Victor William Bach v. State

NUMBER 13-09-00497-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
VICTOR WILLIAM BACH, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS Appellee.
On appeal from the 107th District Court
of Cameron County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Garza, Benavides, and Vela
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Benavides
Appellant, Victor William Bach, was found guilty of criminal conspiracy to commit
murder for hire. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 15.02(a) (Vernon 2003). The State
sought enhancement of punishment under the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure based
on Bach‘s prior felony convictions.1 After waiving jury sentencing, Bach was sentenced
to thirty years‘ confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Institutional
Division. By five convoluted and overlapping issues, Bach contends that the evidence
introduced at his trial was insufficient to show that he: (1) intended to murder the
alleged victim; (2) did not express an intent to completely withdraw from the conspiracy;
(3) undertook some overt act to further the conspiracy; and that (4) the evidence was
insufficient because no corroborating evidence was presented beyond the alleged
accomplice‘s testimony; and (5) the trial court erred in not defining ―preponderance of the
evidence‖ in the jury charge as it applied to Bach‘s affirmative defense of renunciation.
We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In June of 2007, Mauro Sauceda and Ruth Jara were divorced. Following their
divorce, Sauceda‘s ―long-time acquaintance,‖ Bach, was arrested for failure to pay child
support. Before Bach‘s arrest, Sauceda solicited Bach to murder his ex-wife, Jara, with
no apparent success. After Bach was taken into custody, Sauceda continued to solicit
Bach to murder Jara and offered to pay approximately $5,000 in Bach‘s back child
support so that Bach could be released from custody. Sauceda also offered to pay
additional money as compensation. Sauceda testified that he paid ―close to $10,000‖ to
Bach. This deal was allegedly made in code over the phone where Bach said, ―I‘m
going to take care of the truck. I‘m going to do some repairs.‖ The phone
conversation between Sauceda and Bach was recorded while Bach was in custody. 2
1
Bach had previously served prison terms for two separate third-degree felony DWI convictions
and an eight-year prison term for burglary. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 12.42 (Vernon 2005)
(enhancement statute).
2
The telephone recordings were not entered into evidence at Bach‘s trial.
2
FBI agents who monitored the jail telephone conversation notified the Cameron County
Sheriff‘s Department of what they believed was a plot to murder Jara. With the help of
the Edinburg Police Department, Jara was notified and told to take precautions while the
investigation continued. Sauceda did in fact pay Bach‘s back child support and Bach
was released from custody. Nine days later, Bach and Sauceda were located by the
police, and each was arrested on charges of conspiracy to commit murder. After a
search warrant was executed, financial records were found evidencing Sauceda‘s
payments to Bach.
Sauceda pleaded guilty and was sentenced to six years‘ imprisonment. During
Bach‘s trial, Sauceda testified as to the circumstances surrounding the agreement, his
payment to Bach, and his expectation that Bach would go through with the murder.
Sauceda testified that, to his knowledge, Bach had not taken any action to effectuate the
murder, but that Bach had continuously expressed his intent to follow through and to
solicit others to assist him.
Bach pleaded not guilty. At trial, Bach testified that he had made an agreement
with Sauceda to murder Jara, but that he never intended to follow through with his part of
the bargain. Bach also testified that he took Sauceda‘s money as part of the agreement
because he was ―desperate‖ to get out of jail, but claimed that he only intended to
defraud Sauceda of the money—he never intended to carry out the murder. Bach
testified that he had renounced his intent to be involved in the conspiracy, but did not
show any evidence of a specific act of renunciation. Bach testified that his renunciation
was evidenced by his failure to take any action in furtherance of the agreement and the
fact that he only wanted to steal money from Sauceda.
3
The evidence indicated that, in nine days after being released from jail, Bach had
taken no action to effectuate the murder. There was no evidence that Bach had
attempted to contact or otherwise harm Jara, nor was there evidence that he was in
possession of a weapon at any relevant time.
Bach was found guilty of criminal conspiracy. Following the verdict, Bach
elected to waive his prior jury-sentencing request. The court sentenced Bach to thirty
years‘ imprisonment. This appeal ensued.3
II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
A. Standard of Review
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that our only sufficiency review
should be under ―a rigorous and proper application‖ of the Jackson standard of review.
Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 906 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Under this standard,
―the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.‖ Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); see
Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 902 n.19. ―[T]he fact-finder‘s role as weigher of the evidence is
preserved through a legal conclusion that upon judicial review all of the evidence is to be
considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution.‖ Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319
(emphasis in original); see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.04 (Vernon 1979)
(The jury, in all cases is the exclusive judge of facts proved and the weight to be given to
the testimony . . . .‖); Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)
3
After receiving a copy of the State‘s Reply Brief in this case, Bach filed a pro se motion to abate
this appeal. The State, on April 29, 2010, filed a Motion to Strike Appellant‘s Pro-se Motion to Abate. On
May 6, 2010, we denied Bach‘s motion to abate the appeal. The State‘s motion, which was never ruled
upon, is dismissed as moot.
4
(―The jury is the exclusive judge of the credibility of witnesses and of the weight to be
given testimony, and it is also the exclusive province of the jury to reconcile conflicts in
the evidence.‖)
Sufficiency of the evidence is measured by the elements of the offense as defined
by a hypothetically correct jury charge. Adi v. State, 94 S.W.3d 124, 131 (Tex.
App.–Corpus Christi 2002, pet. ref‘d). Under a hypothetically correct jury charge, the
State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Bach: (1) with intent to
commit a felony; (2) agreed with Sauceda that one or both of them engage in conduct
that would constitute murder; and (3) he or Sauceda performed an overt act in
pursuance of the agreement. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 15.02(a) (Vernon 2003).
Intent may ―be inferred from circumstantial evidence such as acts, words, and the
conduct of the appellant,‖ and ―[a]n agreement constituting a conspiracy may be inferred
from acts of the parties.‖ TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 15.02(b) (Vernon 2003); cf. Guevara
v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 50 (Tex. Crim App. 2004). Thus, ―the corpus delicti of
conspiracy is the agreement and an overt act in furtherance thereof.‖ McCann v. State,
606 S.W.2d 897, 898 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). However, a defendant charged with
criminal conspiracy may not be convicted on the basis of the uncorroborated testimony
of a co-conspirator. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.14 (Vernon 2005). We also
note that a ―conspiracy to commit a crime is a separate and distinct crime from the
substantive or ‗object‘ offense. Commission of the substantive offense is not an
essential element of the conspiracy charged.‖ McCann, 606 S.W.2d at 898.
B. Analysis
By his first and third issues, Bach contends that the State presented insufficient
5
evidence to show that he intended to murder Jara or to show that he performed an overt
act in pursuance of the agreement. For this contention, Bach relies on his testimony
that he only intended to steal money from Sauceda, and never intended to commit the
murder, and further, that he never made any attempt to find, contact, or in any way harm
Jara. However, we find the following evidence that, when combined, could be
construed by a rational juror to contradict Bach‘s testimony, and thereby allow the jury to
infer that the agreement was one in which Bach‘s intent was to commit a felony: (1)
Sauceda testified that Bach had continuously maintained that he would go through with
the murder; (2) Bach conceded at trial that he did agree to murder Jara; (3) Bach
admitted at trial that he accepted between five and ten thousand dollars in exchange for
agreeing to commit the murder; and (4) Bach spoke in code about the murder while he
was in jail, saying that he was going to ―take care of the truck‖ and ―do some repairs‖ in
exchange for money. We believe that this evidence, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to allow the jury to find all of the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; see
also McCurry v. State, No. 11-05-00387-CR, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 4617, at *4-5 (Tex.
App–Eastland June 14, 2007) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding that
the defendant‘s statements alone were sufficient evidence to uphold a conspiracy to
commit capital murder conviction, despite the fact that the defendant ―denied the
intention to harm‖ the intended victim). Specifically, this evidence was sufficient to
allow the jury to infer Bach‘s intent to carry out the object of the conspiracy, and though
this evidence was contested, it was within the province of the jury to resolve this conflict.
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 15.02(b); Wesbrook, 29 S.W.3d at 111. Additionally, the
6
evidence showing that Bach accepted and spent money as part of the agreement was
uncontroverted, and this is a sufficient ―overt act in pursuance of the agreement‖ to
satisfy the ―overt act‖ requirement of criminal conspiracy. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 15.02(a)(2); Brown v. State, 576 S.W.2d 36, 42 (Tex. Crim App. 1978) (adopting the
State‘s contention that, among other acts of the defendant, ―[t]he act of accepting
payment to kill an individual . . . must certainly be considered to be [an] overt act[] in
pursuance to the agreement‖). Therefore, we overrule Bach‘s first and third issues.
III. RENUNCIATION DEFENSE
By his second issue, Bach contends that there was insufficient evidence to show
that he had not renounced his involvement in the conspiracy. Renunciation, however,
is an affirmative defense to criminal conspiracy, not an element of the offense. See
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 15.04(b). ―A defendant bears the full burden of proof on an
affirmative defense under Penal Code section 2.04.‖ Madrid v. State, 595 S.W.2d 106,
110-11 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979); see also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 2.04(d)
(Vernon 2003) (―If the issue of the existence of an affirmative defense is submitted to the
jury, the court shall charge that the defendant must prove the affirmative defense by a
preponderance of evidence.‖). Therefore, the burden to prove the elements of this
affirmative defense was placed on Bach, and the State was not required to show any
evidence to negate this defense. See Adi, 94 S.W.3d at 131 (noting that sufficiency of
the evidence is measured by the elements of the offense). Additionally, Bach clearly
did not meet his burden on the renunciation defense, as he offered no evidence
whatsoever that he had taken ―further affirmative action‖ to prevent the commission of
the object offense as required by the penal code. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
7
§ 15.04(b). Accordingly, we overrule Bach‘s second issue.
III. ACCOMPLICE WITNESS RULE
By his fourth issue, Bach contends that the evidence for each element of the
offense was provided solely from the testimony of Sauceda and was not corroborated by
independent evidence connecting him with the commission of the conspiracy as required
by the code of criminal procedure. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.14; Rice v.
State, 605 S.W.2d 895, 897-98 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). ―If the combined weight of the
non-accomplice evidence tends to connect the defendant to the offense, the requirement
of Article 38.14 has been fulfilled.‖ Cathey v. State, 992 S.W.2d 460, 462 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1999) (citing Gosch v. State, 829 S.W.2d 775, 777 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)). As we
have previously noted, the uncontested evidence that Bach accepted payment as a part
of the agreement is non-accomplice corroborating evidence as to every element of the
offense—namely that Bach (1) with felonious intent, (2) entered into an agreement to
commit murder and (3) performed an overt act in furtherance of that agreement. No
further evidentiary analysis is necessary, as any independent corroboration that merely
―tend[s] to connect the accused with the extraneous offense‖ is sufficient to overcome
the accomplice witness rule. Rice, 605 S.W.2d at 898. Nonetheless, the elements of
the offense were also shown by Bach‘s own testimony, by testimony regarding Bach‘s
recorded prison conversations, and by financial records obtained during execution of
search warrants for the conspirators‘ homes. Accordingly, we overrule Bach‘s fourth
issue.
IV. JURY CHARGE
By his fifth issue, Bach argues that the trial court erred by not including an
8
instruction on the definition of ―preponderance of the evidence‖ in the jury charge as it
related to his affirmative defense of renunciation.
―Our first duty in analyzing a jury-charge issue is to decide whether error exists.
Then, if we find error, we analyze that error for harm.‖ Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738,
743 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (citing Middleton v. State, 125 S.W.3d 450, 453 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2003)). The degree of harm required to reverse the trial court‘s judgment depends
on whether or not the appellant objected to the charge before it was given to the jury.
Id. Under Almanza v. State, if the defendant has properly objected to the charge, we
need only find ―some harm‖ to reverse the trial court‘s judgment. Id. at 743-44 (citing
Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (op. on reh‘g)). When
the defendant fails to object, however, or states that he has no objection to the charge,
―we will not reverse for jury-charge error unless the record shows ‗egregious harm‘ to the
defendant.‖ Id.
The jury charge in this case clearly includes the instruction that Bach claims the
trial court erred in excluding. In pertinent part, page 5 of the jury charge reads:
It is an affirmative defense to this prosecution if, under
circumstances manifesting a voluntary and complete renunciation of his
criminal objective, the defendant withdrew from the conspiracy before
commission of the object offense and took further action that prevented the
commission of the object offense.
In order for you to consider an affirmative defense, the defense must
be established by a preponderance of the evidence. The term
―preponderance of the evidence,‖ as used herein, means the greater
weight and degree of credible testimony or evidence introduced before you
and admitted in evidence in the case.
By including this definition, the court sufficiently explained the meaning of
―preponderance of the evidence‖ so as to allow the jury to properly resolve the issues.
9
See Thomas v. State, 474 S.W.2d 692, 695 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972). Therefore, we find
no error, and we overrule Bach‘s fifth issue.
V. CONCLUSION
Finding no meritorious issue on appeal, we affirm the trial court‘s judgment.
________________________
GINA M. BENAVIDES,
Justice
Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P.47.2(B)
Delivered and filed the
10th day of March, 2011.
10