Com. v. Brawley, M.

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
PENNSYLVANIA : OF PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
v. :
:
MARK BRAWLEY
No. 2869 EDA 2019
Appellant
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 20, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Criminal Division
at No(s): CP-45-CR-0002612-2017
BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., KING, J., and McCAFFERY, J.
MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED: MARCH 19, 2021
Mark Brawley appeals the judgment of sentence imposed following his
convictions for simple assault, recklessly endangering another person
(“REAP”), and the summary offense of harassment.1 We affirm.
On October 11, 2017, while on probation in two prior cases, Brawley
was involved in an incident at the home of his employer (“the victim”), who is
the owner of a landscaping business. On the day of the incident, Brawley
reported to the victim’s house to load a truck with materials for a landscaping
job. A verbal dispute erupted. The dispute escalated and became physical
when Brawley threw a log at the victim, striking him in the face. Brawley also
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1
See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2701(a)(1), 2705, 2709(a).
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struck the victim with a shovel. The victim sustained facial fractures, swelling,
and bleeding.
The trial court summarized the relevant procedural history that
followed:
[Brawley] was arrested and charged with aggravated
assault [circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to
the value of human life], . . . simple assault, . . . a
misdemeanor of the second degree; REAP, . . . a
misdemeanor of the second degree; and harassment . . ..
Later, a count of aggravated assault [use of a deadly
weapon] . . . was added.
***
On May 8, 2018, a jury was selected. [During voir
dire, there was some confusion regarding juror No. 21, who
indicated that he had significant mental health issues for
which he was on medication, and had prior dealings with the
police which prevented him from being fair and impartial.
The Commonwealth mistakenly believed that juror No. 21
had been excused for cause. Accordingly, when juror No.
21 was thereafter seated, the Commonwealth moved for a
mistrial. Defense counsel objected to that motion. The trial
court then denied the motion for mistrial.] . . . The
evidentiary portion of [Brawley’s] trial began on May 29,
2018. The Commonwealth called the victim, his wife,
several other witnesses, including police officers, and
submitted 24 exhibits, including photographs of the shovel
and log used by [Brawley] in the assault. [Brawley]
testified, called another witness, and submitted an exhibit.
[Brawley] asserted that the victim initiated a series of
aggressive actions against him and that he acted in self-
defense.
The next day, the jury convicted [Brawley] of simple
assault and REAP, acquitted him of aggravated assault
[circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the
value of human life], and was unable to reach a verdict on
aggravated assault [use of deadly weapon]. [The trial
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court] found [Brawley] guilty of [the summary offense of]
harassment.
***
[At the] July 20, 2018, . . . sentencing hearing . . .
[defense counsel] also argued that the REAP and simple
assault convictions merged for sentencing purposes . . ..
The victim addressed the court and indicated that he
was lucky not to be blind. The assistant district attorney
then argued that . . . simple assault and REAP do not merge.
He asked for consecutive sentences of 9 to 18 months on
each count. . . ..
At the conclusion of the hearing, [the trial court]
sentenced [Brawley] to concurrent, standard range
sentences of 8 to 16 months’ incarceration, plus 8 months
of consecutive probation, on the simple assault and REAP
convictions. [No sentence was imposed on the summary
harassment conviction.] . . ..
On July 30, 2018, [Brawley] timely filed a multi-count
post-sentence motion. In the motion, . . . [Brawley] alleged
that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the
convictions, asserted that the convictions were against the
weight of the evidence, . . . and claimed that the court
abused its discretion in striking a juror for cause after voir
dire had been completed but before the selected jurors had
been formally seated.
[The trial court] did not rule on [Brawley’s] post-
sentence motion within 120 days. Accordingly, on
November 27, 2018, the motion was deemed denied under
Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(3)(a). However, the Clerk of Courts
did not enter a deemed denial order pursuant to Rule
720(B)(3)(c).
***
On September 24, 2019, a hearing was convened . .
.. During the hearing, procedural and jurisdictional issues
relating to the deemed denial, the fact that no order
commemorating the deemed denial was entered of record
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or served, and the overall passage of time were discussed.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the [trial court] issued an
order finding that [Brawley’s] post-sentence motion had
been deemed denied, directing the clerk of courts to enter
and serve the order, and continuing bail pending appeal
conditioned on [Brawley] filing a timely appeal.
[Brawley] then filed the instant appeal. Since the
appeal was timely filed in accordance with the September
24, 2019 order, [Brawley] remains on bail pending appeal.
[Both Brawley and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P.
1925.]
Trial Court Opinion, 12/23/19, at 1-5 (footnotes, references to the record, and
unnecessary capitalization omitted).
Brawley raises the following issues for our review:
1. Did the court abuse its discretion by not granting [the]
motion for new trial after it removed a juror at the
request of the Commonwealth after jury selection was
completed?
2. Did the court abuse its discretion by failing to merge the
convictions for sentencing purposes?
3. Did the court abuse its discretion by not entering a
judgment of acquittal as to [REAP], where there was
insufficient evidence to show [Brawley] placed another
person in danger of death or serious bodily injury by
acting in self-defense when throwing a log in the
direction of another person?
4. Did the court abuse its discretion by not entering a
judgment of acquittal as to . . . simple assault, where
there was insufficient evidence to convict on as there was
insufficient evidence to show [Brawley] attempted to do
bodily harm where he was acting in self-defense when
throwing a log in the direction of another person?
5. Did the court abuse its discretion by not entering a
judgment of acquittal as to [REAP], where the conviction
goes against the weight of the evidence when there was
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evidence [Brawley] was acting in self-defense and no
evidence the person was in danger of death or serious
bodily injury?
6. Did the court abuse its discretion by not entering a
judgment of acquittal as to . . . simple assault, where the
conviction goes against the weight of the evidence to
convict when there was evidence [Brawley] was acting in
self-defense?
7. Did the court abuse its discretion at sentencing when the
court gave [Brawley] a sentence of not less than eight
(8) months to a maximum of sixteen (16) months on
both counts to be run concurrently, where [Brawley]
believes the Court did not take into consideration as a
mitigating factor the amount of time since [Brawley’s]
last conviction for simple assault being over twenty (20)
years ago?
Brawley’s Brief at 7-8 (unnecessary capitalization omitted, issues reordered
for ease of disposition).
In his first issue, Brawley contends that the trial court abused its
discretion by denying the Commonwealth’s motion for mistrial. Our standard
of review of a court’s denial of a request for mistrial is as follows:
A motion for a mistrial is within the discretion of the trial
court. A mistrial upon motion of one of the parties is required only
when an incident is of such a nature that its unavoidable effect is
to deprive the appellant of a fair and impartial trial. It is within
the trial court’s discretion to determine whether a defendant was
prejudiced by the incident that is the basis of a motion for a
mistrial. On appeal, our standard of review is whether the trial
court abused that discretion.
Commonwealth v. Tejeda, 834 A.2d 619, 623 (Pa. Super. 2003) (internal
citations and footnote omitted).
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The Commonwealth’s motion for mistrial arose during the juror voir dire
process. The purpose of voir dire is to empanel a fair and impartial jury. See
Commonwealth v. Craver, 688 A.2d 691, 697 (Pa. 1997). The scope of voir
dire rests in the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed on
appeal in the absence of palpable error. Commonwealth v. Smith, 540 A.2d
246 (Pa. 1988).
In non-capital cases such as the one currently before us, the trial court
is vested with the discretion to select between two methods of voir dire. See
Pa.R.Crim.P. 631. In this case, the trial court opted to use the individual voir
dire and challenge system. Rule 631 directs the procedure for this method,
as follows:
(a) Voir dire of prospective jurors shall be conducted individually
and may be conducted beyond the hearing and presence of other
jurors.
(b) Challenges, both peremptory and for cause, shall be exercised
alternately, beginning with the attorney for the Commonwealth,
until all jurors are chosen. Challenges shall be exercised
immediately after the prospective juror is examined. Once
accepted by all parties, a prospective juror shall not be removed
by peremptory challenge. Without declaring a mistrial, a judge
may allow a challenge for cause at any time before the jury begins
to deliberate, provided sufficient alternates have been selected,
or the defendant consents to be tried by a jury of fewer than 12,
pursuant to Rule 641.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 631(E)(1)(a), (b).
Dismissal for cause and dismissal by peremptory challenge are very
different things. While a peremptory challenge may be exercised for any
reason or no reason at all, a challenge for cause is directed at a prospective
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juror’s ability to serve fairly and impartially. See Commonwealth v. Chmiel,
889 A.2d 501, 518 n.13 (Pa. 2005). There are two types of situations in which
challenges for cause should be granted: (1) when the potential juror has such
a close relationship, be it familial, financial or situational, with parties, counsel,
victims, or witnesses, that the court will presume the likelihood of prejudice;
and (2) when the potential juror’s likelihood of prejudice is exhibited by his
conduct and answers to questions at voir dire. See Commonwealth v.
Colon, 299 A.2d 326, 327 (Pa. Super. 1972). The decision on whether to
disqualify is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be
reversed in the absence of a palpable abuse of discretion. See
Commonwealth v. Black, 376 A.2d 627 (Pa. 1977).
The trial court summarized the events underlying this issue, as follows:
In this case, jury selection was uneventful up through the
point at which jurors had been excused for cause, the parties had
exercised peremptory challenges, and the trial court had begun
seating selected jurors and excusing those who had not been
chosen. At that point, a juror whom the assistant district attorney
(“ADA”) mistakenly believed had been excused was called to be
seated. The ADA brought the matter to the attention of the trial
court. A long, multi-segmented discussion between the Court and
counsel for both parties ensued. See N.T., 5/8/[18], pp. 33-53.
The discussion revealed that the ADA incorrectly marked-up
his list so that he believed prospective juror No. 21 had been
stricken for cause. Because of that error, prospective juror No.
22 rather than 21 was stricken. [The trial court] initially
suggested that the Commonwealth might have to live with its
error. However, when the ADA pointed out that the juror said he
was on serious medications and, further, could not be fair and
impartial due to prior encounters with the police, discussion
ultimately turned to potential remedies.
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The ADA seized on one of the first potential remedies
mentioned, and asked [the trial judge] to declare a mistrial so that
a new jury could be selected. Significantly, [Brawley’s] attorney
objected to that request. Ultimately, believing that the
prospective jury pool, including persons not selected for this case,
had been dismissed, [the trial court] denied the motion.
The ADA then asked that No. 21 be stricken for cause.
Counsel for [Brawley] opposed the request. At that point, it was
learned that the entire prospective jury pool had been excused for
lunch but would be returning. [The trial court] excused the jurors
and alternates who had been chose[n] for this case for lunch and
indicated he would take the Commonwealth’s request under
advisement.
After a break, additional potential remedies were discussed
and the Commonwealth renewed its request to dismiss
prospective juror No. 21. The stated reasons were that during
questioning No. 21 stated he was bipolar with severe swings
between mania and depression, that he was on significant
medications, and that he was prejudiced against the police. In
the end, counsel for [Brawley] did not dispute that No. 21 had
revealed his mental health issues and prejudice. Nonetheless, he
objected to removal of juror No. 21 because the remainder of the
panel was comprised of female jurors and he wanted at least one
male on the jury. [Brawley’s] counsel also generally stated that
if he knew No. 21 was stricken he might have exercised
peremptory challenges differently. He did not, however, expand
on his general assertion, which most likely was intended to mean
that he would have attempted to use his peremptory challenge to
avoid an all-female jury.
Ultimately, [the trial court] excused prospective juror No.
21 for cause and substituted the first alternate . . . based on No.
21’s candid answers about his mental health and prejudice against
the police.
Trial Court Opinion, 12/23/19, at 18-20 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
Brawley claims that the only remedy for the late removal of juror No.
21 was a mistrial. He further argues that he was prejudiced by this late
removal because prospective juror No. 21 was the only male on the panel.
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Brawley claims that defense counsel would have made different choices had
the Commonwealth struck that juror. Brawley additionally claims that the
Commonwealth was, in essence, granted an extra peremptory challenge,
giving it an unfair advantage in the selection process. Brawley maintains that
“[t]he Commonwealth cannot just be able to say after they are done, oops I
made a mistake, and please let me take one more person off.” Brawley’s Brief
at 19.
The trial court considered Brawley’s voir dire issue and concluded that
the issue was waived and, further, that it lacked merit. It reasoned:
Initially, we note that while [Brawley] is now asserting that
“[t]he [c]ourt abuse [sic] its discretion by not granting motion for
new trial after it removed a juror at the request of the
Commonwealth after jury selection was completed,” at the time
the Commonwealth moved for a mistrial when the juror issue first
came to light, [Brawley] objected to the motion. (N.T., 5/8/[18],
pp. 37-39). If [Brawley] had really believed that he was entitled
to or would somehow be prejudiced by an all-female jury, that the
seated jury was not fair and impartial, or that the juror miscue
threw off his other challenges, he could at the time have concurred
with or joined in the Commonwealth’s motion for a mistrial, moved
for a mistrial himself, or agreed with or requested one of the other
options and potential remedies [the trial judge] discussed with the
attorneys. Since [Brawley] objected to the functional equivalent
to the remedy he is now seeking, he waived this assignment of
error.[fn]
_____________________________________________
[fn]
While [the trial court] denied the Commonwealth’s
motion for a mistrial, [it] did so because [it] had
erroneously been informed that the entire jury pool,
including prospective jurors who had not been chosen
for this case, had been dismissed, not because he
determined that a mistrial was not proper remedy.
(N.T., 5/8/[18], p. 39). Indeed, [the trial court]
suggested and was amendable to the mistrial remedy.
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Before the Commonwealth’s motion to excuse
prospective juror No. 21 was granted, the parties and
[the trial court] had been informed that the jury pool
would be returning after lunch. Thus, had [Brawley]
really wanted a new or different jury to hear the case,
he could have had a mistrial.
___________________________________________
Additionally, striking prospective juror No. 21 for cause and
substituting an alternate was well within [the trial court’s]
discretion. In this regard, there is and can be no question that
the answers given by juror No. 21 - severe mental health issues,
significant medications, and prejudice against police - merited the
juror’s disqualification, even though the challenge was raised and
granted out of the typical order. As discussed, the purpose of voir
dire is to empanel a fair and impartial jury. Once other options
were explored and rejected or objected to, if prospective juror No.
21 was not stricken, a fair and impartial jury simply would not
have been empaneled.
Trial Court Opinion, 12/23/19, at 22-23 (emphasis in original, additional
footnote omitted)
Here, Brawley never moved for a mistrial. Although he objected to the
Commonwealth’s renewed motion to disqualify juror no. 21 for cause, Brawley
never requested a mistrial upon the trial court’s ruling to grant that motion.
See N.T., 5/8/18, at 47-48. Indeed, after the trial court excused juror No. 21
for cause and seated the first alternate juror, Brawley’s counsel did not raise
any further objection or make any motion regarding that ruling, even when
asked by the trial court if there was anything further that counsel wished to
bring to the court’s attention. See id. at 50-52. As noted by the trial court,
Brawley also objected to the Commonwealth’s earlier motion for mistrial.
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Thus, having failed to move for a mistrial in the court below, Brawley cannot
now fault the trial court for not granting him one.
Moreover, we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court in excusing
juror No. 21 for cause based on his candid admission of mental health issues,
significant medication, and bias toward police. While Brawley attempts to
characterize the dismissal of juror No. 21 as an additional and belated
peremptory challenge exercised by the Commonwealth, the record makes
clear that juror No. 21 was excused for cause in accordance with Pa.R.Crim.P.
631(E)(1)(b), which permits the removal of any juror for cause up until the
time the jury begins to deliberate so long as sufficient alternates have been
selected. Here, the jury had not begun deliberations and sufficient alternates
had been selected and agreed to by the parties. As such, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in excusing juror No. 21 for cause and seating the first
alternate juror. Accordingly, Brawley’s first issue merits no relief.
In his second issue, Brawley contends that the trial court erred in failing
to merge his sentences for REAP and simple assault, and that such error
requires this Court to vacate his judgment of sentence and remand for
resentencing.
Whether Brawley’s convictions merge for the purposes of sentencing is
a question implicating the legality of his sentence. See Commonwealth v.
Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1248 (Pa. Super. 2014). Consequently, our standard
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of review is de novo and the scope of our review is plenary. See id. (citing
Commonwealth v. Collins, 764 A.2d 1056, 1057 n.1 (Pa. 2001)).
The legislature has provided that:
No crimes shall merge for sentencing purposes unless the
crimes arise from a single criminal act and all of the statutory
elements of one offense are included in the statutory elements of
the other offense. Where crimes merge for sentencing purposes,
the court may sentence the defendant only on the higher graded
offense.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9765. Thus, merger is prohibited unless two distinct facts are
present: (1) the crimes arise from a single criminal act; and (2) all of the
statutory elements of one of the offenses are included in the statutory
elements of the other. See Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 985 A.2d 830, 833
(Pa. 2009).
The crime of REAP is committed when a person “recklessly engages in
conduct which places or may place another person in danger of death or
serious bodily injury.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705. Serious bodily injury means
bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious,
permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of
any bodily member or organ. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2301.
A person commits the crime of simple assault if he attempts to cause or
intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another. See 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a)(1). An attempt occurs when, with intent to commit a
specific crime, the person does any act which constitutes a substantial step
toward the commission of that crime. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 901. Bodily injury
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means impairment of physical condition or substantial pain. See 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2301.
The trial court determined that, although the crimes arose from the
same criminal episode, “the elements of the two crimes are different[,] . . .
designed to prohibit different wrongs and harms[, and do] not merge for
sentencing purposes. Trial Court Opinion, 12/23/19, at 12.2
Prior to the enactment of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9765, this Court provided
inconsistent rulings on whether convictions for REAP and simple assault
merged for sentencing purposes. See e.g., Commonwealth v. Berrena,
617 A.2d 1278, 1280 (Pa. Super. 1992) (holding that simple assault and REAP
merged); cf Commonwealth v. Gouse, 429 A.2d 1129, 1133 (Pa. Super.
1981) (holding that simple assault is not a lesser-included offense of REAP).
Following the enactment of § 9765, however, this Court has concluded
that simple assault is not a lesser-included offense of REAP, and the two
crimes do not merge for sentencing purposes. See Commonwealth v.
Calhoun, 52 A.3d 281, 286 (Pa. Super. 2012), appeal denied, 67 A.3d 793(Pa. 2013) (holding that, whereas the simple assault statute requires bodily
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2
Alternatively, the trial court concluded that, because it imposed the same
sentence for each offense and ordered the sentences to run concurrently,
“[Brawley] was not prejudiced to the point that any relief or remedy would be
warranted since even if the offenses should have merged he will not spend
any more time in jail, on probation, or on parole.” Trial Court Opinion,
12/23/19, at 12.
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injury or the attempt to cause bodily injury, the REAP statute contemplates “a
crime of assault which requires the creation of danger” of serious bodily injury
or death). As the crimes of simple assault and REAP do not merge for
sentencing purposes, Brawley’s second issue merits no relief.
In his third and fourth issues, Brawley challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting his convictions for REAP and simple assault. In reviewing
a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, our standard of review is as
follows:
As a general matter, our standard of review of sufficiency
claims requires that we evaluate the record in the light most
favorable to the verdict winner giving the prosecution the benefit
of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.
Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict when it
establishes each material element of the crime charged and the
commission thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt.
Nevertheless, the Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a
mathematical certainty. Any doubt about the defendant’s guilt is
to be resolved by the fact finder unless the evidence is so weak
and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact
can be drawn from the combined circumstances.
The Commonwealth may sustain its burden by means of
wholly circumstantial evidence. Accordingly, [t]he fact that the
evidence establishing a defendant’s participation in a crime is
circumstantial does not preclude a conviction where the evidence
coupled with the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom
overcomes the presumption of innocence. Significantly, we may
not substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder; thus, so
long as the evidence adduced, accepted in the light most favorable
to the Commonwealth, demonstrates the respective elements of
a defendant’s crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, the appellant’s
convictions will be upheld.
Commonwealth v. Franklin, 69 A.3d 719, 722-23 (Pa. Super. 2013)
(internal quotations and citations omitted). Importantly, “the jury, which
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passes upon the weight and credibility of each witness’s testimony, is free to
believe all, part, or none of the evidence.” Commonwealth v. Ramtahal,
33 A.3d 602, 607 (Pa. 2011).
Brawley contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his REAP
conviction because there was no serious bodily injury and no reasonable
inferences to be drawn from the evidence that would lead one to believe
Brawley placed the victim in danger of death or serious bodily injury. He
claims “it is complete speculation that the intent was to cause death or serious
bodily injury.” Brawley’s Brief at 23-24. He further argues that, if the jury
acquitted on the charge of aggravated assault (circumstances manifesting
extreme indifference to the value of human life), then it cannot find REAP
because that charge has the same element of serious bodily injury or death.
Lastly, Brawley argues that because he raised a claim of self-defense, the
burden was on the Commonwealth to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
his actions were not justifiable self-defense. Brawley points to his own
testimony that the victim provoked him, and asserts that there was insufficient
evidence to convict him of REAP where the Commonwealth failed to show that
Brawley had the mens rea to commit this crime.
For similar reasons, Brawley contends that the evidence was insufficient
to support his simple assault conviction. According to Brawley, the
Commonwealth needed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Brawley
attempted to cause or intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly caused bodily
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injury to another. Brawley argues that, because he claimed self-defense, the
Commonwealth had the burden of proving that his actions were not justifiable
self-defense. Brawley asserts that the Commonwealth failed to meet this
burden because there are no reasonable inferences to be drawn from the
evidence that would lead one to believe Brawley acted to cause, either
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly, bodily injury outside of trying to defend
himself. Brawley maintains that, although he threw a log in the direction of
the victim, inferences of intention alone are not enough to show beyond a
reasonable doubt that he is guilty of simple assault. Brawley argues that “it
is inconceivable that the jury was able to determine beyond a reasonable
doubt that [Brawley] threw the log with the intent to cause injury to the victim
and was not just throwing the log in the direction of the victim to get him to
stop his attack.” Brawley’s Brief at 38-39.
The trial court considered Brawley’s sufficiency claims and determined
that they lacked merit. The trial court reasoned:
Among other evidence, the victim testified that [Brawley]
threw a log of wood at him and hit him with a shovel. (N.T.,
05/29/18[,] pp. 37-38; 75). Photos of the shovel and the log were
submitted as exhibits. (Id. at 54-56, Exhibits 18 and 22). The
victim’s wife saw [Brawley] pick up a log of wood and threaten her
husband with it. (Id. at 87). She also observed [Brawley] holding
the shovel with the blade up and standing close to her husband
while he was lying on the ground. (Id. at 88-90). Officer Brown,
the first officer to arrive on scene, observed that the victim was
bleeding and had major swelling on his face. (Id. at 126).
[Brawley] was taken into custody and the victim was
transported to Lehigh Valley Pocono Hospital. At the hospital, the
victim’s wife photographed her husband’s injuries and pieces of
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wood that were stuck on or in his face. The photographs were
submitted as exhibits. (Id. at 60-61, Exhibits 20-22). A
diagnostic scan of the victim’s head and neck revealed multiple
facial fractures. The victim’s medical records were admitted into
evidence. (Id. at 70, Exhibits 24).
Against this and other evidence, [Brawley] testified that he
acted in self-defense. Among other things, he stated that the
victim operated a skid-steer in a threatening manner when the
dispute began to escalate. According to his testimony, the victim
flipped the log splitter on which [Brawley] was sitting and dumped
piles of debris on him. [Brawley] further stated that he felt his life
was in danger and that is why he picked up a log out of the pile of
debris and threw it. (Id. at 168-88; 205).
Viewed in light of the applicable standards, the evidence
presented by the Commonwealth is amply sufficient to establish
the elements of simple assault and REAP. In addition, the jury
heard but obviously rejected the self-defense claim. It was
entirely within the jury’s province to do so.
Trial Court Opinion, 12/23/19, at 14-15 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
as we must, we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court in finding that
the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions for REAP and simple
assault. The jury was free to disregard Brawley’s version of events as well as
his claim that he acted in self-defense. The jury instead chose to believe the
prosecution’s evidence that Brawley threw a log in the victim’s face and hit
him with a shovel, causing multiple facial fractures, bleeding and swelling.
Importantly, an individual may be convicted of REAP “if he recklessly
engages in conduct which places or may place another person in danger of
death or serious bodily injury.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705 (emphasis added). The
statute does not require any particular person to be actually placed in danger,
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but deals with potential risks, as well as cases where a specific person actually
is within the zone of danger. See Commonwealth v. Edwards, 175 A.3d
359 (Pa. Super. 2017). In this case, the jury properly found that Brawley’s
actions in throwing a log which hit the victim in the face, as well as hitting him
with a shovel, could have resulted in damage or trauma to him. Brawley’s
culpability is not reduced by the fortunate happenstance that the victim did
not lose his vision or sustain brain damage. Thus, the Commonwealth proved
all the elements of REAP beyond a reasonable doubt.
The evidence was also sufficient to sustain the verdict for simple assault.
As discussed above, a person is guilty of simple assault if he “attempts to
cause or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to
another.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a)(1). Here, the evidence presented by the
Commonwealth sufficiently established that Brawley threw a log at the victim,
which struck him in the face with enough force to cause visible and invisible
injuries, and hit him with a shovel. This evidence is sufficient to support the
jury’s finding that Brawley was guilty of simple assault. Thus, as the evidence
when viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth supports
Brawley’s convictions for REAP and simple assault.
Finally, the fact that the jury acquitted Brawley of aggravated assault
(circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life)
does not warrant a different result. Pennsylvania courts have long recognized
that jury acquittals may not be interpreted as specific factual findings with
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regard to the evidence, as an acquittal does not definitively establish that the
jury was not convinced of a defendant’s guilt. Commonwealth v. Moore,
103 A.3d 1240, 1246 (Pa. 2014). Rather, it has been the understanding of
the courts of this Commonwealth that an acquittal may merely show lenity on
the jury’s behalf, or that “the verdict may have been the result of compromise,
or of a mistake on the part of the jury.” Id. Accordingly, Brawley’s sufficiency
challenges merit no relief.
In his fifth and sixth issues, Brawley contends that the convictions for
REAP and simple assault are against the weight of the evidence. The following
legal principles apply when a challenge to the weight of the evidence
supporting a conviction is presented to the trial court:
A motion for new trial on the grounds that the verdict
is contrary to the weight of the evidence, concedes that
there is sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict. Thus, the
trial court is under no obligation to view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the verdict winner. An allegation
that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence is
addressed to the discretion of the trial court. A new trial
should not be granted because of a mere conflict in the
testimony or because the judge on the same facts would
have arrived at a different conclusion. A trial judge must do
more than reassess the credibility of the witnesses and
allege that he would not have assented to the verdict if he
were a juror. Trial judges, in reviewing a claim that the
verdict is against the weight of the evidence do not sit as
the thirteenth juror. Rather, the role of the trial judge is to
determine that notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts
are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to
give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice.
Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751-52 (Pa. 2000) (citations,
footnotes and quotation marks omitted). Thus, to allow an appellant “to
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prevail on a challenge to the weight of the evidence, the evidence must be so
tenuous, vague and uncertain that the verdict shocks the conscience of the
[trial] court.” Commonwealth v. Talbert, 129 A.3d 536, 545 (Pa. Super.
2016) (internal citation omitted).
An appellate court’s standard of review when presented with a weight
of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard of review applied by the
trial court:
Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of
the exercise of discretion, not of the underlying
question of whether the verdict is against the weight
of the evidence. Because the trial judge has had the
opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented, an
appellate court will give the gravest consideration to the
findings and reasons advanced by the trial judge when
reviewing a trial court’s determination that the verdict is
against the weight of the evidence. One of the least
assailable reasons for granting or denying a new trial is the
lower court’s conviction that the verdict was or was not
against the weight of the evidence and that a new trial
should be granted in the interest of justice.
Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1055 (Pa. 2013) (emphasis in
original, internal citations omitted).
Brawley argues that his conviction for REAP is against the weight of the
evidence for the same reasons that he claims the evidence was insufficient to
support that conviction. Indeed, Brawley essentially restates his sufficiency
argument for his REAP conviction, word for word, in his weight challenge for
that conviction. In relation to his simple assault conviction, Brawley merely
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argues that the evidence showed he was acting in self-defense, and that there
was no evidence that he intended to cause injury. Brawley’s Brief at 41.
Importantly, by once again claiming that certain elements of REAP and
simple assault went unproven at trial, Brawley conflates his weight of the
evidence challenges with his sufficiency challenges. A challenge to the weight
of the evidence is distinct from a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Charlton, 902 A.2d 554, 561 (Pa. Super. 2006).
Whereas a sufficiency claim asserts that the Commonwealth failed to prove
one or more elements of a crime, a weight challenge concedes that the
Commonwealth produced sufficient evidence of each element of a crime, but
questions which evidence is to be believed. Id.Here, Brawley does not indicate in his weight challenges that certain
evidence was so clearly of greater weight than other evidence that the verdicts
of guilt shock one’s sense of justice. Instead, he asserts that the verdicts of
guilt shock one’s sense of justice because certain elements of REAP and simple
assault went unproven at trial. Specifically, Brawley argues that the verdict
of guilt for REAP shocks one’s sense of justice because the Commonwealth
failed to prove serious bodily injury, a danger of serious bodily injury, and that
he had the requisite mens rea. See Brawley’s Brief at 34-35. Similarly,
Brawley claims that the verdict of guilt for simple assault shocks one’s sense
of justice due to the “lack of any evidence that [Brawley] was intentionally
trying to cause injury.” Id. at 41. Moreover, in his weight challenges, Brawley
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primarily asks this Court to “set aside the guilty verdict and enter a judgment
of acquittal.” Brawley’s Brief at 35, 41.3 This is the appropriate remedy for a
successful sufficiency challenge, rather than for a weight challenge. See
Commonwealth v. Ruffin, 463 A.2d 1117, 1118 n.5 (Pa. Super. 1983)
(holding that the appropriate remedy for an insufficiency claim would be a
discharge and dismissal of all charges). As Brawley failed to properly advance
his weight of the evidence claims, we find they are without merit.
Moreover, the trial court considered Brawley’s weight challenges and
determined that his guilty verdicts for REAP and simple assault did not shock
one’s conscious. The trial court reasoned:
In this case, as discussed and as the weight claims
concede, the evidence presented by the Commonwealth was
sufficient to support both verdicts. [Brawley] testified,
called another witness, submitted an exhibit, and claimed
that his actions were legally justified. In addition, the
Commonwealth’s witnesses were cross-examined. The jury
heard and observed all witnesses. By its verdict, the jury
obviously rejected [Brawley’s] self-defense claim and other
contrary evidence. It was entirely within the jury’s province
to do so and, since there was support for the jury’s
conclusions and the verdict was not so contrary to the
evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice, there was and
is no basis to overturn the findings of guilt and award a new
trial.
Simply, there was ample evidence to support the
verdict and the jury’s findings of guilt were not against the
____________________________________________
3
The sole remedy for a challenge to the weight of the evidence is a new trial.
See Commonwealth v. Whiteman, 485 A.2d 459, 461 (Pa. Super. 1984).
While Brawley primarily seeks the remedy of an acquittal, he does ask for a
new trial as an alternative remedy. See Brawley’s Brief at 35, 41.
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weight of the evidence. [Brawley’s] weight and sufficiency
challenges are bootless.
Trial Court Opinion, 12/23/19, at 16-17 (footnote omitted).
As discussed above, we give the gravest consideration to the findings
and reasons advanced by the trial court when reviewing its determination that
the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence. In this matter, we
discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court in arriving at its determination
that the verdicts of guilt did not shock its conscious. Accordingly, Brawley’s
weight challenges merit no relief.
In his final issue, Brawley contends that the trial court abused its
discretion in sentencing him. “Challenges to the discretionary aspects of
sentencing do not entitle an appellant to review as of right.” Commonwealth
v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010). Prior to reaching the merits
of a discretionary sentencing issue,
[this Court conducts] a four[-]part analysis to determine:
(1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal,
see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was
properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to
reconsider and modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. [720];
(3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, [see]
Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial
question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate
under the Sentencing Code, [see] 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).
Moury, 992 A.2d at 170 (citation omitted). When an appellant challenges the
discretionary aspects of his sentence, we must consider his brief on this issue
as a petition for permission to appeal. Commonwealth v. Yanoff, 690 A.2d
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260, 267 (Pa. Super. 1997); see also Commonwealth v. Tuladziecki, 522
A.2d 17, 18 (Pa. 1987); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).
In the instant case, Brawley filed a timely notice of appeal and preserved
his discretionary sentencing claim in a timely post-sentence motion. However,
Brawley’s brief has a fatal defect in that it does not include a separate Rule
2119(f) statement. Pursuant to Rule 2119(f), “[a]n appellant who challenges
the discretionary aspects of a sentence in a criminal matter shall set forth in
his brief a concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal
with respect to the discretionary aspects of a sentence.” Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f)
(emphasis added). The Rule 2119(f) statement must specify where the
sentence falls in relation to the sentencing guidelines and what particular
provision of the Code is violated (e.g., the sentence is outside the guidelines
and the court did not offer any reasons either on the record or in writing, or
double-counted factors already considered). See Commonwealth v.
Goggins, 748 A.2d 721, 727 (Pa. Super. 2000). Additionally, the Rule
2119(f) statement must specify what fundamental norm the sentence violates
and the manner in which it violates that norm. Id. Generally, an appellate
court will only evaluate substantive discretionary sentencing claims that were
relied upon in the Rule 2119(f) concise statement. See Commonwealth v.
Feucht, 955 A.2d 377, 384 (Pa. Super. 2008).
Here, Brawley has not included a Rule 2119(f) statement in his brief.
However, when the appellant has not included a Rule 2119(f) statement and
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the appellee has not objected, this Court may ignore the omission and
determine if there is a substantial question that the sentence imposed was not
appropriate, or enforce the requirements of Pa. R.A.P. 2119(f) sua sponte,
i.e., deny allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. Kiesel, 854 A.2d 530,
533 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted).
Here, the Commonwealth has not objected to Brawley’s failure to include
a Rule 2119(f) statement in his brief. Indeed, the Commonwealth did not file
a brief in this matter. Therefore, we may reach our own conclusion as to
whether Brawley should be permitted to proceed with this appeal. See
Commonwealth v. Slotcavage, 939 A.2d 901, 904 (Pa. Super. 2007).
In the instant matter, it does not appear that Brawley has raised a
substantial question. Brawley argues that the trial court failed to consider
certain mitigating factors when imposing concurrent, standard range
sentences of eight to sixteen months’ incarceration, plus eight months of
consecutive probation, on the simple assault and REAP convictions.
Specifically, Brawley argues that the trial court did not consider the fact that
twenty years had passed since Brawley’s prior conviction for simple assault or
the fact that he was employed. Brawley claims that, had the trial court had
taken such factors into account, it would have imposed an incarceration
sentence lower than the eight months that he received.
Where, as here, an appellant has been sentenced in the standard range
of the sentencing guidelines, this Court has held that an allegation that the
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sentencing court failed to consider certain mitigating factors does not present
a substantial question. Moury, 992 A.2d at 171. Further, where the
sentencing court had the benefit of a PSI report, we assume that the
sentencing court “was aware of relevant information regarding the defendant’s
character and weighed those considerations along with mitigating statutory
factors.” Id. Moreover, where a sentence falls within the standard range of
the guidelines, Pennsylvania law views the sentence as appropriate under the
Sentencing Code. Id. Thus, as Brawley has not raised a substantial question,
we decline to reach the merits of his challenge to the discretionary aspects of
his sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/19/21
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