Jose A. Garcia v. Carlos Abrego

NUMBER 13-11-00730-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
CARL EDWARD SHINER A/K/A Appellant,
CARL ROBERT SHINER,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 377th District Court
of Victoria County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Rodriguez, Garza and Vela
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Garza
A jury convicted appellant, Carl Edward Shiner a/k/a Carl Robert Shiner, of
arson, a first-degree felony offense, see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 28.02 (a)(2)(A), (d)(2)
(West 2011), enhanced by prior convictions under the habitual felony-offender statute,
see id. § 12.42 (d) (West Supp. 2011), and sentenced him to ninety-nine years’
imprisonment. By a single issue, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
that he had the required intent to commit arson. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
The following testimony was provided by the State’s witnesses at trial. Appellant
presented no witnesses.
A. Lou Brooks
Lou Brooks testified that she and her husband, Troy Brooks, perform part-time
security work at apartments located in Bloomington, Texas. Appellant was a resident in
an apartment complex where Lou and Troy performed security duties.
On the afternoon of December 22, 2010, Lou and Troy first encountered
appellant when he began chasing their vehicle, armed with crutches and a two-by-four.
Later that afternoon, Lou and Troy responded to complaints that appellant was beating
on his neighbors’ doors. Appellant had barricaded the bathroom in his apartment shut
and informed Lou and Troy that someone was in his bathroom. Lou and Troy checked
the bathroom and found no one inside. Later, in response to another call, Lou and Troy
found appellant tearing at the outside wall of the apartment; appellant said that
someone was in his wall. Appellant said that his wife—who no longer lived in the
apartment—had been in his apartment and had run into a neighboring apartment. Lou
and Troy checked appellant’s apartment and found no one; they also checked the
neighboring apartment and found no one. Approximately twenty minutes later, Lou and
Troy noticed smoke coming from appellant’s apartment. Troy went inside the apartment
and extinguished the fire with water, while Lou and Hilda Molina, the apartment
manager, talked with appellant outside. Lou said that appellant was “jittery” and was
“talking out of his head.” Appellant’s belongings were removed from the apartment to
assess the damage. According to Lou, the fire started in a closet that was piled waist-
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high with clothing and shoes. The fire damage was limited to appellant’s apartment,
which was located in a building with two other occupied units.
B. Troy Brooks
Troy provided similar testimony regarding the incidents with appellant on
December 22, 2010. Troy stated that earlier in the day, appellant had pulled siding off
the walls of the apartment complex in an attempt to get to people he believed were
inside the walls. Troy described how appellant chased him and Lou with a two-by-four.
Later that evening, Lou and Troy responded to appellant’s complaint that someone had
stolen something from his apartment and was hiding in the next-door apartment. No
one was in the next-door apartment. Troy noticed smoke coming from appellant’s
apartment, identified the source as a pile of burning clothing, and extinguished the fire
with water. The fire department arrived shortly thereafter. Troy stated that appellant’s
behavior had been reported to the sheriff’s department on several prior occasions
because they knew “something was wrong”; however, the department’s response was
that it was unable to take any action against appellant unless he harmed someone.
C. Clara Escalante
Clara Escalante testified that she knows appellant because he used to live in the
apartment complex near Escalante’s home. On the day of the fire, Escalante said
appellant had come by her home and asked for money to buy beer and cigarettes.
When Escalante and her husband refused, appellant became very angry and
threatened that he was going to set fire to everyone’s house. Escalante was afraid
because her husband is disabled due to a stroke. Escalante reported to the fire
marshal that appellant told her he had started the fire.
On cross-examination, Escalante stated she was at appellant’s apartment when
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he started the fire. Appellant started the fire using a “hot plate” and a towel. Escalante
reported to the fire marshal that she saw appellant outside his apartment with a burning
towel, but did not report the details of how appellant started the fire because she was
afraid of him.
D. Hilda Molina
Hilda Molina testified that at the time of the fire, she was an apartment manager
at the complex. Molina stated that Lou came to her office and reported that some
tenants were complaining about appellant banging on the walls. When Lou and Molina
reached appellant’s apartment, they noticed that the front door was open and smoke
was coming out. Appellant came to the door and said that “a guy” tried to set his
apartment on fire and then ran into the apartment next door. Lou opened the next-door
apartment; no one was there. The source of the fire in appellant’s apartment was a pile
of clothing burning in a closet. According to Molina, the apartment had to be repainted
and the appliances replaced. On cross-examination, Molina testified that she did not
see Escalante at the apartment.
E. Roger Hempel
Roger Hempel, a firefighter and batallion chief with the Victoria Fire Department,
testified that he and approximately eleven other fire department personnel responded to
the reported fire at the apartment complex. The fire was already extinguished when
they arrived. The firefighters identified the pile of smoldering clothing as the source of
the fire. The fire crew removed the charred clothing from the apartment.
F. Ron Prey
Ron Prey, the Victoria County Fire Marshal and Fire Chief, testified that he was
dispatched to the fire at appellant’s apartment. By the time Chief Prey arrived, the fire
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had been extinguished. He conferred with Chief Hempel and several witnesses. Chief
Prey inspected the closet area after most of the charred clothing had been removed.
He also spoke to appellant at the scene regarding the fire. Appellant told Chief Prey
multiple stories regarding the fire. Initially, appellant said his brother’s girlfriend had
started the fire and ran away. He later said that two women set the fire and ran away.
Still later, appellant said that he may have accidentally started the fire himself. In
inspecting the apartment, Chief Prey did not find any evidence that the fire started
accidentally. Appellant told Chief Prey that he may have accidentally dropped a
cigarette in the closet. Chief Prey “felt something was wrong” because appellant’s
“story was not what [he] was seeing in the closet.” When Chief Prey first made contact
with appellant, appellant was “kind of mumbling to himself,” seemed confused, and
“wasn’t making any sense.” Chief Prey told appellant that he did not find any evidence
in the closet that a cigarette accidentally started the fire. Appellant responded that he
may have set the fire in the closet with a cigarette or a lighter. Chief Prey also
interviewed Escalante at the scene and again later in his office. According to Chief
Prey, appellant’s version of events did not “match up” to the facts reported by other
witnesses at the scene.
On cross-examination, Chief Prey stated that he concluded the fire started in the
closet and was ignited by either a cigarette or a lighter using some of the polyester
clothing in the closet. Although cigarettes were found in the apartment, no cigarettes
were found under the clothing in the closet. Matches, lighters, and ash trays with
cigarettes in them were also found in the apartment. Chief Prey did not recall finding a
“hot plate” in the apartment and did not recall anyone at the scene mentioning a “hot
plate.” Chief Prey said that in her statement, Escalante did not mention that she had
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seen appellant start the fire with a towel and a “hot plate.”
The State and defense rested. The jury found appellant guilty and sentenced
him to ninety-nine years’ imprisonment. This appeal followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW
The court of criminal appeals has held that there is “no meaningful distinction
between the Jackson v. Virginia legal sufficiency standard and the Clewis factual-
sufficiency standard” and that the Jackson standard “is the only standard that a
reviewing court should apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support
each element of a criminal offense that the State is required to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 902–03, 912 (Tex. Crim. App.
2010) (plurality op.) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). Accordingly,
we review claims of evidentiary insufficiency under “a rigorous and proper application of
the Jackson standard of review.” Id. at 906–07, 912. Under the Jackson standard, “the
relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; see Brooks, 323 S.W.3d
at 898–99 (characterizing the Jackson standard as: “Considering all of the evidence in
the light most favorable to the verdict, was a jury rationally justified in finding guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt”). The fact-finder is the exclusive judge of the credibility of
witnesses and of the weight to be given to their testimony. Anderson v. State, 322
S.W.3d 401, 405 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d) (citing Lancon v.
State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 707 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)). Reconciliation of conflicts in the
evidence is within the fact-finder's exclusive province. Id. (citing Wyatt v. State, 23
S.W.3d 18, 30 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)). We must resolve any inconsistencies in the
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testimony in favor of the verdict. Id. (citing Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d 394, 406 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2000)).
We measure the sufficiency of the evidence by the elements of the offense as
defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. Coleman v. State, 131 S.W.3d 303, 314
(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2004, pet. ref’d) (citing Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240
(Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). “Such a charge [is] one that accurately sets out the law, is
authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of
proof or unnecessarily restrict the State's theories of liability, and adequately describes
the particular offense for which the defendant was tried.” Villarreal v. State, 286 S.W.3d
321, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (quoting Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240).
A person commits the offense of arson if he starts a fire with intent to destroy or
damage a building or habitation within the limits of an incorporated city or town. TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 28.02(a)(2)(A); Orr v. State, 306 S.W.3d 380, 394 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2010, no pet.). “To establish the corpus delicti in arson cases it is necessary to
show that a fire occurred and that the fire was designedly set by someone.” Orr, 306
S.W.3d at 394 (quoting Mosher v. State, 901 S.W.2d 547, 549 (Tex. App.—El Paso
1995, no pet.). “[T]he offense of arson is complete whenever the actor starts a fire with
the requisite culpable mental state, whether or not damage of any kind actually occurs.”
Mosher, 901 S.W.2d at 549.
A person commits arson with specific intent to damage or destroy a building,
habitation, or vehicle if it is the person’s conscious objective or desire to engage in the
conduct or cause the result. Beltran v. State, 593 S.W.2d 688, 689 (Tex. Crim. App.
1980); see Scruggs v. State, No. 14-09-00329-CR, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 3750, at *4–5
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th] Dist. May 20, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
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publication); see also TEX PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03(a) (West 2011). A jury may infer
intent from any facts that tend to prove its existence, such as acts, words, and conduct
of the defendant. Orr, 306 S.W.3d at 394–95. “Circumstantial evidence is as probative
as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor, and circumstantial evidence
alone can be sufficient to establish guilt.” Id. at 395 (quoting Hooper v. State, 214
S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). “Attempts to conceal incriminating evidence,
inconsistent statements, and implausible explanations to the police are probative of
wrongful conduct and are also circumstances of guilt.” Id. (quoting Guevara v. State,
152 S.W.3d 45, 50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)). Each fact need not point directly and
independently to the guilt of the accused, so long as the logical force of the probative
evidence, when coupled with reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, is sufficient
to support the conviction. Id. (citing Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158, 166 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2006)).
III. DISCUSSION
Appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to prove that he acted with the
intent to commit arson. Appellant asserts that the State’s evidence constitutes “mere
surmise” that appellant intentionally started the fire. Appellant also argues that “[i]t is
difficult to decipher how a rational jury could resolve [Escalante’s] testimony with that of
the other witnesses” to conclude that appellant was guilty of arson. We disagree.
The evidence showed that: (1) appellant had threatened to set everyone’s house
on fire; (2) appellant was acting erratically, beating on his neighbors’ doors, tearing at
the outside wall, and chasing the security personnel; (3) when Lou and Troy noticed
smoke coming from appellant’s apartment, they did not see anyone else in the vicinity;
(4) Escalante testified that appellant started the fire using a “hot plate” and a towel; and
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(5) Chief Prey testified that he found no evidence of an accidental fire. Appellant’s
inconsistent statements regarding the fire included that the fire was started by “a guy,”
by his brother’s girlfriend, by two women, and possibly accidentally by himself. See
Guevara, 152 S.W.3d at 50 (recognizing that inconsistent statements and implausible
explanations are circumstances of guilt). Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that a rational jury could have determined
beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant started the fire and had the specific intent to
damage or destroy the apartment building when he did so. See Orr, 306 S.W.3d at 396.
We hold that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict and overrule
appellant’s sole issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
________________________
DORI CONTRERAS GARZA
Justice
Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)
Delivered and filed the
15th day of November, 2012.
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