Reid, Duane

PD-1390-15 PD-1390-15
COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
Transmitted 10/30/2015 10:20:10 AM
Accepted 11/2/2015 12:26:55 PM
ABEL ACOSTA
NO._________________
CLERK
IN THE
COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
OF TEXAS
DUANE REID
Petitioner
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
Respondent
Petition is in Cause No. 17125 from the 271st Criminal
District Court of Wise County, Texas,
and Cause No. 02-14-00376-CR in the
Court of Appeals for the Second District of Texas
PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
Abe Factor
TBN: 06768500
Factor, Campbell & Collins
Attorneys at Law
5719 Airport Freeway
Phone: (817) 222-3333
Fax: (817) 222-3330
Email: lawfactor@yahoo.com
Attorney for Petitioner
Duane Reid
November 2, 2015
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
The following is a complete list of all parties to the trial court’s
final judgment, as well as the names and addresses of all trial and
appellate counsel.
Trial Court Judge: Hon. John Fostel
Petitioner: Duane Reid
Petitioner’s Trial Counsel: Terry Barlow
TBN: 01758300
Dunham Law Firm
1110 E. Weatherford Street
Fort Worth, Texas 76102
Petitioner’s Counsel Abe Factor
on Appeal: TBN: 06768500
Factor, Campbell & Collins
Attorneys at Law
5719 Airport Freeway
Fort Worth, Texas 76117
Appellee: The State of Texas
Appellee’s Trial Counsel: Jay Lapham
TBN: 00784448
Assistant District Attorney
101 N. Trinity, Suite 200
Decatur, Texas 76234
Appellee’s Counsel Greg Preston Lowery
on Appeal: TBN: 00787926
Assistant District Attorney
101 N. Trinity, Suite 200
Decatur, Texas 76234
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
page
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .v
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
GROUNDS FOR REVIEW. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2
REASONS FOR REVIEW. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
ARGUMENT. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
I. The court of appeals erred in holding that Petitioner had
forfeited his complaint that his right to confrontation was
violated when the trial court considered the PSI at
punishment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
A. Facts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
B. Opinion Below. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
C. Preservation of Error. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
D. Confrontation Clause Principles. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
E. Application. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9
F. Harm Analysis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10
PRAYER FOR RELIEF. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
iii
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
APPENDIX. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
iv
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Cases page
De La Paz v. State,
273 S.W.3d 671 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Ex parte Hathorn,
296 S.W.3d 570 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Huizar v. State,
12 S.W.3d 479 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Langham v. State,
305 S.W.3d 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
McNac v. State,
215 S.W.3d 420 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Pointer v. Texas,
380 U.S. 400, 85 S. Ct. 1065, 13 L. Ed. 2d 923 (1965). . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Reid v. State,
02-14-00376-CR, 2015 WL 5634251 (Tex. App.–
Fort Worth, September 24, 2015, no. pet. h.)
(mem. op., not designated for publication). . . . 2, 4
Reyes v. State,
361 S.W.3d 222 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth 2012, pet. ref’d). . . . . . .4
Russeau v. State,
171 S.W.3d 871 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 9
Smith v. State,
227 S.W.3d 753 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 5
Stringer v. State,
309 S.W.3d 42 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 5
v
Ex parte Turner,
542 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Wall v. State,
184 S.W.3d 730 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Whorton v. Bockting,
549 U.S. 406, 127 S. Ct. 1173, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2007). . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Constitutions
U.S. C ONST. amend. VI. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 10
Statutes
T EX. C RIM. P ROC. C ODE A NN. §37.07(3)(a) (West Supp. 2014). . . . . . . . 8
T EX. C RIM. P ROC. C ODE A NN. § 37.07(3)(d) (West Supp. 2014). . . . . . . 7
T EX. C RIM. P ROC. C ODE A NN. § 42.12(9)(a) (West Supp. 2014). . . . . . . .7
T EX. P ENAL C ODE A NN. § 31.03(e)(5) (West Supp. 2014). . . . . . . . . . . . .1
Court Rules
T EX. R. A PP. P. 44.2(a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10, 11
vi
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
Because Petitioner does not believe that oral argument will
materially assist the Court in its evaluation of matters raised by this
pleading, Petitioner respectfully waives oral argument.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On March 27, 2013, Petitioner Duane Reid (“Mr. Reid” or
“Petitioner”) was indicted for the third degree felony offense of theft,
alleged to have occurred on August 16, 2012. (C.R. 6); see T EX. P ENAL
C ODE A NN. § 31.03(e)(5) (West Supp. 2014). On August 12,2014, Mr.
Reid entered an open plea of guilty to the charged offense. (C.R. 37-43).
The trial court continued the proceedings pending the preparation of
a Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”), until September 4, 2014. (II
R.R. passim). On that date, the trial court sentenced Mr. Reid to eight (8)
years incarceration in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. (C.R.
44; II R.R. 36). A timely Motion for New Trial and Motion in Arrest of
Judgment was filed on September 16, 2014, which was overruled by
operation of law. (C.R. 48). A Timely Notice of Appeal was filed on
September 16, 2014. (C.R. 47).
STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The opinion by the Second Court of Appeals affirming
1
Petitioner’s conviction was handed down on September 24, 2015. Reid
v. State, 02-14-00376-CR, 2015 WL 5634251 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth,
September 24, 2015, no. pet. h.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication). A timely Motion to Extend Time to File Petition for
Discretionary Review was granted, thus, this Petition for Discretionary
review is timely.
GROUNDS FOR REVIEW
GROUND FOR REVIEW ONE
I. The court of appeals erred in holding that Petitioner had
forfeited his complaint that his right to confrontation was
violated when the trial court considered the PSI at
punishment.
REASONS FOR REVIEW
1. The decision by the Second Court of Appeals has decided an
important question of state law in a way that comports with the
applicable decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeals, but this Court
is invited revisit and overrule or modify those decisions.
2
ARGUMENT
GROUND FOR REVIEW ONE (Restated)
I. The court of appeals erred in holding that Petitioner had
forfeited his complaint that his right to confrontation was
violated when the trial court considered the PSI at
punishment.1
A. Facts
At the punishment hearing held on September 29, 2014, the trial
court admitted into evidence the PSI prepared by the Wise County
Community Supervision and Corrections Department. (II R.R. 5; III
R.R. St. Ex. 1). Additionally, the trial court stated on the record that it
had “considered all matter relevant to this case.” (II R.R. 36). At no time
did trial counsel for Mr. Reid raise an objection to the matters included
in the PSI. Based on the evidence set forth in the PSI, the trial court
denied Mr. Reid’s request for probation and sentenced him to eight (8)
year incarceration. (C.R. 44; II R.R. 36).
B. Opinion Below
The Opinion of the Second Court of Appeals failed to address
1
Undersigned counsel is aware that this Court has directly held adverse
to Petitioner’s argument on this point. See Stringer v. State, 309 S.W.3d 42
(Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Smith v. State, 227 S.W.3d 753 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007). The argument for a change or reversal in the law is presented here
for further review.
3
Petitioner’s substantive complaint, but merely held that his complaint
had not been preserved in the trial court. Reid, 2015 WL 5634251 at *1
(citing Reyes v. State, 361 S.W.3d 222, 229 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth 2012,
pet. ref’d).
C. Preservation of Error
This Court has held that under circumstances where the law is
well-settled to the point where any objection in the trial court would be
futile, the claim will not be considered forfeited for later review. Ex
parte Hathorn, 296 S.W.3d 570, 572 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (citing Black
v. State, 816 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)) (“Given the settled state
of the case law at the time of appellant’s trial, we refuse to fault him or
his attorney for failing to object. . . .Under the established precedent,
the trial judge would have been correct in overruling the objection. . .
.”); See also Ex parte Turner, 542 S.W.2d 187, 189 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976)
(“[I]t would be unreasonable to expect the petitioner to anticipate the
future decision of the United States Supreme Court,” [and held that
there was no intentional waiver for failing] “to object upon a ground
not yet established as a defect of constitutional magnitude.” (citing Ex
parte Casarez, 508 S.W.2d 620 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974)).
4
In Smith v. State, 227 S.W.3d 753 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007), and later
in Stringer v. State, 309 S.W.3d 42 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010), this Court
held that extraneous misconduct evidence could be considered at
punishment if included in a PSI even where it was not shown beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant had committed the misconduct,
Smith, 227 S.W.3d at 763, and the Confrontation Clause protections
articulated in Crawford v. Washington2 do not apply at a non-capital
sentencing to a PSI used by the judge in determining the punishment.
Stringer, 309 S.W.3d at 48. Thus, any objection at trial would necessarily
been overruled by the trial court. Id.; Smith, 227 S.W.3d at 763. Since
any objection would have been futile, the Second Court of Appeals
should have held that Mr. Reid’s complaint had been preserved for
appeal. Hathorn, 296 S.W.3d at 572.
D. Confrontation Clause Principles
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution provides that, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right. . .to be confronted with the witnesses
against him.” U.S. C ONST. amend. VI. This procedural guarantee
2
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177
(2004).
5
applies to both federal and state prosecutions. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S.
400, 403, 85 S. Ct. 1065, 1067–68, 13 L. Ed. 2d 923 (1965); De La Paz v. State,
273 S.W.3d 671, 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Consistent with the
Confrontation Clause guarantee, a testimonial hearsay statement may
be admitted in evidence against a defendant “only where the declarant
is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior
opportunity to cross-examine.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68,
124 S. Ct. 1354, 1373–74, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004); see De La Paz, 273
S.W.3d at 680. “[T]he Crawford rule reflects the Framers’ preferred
mechanism (cross-examination) for ensuring that inaccurate
out-of-court testimonial statements are not used to convict an accused.”
Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 418, 127 S. Ct. 1173, 1182, 167 L. Ed. 2d
1 (2007); De La Paz, 273 S.W.3d at 680. “Generally, speaking, a hearsay
statement is ‘testimonial’ when the surrounding circumstances
objectively indicate that the primary purpose of the interview or
interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to
later criminal prosecution.” De La Paz, 273 S.W.3d at 680. Whether a
statement is testimonial is a question of law. Id.; see also Langham v.
State, 305 S.W.3d 568, 576 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
6
Virtually all statements in a PSI that reflect negatively on the
defendant will constitute “testimonial” statements for Confrontation
Clause purposes. They are gathered by a state employee, a supervision
officer. T EX. C RIM. P ROC . C ODE A NN. § 42.12(9)(a) (West Supp. 2014).
They are for the express purpose of use in a probation or sentencing
determination concerning the defendant. T EX. C RIM. P ROC. C ODE A NN.
§ 37.07(3)(d) (West Supp. 2014). They are not street-corner
“nontestimonial” statements but instead are statements that a
reasonable declarant would recognize, or would have been expressly
told, were for use in a probation or sentencing decision concerning the
defendant. See, e.g., Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821–24, 126 S. Ct.
2266, 2273–74, 165 L. Ed. 2d 224 (2006).
By statute, a PSI is an ex parte communication providing hearsay
evidence to the trial court, denying a defendant the right to confront
witnesses against him in open court. See T EX. C RIM. P ROC. C ODE A NN §§
37.07(3)(d), 42.12(9). The PSI statute not only violates the Confrontation
Clause; its ex parte nature undermines our system of public trials.
Nothing in our law prevents the State’s offering a PSI into evidence
through a sponsoring witness. Nothing prevents the State’s offering a
7
defendant’s criminal history through a sponsoring witness. A jury
assessing punishment does not require a PSI. A jury hears witnesses
and examines evidence in open court to determine the appropriate
sentence.
In a jury trial, a jury must be instructed that they may not
consider extraneous offenses or acts of misconduct unless they believe
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed those acts
and offenses. Huizar v. State, 12 S.W.3d 479, 484 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
The State, then, bears a burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
when it seeks to prove extraneous offenses at the punishment phase of
a jury trial. T EX. C RIM. P ROC. C ODE A NN. §37.07(3)(a) (West Supp. 2014).
The State should not be relieved of its burden of proof merely because
the trial judge assesses punishment.
Additionally, the protections of the Confrontation Clause apply
to the punishment phase of trial. Russeau v. State, 171 S.W.3d 871,
880–81 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). In addressing reports admitted at the
punishment phase, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held in
Russeau v. State,
The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause provides
that,“[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
8
right. . .to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” This
procedural guarantee is applicable in both federal and state
prosecutions and bars the admission of testimonial statements of
a witness who does not appear at trial unless he is unavailable to
testify and the defendant had a prior opportunity to
cross-examine him. Generally speaking, a statement is
“testimonial” if it is a solemn declaration made for the purpose
of establishing some fact.
The reports in question contained testimonial statements which
were inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause, because the
State did not show that the declarants were unavailable to testify
and appellant never had an opportunity to cross-examine any of
them. Indeed, the statements in the reports amounted to
unsworn, ex parte affidavits of government employees and were
the very type of evidence the Clause was intended to prohibit.
The trial court erred in admitting those portions of the reports
that contained the testimonial statements.
Id.
E. Application
Here, though no witnesses testified at punishment regarding the
compilation and contents of the PSI, the PSI compiled by the probation
officer was admitted into evidence. (III R.R. St. Ex. 1). The information
included in the PSI is clearly testimonial, in that much of it is composed
of out-of court statements meant to be used against Mr. Reid at his trial
on punishment. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. at 821–24,126
S.Ct.at2273–74. Much of the information is detrimental to Mr. Reid. (III
R.R. St. Ex. 1). The admission of such testimonial statements violates
9
the Sixth Amendment right possessed by all criminal defendants to
confront the witnesses against them. U.S. C ONST. AMEND. VI; Crawford
v. Washington, 541 U.S.at 68,124 S.Ct.at 1373–74. The trial court erred by
admitting the PSI in violation of the Sixth Amendment.
D. Harm Analysis
Crawford error is constitutional error subject to a harm analysis
under Rule 44.2(a) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. T EX. R.
A PP. P. 44.2(a); McNac v. State, 215 S.W.3d 420, 421 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007). Mr. Reid’s sentence must be reversed unless it can be found
beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to his
punishment. Wall v. State, 184 S.W.3d 730, 745-46 (Tex. Crim. App.
2006). This Court has established four factors to be considered in
analyzing harm from Crawford error: (1) the importance of the hearsay
statements to the State’s case; (2) whether the hearsay evidence was
cumulative of other evidence; (3) the presence or absence of evidence
corroborating or contradicting the hearsay testimony on material
points; (4) the overall strength of the State’s case. Davis v. State, 203
S.W.3d 845, 852 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
The only evidence presented by the state at punishment was the
PSI and the testimony of Soren Anderson, a co-defendant on the instant
10
offense. The trial court ultimately denied Mr. Reid’s request for
probation and sentenced him to prison. Moreover the State emphasized
the extraneous acts of misconduct presented in the PSI in its closing
argument to the trial court. (II R.R. 35-36).
It is impossible to conclude that the error did not contribute to
the conviction or punishment; thus, Mr. Reid was harmed by its
admission, and the judgment of the trial court on punishment should
have been reversed by the Second Court of Appeals. See T EX. R. A PP.
P. 44.2(a).
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Petitioner respectfully
prays that this Court grant discretionary review and allow each party
to fully brief and argue the issues before the Court of Criminal
Appeals, and that upon reviewing the judgment entered below, that
this Court reverse the opinion of the Second Court of Appeals.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/Abe Factor
Abe Factor
TBN: 06768500
Factor, Campbell & Collins
Attorneys at Law
5719 Airport Freeway
Fort Worth, Texas 76117
11
Phone: (817) 222-3333
Fax: (817) 222-3330
Email: lawfactor@yahoo.com
Attorneys for Petitioner
Duane Reid
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I hereby certify that the word count for the portion of this filing
covered by Rule 9.4(i)(1) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure is
2,034.
/s/Abe Factor
Abe Factor
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
instrument has been furnished to counsel for the State’s Prosecuting
Attorney and the Tarrant County District Attorney by a manner
compliant with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, on this 30th
day of October , 2015.
/s/Abe Factor
Abe Factor
12
APPENDIX
1. Opinion of the Second Court of Appeals
13
COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-14-00376-CR
DUANE REID APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
----------
FROM THE 271ST DISTRICT COURT OF WISE COUNTY
TRIAL COURT NO. CR17125
----------
MEMORANDUM OPINION 1
----------
Appellant Duane Reid entered an open plea of guilty to the offense of theft
in August 2014. He waived a jury and asked the trial court to assess
punishment. The trial court ordered a pre-sentence investigation report (“PSI”)
1
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
and postponed the punishment hearing to September 2014. 2 The State
introduced the completed PSI, and the trial court admitted it without objection;
one witness for the State also testified. The trial court sentenced Appellant to
eight years’ confinement. Appellant subsequently filed a motion for new trial,
which was overruled by operation of law. He did not complain of the PSI in his
motion for new trial.
Confrontation
Appellant brings a single point on appeal, arguing that the trial court denied
him his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation when the trial court considered
the PSI at punishment. But Appellant did not object to the PSI’s admission. To
preserve a complaint for our review, a party must have presented to the trial
court a timely request, objection, or motion that states the specific grounds for
the desired ruling if they are not apparent from the context of the request,
objection, or motion. 3 Further, the trial court must have ruled on the request,
objection, or motion, either expressly or implicitly, or the complaining party must
have objected to the trial court’s refusal to rule. 4 A reviewing court should not
2
See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, § 9(a) (West Supp. 2014)
(discussing the PSI requirements).
3
Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1); Everitt v. State, 407 S.W.3d 259, 262–63 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2013); Sanchez v. State, 418 S.W.3d 302, 306 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2013, pet. ref’d).
4
Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(2); Everitt, 407 S.W.3d at 263.
2
address the merits of an issue that has not been preserved for appeal. 5 The
Sixth Amendment right to confrontation, among other constitutional rights, may
be forfeited by the failure to object. 6 Because Appellant did not object or
otherwise complain in the trial court of the admission of the PSI or of the trial
court’s considering the PSI in assessing punishment, he has not preserved this
complaint for review.
We overrule Appellant’s sole point and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/s/ Lee Ann Dauphinot
LEE ANN DAUPHINOT
JUSTICE
PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; DAUPHINOT and GARDNER, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: September 24, 2015
5
Ford v. State, 305 S.W.3d 530, 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
6
See Reyes v. State, 361 S.W.3d 222, 229 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012,
pet. ref’d).
3