Henry William Grotewold v. Janet Kay Meyer

Opinion issued January 13, 2015
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-13-00875-CV
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HENRY WILLIAM GROTEWOLD, Appellant
V.
JANET KAY MEYER, Appellee
On Appeal from the 257th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2004-40933
OPINION
Herny William Grotewold and Janet Kay Meyer each filed a suit to modify
the parent-child relationship. In the course of the proceedings, the trial court
awarded sanctions against Meyer, ordering her to pay certain fees incurred by
Grotewold’s attorney. Following a trial, the trial court made certain modifications
to the prior terms governing the parent-child relationship. In two issues on appeal,
Grotewold argues (1) the trial court miscalculated his monthly child support
obligations and (2) the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion for
continuance.
We reverse and render in part and affirm in part.
Background
Grotewold and Meyer initiated divorce proceedings in 2004. They had one
child together. The divorce was finalized, and child support was set. In 2013,
Grotewold and Meyer each filed suits to modify the parent-child relationship.
They both sought, among other things, a re-evaluation of child support obligations.
During the course of recent proceedings, Grotewold sought discovery from
Meyer on her mental health. On July 22, 2013, Grotewold filed a document titled
“Motion for Psychological Examination and Evaluation of Janet Meyer, Motion for
Continuance and Motion for Sanctions.” In it, Grotewold identified two grounds
for sanctions but one ground for a continuance. Grotewold sought sanctions for
Meyer’s alleged failure to fully disclose the extent of her medication and
counseling for psychological conditions and sanctions for failing to produce her tax
returns as requested. Grotewold only requested a continuance, however, to obtain
more documentation about her mental health and to subject Meyer to a
psychological evaluation.
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The trial court granted Grotewold’s motion for sanctions, but did not
identify the ground or grounds upon which the sanction was based. In the same
order, the trial court denied the motion for psychological evaluation and the motion
for continuance.
After a hearing, the trial court issued an order modifying the parent-child
relationship. In the order, the trial court required Grotewold to pay $1,308.67
monthly in child support. The order acknowledged the guidelines on determining
child support and noted only one variance from the guidelines: basing Grotewold’s
gross annual income on an average from the previous three years. In its findings of
fact, the trial court found that, based on the three-year average, Grotewold’s gross
annual income was $78,520. From this, the trial court determined that Grotewold’s
average gross monthly income was $6,543. The trial court’s order for monthly
child support payments is 20% of Grotewold’s average gross monthly income.
Child Support
In his first issue, Grotewold argues the trial court miscalculated his monthly
child support obligations.
A. Standard of Review
The determination of the amount of child support to be paid is left to the
discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear
showing of abuse of discretion. Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex.
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1990); In re L.R.P., 98 S.W.3d 312, 313 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003,
pet. dism’d). A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts without reference to
any guiding rules and principles. Worford, 801 S.W.2d at 109; McGuire v.
McGuire, 4 S.W.3d 382, 384 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.).
In family law cases, legal and factual sufficiency challenges do not
constitute independent grounds for asserting error, but are relevant factors in
determining whether the trial court abused its discretion. Moore v. Moore, 383
S.W.3d 190, 198 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, pet. denied). To determine whether
the trial court abused its discretion because the evidence is legally or factually
insufficient to support the trial court’s decision, we consider whether the trial court
(1) had sufficient evidence upon which to exercise its discretion and (2) erred in its
application of that discretion. Moroch v. Collins, 174 S.W.3d 849, 857 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2005, pet. denied). We conduct the applicable sufficiency review
when considering the first prong of the test. Id. We then determine whether, based
on the elicited evidence, the trial court made a reasonable decision. Id. A trial
court does not abuse its discretion if there is some evidence of a substantive and
probative character to support the decision. Id.
B. Analysis
Appellant argues that the trial court incorrectly calculated his monthly child
support obligations. We agree.
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The Texas Family Code establishes guidelines for setting monthly child
support obligations in suits affecting the parent-child relationship. See TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. §§ 154.121–.133 (Vernon 2014). These guidelines are presumptively
reasonable. Id. § 154.122(a). The trial court may vary from the guidelines when
the evidence rebuts the presumption that application of the guidelines is in the best
interest of the child. Id. § 154.123(a). But, in order to do so, the trial court must
justify its variance. Id. In that situation, the trial court is required to make specific
findings supporting the variance. Id. § 154.130(a)(3), (b)(4).
Determination of child support obligations begins by determining the
relevant parent’s gross resources on an annual basis. See id. § 154.061(a) (Vernon
2014) (requiring, when feasible, to calculate gross income on annual basis),
§ 154.062(b)–(c) (Vernon 2014) (defining resources). An average monthly gross
income is determined from the annual gross income. Id. § 154.061(a). From those
gross resources, certain deductions are made. See id. § 154.062(d) (identifying
deductions from gross resources). The remaining amount is the parent’s net
resources. See id. § 154.062(a). The Office of the Attorney General is responsible
for annually promulgating charts that compute net monthly income from gross
monthly income. See id. § 154.061(b) (requiring IV-D agency to annually
promulgate tax charts); see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 231.001 (Vernon 2014)
(designating Office of the Attorney General as Title IV-D agency in Texas). For a
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single child, the guidelines set child support obligations at 20% of the parent’s net
resources. Id. § 154.125(b).
The trial court found that Grotewold’s gross annual income was $78,520,
and Grotewold does not dispute this determination. See Vill. Place, Ltd. v. VP
Shopping, LLC, 404 S.W.3d 115, 124 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no
pet.) (holding unchallenged findings are binding on appeal). As the trial court
determined, this sets Grotewold’s average monthly gross resources at $6,543. See
FAM. § 154.061(a). The trial court then determined that Grotewold’s monthly
child support obligation should be $1,308.67. This is 20% of Grotewold’s gross
monthly resources, not his net monthly resources. See FAM. § 154.125(b)
(requiring courts to presumptively apply 20% of parent’s net resources to child
support obligation).
The trial court did not find that a variance is justified. See id.
§ 154.130(a)(3), (b)(4) (requiring trial court to make specific findings justifying
variance from guidelines). To the contrary, the trial court explicitly found that
child support should be based on that number. Additionally, in its order modifying
the parent-child relationship, the trial court explicitly made findings pursuant to
section 154.130 but did not identify any justifications to vary from the guidelines.
See id. Instead, it determined that the only variance from the guidelines was its
basing Grotewold’s gross annual income on an average from the previous three
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years. Accordingly, we must conclude that the trial court determined that no
evidence overcame the presumption that the guidelines were within the best
interest of the child.
Based on this, the record reflects that the trial court miscalculated
Grotewold’s child support obligations. The Attorney General’s charts calculating
net monthly resources set Grotewold’s net monthly resources at $4,954.39. See
Office of the Att’y Gen., 2013 Tax Charts, 38 Tex. Reg. 1011 (2013); see also
FAM. § 154.061(b) (requiring IV-D agency to annually promulgate tax charts).
Grotewold and Meyer had one child. Accordingly, Grotewold is obligated to
dedicate 20% of his net monthly resources to child support. See FAM.
§ 154.125(b). This amounts to $990.88 per month.
We sustain Grotewold’s first issue.
Continuance
In his second issue, Grotewold argues the trial court abused its discretion by
denying his motion for continuance.
A. Standard of Review
The trial court has broad discretion to deny or grant a motion for
continuance. Villegas v. Carter, 711 S.W.2d 624, 626 (Tex. 1986); McAleer v.
McAleer, 394 S.W.3d 613, 617 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.).
“When reviewing a trial court’s order denying a motion for continuance, we
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consider whether the trial court committed a clear abuse of discretion on a case-by-
case basis.” Joe v. Two Thirty Nine Joint Venture, 145 S.W.3d 150, 161 (Tex.
2004). A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts in a manner so arbitrary and
unreasonable that it amounts to a clear and prejudicial error of law. Id. We cannot
substitute our judgment for that of the trial court in matters committed to the trial
court’s discretion. McAleer, 394 S.W.3d at 617.
To determine whether a trial court abused its discretion in denying a motion
for continuance that seeks additional time for discovery, we consider the following
non-exclusive list of factors: “the length of time the case has been on file, the
materiality and purpose of the discovery sought, and whether the party seeking the
continuance has exercised due diligence to obtain the discovery sought.” Joe, 145
S.W.3d at 161.
B. Analysis
Grotewold argues that, because it sanctioned Meyer for failing to fully
disclose in her discovery responses the extent of her medication and counseling for
psychological conditions, the trial court abused its discretion by denying his
request for a continuance to obtain more documentation about her mental health
and to subject Meyer to a psychological evaluation. We disagree that the record
establishes that the trial court sanctioned Meyer for failing to disclose matters
concerning her mental health.
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Grotewold filed a document titled “Motion for Psychological Examination
and Evaluation of Janet Meyer, Motion for Continuance and Motion for
Sanctions.” In it, Grotewold identified two grounds for sanctions but one ground
for a continuance. Grotewold sought sanctions for Meyer’s alleged failure to fully
disclose the extent of her medication and counseling for psychological conditions
and sanctions for failing to produce her tax returns as requested. Grotewold only
requested a continuance, however, to obtain more documentation about her mental
health and to subject Meyer to a psychological evaluation.
The trial court ordered Meyer to pay Grotewold $1,500 in sanctions but did
not identify what specific action or actions were being sanctioned. A sanctions
order is required to state the particulars of good cause supporting sanctions. TEX.
R. CIV. P. 13. Failing to object to the form of the sanctions order, however, waives
any error. Robson v. Gilbreath, 267 S.W.3d 401, 407 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, pet.
denied). There is no objection in the record about the form of the sanctions award.
Accordingly, Grotewold has waived any error concerning the order’s failure to
specify what action or actions were being sanctioned. Because the order does not
support Grotewold’s claim that the trial court sanctioned Meyer for failing to
disclose matters concerning her mental health, this cannot be a basis for
determining that the trial court abused its broad discretion by denying Grotewold’s
motion for continuance.
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We overrule Grotewold’s second issue.
Conclusion
We reverse the trial court’s calculation of Grotewold’s child support
obligations and render the corrected amount. We affirm the remaining portions of
the judgment.
Laura Carter Higley
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Higley, and Brown.
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