State Of Washington v. Stephen Thomas Lynch

FILED 01V 1
COUAT OFOFAPPEALS
WASHINGTON
STATE
MI JUN 25 Ati 9:21
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STEPHEN THOMAS LYNCH, )
) DIVISION ONE
Appellant, )
) No. 76948-1-1
v. )
) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
STATE OF WASHINGTON, and )
CHERYL MUSTAIN, in her capacity )
as a corrections officer for the state of )
Washington, and as an individual, and )
KIM BERLI DEWING, in her capacity )
as a corrections officer for the state of )
Washington, and as an individual, )
)
Respondents, )
)
DOES 1 through 30, )
)
Defendants. ) FILED: June 25, 2018
)
DWYER, J. — Stephen Lynch appeals from the trial court's order
dismissing, pursuant to CR 12(c), his actions filed against the State of
Washington and Department of Corrections community correctional officers
Cheryl Mustain and Kimberli Dewing. Lynch contends that the trial court erred
because his pleadings set forth legally sufficient and timely actions against the
State, Mustain, and Dewing pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and various state law
tort theories. Because there is nothing in the pleadings to support that Lynch
alleged a cognizable § 1983 action or timely filed his state law tort claims, we
No. 76948-1-1/2
conclude that the trial court did not err by ordering dismissal. Accordingly, we
affirm.
I
In 2006, Lynch pleaded guilty to one count of felony harassment) After
sentence was imposed in 2006, Lynch was placed under the supervision of the
Department of Corrections(DOC). During this supervisory period, Lynch was
monitored by Mustain. A condition of Lynch's sentence prohibited him from
having contact with his neighbor (the victim of his felony harassment conviction),
Connie Laire.
In mid-September 2007, Lynch telephoned Mustain to report an interaction
that he had with Laire. He reported that, while in the passenger seat of a car
driven by a business partner, he had argued with asphalt workers who were
laying speed bumps on the driveway leading up to his residence. Lynch reported
that, during that time, Laire had exited her nearby residence and observed the
scene. Lynch reported that he did not address Laire during the incident.
In late September, Laire contacted Mustain to discuss Lynch's conduct
outside of her residence earlier that month. Mustain's notes from Laire's call
read: "Per Connie she was out side with her hired help when P[21 and his friend
drive up and started barking at the. [sic]. Per Connie P did not lok [sic] at her but
was screaming at her and the workers about being on his property etc."
1 Lynch entered a guilty plea in accordance with North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91
S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162(1970).
2 The parties do not dispute that "P" in Mustain's notes referred to Lynch.
- 2-
No. 76948-1-1/3
Shortly thereafter, Mustain and Dewing determined that Lynch had
violated the no-contact condition of his felony harassment sentence and they
approved his detention. In early October, Lynch was taken into custody and
transported to a jail. He was released from detention one month later, at the end
of October 2007.
More than nine years after his release from detention, in November 2016,
Lynch filed a complaint against the State of Washington, Mustain, Dewing, and
"Does 1 through 30," alleging that, in October 2007, he was unlawfully seized in
violation of the Fourth Amendment, unlawfully arrested without probable cause in
violation of the Fourth Amendment, unlawfully harmed while in custody in
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and that he was subjected
to "false arrest/false imprisonment," negligence, and "trespass to personal
property and/or conversion."
Lynch alleged that the foregoing wrongful conduct arose from when he
was detained in October 2007 for violating the condition of his sentence
prohibiting him from having contact with Laire. Specifically, Lynch alleged that,
prior to and during his period of detention, he informed the defendants of his
health problems, he was denied medical treatment, and, as a result, he
"suffered." He further alleged that he did not receive his required medications,
lost 12 pounds of weight, and, on one occasion, had been handcuffed to a
wheelchair and lost consciousness. In addition, he alleged that he had been
denied an attorney, that DOC refused to accelerate his violation hearing, that he
3
No. 76948-1-1/4
was transferred to three different jails, and that the records maintained by DOC
misstated the date of the alleged violation.
Additionally, Lynch alleged that, upon his release, his clothes, wallet,
money, identification, and keys were not returned to him. He alleged that the
search for his property took weeks after his release and that, "eventually," his
property was returned to him after being "misplaced" by DOC employees. His
complaint did not set forth the date on which his property was alleged to have
been returned to him.
The defendants moved to dismiss Lynch's complaint pursuant to CR
12(c).3 The trial court granted the defendants' motion and dismissed Lynch's
complaint.
Il
In this matter, we are called upon to review the trial court's order
dismissing Lynch's complaint pursuant to CR 12(c).
The rule provides:
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. After the pleadings are
closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may
move for judgment on the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment
on the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to
and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one
for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in rule 56, and
all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all
material made pertinent to such a motion by rule 56.
CR 12(c).
3 The Defendants' dismissal motion was initially characterized as a CR 12(b)(6) motion,
but their reply brief before the trial court indicated that they were, in actuality, seeking dismissal
pursuant to CR 12(c).
4
No. 76948-1-1/5
We review de novo a trial court's dismissal of a claim pursuant to CR
12(c). Nw. Animal Riqhts Network v. State, 158 Wash. App. 237, 241, 242 P.3d
891 (2010)(citing Parrilla v. King County, 138 Wn. App. 427,431, 157 P.3d 879
(2007)). In so doing,
[w]e examine the pleadings to determine whether the plaintiff can
prove any set of facts consistent with the complaint that would
entitle the plaintiff to relief. N. Coast Enters., Inc. v. Factoria P'ship,
94 Wash. App. 855, 859, 974 P.2d 1257(1999). The factual
allegations contained in the complaint are accepted as true. N.
Coast Enters., 94 Wn. App. at 859(quoting Roth v. Bell, 24 Wn.
App. 92, 94, 600 P.2d 602(1979)).
Nw. Animal Rights Network, 158 Wash. App. at 241.4
A
Lynch contends that the trial court erred by dismissing his alleged § 1983
monetary damages actions against the State of Washington. We disagree.
42 U.S.0 § 1983 provides a civil cause of action for monetary damages
against any "person" who deprives another of "any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by" the United States Constitution.
Significantly, however, a sovereign state of the United States is not a
"person" within the meaning of § 1983 and is, thus, not subject to a monetary
damages suit. Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613,
617, 122 S. Ct. 1640, 152 L. Ed. 2d 806(2002)("Lapides' only federal claim
against the State arises under 42 U.S.C.§ 1983, that claim seeks only monetary
damages, and we have held that a State is not a 'person' against whom a § 1983
4 We may affirm the trial court's order dismissing Lynch's complaint pursuant to CR 12(c)
on any basis supported by the record. State v. Costich, 152 Wash. 2d 463, 477, 98 P.3d 795
(2004).
5
No. 76948-1-1/6
claim for money damages might be asserted."). Accord Will v. Mich. Dep't of
State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 105 L. Ed. 2d 45 (1989); Wash.
State Republican Party v. Pub. Disclosure Comm'n, 141 Wash. 2d 245, 285-86,4
P.3d 808 (2000); Smith v. State, 135 Wash. App. 259, 270, 144 P.3d 331 (2006).
Lynch's complaint alleged that the State of Washington deprived him of
various constitutional rights in violation of § 1983 and that, as a result, he is
entitled to monetary damages against the State. As indicated, however, the
State is not a "person" within the meaning of § 1983. Lapides, 535 U.S. at 617.
Thus, Lynch's claims for money damages are not cognizable. Lapides, 535 U.S.
at 617.
Hence, there is no basis in the pleadings to support Lynch's alleged
§ 1983 actions against the State. The trial court did not err by dismissing these
claims.
Lynch next contends that the trial court erred by dismissing his § 1983
damages actions against Mustain and Dewing. Again, we disagree.
As pertinent here, Lynch's complaint alleged the following:
On or about February 8, 2016, the King County Superior
Court entered an order which provided as follows:
(a) Mr. Lynch was permitted to withdraw his guilty plea in the
matter;
(b) A plea of not guilty was entered by the Court on behalf
of the Mr. Lynch;
(c) The conviction was vacated, and the case was
dismissed with prejudice;
(d) Mr. Lynch was released from all penalties and disabilities
resulting from the offense; and
6
No. 76948-1-1/7
(e)The Court directed that for all purposes, including
responding to questions on employment applications, Mr. Lynch
may state that he has never been convicted of the crime.
Given these allegations, Lynch contends that he accrued a cognizable
monetary damages action pursuant to § 1983 against Mustain and Dewing when
his conviction was vacated and dismissed by the superior court.
In support of this proposition, Lynch relies on the United States Supreme
Court's opinion in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 129 L. Ed.
2d 383(1994). The Court's opinion reads, in pertinent part:
We think the hoary principle that civil tort actions are not
appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding
criminal judgments applies to § 1983 damages actions that
necessarily require the plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of his
conviction or confinement,just as it has always applied to actions
for malicious prosecution.
We hold that, in order to recover damages for allegedly
unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm
caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction
or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the
conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,
expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state
tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into
question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus, 28 U.S.C.§ 2254. A claim for damages bearing that
relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so
invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Thus, when a state
prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must
consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would
necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it
would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can
demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been
invalidated.
Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87(bolded emphasis added)(italicized emphasis in
original)(footnotes omitted).
7
No. 76948-1-1/8
As an initial matter, there is no dispute that Lynch's § 1983 monetary
damages actions against Mustain and Dewing, if proved, would "necessarily
imply" the invalidity of his conviction and sentence. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487.
Moreover, as indicated, Lynch's complaint set forth that a superior court order
vacated his conviction and dismissed his case.
However, Lynch's reliance on Heck is unavailing. The Court in Heck did
not rule that vacation of a conviction or dismissal of a case established a
cognizable § 1983 damages action. 512 U.S. at 486-87. Rather, the Court ruled
that, when a party seeks to file a § 1983 action that necessarily implies the
invalidity of a conviction or sentence, the party's § 1983 action becomes
cognizable only when the underlying conviction or sentence is determined to
have been invalidated, i.e., deemed unconstitutional or unlawful. Heck, 512 U.S.
at 486-87.
Nevertheless, relying on the foregoing trial court order, Lynch contends
that, by vacating his sentence, the trial court, in actuality, invalidated his
conviction and sentence. Lynch is mistaken.
The trial court order referenced in Lynch's complaint was an order entered
pursuant to RCW 9.94A.640. This statutory provision reads, in pertinent part:
Vacation of offender's record of conviction.(1) Every offender
who has been discharged under RCW 9.94A.637 may apply to the
sentencing court for a vacation of the offender's record of
conviction. If the court finds the offender meets the tests
prescribed in subsection (2) of this section, the court may clear the
record of conviction by:(a) Permitting the offender to withdraw the
offender's plea of guilty and to enter a plea of not guilty; or(b) if the
offender has been convicted after a plea of not guilty, by the court
setting aside the verdict of guilty; and (c) by the court dismissing
the information or indictment against the offender.
8
No. 76948-1-1/9
(2) An offender may not have the record of conviction
cleared if: (a) There are any criminal charges against the offender
pending in any court of this state or another state, or in any federal
court;(b) the offense was a violent offense as defined in RCW
9.94A.030;(c)the offense was a crime against persons as defined
in RCW 43.43.830;(d)the offender has been convicted of a new
crime in this state, another state, or federal court since the date of
the offender's discharge under RCW 9.94A.637;(e)the offense is a
class B felony and less than ten years have passed since the date
the applicant was discharged under RCW 9.94A.637; (f) the offense
was a class C felony, other than a class C felony described in RCW
46.61.502(6) or 46.61.504(6), and less than five years have passed
since the date the applicant was discharged under RCW
9.94A.637; or (g)the offense was a class C felony described in
RCW 46.61.502(6) or 46.61.504(6).
(3) Once the court vacates a record of conviction under
subsection (1) of this section, the fact that the offender has been
convicted of the offense shall not be included in the offender's
criminal history for purposes of determining a sentence in any
subsequent conviction, and the offender shall be released from all
penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense. For all
purposes, including responding to questions on employment
applications, an offender whose conviction has been vacated may
state that the offender has never been convicted of that crime.
Nothing in this section affects or prevents the use of an offender's
prior conviction in a later criminal prosecution.
(Emphasis added.)
There is no indication that RCW 9.94A.640 allows for the invalidation of an
offender's conviction or sentence. By its plain terms, it provides not for a
conviction's invalidation but, rather, for vacation of the record of conviction.
RCW 9.94A.640(1),(3). Indeed, the word "invalid"—or any variant thereof—
appears nowhere in RCW 9.94A.640. Moreover, subsection (3) of RCW
9.94A.640 presupposes the validity of the underlying conviction, setting forth that,
"Nothing in this section affects or prevents the use of an offender's prior
conviction in a later criminal prosecution." Thus, RCW 9.94A.640 lends no
support to Lynch's argument.
9
No. 76948-1-1/10
Subsection (1) of RCW 9.94A.640 sets forth that a discharge of a
sentence pursuant to RCW 9.94A.637 is a predicate to obtaining vacation of an
offender's record of conviction pursuant to RCW 9.94A.640.
This statute provides, in pertinent part:
(1)(a) When an offender has completed all requirements of the
sentence, including any and all legal financial obligations, and while
under the custody and supervision of the department, the secretary
or the secretary's designee shall notify the sentencing court, which
shall discharge the offender and provide the offender with a
certificate of discharge by issuing the certificate to the offender in
person or by mailing the certificate to the offender's last known
address.
(5) The discharge shall have the effect of restoring all civil
rights not already restored by RCW 29A.08.520, and the certificate
of discharge shall so state. Nothing in this section prohibits the use
of an offender's prior record for purposes of determining sentences
for later offenses as provided in this chapter. Nothing in this
section affects or prevents use of the offender's prior conviction in a
later criminal prosecution either as an element of an offense or for
impeachment purposes. A certificate of discharge is not based on
a finding of rehabilitation.
(6) Unless otherwise ordered by the sentencing court, a
certificate of discharge shall not terminate the offender's obligation
to comply with an order that excludes or prohibits the offender from
having contact with a specified person or coming within a set
distance of any specified location that was contained in the
judgment and sentence. An offender who violates such an order
after a certificate of discharge has been issued shall be subject to
prosecution according to the chapter under which the order was
originally issued
RCW 9.94A.637(emphasis added).
By its plain terms, RCW 9.94A.637 does not implicate the validity of an
offender's sentence or the offender's underlying conviction. Indeed, the word
"invalid" appears nowhere in this provision.
-10-
No. 76948-1-1/11
Instead, RCW 9.94A.637 sets forth the circumstances under which an
offender's sentence may be discharged when the offender completes the
requirements of the offender's sentence. Moreover, RCW 9.94A.637 permits the
State, notwithstanding that the offender has obtained a certificate of discharge, to
rely on the offender's conviction or sentence in a later criminal prosecution.
RCW 9.94A.637(5),(6). In this light, the provisions of RCW 9.94A.637
presuppose that the offender's underlying sentence is valid. Thus, RCW
9.94A.637 does not support Lynch's contention.
Furthermore, there is nothing in either RCW 9.94A.637 or RCW 9.94A.640
that authorizes the trial court to issue findings of fact or reach a determination
regarding the validity of an offender's conviction or sentence. Indeed, Lynch did
not need to prove the invalidity of his conviction in order to obtain the relief he
requested pursuant to subsections .637 and .640.
Thus, there is no indication that Lynch ever established the invalidity of the
judgment entered on his conviction or the sentence imposed thereon. Because
Lynch has not established that his conviction or sentence was invalid, his § 1983
damages actions against Mustain and Dewing are not cognizable. Heck, 512
U.S. at 486-87.
Accordingly, there is no basis in the pleadings to support Lynch's § 1983
actions against Mustain and Dewing. There was no error in dismissing the
claims.
No. 76948-1-1/12
Lynch next contends that the trial court erred by dismissing his state law
tort actions against the State, Mustain, and Dewing. Once again, we disagree.
As a general rule, a tort "cause of action accrues at the time
the act or omission occurs." In re Estates of Hibbard, 118 Wash. 2d
737, 744, 826 P.2d 690 (1992). The discovery rule is an exception
to the general rule. Hibbard, 118 Wash. 2d at 744-45. Application of
the discovery rule extends to "claims in which plaintiffs could not
immediately know of the cause of their injuries." Hibbard, 118
Wash. 2d at 750.
In certain torts, . . injured parties do not, or cannot,
know they have been injured; in these cases, a cause
of action accrues at the time the plaintiff knew or
should have known all of the essential elements of the
cause of action.
White v. Johns-Manville Corp., 103 Wash. 2d 344, 348,693 P.2d 687
(1985); see also Deoos v. Asbestos Corp., 186 Wash. 2d 716, 727,
381 P.3d 32(2016).
Under the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues when
the plaintiff "knew or should have known the essential elements of
the cause of action." Allenf v. Statel, 118 Wn.2d [753,] 757-58[,
826 P.2d 200 (1992)]. ... We may decide the applicability of the
discovery rule as a matter of law where the facts are subject to only
one reasonable interpretation. Allen, 118 Wash. 2d at 760.
Brown v. Dep't of Corr., 198 Wash. App. 1, 12, 392 P.3d 1081 (2016).
The statutory limitation period applicable to both an action for negligence
and an action for trespass upon personal property is three years. RCW
4.16.080(2); Woods View II, LLC v. Kitsap County, 188 Wn. App. 1,20, 352 P.3d
807(2015)(negligence); Hudson v. Condon, 101 Wash. App. 866, 872-73,6 P.3d
615(2000)(conversion). The torts of false arrest and false imprisonment "are
subject to a two-year statute of limitations under RCW 4.16.100." Southwick v.
- 12 -
No. 76948-1-1/13
Seattle Police Officer John Doe #s 1-5, 145 Wash. App. 292, 297, 186 P.3d 1089
(2008).5
Accepting Lynch's allegations as true, the misconduct by the State,
Mustain, and Dewing occurred in 2007. Lynch filed the complaint here at issue in
2016, nine years after the alleged misconduct occurred.
There is nothing in the pleadings that supports a later accrual date for any
of Lynch's alleged state law tort actions.6 Thus, these actions were filed well
beyond their applicable statutory limitation period. Accordingly, the trial court did
not err by ordering dismissal of the claims. There was no error.7
Affirmed.
We concur:
S-rkiA\i-eUe.,
'o
5 To the extent that any of these tort claims arose from acts independent of the
underlying conviction and are contended by Lynch to be the basis for a § 1983 claim, that federal
claim has the same statutory limitation period as its analogous state claim. Southwick, 145 Wn.
App. at 297 (citing Robinson v. City of Seattle, 119 Wash. 2d 34, 86, 830 P.2d 318 (1992)).
6 Lynch relies on our opinion in Brown, 198 Wash. App. 1, for the proposition that his state
law tort actions did not accrue until his conviction was vacated in 2016. His reliance is unavailing.
There is nothing in the pleadings submitted that put into doubt that, in 2007, Lynch "'knew
or should have known all of the essential elements of the cause of action'for each of his alleged
tort claims. Brown, 198 Wn. App. at 12(quoting White, 103 Wash. 2d at 348).
7 Given our disposition of this matter, the parties' motions on appeal are denied.
- 13-