Sidya v. World Telecom Exchange Communications

PRESENT: All the Justices
YACOUB SIDYA
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 201007 JUSTICE D. ARTHUR KELSEY
MARCH 24, 2022
WORLD TELECOM EXCHANGE
COMMUNICATIONS, LLC
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY
Bruce D. White, Judge
In this case, World Telecom Exchange Communications, LLC (“World Telecom”), a
wholly owned American subsidiary of a Dubai parent company, sued Yacoub Sidya claiming
that he had engaged in the misappropriation of protected trade secrets, tortious interference with
a business expectancy, and civil conspiracy. The case has been before us on two prior occasions,
each resulting in a partial reversal and remand. In this third appeal, we address the remaining
contests between these parties and conclude that the trial court’s latest decision should be
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.1
I.
Our two prior orders summarize much of the background of this dispute. See generally
World Telecom Exch. Commc’ns, LLC v. Sidya, Record No. 180901, 2019 WL 3238643 (Va.
July 18, 2019) (unpublished) (Sidya II); World Telecom Exch. Commc’ns, LLC v. Sidya, Record
Nos. 160666, 160672, 160895, 2017 WL 3084091 (Va. July 20, 2017) (unpublished) (Sidya I).
The present appeal is from a partial final judgment in favor of World Telecom against Sidya for
 compensatory damages of $1.332 million, trebled to $3.996
million;
1
The trial court entered a partial final judgment pursuant to Rule 1:2 because all claims
against Sidya had been resolved. See generally Kent Sinclair & Leigh B. Middleditch, Jr.,
Virginia Civil Procedure § 17.3[F], at 1266-69 (7th ed. 2020) (discussing partial final judgments
under Rule 1:2). Claims against other parties, however, remain unresolved in the trial court.
 punitive damages of $350,000;
 attorney fees incurred while preparing for and attending the
2015 trial that total $1.682 million, as well as post-trial,
supplemental attorney fees of $500,000;
 post-judgment interest of 6% per annum, calculated from the
date of the 2015 jury verdict, applied to the compensatory
damages, trebled damages, punitive damages, and attorney fees
attributable to the 2015 trial; and
 post-judgment interest of 6% per annum, calculated from the
March 2020 order, applied to the post-trial, supplemental
attorney fees.
In this appeal, Sidya challenges various aspects of each of the trial court’s holdings. We will
address each issue beginning with the most basic: whether to overturn the jury verdict against
Sidya on World Telecom’s claims.
II.
A. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
“Pursuant to Code § 8.01-680, the standard of review for determining the sufficiency of
evidence on appeal is well established.” Nolte v. MT Tech. Enters., LLC, 284 Va. 80, 90 (2012)
(alterations and citation omitted). “The reviewing court must examine the evidence in the light
most favorable to . . . the prevailing party at trial, and the trial court’s judgment will not be
disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Id. “When the law says
that it is for the jury to judge of the credibility of a witness, it is not a matter of degree.” Simpson
v. Commonwealth, 199 Va. 549, 557 (1957) (citation omitted).
After an eight-day trial, the jury found in favor of World Telecom on three of the counts
it had alleged against Sidya: misappropriation of trade secrets, tortious interference with a
business expectancy, and civil conspiracy. Sidya argues that the jury verdict on all three counts
must be set aside because it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. We disagree.
2
Evidence at trial demonstrated that in November 2010, Sidya and Mohammad Barmawi
decided to start their own telephony business called SBC FZ, LLC (“SBC”). Barmawi was at the
time CEO of World Telecom, and Sidya owned Y-Telecom, which was a vendor to World
Telecom. While Barmawi was still employed at World Telecom, Barmawi and Sidya planned
together to price World Telecom out of one of their most successful markets — the country of
Mauritania. Barmawi prepared price-increase information for the Mauritania market and e-
mailed it to Sidya for Sidya to send to World Telecom as if it had come from Sidya’s company,
Y-Telecom. In the e-mail, Barmawi said that they needed to act now because Mauritania was
World Telecom’s “bread and butter.” See Pl.’s Ex. 246. He warned Sidya to “not go
forward[ing] this e-mail hahahaha.” Id. Later that day, Sidya e-mailed the pricing information
to World Telecom as if it had come from him. In reply to the e-mail, Barmawi pretended that the
increase was “shocking.” Pl.’s Ex. 95, at 4.
At trial, Barmawi and Sidya claimed that the price increase was based upon a tax in
Mauritania, but Barmawi admitted that it was “a business decision that [he] made to protect
SBC.” Trial Tr. (Aug. 13, 2015) at 88-89. Sidya conceded that he knew Barmawi was “playing
games” with World Telecom. Id. at 188. As a result of the scheme, World Telecom was forced
to abandon all business in Mauritania, which was a “major, major problem for [World Telecom]
with regards to revenue and cost.” Trial Tr. (Aug. 11, 2015) at 33-34.
World Telecom presented evidence that Sidya and Barmawi recruited World Telecom’s
employees and that these employees used World Telecom’s data and resources for SBC while
they were still employed at World Telecom. Under Sidya’s direction, the CFO of World
Telecom used World Telecom’s financial data at bank meetings for SBC while still employed for
World Telecom. See Trial Tr. (Aug. 12, 2015) at 63-66, 69-74; Pl.’s Ex. 238; Pl.’s Ex. 262.
3
World Telecom also presented uncontradicted evidence of a data breach perpetrated by
SBC’s employees. World Telecom stored its confidential data in a password-protected program
called OrcaWave. This included data for its customers and vendors — pricing information,
margins, costs, and route matrixes. OrcaWave was “the Holy Grail of the company.” Trial Tr.
(Aug. 10, 2015) at 148. Before departing World Telecom for SBC, the chief technology officer,
David Hart, created an unauthorized username and password for OrcaWave. At trial, Barmawi,
Hart, and Jung Kim (another SBC employee) admitted that they had used this unauthorized
username and password to regularly access World Telecom’s data. Hart also admitted that he
had discussed the username with Sidya but had not given him the password. See Trial Tr. (Aug.
12, 2015) at 144-45.
OrcaWave’s usage report showed that the unauthorized username was used over 850
times in a six-month period. World Telecom’s computer forensic analyst testified that the login
information had been used by SBC employees Barmawi, Hart, Kim, and Satanand Atwaru. He
also stated that he “would not agree” with the “suggestion that nothing ties Yacoub Sidya” to
accessing the OrcaWave information because evidence indicated that the unauthorized username
had been used in Mauritania (Sidya’s place of residence). Trial Tr. (Aug. 17, 2015) at 63-64.
In its data breach, SBC employees accessed World Telecom’s margin reports, account
history reports, rate addendum archives, and cost reports. These reports included information
about the customers’ minutes, procedure ratios, revenue and cost margins, billing statuses, rates,
and previous offers. World Telecom presented e-mails demonstrating that SBC employees had
used this information to undercut World Telecom. See Trial Tr. (Aug. 12, 2015) at 127-29; Pl.’s
Ex. 196; Pl.’s Ex. 229. The president of World Telecom testified that in the first six months of
4
2011, they could not understand why the company’s margins were being squeezed and why they
were losing so many customers — until he discovered the data breach.
World Telecom presented evidence from a research analyst who qualified as an expert in
the wholesale telephony industry. He testified that the telephony industry was still a “viable
market” with $92 billion of annual revenue, an average of 6-7 percent annual growth, and 15-18
percent annual growth in Africa and South Asia. Trial Tr. (Aug. 17, 2015) at 103-04. World
Telecom also presented expert testimony as to the diminution in value of the business from
December 2010 to December 2011. The expert opined that “the data reflected that there was a
total destruction of the business” and that after the OrcaWave data breach, World Telecom was
“never profitable again.” See id. at 120-21, 152.
Given the evidence, the jury’s verdict was not plainly wrong or without evidence to
support it. “Under Virginia’s Uniform Trade Secrets Act (VUTSA), an owner of ‘trade secrets’
may be entitled to damages when it can prove ‘misappropriation’ by another.” Babcock &
Wilcox Co. v. Areva NP, Inc., 292 Va. 165, 205 (2016) (citation omitted). As to the trade-secrets
count, Sidya does not deny the data breach that occurred through the unauthorized access to
OrcaWave. Instead, he argues only that he knew nothing about it. The evidence, however,
suggested otherwise. Hart testified that he told Sidya about the username, and the forensic
analyst found that someone had logged in to OrcaWave with the unauthorized username and
password multiple times from a computer in Mauritania. The jury reasonably distrusted Sidya’s
claim of ignorance and inferred from the evidence that he was actively involved in the
misappropriation of World Telecom’s trade secrets.
As to the claim for tortious interference with a business expectancy, World Telecom
needed to prove that Sidya had known of a World Telecom business expectancy and that he had
5
used improper means to intentionally interfere with that expectancy. See Preferred Sys. Sols.,
Inc. v. GP Consulting, LLC, 284 Va. 382, 403 (2012). The evidence demonstrates a number of
business expectancies, including World Telecom’s ongoing relationships with its customers and
vendors, that were interfered with by Sidya and his co-conspirators using confidential
information from employees while they were still working at World Telecom and using
confidential information from the OrcaWave database. The evidence thus supports the jury’s
verdict on this count.
Finally, to prove a civil conspiracy under Code § 18.2-499, “a plaintiff must establish:
‘(1) a combination of two or more persons for the purpose of willfully and maliciously injuring
plaintiff in his business; and (2) resulting damage to plaintiff.’” Dunlap v. Cottman
Transmission Sys., LLC, 287 Va. 207, 214 (2014) (alteration and citation omitted). Sidya and
Barmawi deceived World Telecom in order to price them out of the Mauritania market, worked
with an active employee of World Telecom to take and use World Telecom’s financial data, and
used World Telecom’s confidential data to undercut World Telecom and steal customers for at
least six months. These facts sufficiently proved a civil conspiracy by clear and convincing
evidence.
We also find that the evidence was sufficient to establish that Sidya’s actions caused
harm to World Telecom under each of these counts. The testimony of both World Telecom’s
owner and the damages expert identified the actions of Sidya and his co-conspirators as causing
the destruction of World Telecom’s business.
Having examined the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to World Telecom,
we find that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict on all three counts.
6
B. APPORTIONMENT RULING ON REMAND
Because “the parent company and one of two plaintiffs . . . ha[d] been stricken from the
case,” we instructed the trial court to “hold a hearing to determine what portion of the damages
should be allocated to . . . World Telecom Exchange Communications, LLC.” Sidya II, 2019
WL 3238643, at *2. On remand, the trial court held a hearing and determined that the portion of
damages allocable to World Telecom was $1.332 million. That award, Sidya now argues,
violated our appellate mandate because the trial court did not specifically allocate a percentage of
the damages to World Telecom but rather calculated a whole new attribution of damages. Upon
this subtle distinction between allocation and attribution, Sidya contends that we should vacate
the trial court’s award in its entirety based upon the mandate rule. We decline to do so.
In Virginia, an appellate mandate “is the directive of the appellate court certifying a
judgment in a particular case to the court from which it was appealed” and thus “speaks only to
that case.” Powell v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 107, 128 (2004). The mandate controls “only ‘as
to matters within its compass.’” Id. (quoting Sprague v. Ticonic Nat’l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 168
(1939)). The mandate does not prohibit a trial court on remand “from acting on matters not
constrained by the language of the mandate, construed in light of the appellate court’s opinion.”
Id. While a trial court must obey “both the letter and spirit” of an appellate mandate, the
mandate rule only precludes the trial court from considering issues that “the mandate laid at
rest.” United States v. Bell, 5 F.3d 64, 66-67 (4th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). Best
understood, the rule is “merely a ‘specific application of the law of the case doctrine,’” which
has the effect of foreclosing “relitigation of issues expressly or impliedly decided by the
appellate court.” Powell, 267 Va. at 128 (citation omitted).
7
Before applying these background principles, we first question Sidya’s view of the trial
court’s damages ruling on remand. At the 2015 trial, the jury returned a $2.682 million verdict
for compensatory damages. It was a general verdict unaccompanied by special interrogatories.
The jury awarded a single sum to two plaintiffs who were each asserting identical claims. On
remand, the trial court awarded $1.332 million to one plaintiff, which was a “portion” of the
original $2.682 million jury verdict against both plaintiffs, see Sidya II, 2019 WL 3238643, at
*2. Whatever linguistic distinctions exist between “allocating” and “attributing,” nothing in our
Sidya II order (incorporated by reference in the mandate) dictated the precise manner in which
the trial court was obligated to apportion the damages. For this reason, the trial court did not
ignore or otherwise violate the Sidya II mandate.
Perhaps so, Sidya argues, but the trial court had no evidentiary basis for allocating $1.332
million of the original jury verdict to World Telecom. One difficulty with this argument is that
no one can say with confidence what the jurors would have done on this issue. Neither side of
this case asked the trial court to instruct the jury to allocate damages between the two plaintiffs,
nor did the parties submit a detailed verdict form or request special interrogatories on the
damages-allocation issue.
In the first appeal in this case, Sidya I, neither side requested a remand for a new jury
trial. Again, in Sidya II, both sides requested for this Court to enter final judgment on their
behalf, and neither side insisted on a new jury trial limited to the question of damages. 2 As a
result, our Sidya II mandate used the most efficient method left for bringing this case to
2
See Appellant’s Br. (Sidya II) at 40; Appellee’s Br. (Sidya II) at 40. In oral arguments
for Sidya II, World Telecom acknowledged that we could remand the case for the trial court to
either remit the damages or order a new jury trial on the apportionment of damages. See Oral
Argument Audio (Sidya II) at 7:40 to 8:40.
8
closure — a remand with instructions to the trial court to apportion damages. In doing so, we
vested the trial court with the same factfinding discretion the jury had previously possessed
(subject only to the restraints of the existing evidentiary record) and directed the court to answer
a question the jury was never asked.
This brings us to Sidya’s contest of the trial court’s apportionment decision, which Sidya
claims relied upon a “completely different approach” than the one World Telecom presented to
the jury and later “abandoned.” See Appellant’s Br. at 34. 3 In support of his argument, Sidya
asserts that World Telecom’s expert at the jury trial calculated damages using an income-based
approach to value the consolidated business. The trial court’s post-remand award, Sidya
contends, calculated damages using an asset-based approach. Our review of the record,
however, does not support this assertion.
At trial, World Telecom’s damages expert calculated the value of the combined
companies in December 2010 (before Sidya’s tortious acts) and subtracted from that the value of
the remaining assets in December 2011, which was the only remaining value after Sidya’s
tortious acts. The expert evaluated the companies as of December 2010 using a combination of
the income approach and market approach. See Trial Tr. (Aug. 17, 2015) at 123-24, 129. In
making these determinations, the expert evaluated World Telecom and its parent company
jointly, as if they were one enterprise, and did not seek to divide the damages between them. See
id. at 178-79.
3
One particularly unfair aspect of this change of strategy, Sidya contends, was World
Telecom’s reliance in the trial court on deposition testimony not presented to the jury at the 2015
trial. The record reflects, however, that the trial court emphasized its intent to rely only on
evidence previously presented to the jury. See, e.g., J.A. at 156-57. Additionally, the deposition
testimony identified by Sidya was the $1.8 million offer made for World Telecom, which was
also testified to at trial by both World Telecom’s owner and by the damages expert. See Trial Tr.
(Aug. 11, 2015) at 26; Trial Tr. (Aug. 17, 2015) at 150.
9
On remand, the trial court also determined damages by finding the value of World
Telecom as of December 2010 and subtracting from that the value of its remaining assets as of
December 2011. In determining the initial value of World Telecom, the trial court adopted what
World Telecom called a “lowball number” based upon a purchase offer that Sidya had made for
the company in January 2011. Id. at 162. 4 Sidya argues that this purchase offer was for both
companies, but the evidentiary record supports the trial court’s determination that this offer
represented the value of World Telecom alone. At the time of the offer, Sidya and Barmawi had
already established a parent company in Dubai — they needed only the subsidiary.
World Telecom, after all, operated the business, employed all but one of the company’s
officers and employees, and owned the “OrcaWave” servers and the trade secrets contained
therein. See J.A. at 179-80; Trial Tr. (Aug. 10, 2015) at 132-36; Trial Tr. (Aug. 17, 2015) at 14-
15. In contrast, World Telecom’s Dubai parent company had at most two employees. The
parent company’s principal contribution to the joint business plan was to provide financing,
banking services, and tax benefits for income realized in Dubai. After deducting World
Telecom’s remaining assets, the trial court arrived at the $1.332 million allocation of damages to
World Telecom — which, as it turns out, is close to half of the $2.682 million in damages
awarded by the jury to both World Telecom and its Dubai parent company. Given the
evidentiary discretion available to the trial court, sitting as factfinder on remand, we affirm the
court’s damages-allocation decision.
C. TREBLE DAMAGES FOR CIVIL CONSPIRACY
For two reasons, Sidya argues that the trial court erroneously trebled the compensatory-
4
World Telecom offered this valuation as a floor or “backstop” (estimating it as
“approximately . . . half” of World Telecom’s true value) to its other higher valuation figures.
See Hr’g Tr. (Feb. 27, 2020) at 7-8; Trial Tr. (Aug. 10, 2015) at 26.
10
damages award to $3.996 million. First, Sidya finds fault with the post-remand decision 5 to
treble damages because only one of the various claims against him — the civil conspiracy claim
under Code §§ 18.2-499 and 18.2-500(A) — authorized such an award, and the jury did not
specify the amount of damages caused by the civil conspiracy. Second, Sidya contends that the
trial court mistakenly interpreted the civil conspiracy statute to require a mandatory award of
trebled damages rather than a discretionary award.
With respect to the first point, Sidya is correct that the jury did not break down the
aggregate award into discrete subsets of damages allocable to each specific successful claim.
The trial court recommended that a damages award be designated by individual count on the
jury-verdict form, but both parties disagreed. Sidya never advocated for a distinct damages
award on the civil conspiracy count and, in fact, agreed with the jury-verdict form. Sidya cannot
fault the trial court, therefore, for interpreting the jury verdict to attribute the full damages award
to each count jointly and separately.
As for Sidya’s second point, arguing that the trial court mistakenly treated the treble-
damages award as statutorily mandated, we agree that the court came to that conclusion, but we
see no need to determine whether the court erred in doing so. See Rickman v. Commonwealth,
294 Va. 531, 542 (2017) (applying the right-result-different-reason doctrine to affirm the trial
court’s judgment while “express[ing] no view on the correctness of the lower court’s rationale”).
The trial court made clear that while it believed treble damages were mandatory, it would
5
In 2015, the trial court denied World Telecom’s post-trial motion for treble damages.
Our rulings in Sidya I and Sidya II, however, effectively “wipe[d] the slate clean on remand to
just after the jury rendered its verdict.” Sidya II, 2019 WL 3238643, at *2 (citation omitted).
After the Sidya II remand, the trial court changed its decision and ordered treble damages to be
awarded. We have no concerns about this post-remand decision. World Telecom appealed the
earlier decision to deny a trebled award, and we remanded the issue back to the trial court. See
Sidya I, 2017 WL 3084091, at *2 n.2. The issue was properly before the trial court on remand.
11
nevertheless exercise its discretion in awarding treble damages in this case if the statute merely
authorized a discretionary award. Because Sidya did not assign error to this “separate and
independent basis” for the trial court’s treble-damages award, Manchester Oaks Homeowners
Ass’n v. Batt, 284 Va. 409, 421 (2012), we affirm the court’s discretionary award of treble
damages and decline to address the question whether the statute mandates such an award under
the circumstances of this case.
D. ATTORNEY FEES
We turn next to Sidya’s contest of the jury’s award of attorney fees attributable to the
2015 trial totaling $1.682 million and to Sidya’s objection to the trial court’s award of
supplemental attorney fees of $500,000 incurred after the verdict on appeal and on remand. On
the first subject, Sidya argues that World Telecom presented the jury a wholly insufficient
evidentiary basis for any award of attorney fees. We agree.
World Telecom did not assert any contractual right to attorney fees. World Telecom’s
claim for fees was compensable, if at all, only if it proved a violation of the Virginia Uniform
Trade Secrets Act, Code § 59.1-338.1 (addressing “willful and malicious” violations), or the civil
conspiracy statute, Code § 18.2-500(A), both of which authorize an award of attorney fees.
These statutes, however, only authorize fees incurred in the prosecution of these specific
statutory claims — not causes of action created by other statutes or by common law.
At trial, Sidya moved to strike the evidence for attorney fees as insufficient. The trial
court initially took the motion under advisement, and after the trial, it granted the motion. The
trial court noted that in support of over $1.6 million dollars in fees the plaintiffs had only
testified from a brief summary of the fees, and “[n]o further documentation was provided.” Hr’g
Tr. (Oct. 23, 2015) at 34-36.
12
On appeal, Sidya contends that World Telecom presented the jury with no fee invoices,
time records, or witness estimations of the portion of the fee claim attributable solely to
prosecution of the trade secrets and civil conspiracy claims (as opposed to the other non-fee
claims) asserted against Sidya (as opposed to the various other defendants). What is more, a
portion of the fees involved legal work during several years prior to the civil action being filed
against Sidya. In response, World Telecom suggests that the fees did not need to be divided by
claim or by defendant because all of the legal work compensated by the requested fees would
have had to be performed to support the specific fee-shifting claims against Sidya. The judge
who presided over the 2015 trial found this supposition unsupported by the evidence. We do as
well. 6
A prevailing party entitled by law to an award of attorney fees has the burden of proving
“that the requested fees are reasonable and that they were necessary.” West Square, L.L.C. v.
Communication Techs., Inc., 274 Va. 425, 433 (2007). For a fee award to survive appellate
scrutiny, it must be supported by sufficient evidence that tailors the fees to the specific successful
claims triggering the right to such an award (statutory, contractual, or otherwise) and to the
specific defendants against whom the claims could be asserted. See Manchester Oaks
Homeowners Ass’n, 284 Va. at 428-29 (“[I]n an action encompassing several claims, the
prevailing party is entitled to an award of costs and attorneys’ fees only for those claims for
which (a) there is a contractual or statutory basis for such an award and (b) the party has
prevailed.”). Nowhere in the extensive record in this case is there sufficient evidence on these
necessary elements of World Telecom’s fee claim. For this reason, agreeing with the judge who
6
A different judge presided over this case on remand from Sidya II, who disagreed with
the earlier trial judge’s decision and awarded the attorney fees challenged in this appeal.
13
presided over the jury trial and disagreeing with his colleague’s later decision to the contrary, we
vacate the $1.682 million award of attorney fees attributed to the 2015 trial.
On remand after Sidya II, World Telecom presented evidence to the trial court in support
of supplemental attorney fees incurred after the 2015 trial. In a single sentence in his brief,
Sidya argues that these supplemental fees should not be permitted because World Telecom again
failed to demonstrate that the fees were incurred only on the civil conspiracy and trade secrets
claims. See Appellant’s Br. at 48. At the hearing to determine fees, however, World Telecom
presented detailed evidence as to the specific work encompassed in the requested fees. The
evidence distinguished between successful and unsuccessful arguments — with an example of
the latter being the failed defense of the parent company’s untimely registration in Sidya I, see
Hr’g Tr. (Feb. 27, 2020) at 121-22. World Telecom presented evidence of over $900,000 in
attorney fees on post-trial work, and the trial court ultimately awarded $500,000. We find that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in doing so.
E. POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST
The trial court awarded post-judgment interest of 6% per annum, which was calculated
from the date of the 2015 jury verdict, and applied that interest rate to the trebled compensatory
damages, punitive damages, and the attorney fees attributable to the 2015 trial. The court also
awarded interest on the post-trial, supplemental attorney fees running from the date of the March
2020 order. Sidya argues that the trial court erred to the extent that it awarded interest on the
$350,000 punitive-damages award and on the treble-damages award. 7 Sidya also argues that
7
Sidya also argues that post-judgment interest cannot be awarded on a recovery of
attorney fees. We have never addressed this precise issue, though others have. See 2004 Op.
Atty. Gen. 26, 26-28; 1991 Op. Atty. Gen. 23, 24. Given our reversal of the attorney-fee award,
14
interest should run from the date of the March 2020 judgment rather than the date of the 2015
jury verdict.
This debate over interest arises in a rather unique context. The jury rendered its verdict
on August 20, 2015, and the trial court entered its judgment on the verdict on September 18,
2015. We vacated the judgment (but not the verdict) in July 2017. See Sidya I, 2017 WL
3084091, at *5. We later vacated the trial court judgment entered on remand, see Sidya II, 2019
WL 3238643, at *2, and we are now considering a post-judgment interest award entered in
March 2020 running from the August 2015 verdict.
Despite this convoluted storyline, one aspect of Code § 8.01-382 answers the question
whether post-judgment interest applies to awards of punitive and treble damages. That statute
provides:
[T]he final order, verdict of the jury, or if no jury the judgment or
decree of the court, may provide for interest on any principal sum
awarded, or any part thereof, and fix the period at which the
interest shall commence. The final order, judgment or decree
entered shall provide for such interest until such principal sum be
paid. If a final order, judgment or decree be rendered which does
not provide for interest, the final order, judgment or decree
awarded or jury verdict shall bear interest at the judgment rate of
supra at 12-14, we need not address the question whether the attorney-fee award for pretrial and
trial efforts is covered by Code § 8.01-382.
In a single sentence in a footnote, Sidya includes the interest on the award of
supplemental attorney fees in his argument. See Appellant’s Br. at 43 n.4. In response to this
very brief discussion, see AlBritton v. Commonwealth, 299 Va. 392, 412 & n.12 (2021)
(discussing what is “colloquially called bad-brief waiver”), we will make only a few
observations. The fees in this case were not awarded as compensatory damages either in tort
law, see generally Kent Sinclair, Sinclair on Virginia Remedies § 1-8[A], at 1-39 (5th ed. 2016)
(listing exceptions to the “American Rule”), or as an element of damages arising out of a breach
of a contractual duty. Instead, the fees here are entirely a product of statutory awards that are
typically deemed to be in the nature of costs. See Code § 18.2-500(A) (allowing recovery for
“costs of the suit, including a reasonable fee to plaintiff’s counsel”); cf. Scott v. Doughty, 130
Va. 523, 527 (1921). Because these issues are not adequately developed in Sidya’s appellate
briefs, however, we reject Sidya’s argument on this issue without further comment.
15
interest as provided for in § 6.2-302 from its date of entry or from
the date that the jury verdict was rendered.
The “principal sum awarded” phrase serves as the predicate for an award of statutory interest.
We understand the phrase to mean the “element of the plaintiff’s damages that compensates the
plaintiff for the actual harm sustained.” RGR, LLC v. Settle, 288 Va. 260, 295 (2014) (emphases
added) (quoting Upper Occoquan Sewage Auth. v. Black Constr. Co., 275 Va. 41, 67 (2008)).
This understanding necessarily excludes recoveries that are noncompensatory in nature and those
that, while compensating a litigant in the broadest sense, do not remedy an actual harm sustained
by the litigant.8
Sidya argues that punitive damages and treble damages do not fit within the scope of
Code § 8.01-382. We agree. As Justice Roush said during her earlier service on the trial bench,
“punitive damages, by definition, are not intended to compensate the plaintiff. Instead, they are
intended to punish the defendant and to serve as an example to others from acting in a similar
way.” LeBrun v. Yakeley, 67 Va. Cir. 122, 123 (Fairfax Cnty. Cir. Ct. 2005). Her succinct
observation summarizes a century of jurisprudence on the nature of punitive damages. See
Arthur G. Sedgwick, Elements of Damages 85 (1896); Sinclair, supra note 7, § 3-4[A], at 3-44.
The same can be said of “treble damages,” which, under Virginia law, are also “in the nature of a
8
A statutory award of post-judgment interest under Code § 8.01-382 requires “such
interest until such principal sum be paid.” The phrase “such principal sum” refers to any award
of pre-judgment interest on a “principal sum awarded” in the first sentence of the statute. See
Code § 8.01-382. In this respect, the Virginia statute is unlike its federal counterpart. See 28
U.S.C. § 1961(a) (2000) (mandating post-judgment interest “on any money judgment in a civil
case”); Air Separation, Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London, 45 F.3d 288, 290 (9th Cir.
1995) (“Accordingly, postjudgment interest has been applied to attorneys’ fees; costs; punitive
damages; exemplary damages; and fraud penalties.” (citations omitted)). Compare Quesinberry
v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 987 F.2d 1017, 1032 (4th Cir. 1993) (awarding post-judgment interest
on the entire sum awarded, including pre-judgment interest), with Upper Occoquan Sewage
Auth. v. Blake Constr. Co., 275 Va. 41, 67 (2008) (declining to award post-judgment interest on
a pre-judgment interest award).
16
penalty.” Porter v. Wilson, 244 Va. 366, 372 (1992) (citing Bowers v. Westvaco Corp., 244 Va.
139, 150 (1992)); see also Multi-Channel TV Cable Co. v. Charlottesville Quality Cable
Operating Co., 108 F.3d 522, 528-29 (4th Cir. 1997). It follows that the trial court erred in
applying Code § 8.01-382 to World Telecom’s punitive damages and treble damages because
they were meant to punish Sidya not to compensate World Telecom.
Finally, Sidya argues that because we vacated the 2016 judgment in Sidya I, there was no
“principal sum awarded” until the March 2020 judgment. We disagree. “Code § 8.01-382 is
clear and unambiguous as to when, and how, the application of post-judgment interest begins.”
Upper Occoquan Sewage Auth., 275 Va. at 64. “[I]f a jury determines through its verdict that
money damages are owed to a plaintiff, . . . post-judgment interest will accrue from the date of
the verdict until the judgment is paid.” Id.; see also Sinclair & Middleditch, supra note 1, § 3.16,
at 404. This is true even if the amount of the jury verdict is later reduced by the trial court.
Upper Occoquan Sewage Auth., 275 Va. at 64 n.9.
III.
In sum, we reject Sidya’s challenges to the trial court’s partial final judgment on the
grounds that it:
 rested on insufficient evidence supporting World Telecom’s
trade secrets, tortious interference, and civil conspiracy claims;
 failed to comply with Sidya II’s remand instructions in
determining compensatory damages;
 improperly trebled damages under Code § 18.2-500(A);
 erroneously awarded supplemental attorney fees and interest
thereon; and
 incorrectly ran the award of interest from the date of the jury
verdict rather than the date that judgment was entered on the
verdict.
We affirm the trial court’s holdings on each of these issues.
17
We agree with Sidya that the trial court erred in refusing to strike the evidence offered in
support of World Telecom’s claim for attorney fees incurred before and during trial. We also
agree that the court erred in awarding post-judgment interest on the punitive and treble damages.
We thus reverse the trial court’s holdings on these issues and direct the court to amend its partial
final judgment accordingly.9
Affirmed in part,
reversed in part,
and remanded.
9
The consolidated record in this case has swelled to over 16,000 pages. The parties
appear to have exhausted themselves on every possible issue that could be contested. Because
this case will again return to the trial court on remand, we suggest that the court consider
ordering the parties to participate in an orientation session pursuant to Code § 8.01-576.5. If the
trial court in its discretion chooses to do so, we encourage the parties to continue to participate in
the judicial dispute resolution process until all remaining contests, if any, have been brought to
closure.
18