Jorge A. Resendiz Jr. v. Mandi Marie Martinez

NUMBER 13-22-00060-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
JORGE A. RESENDIZ JR, Appellant,
v.
MANDI MARIE MARTINEZ, Appellee.
On appeal from the 135th District Court
of DeWitt County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Benavides, Longoria, and Tijerina
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria
Appellant Jorge A. Resendiz Jr. challenges the trial court’s final divorce decree
arguing the trial court abused its discretion by: (1) ordering that appellee Mandi Marie
Martinez determine when, where, “and even if” Resendiz can see his children and that
said visitation be supervised; (2) naming Martinez sole managing conservator;
(3) ordering an amount of child support that deviated from the guidelines; and
(4) inequitably dividing the estate of the parties. We affirm in part and reverse and remand
in part.
I. BACKGROUND
Martinez filed for divorce from Resendiz and sought to be named joint managing
conservators of their children A.R. and C.R. 1 After Martinez filed her petition for divorce,
she and Resendiz agreed to temporary orders which were signed by the trial court in
January 2021. In the temporary orders as it relates to conservatorship and possession of
the children, the parties agreed to be joint managing conservators with a modified
standard possession order. Subsequently, after an evidentiary hearing held on October
28, 2021, the trial court entered a final decree of divorce that appointed Martinez as sole
managing conservator and Resendiz as possessory conservator. At the time the order
was entered, Resendiz was in custody in federal prison. The decree stated that during
his incarceration, Resendiz was not entitled to possession of or access to the children
and that upon his release, any periods of possession or access to the children would be
at “times and locations agreed upon in advance by” Mandi and under her supervision.
The decree further ordered Resendiz to pay $800 per month in child support.
As it related to the division of property, Martinez was awarded the vast majority of
the property, including, but not limited to, the martial home and all of its contents, all lawn
equipment, and two vehicles. Resendiz was awarded: a kayak, fishing gear, a Yeti cooler,
all personal effects in his possession, all sums of cash in his possession, and all life
insurance policies insuring his own life.
1 To protect the identity of the minor children, we refer to the children by their initials or an alias.
See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 109.002(d); TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(a).
2
Resendiz filed a motion for new trial, which was denied by operation of law. This
appeal followed. 2
II. CONSERVATORSHIP AND POSSESSION
By his first two issues, Resendiz challenges the trial court’s determinations related
to conservatorship and possession of the children.
A. Standard of Review & Applicable Law
“The best interest of the child shall always be the primary consideration of the court
in determining the issues of conservatorship and possession of and access to the child.”
In re J.J.R.S., 627 S.W.3d 211, 218 (Tex. 2021) (quoting TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.002).
“[C]onservatorship determinations are ‘intensely fact driven.’” Id. (quoting Lenz v. Lenz,
79 S.W.3d 10, 19 (Tex. 2002)). For this reason, “the trial court is in the best position to
‘observe the demeanor and personalities of the witnesses and can “feel” the forces,
powers, and influences that cannot be discerned by merely reading the record.’” Id.(quoting Echols v. Olivarez, 85 S.W.3d 475, 477 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.)). “A
trial court’s determination of what is in the child’s best interest, specifically the
establishment of terms and conditions of conservatorship, is a discretionary function.” Id.“The trial court’s judgment will be reversed only when it appears from the record as a
whole that the court has abused its discretion.” Id.“A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts ‘without reference to any guiding
rules or principles; or in other words, [when it acts] arbitrarily or unreasonably.’” Id.(alteration in original) (quoting Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990) (per
2 Martinez has not filed a brief to assist this Court in the resolution of this matter.
3
curiam)); see also Lee v. Melinda A.S., No. 02-14-00135-CV, 2015 WL 7820584, at *10
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 3, 2015, no. pet.) (mem. op.). An abuse of discretion occurs
when “[a] trial court . . . imposes restrictions that exceed those required to protect the
child’s best interest.” In re B.O., No. 02-16-00485-CV, 2017 WL 2590571, at *30 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth June 15, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing In re H.D.C., 474 S.W.3d
758, 764 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.)). To determine whether a trial
court abused its discretion in modifying a parent’s possession, we look to whether the trial
court had sufficient information on which to exercise its discretion, and, if so, whether it
acted reasonably in applying its discretion based on the information before it. In re M.M.S.,
256 S.W.3d 470, 476 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.). Challenges to the legal and
factual sufficiency of the evidence are not independent grounds of review but are relevant
factors in determining whether the trial court abused its discretion. Id. “There is no abuse
of discretion so long as some evidence of a substantive and probative character supports
the trial court’s decision.” Id.The relationship between parent and child is constitutionally protected. Quilloin v.
Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978). A parent’s right to the care and custody of his child is
a fundamental liberty interest more precious than property rights. In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d
534, 547–48 (Tex. 2003) (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758–59 (1982)). It is
the public policy of the state of Texas to maintain ongoing, healthy relationships between
parents and children where it is shown to be appropriate. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.001.
The findings necessary to support the trial court’s conservatorship decisions against the
parent need be supported by only a preponderance of the evidence, rather than clear and
4
convincing evidence. See id. § 105.005; In re J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d 611, 616 (Tex. 2007).
Under this standard, “evidence is legally sufficient when it would ‘enable reasonable and
fair-minded people to reach the verdict under review’” and is “factually insufficient ‘only if
it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and
unjust.’” In re J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d at 611 (first quoting City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d
802, 827 (Tex. 2005), then quoting Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986) (per
curiam)).
B. Analysis
Resendiz argues that there was insufficient evidence to rebut the presumption that
the standard possession order is in the childrens’ best interest and provides the
reasonable minimum possession of a child for a parent named as joint managing
conservator. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.252. Resendiz contends that there was no
evidence to support the trial court’s deviation from the standard possession order, nor to
support the modification of the parties from joint managing conservators to Martinez as
sole managing conservator and Resendiz as possessory conservator.
1. Possession
At the hearing for final orders, Martinez’s testimony as it related to possession and
visitation was as follows:
[Martinez’s Counsel]: And it will just be upon [Resendiz’s] release. It
will be at your discretion as to days and times
that he might have visits?
[Martinez]: Yes.
[Martinez’s Counsel]: And it will be at your discretion to supervise
those visits or designate somebody to supervise
5
those visits; is that correct?
[Martinez]: Yes, ma’am.
[Martinez’s Counsel]: And do you think that’s in the best interest of the
children?
[Martinez]: Yes.
...
[Resendiz’s Counsel]: Okay. And with regards to the children, after you
and Mr. Resendiz separated, was Mr. Resendiz
visiting with the children?
[Martinez]: Yes, he was.
[Resendiz’s Counsel]: How often was he visiting?
[Martinez]: Every other weekend, and then I—we also had
a very good communication when it was just,
you know, [h]ey, the kids miss you. Come pick
them up. And he would go pick them up. So[,] I
wasn’t opposed to that either.
[Resendiz’s Counsel]: Okay. Were there any problems with your
children coming back from the visits?
[Martinez]: Besides their attitudes, no.
[Resendiz’s Counsel]: Were they otherwise fed and treated properly?
[Martinez]: Yes, of course.
[Resendiz’s Counsel]: Okay. But you’re asking that the visits, once he’s
released, be kind of limited at your discretion,
correct?
[Martinez]: Yes.
[Resendiz’s Counsel]: Why is it that you are opposed to him resuming
his standard visitation upon his release from
prison?
6
[Martinez]: Just like I had just mentioned, the kids,
whenever me and their father were married,
they listened and endured a lot of verbal abuse.
And so technically whenever they do come
back, I would always see a different version of
them and what their father would allow and
manners of, like, speaking terms, like, how they
spoke to me, the type of aggression that they
had towards me. So[,] it would just make me
consider, like, what was actually being said
whenever he—whenever they were with him.
[Resendiz’s Counsel]: Did you at any point stop the visitation?
[Martinez]: No.
Resendiz argues that on this testimony alone, there was insufficient evidence to
support the trial court’s order deviating from the standard possession order. While a trial
court is given wide latitude in determining issues pertaining to possession and access,
there is a rebuttable presumption that the standard possession order: (1) provides
reasonable minimum possession of a child for a parent named as a possessory
conservator or joint managing conservator; and (2) is in the best interest of the child. TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.252. The trial court may deviate from the standard possession
order if there is sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption. See In re N.P.M., 509 S.W.3d
560, 564 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016, no pet.). When deviating from the standard
possession order, the trial court may consider: (1) the age, developmental status,
circumstances, needs, and best interest of the child; (2) the circumstances of the
managing conservator and of the parent named as a possessory conservator; and (3) any
other relevant factor. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.256. We analyze the best interest of the
children using the Holley factors, as relevant here: (1) the children’s desires, (2) the
7
children’s present and future emotional and physical needs, (3) emotional and physical
danger posed to the children now and in the future, (4) the parenting abilities of the
individuals seeking custody, (5) programs available to assist the would-be parents, (6) the
individuals’ or agency’s plans for the child, (7) the stability of the proposed homes, (8) any
acts or omissions by the parent that might show an improper parent–child relationship,
and (9) any excuse for such acts or omissions. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–
72 (Tex. 1976).
Section 153.006(c) of the Family Code allows the trial court to issue a
nonspecific order regarding a possessory conservator's possession and
access when “good cause” exists, see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN § 153.006(c),
while section 153.193 places an outer limit on the permissible scope of
restrictions on a parent possessory conservator’s rights: such “restrictions
or limitations on a parent’s right to possession of or access to a child may
not exceed those that are required to protect the best interest of the child,”
id. § 153.193. Thus, in rare cases, a severe restriction or limitation is
permissible if it is in the best interest of the child. See In re Walters, 39
S.W.3d 280, 286 n.2 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001, no pet.).
In re J.J.R.S., 627 S.W.3d 211, 220 (Tex. 2021), cert. denied sub nom. R.S. C. v. Tex.
Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 212 L. Ed. 2d 24, 142 S. Ct. 1139 (2022).
The evidence before the trial court is Martinez’s testimony that she did not like the
“manners” of the children after they visited with Resendiz. Martinez also stated the
children witnessed and endured “verbal abuse” during her marriage with Resendiz,
however Martinez did not elaborate, and that was the extent of her testimony regarding
the children witnessesing and enduring “verbal abuse.” To the contrary, Martinez further
testified that during his periods of possession, Resendiz cared for the children and treated
them properly. Additionally, she explained that the children would inform her that they
missed Resendiz and she would communicate that to Resendiz and he would take the
8
children for a visit. Martinez’s testimony sets forth that the children desired to see
Resendiz, that their needs were met, and that Resendiz cared for them properly during
his periods of possession. This evidence, when viewed in light of the Holley factors, does
not rebut the presumption that a standard possession order was proper. 3
Additionally, the order put into place by the trial court allows Martinez to determine
when, where, and how often Resendiz is allowed to see his children and effectively denies
Resendiz’s access to his children. Many of our sister courts have held that such an order,
which could allow the other parent to deny access to the children completely, absent
sufficient evidence, is an abuse of discretion. See In re A.P.S., 54 S.W.3d 493, 498 (Tex.
App.—Texarkana 2001, orig. proceeding) (finding that the trial court’s order allowing
father “complete discretion” over mother’s possession of children was an abuse of
discretion); In re Lemons, 47 S.W.3d 202, 206 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2001, orig.
proceeding) (explaining that the trial court’s order giving father “complete discretion to
determine when, where, and if” mother may have possession or access to child
constituted an abuse of discretion); Roosth v. Roosth, 889 S.W.2d 445, 451-52 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (providing that the trial court’s order
requiring mother’s approval for father’s visitation, which was not enforceable by contempt,
was erroneous); Wright v. Wentzel, 749 S.W.2d 228, 234 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 1988, no writ) (holding that the trial court’s order making mother’s visitation
3 The trial court also heard testimony from Martinez that Resendiz was incarcerated in federal
prison. The record does not provide Resendiz’s release date or the terms of his incarceration. The parties
agreed, and Resendiz does not dispute on appeal, that the terms of the possession order would not be in
effect until his release from federal prison. The parties agreed that the children would not see Resendiz
during his period of incarceration.
9
contingent on father’s consent was error); Hill v. Hill, 404 S.W.2d 641, 643 (Tex. Civ.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1966, no writ) (holding that the trial court’s order making father’s
visitation contingent on mother’s prior written consent denied father the ability to enforce
the judgment by contempt and was an abuse of discretion). An order providing Martinez
sole discretion to determine when, where, and if Resendiz would have visitation is not
inherently an abuse of discretion; however, such a secerely restrictive order constitutes
an abuse of discretion absent sufficient evidence that it was in the best interests of the
children. See Interest of J.J.R.S., 627 S.W.3d at 221.
The trial court is required to fashion an order that specifically articulates the times
and conditions of Resendiz’s access to the children upon his release from incarceration.
See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.006. Because the order in the present case severely
restricts and limits Resendiz’s access to the children, because these restrictions and
limitations were not shown to be in the children’s best interests, and because good cause
as to why specific orders were inappropriate was not shown, we find that the trial court
abused its discretion. See Interest of J.J.R.S., 627 S.W.3d at 221.
Resendiz’s first point of error is sustained.
2. Conservatorship
Both Martinez’s testimony and her pleadings requested that she and Resendiz be
named joint managing conservators of the children. Resendiz contends that the trial court
erred in appointing Martinez as sole managing conservator and Resendiz as possessory
conservator absent sufficient evidence to determine such an appointment was in the best
interests of the children.
10
It is presumed that the appointment of both parents of a child as joint managing
conservators is in the best interest of the child unless the court finds the appointment
would not be in the best interest of the child because it would significantly impair the
child’s physical health or mental development. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.131(a).
“When determining fitness of a parent, the material time to consider is the present.” In re
K.R.B., No. 02-10-00021-CV, 2010 WL 3928727, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 7,
2010, no pet.) (mem. op.). At the time that the court entered its final decree, it was
undisputed that Resendiz was incarcerated in federal prison. Accordingly, at the present
time, he was unable to care for the children and it was not an abuse of discretion to
designate Resendiz as a possessory conservator.
We overrule Resendiz’s second issue. 4
III. CHILD SUPPORT
By his third issue, Resendiz challenges the trial court’s order setting child support
in the amount of $800 per month. Resendiz argues that the amount awarded was not
supported by the evidence and testimony presented and accordingly was unreasonable
in light of the guidelines in the Texas Family Code. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 154.121.
A. Standard of Review & Applicable Law
Most of the appealable issues in a family-law case, including issues related to child
support, are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Reddick v. Reddick, 450 S.W.3d 182,
187 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.). Thus, we will not disturb a trial court’s
4 We note that upon his release from federal prison, Resendiz has the option of seeking a
modification of the order establishing conservatorship or possession and access. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 156.101. We pass no judgment on the merits of any such claim, should Resendiz choose to pursue a
modification.
11
modification of a child support obligation absent a clear abuse of discretion. See In re
K.M.B., 606 S.W.3d 889, 894 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2020, no pet.); In re H.J.W., 302 S.W.3d
511, 513 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.); Holley, 864 S.W.2d at 706. A trial court
abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily or unreasonably, or without any reference to
guiding rules and principles. Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990). In
making this determination, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial
court’s decision and indulge every legal presumption in favor of its judgment. In re K.M.B.,
606 S.W.3d at 894; Holley, 864 S.W.2d at 706.
Challenges to the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence are not independent
grounds of review but are relevant factors in determining whether the trial court abused
its discretion. In re M.M.S., 256 S.W.3d at 476. “There is no abuse of discretion so long
as some evidence of a substantive and probative character supports the trial court’s
decision.” Id.
The Texas Family Code establishes guidelines for setting monthly child support
obligations in suits affecting the parent-child relationship. See Grotewold v. Meyer, 457
S.W.3d 531, 534 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.). The first step in
determining a monthly child support obligation is to calculate, if feasible, the gross annual
resources of the obligor parent. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 154.061(a) (requiring, when
feasible, calculation of gross income on annual basis); Stringfellow v. Stringfellow, 538
S.W.3d 116, 118 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, no pet.); Grotewold, 457 S.W.3d at 534; see
also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 154.062(b) (listing income to be included in calculation of
parent’s resources). Resources include several types of income, including “all other
12
income actually being received.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 154.062(a), (b); see also In re
P.C.S., 320 S.W.3d 525, 537 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, pet. denied) (noting that the
language of Texas Family Code § 154.062(b) indicates the Legislature intended “all
receipts of money that are not specifically excluded by the statute . . . whether
nonrecurring or periodic, whether derived from the obligor[ ][parent’s] capital or labor or
from that of others, must be included in the definition of ‘resources’”).
Pursuant to Texas Family Code § 154.068:
(a) In the absence of evidence of a party’s resources, as defined by
Section 154.062(b), the court shall presume that the party has
income equal to the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour week to
which the support guidelines may be applied.
(b) The presumption required by Subsection (a) does not apply if the
court finds that the party is subject to an order of confinement that
exceeds 90 days and is incarcerated in a local, state, or federal jail
or prison at the time the court makes the determination regarding the
party’s income.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 154.068.
In this case, the trial court made no findings of fact, and Resendiz requested none.
See TEX. R. CIV. P. 296, 297. “Therefore, we assume the trial court found all facts to
support the judgment, and we will affirm the judgment if there is any legal theory
supported by the record to justify it.” See In re M.M., 980 S.W.2d 699, 700 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio 1998, no pet.).
B. Analysis
Resendiz contends that the trial court lacked sufficient evidence to calculate his
net resources, because no evidence established his income or capability for earning
income. He maintains that, in the absence of such evidence, the trial court was required
13
to “presume that [he] has wages or salary equal to the federal minimum wage for a 40–
hour week.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 154.068.
We agree that the record reveals no evidence concerning Resendiz’s employment,
wages, salary, or income. No documents were submitted into evidence demonstrating
Resendiz’s monthly salary. Martinez testified that prior to Resendiz’s incarceration, “he
had a very good income” but went on to state that she “didn’t really understand or know
about” Resendiz’s occupation or source of income. While Martinez made an assertion
that she believed Resendiz had “about $200,000” in cash savings somewhere, there was
no calculation regarding Resendiz’s net resources. Because the record contains no
evidence of Resendiz’s salary, wages, or earning income, we conclude there was
insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s order that Resendiz pay $800 per month
in child support. See Miles v. Peacock, 229 S.W.3d 384, 390 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (“There must be some evidence of a substantive and probative
character of net resources” in order for the trial court to discharge its duty to calculate
monthly net resources).
We sustain Resendiz’s third issue.
IV. DIVISION OF PROPERTY
In his fourth and final issue, Resendiz argues that the trial court erred in awarding
a “grossly disproportionate share of the parties’ community estate” to Martinez.
A. Standard of Review & Applicable Law
We review a trial court’s division of marital property in a divorce proceeding for an
abuse of discretion. Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex. 1981). A trial court enjoys
14
wide latitude in dividing the marital estate, and we presume that the trial court properly
exercised its discretion in reaching its decision. Id. at 698–700. Accordingly, we will not
overturn that decision unless the complaining party demonstrates that it was so unjust
and unfair as to constitute an abuse of discretion. Id. at 698, 700; Mann v. Mann, 607
S.W.2d 243, 245 (Tex. 1980).
A trial court is required to divide the marital estate in a manner that it deems “just
and right.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 7.001. Although a trial court does not have to divide the
marital estate equally, it must do so equitably. Murff, 615 S.W.2d at 699; O’Carolan v.
Hopper, 71 S.W.3d 529, 532 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.). If a trial court chooses to
divide the marital estate unequally, there must be some reasonable basis for doing so.
O’Carolan, 71 S.W.3d at 532. In deciding whether a reasonable basis exists for an
unequal division of the marital estate, a trial court may consider many factors, including:
(1) the spouses’ capacities and abilities; (2) benefits that the party not at fault would have
derived from the continuation of the marriage; (3) business opportunities; (4) relative
physical conditions; (5) relative financial conditions; (6) disparity of ages; (7) size of
separate estates; (8) the nature of the property; and (9) disparity of income or earning
capacity. Murff, 615 S.W.2d at 699.
To evaluate the trial court’s “just and fair” division, the analysis typically begins with
the values of the various marital assets. See Wells v. Wells, 251 S.W.3d 834, 841 (Tex.
App.—Eastland 2008, no pet.). “The party complaining of the division of the community
estate has the burden of showing from the evidence in the record that the trial court’s
division of the community estate was so unjust and unfair as to constitute an abuse of
15
discretion.” See In re Marriage of C.A.S. & D.P.S., 405 S.W.3d 373, 384 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2013, no pet.).
B. Analysis
The trial court awarded to Martinez the marital home and all “furniture, furnishings,
fixtures, goods, art objects, collectibles, appliances, and equipment” therein, her Dodge
Charger, Resendiz’s truck, a smoker pit, lawn equipment, garage equipment, the pool
and accessories, a trailer, and all possessions subject to her sole control. Martinez also
took on the remaining debt on the portion of the estate awarded to her. Resendiz was
awarded a kayak, his fishing gear, a Yeti cooler, and the possessions subject to his sole
control such as his cash, clothing, and jewelry. Resendiz was also ordered to pay
Martinez $6,500 on the day of divorce “to equalize the division.”
“It is difficult—if not impossible—to determine whether the trial court abused its
discretion by dividing the marital estate when we do not know what percentage of the
marital assets either party received.” Wells v, 251 S.W.3d at 841. Here, however, the
record does not include the value of any of the parties’ respective or marital assets. Nor
is there any evidence in the record about the parties’ debt, though there was testimony
from Martinez that there was at least one vehicle loan and a mortgage on the home. It
was Resendiz’s burden to demonstrate that the trial court’s division of the community
estate was so unjust and unfair, such that the trial court abused its discretion. See In re
Marriage of C.A.S. & D.P.S., 405 S.W.3d at 384 Absent these valuations, Resendiz
cannot demonstrate from the record that the trial court erred in its division of the marital
estate. See id. Without such evidence we cannot say the division of the marital estate
16
was disproportionate, much less an abuse of discretion. See id.We overrule Resendiz’s fourth issue.
V. CONCLUSION
We reverse the trial court’s order as it relates to possession and remand the cause
for the trial court to to fashion an order that specifically articulates the times and conditions
of Resendiz’s access to the children upon his release from incarceration. We further
reverse the trial court’s order setting forth Resendiz’s child support obligations and
remand for further proceedings to determine Resendiz’s net resources. In all other
respects, we affirm the order of the trial court.
NORA L. LONGORIA
Justice
Delivered and filed on the
27th day of July, 2023.
17