 189 (Pa. 2005) (citing 1
Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(a)). “When the words of a statute are clear and free from
all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of
pursuing its spirit.” 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(b). Further, “[a]s a general rule, the
best indication of legislative intent is the plain language of a statute.” Shiffler,
879 A.2d at 189 (citation omitted). However, “in ascertaining the General
Assembly's intent, we may presume that the General Assembly does not
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intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable.”
Commonwealth v. Diamond, 945 A.2d 252, 256 (Pa.Super. 2008) (citing 1
Pa.C.S.A. § 1922(1)).
Courts are to presume “that the General Assembly intends the entire
statute to be effective and certain.” 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1922(2). To that end,
“[c]ourts must read and evaluate each section of a statute in the context of,
and with reference to, the other sections of the statute. . . .” Commonwealth
v. Boyles, 104 A.3d 591, 594 (Pa.Super. 2014). We thus start our analysis
from the premise “that the legislature placed every word, sentence and
provision in the statute for some purpose,” and if we can reconcile seemingly
inconsistent provisions, we must do so. Commonwealth v. Morris, 958 A.2d
569, 579 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc).
In the case sub judice, the rules of statutory construction lead us to
conclude that 75 Pa.C.S.A. §3334 requires drivers to use a turn signal when
moving from one lane of traffic to another. Subsection 3334(a) provides that
“no person shall . . . move from one traffic lane to another . . . unless and
until the movement can be made with reasonable safety nor without giving an
appropriate signal in the manner provided in this section.” This plain language
indicates that drivers may only move from one lane of traffic to another if the
driver both can make the movement safely and has given an appropriate
signal. See Shiffler, 879 A.2d at 189.
The suppression court and Gurung contend that the final phrase in the
quoted portion, “in the manner provided in this section,” undermines our
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conclusion. They contend that subsection 3334(b) is the portion of “this
section” (i.e., Section 3334) where “the manner” of using a signal is
“provided.” They point out that subsection 3334(b) does not mention using a
turn signal when changing lanes, but rather only sets the timing for signaling
before making a turn and requires a signal when moving “from a parked
position.”
This line of reasoning violates the Statutory Construction Act and is
untenable. Perhaps the most significant flaw is that it reads the phrase, “move
from one traffic lane to another” out of subsection 3334(a). That we cannot
do. Rather, we must give effect to all provisions of the statute. See 1 Pa.C.S.A.
1922(2). We therefore read the portion of subsection 3334(a) requiring
signals “in the manner provided in this section” merely indicates that other
portions of Section 3334, such as subsection 3334(b), set forth additional
specifics regarding the use of the signal, where appropriate. See Shiffler, 879
A.2d at 189. Otherwise, we are left with the absurd conclusion that the
General Assembly placed the words “moving from one traffic lane to another”
in subsection 3334(a) for no reason at all.
Indeed, reading Section 3334 as a whole supports the conclusion that
the requirement to use a turn signal applies to changing lanes of traffic, as
other portions of Section 3334 would be read into nothingness if we follow
Gurang’s line of reasoning. Of note, subsection 3334(d) requires “[t]urn
signals shall be discontinued immediately after completing . . . movement
from one traffic lane to another traffic lane.” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3334(d). If drivers
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were not required to employ a signal to move from one lane of traffic to
another, subsection 3334(d) would be superfluous. See Boyles, 104 A.3d at
594.
Gurang’s citation to this Court’s decision in Commonwealth v.
Slattery, 139 A.3d 221, 224 (Pa.Super. 2016), is inapposite. There, this Court
concluded that the police officer in question did not have probable cause to
stop a defendant’s car when the defendant had activated his turn signal less
than 100 feet before changing lanes. Id. The Court emphasized that while
subsection 3334(b) requires a driver to use a signal 100 feet before turning,
it does not set forth any distance that a driver must signal before changing
lanes. Id. That conclusion in no way contradicts our holding in this case. Here,
the officer did not stop Gurung because he turned on his signal less than 100
feet before turning. Rather, Gurung did not activate his turn signal at all prior
to changing traffic lanes.
Moreover, in Slattery we did not hold that subsection 3334(a) does not
require drivers who are changing lanes to use a turn signal. In fact,
Pennsylvania courts have long held the opposite. See Sollinger v. Himchak,
166 A.2d 531, 533-34 (Pa. 1961) (holding “[o]ne does not have the absolute
right to turn into or cross another lane of traffic and may do so only after
signaling an intention so to do and first having reasonably assured himself
that, by his so doing, others using the highway will not be placed in danger of
injury”); Commonwealth v. Spieler, 887 A.2d 1271, 1275 (Pa.Super. 2005)
(holding lower court properly denied a suppression motion where officer had
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probable cause to stop the appellant because appellant changed lanes several
times without using appropriate signals, in violation of Section 3334).
Accordingly, the suppression court thus erred in determining that Trooper
Hartless did not have probable cause to stop Gurung’s vehicle, and we reverse
the suppression order.
Order reversed. Case Remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/17/2020
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